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AN ESSAY 

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A 1 6^0 

ON THE 



INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY 



IN 



MATTERS OF OPINION. 



BY 



GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, ESQ. 



LONDON: 
JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND. 

MDCCCXLIX. 



LL 



/ 



-$? 



V 



/x 



LONDON: 

SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PBINTEBS, 4, CHANDOS STREET, 

COVENT GARDEN. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 

SECTION PAGE 

1. Distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion . 1 

2. Subject of the Essay: authority in matters of opinion ex- 

plained 3 

3. Relation between this subject and logical science .... 7 

CHAPTER II. 

ON THE EXTENT OF OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 

1. Children derive their opinions from the authority of their 

parents 10 

2. Extent to which these opinions are modified in after-life . . 12 

3. Disposition to follow the crowd in matters of opinion ... 14 

4. Disposition to defer to the authority of others, arising from 

the habit of holding opinions without remembering their 
grounds 15 

5. Derivation of opinions from authority in matters of practice . 18 

CHAPTER III, 

ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 

1. Elements of credibility in a witness to a fact. Distinction 

between testimony and argument as to moral character . . 21 

2. How far anonymous testimony may have weight 23 

3. Cases in which testimony is strengthened by special training 25 

4. Distinction between testimony, argument, and authority . . 25 



VI CONTENTS. 

SECTION PAGE 

5. Comparative frequency of qualities which render a man a 

credible witness, or an authority in matters of opinion . . 26 

6. Qualifications of an authority in matters of opinion .... 27 

7. First qualification: that a person must have studied the subject 

carefully in theory, or have had experience of it in practice 27 

8. Second qualification : that his mental powers must be 

adequate to the subject 30 

9. Third qualification: that his moral feelings must be in a 

proper state 33 

10. Process by which the existence of these qualifications in any 

person is determined 40 

11. Additional indications of trustworthy authority : — 

(1.) Agreement or consensus of competent judges .... 41 

12. (2.) Marks of imposture in professors of science .... 50 

13. (3.) The countries whose opinion is to be considered . . 59 

14. The guides to opinion are chosen voluntarily 62 

15. Supposed opposition between reason and authority .... 63 

CHAPTER IV. 

ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY 
TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 

1. Gradual progress to agreement in scientific matters .... 66 

2. All nations agree in recognising the existence of a God . . 67 

3. All civilized nations agree in recognising some form of Chris- 

tianity 69 

4. But they differ as to the form or mode of Christianity ... 69 

5. Causes of the existence of numerous Christian churches and 

sects 70 

6. The various Christian sects remain distinct, and do not tend 

to an agreement 72 

7. Attempts which have been made to bring about an agreement 

in Christian belief 75 

8. One portion of the Christian world makes the teaching of the 

true church the standard of religious truth 77 

9. Differences of opinion as to the marks of the true church . . 77 

10. Differences of opinion as to the organs of the true church . 85 



CONTENTS. Vll 

SECTION PAGE 

11. Differences of opinion as to the tradition of true doctrines 

from the Apostolic age 87 

12. Differences of opinion as to Fundamentals and Non-funda- 

mentals, in matters of faith 90 

13. Differences of .opinion between Roman Catholics and Pro- 

testants as to the Regula Fidei 92 

14. No Christian church or sect can lay claim to a paramount 

authority in matters of truth 97 

15. In the absence of a general agreement, the authority of each 

church or sect is limited to its own members 101 

16. General results as to church authority and private judgment 103 
Notes to Chapter IV 105 

CHAPTER V. 

ON THE UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 

1. Extent to which an independent opinion can be formed by 

each person on scientific subjects Ill 

2. Deference due to the opinions of competent and experienced 

judges 113 

3. Expediency of being guided by the opinions of others in prac- 

tical questions 116 

4. Advantage of professional advice 118 

5. Rules for the selection of professional advisers 121 

6. Origin of the prejudices against professional advice .... 122 

7. Voluntary advice of friends upon domestic and private con- 

cerns. Auricular confession 123 

8. Mode of obtaining advice in the purchase of goods .... 127 

9. Advice in joint deliberation 128 

10. Deliberation relates to the future. Extent of our powers of 

prediction 132 

11. The advice of competent judges assists in determining the 

future, and guiding action 142 

12. The superstitious reject such advice, and seek to determine 

the future by means of divination 143 

13. Duty of counsellors to give honest advice 144 

14. Marks of a trustworthy historian 145 

Note to Chapter V 156 



Vlll CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VI. 

ON THE NUMBER OP THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE OPINION 
ON ANY SUBJECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NUMBER OF THE 
REST OF THE COMMUNITY. 

SECTION PAGE 

1. The competent judges on each subject are comparatively few 

in number 159 

2. The opinion of the body of the people on each subject is 

devoid of authority 160 

3. The authority of each competent judge is limited to his own 

class of subjects 164 

4. Everybody is a competent judge on some subject . . . .166 

5. No set of persons are competent judges on all subjects . . 167 

6. The prevalence of an opinion is not a proof of its soundness . 167 

7. Circumstances which give weight to a prevalent opinion . . 171 

8. A high degree of knowledge and virtue cannot be formed 

by the aggregation of numerous individuals of ordinary 
qualities . 176 

9. The value of proverbs as the expression of popular opinion . 178 

10. Importance of numerical preponderance as a fact .... 180 

11. Its importance in political affairs 181 

12. In language 182 

13. In style of composition and eloquence 184 

14. But the popular taste is not the criterion of excellence in the 

arts 185 

15. The control of public opinion over individuals in matters of 

taste ought to be exercised leniently 189 

CHAPTER VII. 

ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE 
DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 

1. In the decisions of political bodies opinions must be counted, 

and not weighed 191 

2. Sketch of the origin and nature of political bodies .... 191 

3. Advantages and disadvantages of plurality of members in ad- 

ministrative and judicial bodies 197 



CONTENTS. IX 

SECTION PAGE 

4. And in legislative bodies 202 

5. Manner in which the decision of a political body is made . . 204 
6 In administrative and judicial bodies unanimity is sometimes 

required, but they generally decide by a majority .... 204 

7. Legislative bodies always decide by a majority 206 

8. The modes in which the majority of votes in a political body 

is determined 207 

9. Eeason for decision by a majority in political bodies . . . 210 

10. Defects of this mode of decision 213 

11. Circumstances which tend to counteract these defects — first, 

in judicial and administrative bodies 214 

12. Secondly, in legislative bodies 215 

13. It is expedient that a decision by a majority, when made, 

should be acquiesced in 221 

14. And that a political body, having adopted a measure, should 

not throw the responsibility upon its advisers 222 

15. Securities for right decision in the case of an election of a re- 

presentative by the majority of a constituent body . . . 223 

16. Contrivances adopted to modify the simple numerical prin- 

ciple in the summation of votes : — 

(1.) Voting by composite units 230 

17. (2.) Plurality of votes to certain members 232 

18. The excesses of a sound principle ought to be counteracted . 235 

Notes to Chapter VII 241 



CHAPTER VIII. 

ON THE RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE 
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE, AND TO THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM 
OF GOVERNMENT. 

1. The theory of aristocratic government is founded on the prin- 

ciple of Special Pitness 249 

2. Objections to this theory as applied to government .... 255 

3. The numerical principle of government is controlled in various 

ways by the principle of Special Fitness 261 

4. Especially through the system of political representation . . 267 



X CONTENTS. 



SECTION 



PAGE 



5. The supposed ill effects of the tyranny of the majority of the 

people 273 

6. The representative system of government is founded on a 

compromise between the Numerical Principle and the prin- 
ciple of Special Fitness ; difficulty of arranging the terms of 
this compromise in each individual case 278 

Notes to Chapter VIII 282 

CHAPTER IX. 

ON THE PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS, BY THE CREATION 
OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 

1. The chief permanent influences for the authentication of 

opinions 286 

2. I. The civil government. Duty of the state to encourage 

truth and discourage error, examined 288 

3. The duty of the state with respect to religious truth and error 

depends upon its power 290 

4. Power of the state to promote religious truth by punishment 291 

5. By reward 296 

6. By endowment 297 

7. By public instruction 306 

8. And by a censorship of the press 307 

9. The state cannot effectually promote religious truth by any 

of these means 309 

10. Objections made to the neutrality of the state in religious 

questions 310 

11. Answer to these objections . 311 

12. Power of the state to promote truth in secular matters by 

literary endowments and public instruction 317 

13. Extent to which the government ought to attempt to influence 

opinion in secular matters 322 

14. Moral authority of the government and effect of its example . 322 

15. A government may countenance sound opinions by upholding 

good institutions 326 

16. Censorship of the press in secular affairs 327 



CONTENTS. XI 

SECTION PAGE 

17. The qualifications of professional persons may be authenticated 

by diplomas and degrees 330 

18. II. Churches and ecclesiastical bodies. The influence of the 

heads of each church is exercised over the members of that 
church exclusively 332 

19. Authentication of ministers of religion by ordination . . . 333 

20. III. Voluntary associations for political, scientific, and lite- 

rary purposes. Their influence upon opinion 334 

21. Universities and places of learning 337 

22. Political parties 338 

23. TV. The periodical press. Origin and history of newspapers 339 

24. Influence of newspapers upon opinion 342 

25. The chief characteristic of newspapers is, that they are 

anonymous 343 

26. Seasons of this peculiarity. Its evil consequences, and their 

correctives 343 

27. Reviews and literary journals. Transactions of learned 

societies. Publications appearing in a series or set. Ency- 
clopedias 355 

28. The powers of literary judgment ought to be impartially ex- 

ercised 359 

29. Classes of subjects upon which the general diffusion of sound 

opinions is most important 361 

CHAPTER X. 

ON THE ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 

1. Reasons for illustrating the evils which arise from the abuses 

of the principle of authority 366 

2. The reverence for the authority of scientific teachers must not 

be excessive 366 

3. Distinction between excessive reverence for authority and 

conscious adoption of a defective philosophy 368 

4. Distinction between opinions handed down from antiquity, 

and opinions of aged men 372 

5. The chief question at present as to the authority of antiquity 

concerns political institutions 374 



xii CONTENTS. 

SECTION PAGE 

6. Sound legislative reforms are impeded by opposite errors as 

to the authority of established institutions 382 

7. Authority of parties and party leaders in politics. Its 

abuses 384 

8. Difference between the slow and rapid propagation of 

opinions 391 

9. Influence of numbers in deliberative bodies 394 

10. Concluding remarks 398 

APPENDIX. 

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY, 
AND ON THE PROVINCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 

1. Aristocracy is usually denned to be a government of the 

minority, and democracy to be a government of the ma- 
jority of the people 403 

2. The distinction between these two forms of government, is a 

distinction, not of kind, but of degree 404 

3. Necessity of caution in laying down general propositions re- 

specting aristocratic and democratic government . . . 409 

4. The neglect of proper precautions in speculations upon go- 

vernment has rendered political science uncertain .... 415 

5. Province of political science. Its division into positive or 

descriptive, and ideal or speculative politics 416 

6. Importance of treating these two branches of political science 

separately 422 



ERRATA. 

P. 78, Notes, line 6 from bottom, for "to extend," read " of extending." 
P. 157, line 8 from bottom, for " septengentos," read " septingentos." 
P. 234, Notes, line 5 from bottom, for " arguments," read " argument." 



ON 



THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY 

IN 

MATTERS OF OPINION. 



CHAPTEK I. 

ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 

§ 1. As the ensuing Essay relates to matters of 
opinion, it will be necessary for me, at the outset, without 
entering upon disputed questions of mental philosophy, 
to explain briefly what portion of the subjects of belief 
is understood to be included under this appellation, and 
what is the meaning of the generally received distinction 
between matters of opinion and matters of fact ; a dis- 
tinction which, though not scientifically precise, is, with 
a little explanation, sufficiently intelligible for the pur- 
poses of the present inquiry, and which marks, with toler- 
able accuracy, a distinction leading to important practical 
consequences. 

By a Matter of Fact I understand anything of which 
we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, 
or any individual event or phenomenon which is the 
object of sensation. It is true that even the simplest 
sensations involve some judgment : when a witness reports 
that he saw an object of a certain shape and size, or at 
a certain distance, he describes something more than a 

B 



2 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

mere impression on his sense of sight, and his statement 
implies a theory and explanation of the bare phenomenon. 
When, however, this judgment is of so simple a kind as 
to become wholly unconscious, and the interpretation of 
the appearances is a matter of general agreement, the 
object of sensation may, for our present purpose, be con- 
sidered a fact. A fact, as so defined, must be limited 
to individual sensible objects, and not extended to 
general expressions or formulas, descriptive of classes 
of facts, or sequences of phenomena, such as that the 
blood circulates, the sun attracts the planets, and the 
like.* Propositions of this sort, though descriptive of 
realities, and therefore, in one sense, of matters of fact, 
relate to large classes of phenomena, which cannot be 
grasped by a single sensation, which can only be deter- 
mined by a long series of observations, and are established 
by a process of intricate reasoning. 

Taken in this sense, matters of fact are decided by an 
appeal to our own consciousness or sensation, or to the 
testimony, direct or indirect, of the original and percipient 
witnesses. Doubts, indeed, frequently arise as to the exist- 
ence of a matter of fact, in consequence of the diversity 
of the reports made by the original witnesses, or the sus- 
piciousness of their testimony. A matter of fact may again 
be doubtful, in consequence of the different constructions 
which may be put upon admitted facts and appearances, 
in a case of proof by (what is termed) circumstantial 
evidence. Whenever such doubts exist they cannot be 
settled by a direct appeal to testimony, and can only be 
resolved by reasoning; instances of which are afforded 
by the pleadings of lawyers and the disquisitions of 



* See Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, B. I. c. i., 
B. VIII. c. L. and B. XI. c. iii. 



I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 3 

historians upon contested facts. When an individual 
fact is doubted upon reasonable grounds, its existence 
becomes a matter of opinion. The existence of such a 
fact, however, is not a general or scientific truth, but a 
question to be decided by a consideration of the testi- 
mony of witnesses. 

Matters of Opinion, not being disputed questions of 
fact, are general propositions or theorems relating to 
laws of nature or mind, principles and rules of human 
conduct, future probabilities, deductions from hypotheses, 
and the like, about which a doubt may reasonably exist. 
All doubtful questions, whether of speculation or prac- 
tice, are matters of opinion. With regard to these, the 
ultimate source of our belief is always a process of rea- 
soning.* 

The proper mode of conducting this process, of 
guarding against errors of induction and deduction, of 
testing the soundness of existing arguments, and of 
establishing new truths by ratiocination ; is the province 



* " I remember it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring 
my master to understand the meaning of the word opinion, or how 
a point could be disputable; because reason taught us to affirm or 
deny only where we are certain, and beyond our knowledge we 
cannot do either. So that controversies, wranglings, disputes, and 
positiveness in false or dubious propositions, are evils unknown 
among the Houyhnhnms." — Swift. 

The essential idea of opitiion seems to be that it is a matter about 
which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can 
without absurdity think differently. The existence of an object 
before the eyes of two persons would not be a matter of opinion, nor 
would it be a matter of opinion that twice two are four. But when 
testimony is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may be- 
come doubtful, and, therefore, a matter of opinion. For example, 
it may be a matter of opinion whether there was a war of Troy, 
whether Romulus lived, who was the man in the iron mask, who 

B 2 



4 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

of logical science. The science of logic, having been 
created by the inventive and penetrating genius of Aris- 
totle, and afterwards systematized by the Schoolmen, 
was enlarged by the sagacious divinations of Bacon, 
who indicated its applications to natural philosophy, 
and freed it from much of the needless subtlety of the 
schools. Since the publication of the Novum Organon, 
the fundamental processes of thought connected with 
reasoning have been explored by Locke, Leibnitz, and 
the metaphysicians who have followed in their steps: 
and of late years, logical science has, in this country, 
received much illustration and improvement, from the 
writings of Archbishop Whately, Dr. Whewell, and Mr. 
John Mill: of whom, the first has improved the form 
of the scholastic logic, and adapted it to the wants of 
modern students; the second has expounded the philo- 
sophy of induction, and of its subsidiary processes, as 
applied to the whole field of the physical sciences ; while 
the latter has determined the province of logic with 
precision, has established its first principles on a sound 



wrote Junius, &c. So the tendency of a law or form of govern- 
ment, or social institution, the probability of a future event, the 
quality of an action or the character of an historical personage, may 
be a matter of opinion. 

Any proposition, the contradictory of which can be maintained 
with probability, is a matter of opinion. 

The distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion i3 
recognized by Bacon, Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 42, ed. 
Montagu. See also Locke, Essay on the Understanding, B. IV. 
c. xvi. § 5; On the Conduct of the Understanding, § 24; and 
Whately, Rhetoric, Part. I. c. iii. § 3. 

In the language of jurists, questions of fact are opposed to ques- 
tions of law. Hence the maxim of our law: " De jure respondent 
judices, de facto jurati." On this subject, see Bentham On Judicial 
Evidence by Dumont, B. I, c. v. 



I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 5 

basis, and has systematized the methods of observa- 
tion and deduction, for all the subjects of scientific 
research. 

Upon the field of logical science, as defined by the 
writers whom I have referred to, I do not propose to 
encroach. The object of the following pages will be of 
a subordinate and more limited kind. Without entering 
into any inquiry into the process of reasoning, or at- 
tempting to throw any light upon scientific method, it 
will concern a portion of the application of logical 
science, which has often been discussed in a detached or 
fragmentary manner, but which seems of sufficient im- 
portance to deserve a connected consideration. 

It is familiarly known, that, in our progress from 
childhood to manhood, during the course of our educa- 
tion, and afterwards in the business of life, our belief, 
both speculative and practical, is, owing to our inability 
or unwillingness to investigate the subject for ourselves, 
often determined by the opinions of others. That the 
opinions of mankind should so often be formed in this 
manner, has been a matter of regret to many writers : 
others again have enforced the duty of submitting our 
convictions, in certain cases, to the guidance of fit 
judges; but all have admitted the wide extent to which 
the derivation of opinions upon trust prevails, and the 
desirableness that the choice of guides in these matters 
should be regulated by a sound discretion. It is, there- 
fore, proposed to inquire how far our opinions may be 
properly influenced by the mere authority* of others, 

* This use of the word authority is in accordance with its sense 
in classical writers. One of the meanings of auctoritas is ex- 
plained by Facciolati, as follows: "Item pro pondere ac momento 
quod habent res legitime, sapienter, ac prudenter constitute, ut 



6 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

independently of our own conviction founded upon 
appropriate reasoning. 

When any one forms an opinion on a question either 
of speculation or practice, without any appropriate pro- 
cess of reasoning, really or apparently leading to that 
conclusion, and without compulsion or inducement of 
interest, but simply because some other persons, whom 
he believes to be competent judges on the matter, en- 
tertain that opinion, he is said to have formed his 
opinion upon authority. 

If he is convinced by a legitimate process of reasoning 
— as by studying a scientific treatise on the subject — 
his opinion does not rest upon authority. Or if he 
adopts any opinion, either sincerely or professedly, from 
motives of interest, or from fear of persecution, he 
does not found his opinion upon authority. He who 
believes upon authority, entertains the opinion simply 
because it is entertained by a person who appears to 
him likely to think correctly on the subject. 

Whenever, in the course of this Essay, I speak of the 



sunt leges, decreta senatus, responsa prudentum, res prseclare gestae, 
sententise clarorum virorum." — See Cic. Top. c. xix. 

An auctor meant the originator or creator of anything. Hence 
Virgil speaks of the deified Augustus as " Auctorem frugum tem- 
pestatumque potentem," (Georg. i. 27;) and Sallust says that un- 
equal glory attends " Scriptorem et auctorem rerum," {Cat. c. ii.) 
Hence any person who determines our belief, even as a witness, is 
called an auctor. Thus Tacitus, in quoting Julius Caesar as a 
witness with respect to the former state of the Gauls, calls him 
" Summus auctorum," ( Germ. c. 28,) — i. e., the highest of autho- 
rities. As writers, particularly of history, were the authorities for 
facts, " auctor" came to mean a writer. Hence Juvenal speaks of a 
preceptor of the Roman youth being required, " Ut legat historias, 
auctores noverit omnes, Tamquam ungues digitosque suos." — VII. 
231. Compare Quintilian, Inst. Or at. I. 8, §. 18—21. 



I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 7 

Principle of Authority, I shall understand the principle 
of adopting the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, 
without reference to the particular grounds on which 
that belief may rest. 

In pursuing the inquiry, thus indicated in general 
terms, I shall attempt, first, to describe the circum- 
stances under which opinions are usually derived from 
authority, and next, to ascertain the marks of sound or 
trustworthy authority in matters of opinion. Having 
shown what are the best indications of the competent 
judges in each subject, I shall inquire as to their nume- 
rical ratio to the rest of the community, and shall after- 
wards offer some remarks upon the application of the 
principle of authority to questions of civil government. 
Lastly, I shall make some suggestions upon the best 
means of creating a trustworthy authority in matters of 
opinion, and of guarding against the abuses to which 
the principle of authority is liable. 

§ 3. It will be shown presently that a large propor- 
tion of the general opinions of mankind are derived 
merely from authority, and are entertained without any 
distinct understanding of the evidence on which they 
rest, or the argumentative grounds by which they are 
supported. Moreover, the advice of professional per- 
sons, or other competent judges in any subject matter, 
has great influence in questions of practice, both in 
public and private life. An inquiry, therefore, into the 
legitimate use of the principle of authority, and the con- 
sequences to which it tends, must be admitted to relate 
to an important subject. The importance of investiga- 
tions in the field of logical science is undoubtedly far 
superior, inasmuch as logic furnishes the ultimate tests 
for the discovery of truth. The rules of logic, con- 
sidered as an art, are a guide to the mind in the conduct 



8 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

of all processes of independent reasoning and intellectual 
investigation. A complete and philosophical scheme of 
logic is, therefore, a powerful instrument for facilitating 
the confutation of existing errors, and the discovery of 
new truths. It thus opens the way to the progressive 
advancement of science; all accurate knowledge must 
ultimately be derived from sound methods of investiga- 
tion. For all scientific truths we must be indebted to 
original researches, carried on according to logical rules. 
But when these truths have been discovered by original 
inquirers, and received by competent judges, it is chiefly 
by the influence of authority that they are accredited 
and diffused. Now, it is true that when a person derives 
an opinion from authority, the utmost he can hope is to 
adopt the belief of those who, at the time, are the least 
likely to be in error. If this opinion happens to be 
erroneous, the error is necessarily shared by those who 
receive it upon mere trust, and without any process of 
verification. For example, before the Copernican system 
of the world was demonstrated, and accepted by all com- 
petent astronomers, persons ignorant of astronomy natu- 
rally believed in the truth of the Ptolemaic system, 
which was received among all astronomers of authority. 
Until men of science had, by independent observation 
and reasoning, overthrown this erroneous doctrine, and 
established the true system of the world, the opinions of 
all those who relied upon authority were necessarily 
misled. It must be admitted that the formation of 
opinions by authority can never (except by indirect 
means), produce any increase or improvement of know- 
ledge, or bring about the discovery of new truths. Its 
influence is at best confined to the diffusion and exten- 
sion of sound opinions, when they are in existence; and 
the utmost that any rules on the subject can effect is to 






I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 9 

enable an uninformed person to discern who are the 
most competent judges of a question on which he is 
unable, from any cause, to judge for himself. But it is, 
nevertheless, of paramount importance that truth, and 
not error, should be accredited; that men, when they 
are led, should be led by safe guides ; and that they 
should thus profit by those processes of reasoning and 
investigation, which have been carried on in accordance 
with logical rules, but which they are not able to verify 
for themselves. 

With the view of arriving at the best means for the 
accomplishment of this desirable end, we shall proceed, 
first, to indicate the extent of the opinions necessarily 
founded on authority, and shall afterwards endeavour to 
trace the manner in which the principle of authority can 
be so applied as to be most conducive to the welfare of 
human society. 



10 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. 



CHAPTER II. 

ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON 
AUTHORITY. 

§ 1. The opinions of all children and young persons 
are necessarily derived from their parents and teachers, 
either without any knowledge, or with a very imperfect 
knowledge, of the grounds on which they rest, or the 
objections to which they may be liable. Even in cases 
where the reason is given with the opinion, the belief of 
a child is often determined rather by the authority of 
the teacher, than by the force of the argument. The 
subjects connected with the relations of physical objects, 
as well as with morals and religion, which are early pre- 
sented to the mind of a child, often involve considerations 
so numerous, so complex, and so remote from his limited 
experience, that a full explanation of them would neces- 
sarily bewilder, rather than enlighten his understanding. 
Much instruction, too, is conveyed to a child in language, 
the full import of which he cannot comprehend. Words 
are often counters, not money, to children. They coun- 
terfeit processes of thought, rather than represent them. 
Much of the benefit of such early tuition consists in its 
familiarizing the child with the names of ideas, which in 
its mind are still invested only with a vague and sha- 
dowy form, and in habituating it to the use of the great 
instrument of thought and discourse — language. Hence, 
in the education of children, a respect for the teacher 
as teacher, and for his precepts, independently of his 



II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 11 

reasons for them, is necessary : and it is important to 
inculcate principles and truths, even though the evidence 
of them is not, and cannot be, fully understood.* 

In this manner a person grows up, having imbibed, 
almost unconsciously, from his parents, teachers, and 
friends, the opinions and sentiments on religion, mo- 
rality, government, history, and the relations of external 
nature, which are current in his country, at his time, 
among the persons under whose tuition he has been 
placed, and with whom he has associated.f 

This transmission of opinions from one generation to 
another, in a lump, (like the succession of property per 
universitatem, according to the expression of the Roman 
lawyers,) which results from family influences and the 
authority exercised by the parent and the senior upon 
the mind of the child and the junior, doubtless contains 
a considerable alloy of evil, inasmuch as it perpetuates 
error in combination with truth, and affords no test for 
their discrimination.! But it is mainly this process 
which, in each community, connects the present with 
the past, and creates a unity and continuity of national 



* Ael toiq 'ideffiv fi\QaL ko\u>q top irepl Kah&v Kal ducaiiov Kal 6\(oq 
riov ttcKitlkCjv aKovaufievop ikclv&q. dp^rj yap to on, Kal el rovro 
tyaivoiTO dpKovvTOjg, ovSev irpoaZeriaei rov Start. 6 $e toiovtoq 7} eyei rj 
Xafiot ay apx^Q pa(ti(*>£. — Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 2. 

t Ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti, quam, quid esset opti- 
mum, judicare potuerunt: deinde infirmissimo tempore aatatis, aut 
obsecuti amico cuidam, aut una alicujus, quern primum audierunt, 
oratione capti, de rebus incognitis judicant, et ad quamcunque sunt 
disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad earn, tamquam ad saxum, 
adhaerescunt. — Cicero, Acad. Prior. II. 3. 

\ Ratio ilia human a, quam habemus, ex multa fide et multo etiam 
casu, necnon ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, far- 
rago quaedam est et congeries. — Bacon, Nov. Org. Lib. I. aph. 97. 
Compare Locke, On the Conduct of the Understanding y § 41. 



12 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. 

character and feeling. It is the insensible and inces- 
sant propagation of opinions from the old to the young 
within the circle of every family, and the uninquiring 
adoption by the growing generation of the moral and 
intellectual ideas of their immediate predecessors, which 
give to each nation its distinctive attributes — which 
enable it to maintain its characteristic peculiarities, and 
which prevent the general level of civilization through- 
out the country from receding or becoming irregular.* 
The traditions of civilization, if we may use the expres- 
sion, are, to a great extent, perpetuated by the implicit 
faith of children in the authority of their parents. 

§ 2. To what extent a man, when his reason becomes 
mature, and he is emancipated from parental control, 
will modify the opinions with which he has been imbued 
during his childhood, depends upon the circumstances 
of his subsequent life. 

If he belongs to the working-classes, he will probably, 
unless his circumstances be peculiar, retain these opinions 
through life, with little verification or enlargement. His 
opportunities for observation will be principally confined 
to his relations with his employer, together with the 
manual operations in which he is occupied. Owing to 
the cheapness of newspapers and tracts, he may occa- 
sionally obtain imperfect and partial glimpses into some 
of the political questions of the day ; but he can rarely 
exercise any independent judgment, except upon the 
matters with which his labour makes him personally con- 
versant. This description applies particularly to the 
agricultural labourers, who are not within the influence 
of the more stirring life of towns. " A great part of 



Compare Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, torn. iv. p. 581. 



II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 13 

mankind," (says Locke,) " are, by the natural and un- 
alterable state of things in this world, and the constitu- 
tion of human affairs, unavoidably given over to in- 
vincible ignorance of those proofs on which others build, 
and which are necessary to establish those opinions ; the 
greatest part of men, having much to do to get the 
means of living, are not in a condition to look after 
those of learned and laborious inquiries."* 

With the middle classes, there is more opportunity 
for the independent formation of opinions, by the ac- 
quirement of knowledge and observation of the world. 
Their time is, however, from an early age, engrossed with 
their industrial pursuits. Their daily business, combined 
with the care of their families, necessarily consumes the 
chief part of their attention, and leaves few opportunities 
for study and reflexion. Such knowledge, however, and 
fitness for judgment as springs from special skill, and 
from a familiar acquaintance with the mechanical pro- 
cesses of certain arts, trades, and manufactures, will 
often be found in this class. 

With regard to the wealthier classes,f comprising a 
large number of persons who have received a liberal 
education, and have leisure and means for study, obser- 
vation, investigation, and reflection, the facilities for the 
independent formation of opinions are greater. But 
many of these, particularly the more energetic, are 
occupied with business and the affairs of active life, 
which either leave little time for reading and thought, 
or restrict it to one subject. Others consume a large 
portion of their time in amusements, or, at the most, in 



* Essay on the Understanding, B. IV. c. xx. § 2. 
t See the remarks of Locke, ib. § 6. 



.14 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. 

pursuits of mere curiosity; and still more acquiesce, 
without examination, in the opinions current amongst 
their friends and associates. Even persons of a specu- 
lative turn of mind, having leisure for speculation, con- 
fine their thoughts to a limited class of subjects, and 
entertain on all other subjects opinions mainly derived 
from authority. For example, a mathematician takes 
his historical and political opinions, a moral philosopher 
or an historian takes his physical opinions, on trust. The 
difficulty and labour of original thought and investiga- 
tion are great; the number of subjects is enormous; 
every year adds to the stock of known facts, both in his- 
tory and physics. The invention of printing and paper, 
by multiplying and perpetuating the records of facts and 
opinions, has rendered it impossible even for a professed 
student to explore more than certain portions of the 
field of knowledge. Hence (as we shall show more fully 
lower down ), the use of reviews, manuals, compendia, 
encyclopaedias, and other books of reference, which serve 
as guides to the character of works, which contain results 
and opinions without the scaffolding by which they were 
constructed, and abridge intellectual labour. 

§ 3. Men in general, with regard even to their opi- 
nions, are influenced by the prevailing fashion. They 
fear singularity more than error; they accept numbers 
as the index of truth; and they follow the crowd. f The 
dislike of labour, the fear of unpopularity, the danger 



* Chapter ix. 
f Pendemus toti ex alienis judiciis, et id optimum nobis videtur, 
quod petitores laudatoresque multos habet, non id, quod laudandum 
petendumque est. Nee viam bonam ac malam per se sestimamus, 
sed turba vestigiorum, in quibus nulla sunt redeuntium. — Seneca 
de Ot. Sapient, c. xxviii. 






II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 15 

even of setting up individual opinion against established 
convictions and the voice of the multitude, contribute to 
strengthen this inclination. In the voting of political 
bodies, it is necessary (as we shall see hereafter) to 
make the decision depend upon the numerical majority. 
But although everybody is aware that numbers are not 
a test of truth, yet many persons, while they recognise 
this maxim in theory, violate it in practice, and accept 
opinions simply because they are entertained by the 
people at large. It may be added, that a state of doubt, 
or suspense, as to opinions, particularly on important 
subjects, is painful to most minds, and men are im- 
patient of the delay, or unwilling to make the exertion 
needful for the independent examination of the evidence 
and arguments on both sides of a disputed question. 
Hence, they are prone to cut the knot by accepting with- 
out verification, or with a very partial examination of 
its grounds, the opinion of some person whom, for any 
reason, they look to with respect, and whom they con- 
sider a competent judge in the matter. This feeling is 
naturally much strengthened by a conviction which the 
modesty and candour of most persons will suggest to 
them — viz., that if they do their best to form an inde- 
pendent judgment, they are not more likely to be right 
than other persons who have previously examined the 
subject, and whose opinions are known. 

§ 4. There is a further motive which induces us to 
rely upon the judgment of persons whom we believe to 
have previously examined a subject with care and atten- 
tion, and to be competent to form a sound opinion upon 
it. Even if we have, at some former time, gone through 
a process of study and examination, and have arrived at 
a given conclusion, the reasons for that conclusion do 
not always remain present to our mind. We may hold 



16 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. 

the opinion, rather upon the recollection of our having 
once ascertained it to be well grounded, than from a pre- 
sent perception of its grounds. " I confess, (says Locke,) 
in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to, in the 
world, their assent is not always from an actual view of 
the reasons that at first prevailed with them ; it being in 
many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, 
even for those who have very admirable memories, to 
retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, 
made them embrace that side of the question. It suffices 
that they have once with care and fairness sifted the 
matter as far as they could, and that they have searched 
into all the particulars that they could imagine to give 
any light to the question, and with the best of their 
skill cast up the account upon the whole evidence; and 
thus, having once found on which side the probability 
appeared to them, after as full and exact an inquiry as 
they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their 
memories as a truth they have discovered; and for the 
future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their 
memories, that this is the opinion that, by the proofs 
they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their 
assent as they afford it. This is all that the greatest 
part of men are capable of doing in regulating their 
opinions and judgments ; unless a man will exact of them 
either to retain distinctly in their memories all the 
proofs concerning any probable truth, and that, too, in 
the same order and regular deduction of consequences in 
which they have formerly placed or seen them, which 
sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one single 
question; or else they must require a man, for every 
opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the 
proofs, both which are impossible. It is unavoidable, 
therefore, that the memory be relied on in the case, and 



II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 17 

that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the 
proofs are not actually in their thoughts — nay, which 
perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without 
this, the greatest part of men must be either very scep- 
tics, or change every moment, and yield themselves up 
to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers 
them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are 
not able presently to answer."* 

As is very clearly explained in the preceding passage 
of Locke, our belief in a matter of opinion often rests 
upon our memory of an investigation which we have 
formerly made ; we rely on a process of reasoning which 
we remember that we went through, though we cannot 
now recollect its several steps, and only recal its final 
result : we know that we had once sufficient reasons for 
the opinion, though the reasons themselves are no longer 
in our thoughts ; so that we believe, as it were, upon our 
own authority ; we refer to a foregone process of inquiry, 
as a ground of present belief, in the faith that it was 
adequately performed, but without feeling the force of 
the reasons by which our mind was originally satisfied. 
If men did not thus fall back upon their own authority ; 
if they did not for a time hold to an opinion in the 
confidence that their previous assent to it had been 
founded on adequate reasons, though these reasons may 
have faded from their memory, they would, as Locke 
truly remarks, be perpetually floating about in doubt, 
or they would be at the mercy of any person who had a 
readier and more retentive memory than themselves, or 
who happened from accidental circumstances to have 
mastered the arguments on one side of the question. 
There is one class of cases in particular, which may be 



On the Understanding, B. IV. c. xvi. §§1 and 2. 




18 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. 

referred to as illustrating our habit of entertaining 
opinions without any accurate memory of their grounds. 
This is, the estimates which we form of the characters 
of persons either in private or public life ; our judgment 
of a man's character is derived from observing a number 
of successive acts, forming in the aggregate his general 
course of conduct. Now in proportion as our oppor- 
tunities for observation are multiplied, our judgment is 
likely to be correct ; but the facts from which our ulti- 
mate opinion is collected are so numerous, and often 
so trivial in themselves, that however sound the opinion 
may be, a large part of them necessarily soon vanish from 
the memory. 

Being thus familiarized with the habit of entertaining 
an opinion without any present consciousness of its 
grounds, and from a mere remembrance of a process 
of investigation which we formerly went through, it is 
easy to transfer this origin of belief to another person, 
and to accept an opinion because that other person, 
(whom, moreover, we believe to be more competent to 
judge in the matter than ourselves) has gone through a 
similar process of investigation. Being accustomed to 
treat his former self as a sort of alter ego, and practically 
to divide his own identity, a man can easily apply the 
same mode of reference to another person. At all events, 
such a ground of belief is quite legitimate until we are 
able to examine the question for ourselves ; and is far 
preferable to the alternative of a temporary suspension 
of belief, (which in practical matters may tend to serious 
evils,) or subjection to a sophistical advocate whose 
business it is to present one side of the case in a 
favourable point of view. 

§ 5. In the preceding remarks, we have had chiefly 



II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 19 

in view those general opinions which are termed specu- 
lative ; and which, although they in fact ultimately 
determine men's conduct, yet have not an immediate 
bearing upon practice. The extensive department of 
Practice, however, also involves a constant succession of 
questions which cause a man to hesitate as to the course 
to be pursued, which give rise to diversity of opinions, 
and require the interference of a competent judge for 
their solution. In many of the affairs of private life, it 
is customary to follow the advice of professional and 
other persons having had an appropriate training and 
peculiar experience in the subject matter. Thus a phy- 
sician is consulted in questions of health, a lawyer in 
legal questions, an architect or engineer in questions of 
building, a gardener in questions of horticulture, a sailor 
in questions of navigation, and the like. There is like- 
wise frequent occasion in the administration of justice, 
and the transaction of public business, for appealing to 
the opinion of persons of professional and special know- 
ledge. In practical affairs, too, many opinions are 
formed upon the authority of the civil government, of 
public bodies and persons in conspicuous and responsible 
positions, of the heads of churches and religious bodies, 
of universities, academies, and places of learning, and of 
leaders of parties, and other voluntary associations. 

For the present, we merely indicate these sources of 
authority, as influencing the opinions of numerous per- 
sons: and we merely point out, in general terms, the 
extent of the opinions accepted upon trust, and formed 
without independent investigation, or a knowledge of the 
grounds on which they rest. We shall now attempt to 
distinguish the cases in which this mode of forming 
opinions is properly applicable, and thus to determine the 

c2 



20 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS, ETC. [CH. 

proper province of authority. As a first step in this 
inquiry, it will be necessary to consider what are the 
marks by which trustworthy authority in matters of 
opinion may be recognised, and what are the quali- 
fications of a competent guide in questions of speculative 
truth and practical conduct. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 21 



CHAPTER III. 

ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 

§ 1 . In the first chapter, we adverted to the received 
distinction between matters of fact and matters of opi- 
nion ; and we showed that, although this distinction may 
be wanting in scientific precision, it nevertheless classifies 
the objects of belief in a manner suitable to the purposes 
of this essay. Before, therefore, we proceed to enumerate 
the marks of trustworthy authority in matters of opinion, 
it will be convenient to ascertain the marks of trust- 
worthy testimony in matters of fact, and to compare 
the qualifications which render a person a credible wit- 
ness with those which give weight to a person's opinion, 
as such, independently of his reasons. 

The credibility of a witness to a fact seems to depend 
mainly on the four following conditions : viz. — 

1. That the fact fell within the range of his senses. 

2. That he observed or attended to it. 

3. That he possesses a fair amount of intelligence 

and memory. 

4. That he is free from any sinister or misleading 

interest ; or if not, that he is a person of ve- 
racity. 
If a person was present at any event, so as to see or 
hear it ; if he availed himself of his opportunity, so as to 
take note of what passed; if he has sufficient mental 
capacity to give an accurate report of the occurrence ; and 
if he is not influenced by personal favour, or dislike, or 
fear, or the hope of gain, to misreport the fact; or if, 



22 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

notwithstanding such influence, his own conscience and 
moral or religious principle, or the fear of public 
opinion, deters him from mendacity, such a person is a 
credible witness. 

Upon considering these conditions for veracious testi- 
mony, we see that, with respect to statements of fact, 
everything depends on the source from which they 
emanate. They rest entirely on the credit due to known 
or assignable witnesses. But with arguments it is dif- 
ferent. They have a probative force quite independent 
of the person by whom they are invented or propounded. 
They depend on the relation of premises and conclusion, 
of antecedent and consequent. For the truth of his 
premises the author of an argument may be personally 
responsible; but the sequence of his conclusion is a 
matter quite independent of his individual veracity. 
Logic, therefore, as a science, or art, of reasoning, has no 
concern with moral character; all arguments, as argu- 
ments, and reduced to their bare logical elements, are 
equally conclusive, whatever may be the source from 
which they proceed. Thus, in judicial proceedings, an 
advocate may argue with equal force on either side of a 
question, though without any personal conviction on 
the subject. He may handle arguments (as a fencer 
handles his sword) with the skill of a practised disputant, 
regarding them merely as instruments for the attainment 
of his end, but without making himself responsible for 
the soundness of his conclusions.* So a person may, as 



* " Sir James Johnston happened to say that he paid no regard to 
arguments of counsel at the bar of the House of Commons, because 
they were paid for speaking. Johnson: * Nay, sir, argument is 
argument. You cannot help paying regard to their arguments, if 
they are good. If it were testimony, you might disregard it, if you 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 23 

a rhetorical exercise, or for the purpose of eliciting the 
truth by the juxta-position of conflicting views, compose 
an argument on opposite sides of a question. Examples 
of this species of composition are afforded by all writings 
in the form of a controversial dialogue, such as the dia- 
logues of Plato and Cicero and the Minute Philosopher 
of Berkeley. A person who produces an argument, pro- 
duces something which can be judged without reference 
to himself, and which is not necessarily either confirmed 
or enfeebled by his individual qualities or circumstances. 
A new demonstration of a mathematical problem would 
in no way depend on the character of its inventor. But 
the witness to a fact can only depose truly to that fact; 
he cannot, like the arguer, choose his ground hypo- 
thetically ; and the credibility of his testimony depends 
solely on his own personal circumstances and moral 
character. 

§ 2. Anonymous testimony to a matter of fact, is 
therefore wholly devoid of weight ; unless, indeed, there 
be circumstances which render it probable that a trust- 
worthy witness has adequate motives for concealment, 
or extraneous circumstances may support and accredit 
a statement, which, left to itself, would fall to the 
ground. 

Thus an anonymous communication may put a man 
on his guard, or may induce him to make inquiries in 
a certain direction, when it appears probable from the 
contents of the communication, or from other circum- 



knew that it were purchased. There is a beautiful image in Bacon 
upon this subject: ' Testimony is like an arrow shot from a long 
bow — the force of it depends on the strength of the hand that draws 
it; argument is like an arrow from a cross-bow, which has great 
force though shot by a child.' " — Boswell's Johnson, vol. viii. p. 281. 



24 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

stances, that it may proceed from some quarter in which 
secrecy is rendered inevitable by a powerful interest. 
Such was the letter to Lord Monteagle concerning the 
Gunpowder Plot ; such are threatening letters, or letters 
giving private information respecting the conduct of in- 
dividuals, in a public or private capacity. Occasionally, 
it happens that important suggestions are conveyed in 
this manner; but, for the most part, information given 
anonymously turns out, on investigation, to be utterly 
worthless. An anonymous work, too, may sometimes 
exhibit internal evidence of truth ; that is, there may be 
certain marks in the writing which give it an air of ve- 
racity, though the author may have deemed it prudent 
to withhold his name from the public. It is in this 
manner that anonymous statements of facts in news- 
papers are authenticated : the periodical appearance of 
the newspaper and the character which its management 
may have acquired for correctness of intelligence, serving 
as guarantees for the truth of its statements.* State- 
ments in an anonymous publication may likewise acquire 
credibility from their remaining uncontradicted by per- 
sons who have an interest in contradicting them, and 
are acquainted with the facts of the case. It may be 
added that a work may be anonymous, from the loss of 
the author's name, though its original publication may 
not have been anonymous. For instance, the Acts of 
the Apostles, and many chronicles of the middle ages, 
are now anonymous, though there is no reason to suppose 
that the authors concealed their names from their con- 
temporaries. 

With these exceptions — which are rather apparent 



See this subject further pursued in Chapter IX. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 25 

than real — it is essential to testimony that we should know 
the witness as well as the fact, and be able to estimate 
his individual qualifications, as a testifier or relator. 
Whereas, in the case of an argument, its conclusiveness, 
considered without reference to the truth of its premises, 
and judged merely by logical rules, is wholly independent 
of its author. 

This independence of an argument with respect to the 
character of its author, implies, however, both that its 
inferential force is thoroughly understood, and that the 
truth of its premises is conceded. Whenever this is not 
the case, the character of the person who advances the 
argument is a most material consideration; and it is to 
cases of this sort that our present inquiry relates — that 
is to say, to cases where an opinion is accepted out of 
confidence in the person who holds it, and without any 
full comprehension of its grounds. 

§ 3. It may be added that for all purposes of philo- 
sophical observation, a knowledge of the proper science, 
and a peculiar training of the senses, are requisite, and 
therefore that a witness who possesses these qualifica- 
tions is far more credible than one who is destitute of 
them. For example, a scientific naturalist who reports 
that he has seen an undescribed animal or vegetable in 
a remote country, is far less likely to be mistaken than 
a common traveller, ignorant of natural history. A 
skilled witness of this sort may be considered, in a cer- 
tain sense, as a witness of authority, inasmuch as his 
previous study and habits of observation give a peculiar 
weight to his report of the phenomenon. 

§ 4. The distinction between testimony, argument, 
and authority, may be briefly summed up thus : 

In questions of testimony, I believe a matter of fact, 
because the witness believes it. 



26 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

In questions of argument, I believe the conclusion 
to be true, because it is proved by reasons 
satisfactory to my understanding. 

In questions of authority, I believe a matter of 
opinion, because it is believed by a person whom 
I consider a competent judge of the question. 

§ 5. Now, on looking at the qualities which render 
any one a credible witness to a matter of fact, we may 
remark that they are of common occurrence. For testi- 
mony, nothing further is in general required than oppor- 
tunity of observation, ordinary attention and intelli- 
gence, and veracity. Almost every person of sound 
mind, who has reached a certain age, is a credible wit- 
ness as to matters which he has observed, and as to 
which he has no immediate interest in deception or 
concealment.* For purposes of scientific observation, 
indeed, (as has been remarked,) a certain skill and 
practice beyond that possessed by ordinary persons is 
requisite; but when this has been acquired, no extra- 
ordinary qualifications are needed. 

The qualities which render a person a competent 
authority in matters of opinion are of rarer occurrence. 



* For the administration of justice, it is important that there 
should be some recognised tests of the credibility of witnesses to 
facts in dispute before the court. In almost all systems of judicial 
procedure, an attempt has been made to lay down inflexible legal 
rules on this subject. Thus, in some cases, the concurrent testi- 
mony of two witnesses to the same fact has been rendered necessary; 
the evidence of persons standing in a near degree of affinity to one 
of the parties, or having a pecuniary interest in the cause, has been 
excluded. But experience has shown that, however useful maxims 
of this sort may be as guiding the discretion of the court in weigh- 
ing the credibility of witnesses, the entire exclusion of evidence on 
such grounds obstructs the administration of justice. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 27 

Many of them are, separately, not frequent; and the 
combination of them in the same individual is neces- 
sarily more uncommon ; a person whose testimony to a 
fact would be unimpeachable, might be utterly devoid of 
authority as a guide of opinion. Besides, a person who 
is a credible witness for one matter of fact, is equally 
credible for all others which may fall under his observa- 
tion; whereas (as we shall see hereafter) no man is 
equally competent as a guide of opinion in all subjects, 
and, in general, the authority of each person is, as com- 
pared with the sum total of human affairs, confined 
within a narrow range. 

§ 6. The first qualification is, that a person should 
have devoted much study and thought to the subject- 
matter if it be merely speculative; and that if it be 
practical, he should also have had adequate experience 
respecting it. 

Secondly, his mental powers must be equal to the task 
of comprehending the subject, and they must be of the 
sort fitted to it. 

Thirdly, he ought to be exempt, as far as possible, 
from personal interest in the matter; or, if he be not 
exempt, his honesty and integrity ought to be such as 
to afford a reasonable security against the perversion of 
his opinions by views of his individual advantage. 

§ 7. The three qualifications just stated may now be 
examined with somewhat more of detail. 

I. If the subject be extensive — if it be one of the 
great departments into which human knowledge is 
divided — a careful study of it, continued for several 
years, or even for a large part of a life, combined with 
frequent meditation, and, if possible, personal observa- 
tion, is requisite in order to enable a man to understand 
it thoroughly and to treat it with a sound and compre- 



28 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

hensive judgment. All the great luminaries of science, 
whether mathematical, physical, metaphysical, ethical, 
or political, have fulfilled this condition. None of them 
would have acquired the authority, which their opinions, 
as such, independently of their reasons, possess, if they 
had not applied all their mental faculties during a large 
part of their lives to the subjects on which they wrote. 

The extent and complexity of the more important 
departments of science are so great, that no person, 
however penetrating his intellect, can master any of 
them without years of patient study and reflection. 
Each science involves the consideration of a vast number 
of particular facts and phenomena, which the mind can 
only apprehend by passing over them in succession, and 
examining them separately. In order that the founda- 
tions of a science should be duly laid, and its super- 
structure raised and enlarged, this process must be fre- 
quently repeated, either for parts or for the whole. The 
institution of proper experiments, and the verification 
of the experiments of others, are likewise often slow and 
delicate processes; though they are powerful aids, of 
which the physical sciences enjoy the exclusive use. In 
the moral sciences, new facts, and combinations of facts, 
are constantly presenting themselves ; but the observa- 
tion of these, and their verification, together with the 
subsequent elimination of such concomitant phenomena 
as do not properly enter into the problem, require patient 
and sustained attention on the part of the scientific 
inquirer. 

If the subject be one, not of mere speculation, but of 
knowledge to be applied in practice, a further condition 
is requisite. Not only must the guide of opinion have 
studied the subject theoretically, not only must he, if a 
lawyer, for example, have rendered himself familiar with 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 29 

the system of law, if a physician, have learned the 
science of medicine, but he must have practised it; he 
must have acquired the ability of applying this theo- 
retical knowledge to actual cases, which experience alone 
can confer. In order that a person should be eminent 
in a learned profession, it is necessary that he should 
combine a knowledge of its principles, with that judg- 
ment, tact, dexterity, and promptitude of applying them 
to actual cases, which are derived from habits of prac- 
tice. The like may be said of persons conversant in 
the constructive arts, as architects and engineers, of the 
military and naval services, of agriculturists, gardeners, 
manufacturers of different sorts, &c. In order that they 
may give sound advice with respect to any practical 
question belonging to their own department, it is neces- 
sary that they should combine actual experience with 
abstract knowledge. In some cases, that experience 
implies even manual skill, which can only be acquired by 
practice. For example, a surgeon would not be a com- 
petent judge on a question of practical surgery, unless 
his judgment were assisted and corrected by actual 
manipulation of his instruments. In like manner, a 
person cannot be a competent judge of works of art, 
such as statues, pictures, coins, and engravings; or of 
articles of trade, as horses, wines, plate, &c, without 
practical observation and experience. In these cases, a 
certain training of the sight is necessary, analogous to 
the training of the hands and limbs in a mechanical em- 
ployment or trade requiring bodily dexterity. The 
senses can be educated so as to discern marks which are 
invisible to the unpractised observer. There are slight 
indicia, which guide the judgment of the man of expe- 
rience, and which no merely theoretical teaching can 
enable a person to detect. The occupation of the hunter 



30 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

or the fisher, again, requires an actual observation of the 
habits of the animals to be caught, in order to guide the 
judgment. In this minor species of warfare, a practical 
knowledge of the probable movements of the enemy, and 
of the best means of diverting or lulling his attention, of 
falling on him unawares, and of overwhelming him with 
a superior force, is as necessary, for success, as in naval 
or military tactics. A similar practical knowledge is 
a necessary qualification for those who are entrusted with 
the care and training of animals, as shepherds, horse- 
breakers, &c. For purposes of scientific observation, a 
training of the senses is likewise necessary. A scientific 
observer must be not only familiar with the terminology 
of his science, and be able to apply its technical terms 
readily to the proper objects, but he ought likewise to 
have acquired that delicacy, rapidity, and correctness 
of discernment which the habit of observation, combined 
with knowledge, can alone confer.* 

§ 8. II. In order that a person should originate 
sound opinions on a subject of speculation and science, 
he ought not merely to have devoted a long time to the 
assiduous study and contemplation of the subject, but 
his mental powers ought to be superior to the average. 
His mind ought to be more wMe-ranging and far-seeing. 
He ought to be able to take a comprehensive or synop- 
tical view of an extensive subject, and also to trace the 
remote consequences of an insulated principle. That 
high degree of intellectual power, which we call genius, 
and which the ancients attributed to the inspiration of 
the gods, is in itself inexplicable, and can only be judged 
by its effects. But some ray of that light is requisite in 



* See this subject well explained by Dr. Whewell, Philos. of 
2nd. Sciences, B. XII. c. ii. §§ 26, 27. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 31 

order to enable a person to be classed among the original 
teachers and guides of mankind. 

Moreover, a man ought, in order to acquire authority 
as an inventor in matters of speculation, not merely to 
be superior in point of intellect to the average of men, 
but he ought also to possess the peculiar mental qualities 
which the subject demands. For example, in order to 
be pre-eminent in mathematical science, it is not sufficient 
for him to possess the faculties which fit him for the 
observation of outward nature. Nor will he be enabled 
to excel in speculation by powers which fit him exclu- 
sively for the solution of practical questions and the 
actual business of life. And, indeed, a person may be 
qualified to shine in one department or branch of a 
science, who has no aptitude for other portions of the 
same subject. As Pope expresses it in his Essay on 
Criticism : 

One science only will one genius fit, 
So vast is art, so narrow human wit. 
Not only bounded to peculiar arts, 
But oft in those confined to single parts. 

(v. 60—63.) 

Such eminence of intellectual power as enables a 
person to discover and establish important principles in 
the physical and moral world is of rare occurrence, and 
it is not necessary to qualify one who has studied a 
subject, to comprehend the views and reasonings of 
others, and to form a competent judgment upon their 
soundness. Having fulfilled the previous condition of 
study and reflection, a person of fair capacity may 
accredit speculative opinions, and serve as a safe guide 
to others in his capacity of a discriminating judge, 
although he may not be able to lead them on as an 
inventor. Such a person may be able to separate truth 



32 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

from error among existing opinions, though he might 
not be able to discover the truth, if unknown, and pro- 
claim it to the world. Or he may be able to arrange 
and systematise existing knowledge ; to expound it with 
perspicuity ; to improve subordinate parts of a science, 
and to correct errors in accessories, without attempting 
to grapple with fundamental questions. 

For practice again, eminent intellectual superiority is 
not essential; and experience alone, combined with 
study, if there be a fair amount of ability, will suffice. 
A large number of the persons practising the learned 
professions are justly considered as safe and prudent 
guides in the subjects with which they are conversant, 
although their general mental powers may not be greatly 
superior to those of the majority of the educated classes 
in their own country. The same may be said of sailors, 
architects, engineers, and other classes of persons having 
a special training and aptitude for judgment with 
respect to their own subject. In each profession, how- 
ever, eminence can only be attained by remarkable 
ability, fitting its possessor for the peculiar department 
of practice which he has chosen. As opposed to unpro- 
fessional men generally, the judgment of any professional 
man, whatever may be his natural talents, is of weight ; 
but among men of the same profession, the opinion of 
those who are peculiarly fitted by nature, in addition to 
the advantages of experience, is that which is most 
highly valued. 

It is not sufficient for success in practice that a person 
should have mastered a science, and should comprehend 
its theory ; or even that he should attempt to apply its 
rules to actual cases. A certain dexterity and aptitude 
for the application of theory to practice is requisite. 
Not every man who has studied a system of rhetoric, and 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 33 

made some speeches, can become a successful orator ; not 
every man who has studied law and medicine, and at- 
tended to the application of his knowledge, can be a good 
practising lawyer or physician. But, on the other hand, 
mere practical aptitude can never enable a man to prac- 
tise a profession with success, unless he is well grounded 
in its principles. By dexterity, and a sort of leger- 
demain, he may conceal his defects, and divert attention 
from his weak points ; but he never can be permanently 
successful. The great practitioners, whether in war, 
politics, law, medicine, the fine arts, or any other de- 
partment of applied knowledge, have all combined a 
careful study of principles, and patient observation, with 
practical genius. Practicians, who are ignorant of the 
principles of their profession or art, instead of acting 
according to general maxims, of which they understand 
the grounds, steer their course (and sometimes merely 
grope their way) by means of analogies ; that is to say, 
they argue from one case or instance to another, without 
being able to bring both of them under one general rule 
or premise. The practical man, who has studied the 
theory of the subject in which he is employed, combines 
that tact which results from experience, with the know- 
ledge of general principles. He is not only imbued with 
the theory, but he has also learned to apply it in prac- 
tice, and he has acquired the facility, promptitude, 
correctness, and confidence of judgment, which result 
from habit and experience in the practical application 
of a sound theory ; in the use of an art founded upon a 
matured science.* 

§ 9. III. The third qualification for rendering a 
person an authority in matters of opinion, adverted to 



* Compare Mill's System of Logic, B. VI. c. xi. 
D 



34 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

above, is honesty ; the absence of personal interests 
likely to deprave his judgment, or an integrity sufficient 
to overcome such influences. 

Even if a man has devoted much time and attention 
to the study of a subject, and is thoroughly conversant 
with its theory and practice ; if his intellect is powerful, 
and he possesses the kind of ability suited to the subject; 
still it is further necessary, in order that his authority 
should be trustworthy, that he should be exempt from 
the operation of any misleading interest, or, at least, be 
proof against its influence. 

Exemption from such misleading interest, with respect 
to an opinion, may be owing to the nature of the subject. 
For example,if the question relate to the mathematical 
or physical sciences, and have no close and immediate 
bearing on the concerns of life, it is not likely that the 
affections or desires should bias the mind in regard to 
it.* In questions of this sort, it is mainly the ardour 
of contention, the desire of gaining an argumentative 
victory over an antagonist, the dislike of a confession of 
error, or sometimes the jealousy of a rival or a superior, 
which can blind the judgment. The exemption may 
likewise arise from the circumstances of the individual. 
A subject which has a direct bearing on the interests of 
one person may have no connexion, or only a remote 
connexion, with the interests of another. It is uni- 
versally admitted that no man ought to be a judge in 
his own case. But, if the case were not his own, his 
competency to form a judgment upon it might be indis- 
putable. So, if any political measure be proposed which 



* Credibile est illos pariter vitiisque locisque 
Altius humanis exseruisse caput, 
says Ovid, in speaking of astronomers. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 35 

affects the interests of a profession, it may happen that 
persons belonging to that profession, though peculiarly 
competent to form an opinion respecting it, on account 
of their experience and knowledge, are disqualified on 
account of the probable bias of their judgment by per- 
sonal considerations ; and that the requisite indifference 
is only to be found among those who do not belong to 
the profession. Such out-lying persons may be the only 
impartial judges in the matter. 

Even, however, if personal interests should tend to 
obscure or distort the judgment, that tendency may be 
resisted by a consciousness of the natural bias, and a 
strength of moral principle sufficient to overcome it. 
A knowledge of the character of particular persons may 
induce us to rely on their integrity, and to reckon on 
their resistance to such misleading influences. But as 
such virtue and strength of purpose is rare, its absence 
must be presumed until it is known or proved to be 
present. 

It has been stated above, that the qualities which 
render a man a trustworthy authority in matters of 
opinion, are much rarer than those which render a man 
a credible witness in matters of fact. Accordingly, the 
honesty which induces a man to speak the truth, is more 
common than that which induces him to form sound 
opinions. There are many men who, under ordinary 
circumstances, would never be seduced by interest to 
report a fact falsely, or to express an insincere opinion, 
whose judgment might, nevertheless, be perverted by 
interest. It is commonly said that the belief is inde- 
pendent of the will, that is, of the desires or inclina- 
tions; and every one must be conscious that he cannot 
change the state of his belief, on matters either of fact 
or opinion, by merely wishing it to be otherwise. But 

d2 



36 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

the operation of a personal interest, bearing closely and 
directly upon the question, generally causes a man, unless 
he be remarkably honest or perspicacious, insensibly to 
adopt prejudices, or partial and unexamined opinions.* 
The dislike of listening to unpalatable truths, induces 
him to shut his ears against evidence and arguments 
opposed to the views which he considers favourable to 
his own interest; while, on the other hand, the desire of 
hearing evidence of a different character, leads him to 
read only the books, and to frequent only the company 
of persons, where opinions, in accordance with his in- 
terest, are likely to be expressed, f The operation of a 
personal interest in perverting the judgment is so in- 
sidious, that great honesty, combined with perpetual 
vigilance, is necessary in order to guard against its in- 
fluence. Men utterly incapable of telling a deliberate 
untruth, or deliberately expressing an insincere opinion, 
are nevertheless liable to be warped by personal interest 
in the deliberate formation of opinions. When a strong 
bias of this sort exists, their minds, ready to receive 
every tittle of evidence on one side of a question, are 
utterly impervious to arguments on the other. Hence, 
we see opinions founded on a belief (and often a radi- 
cally erroneous belief) of self-interest pervade whole 
classes of persons. Frequently, the great majority of a 



* See on this subject the remarks of Mr. Mill, System of Logic, 
B. V. c. i. § 3. 

f " We know some men will not read a letter which is supposed to 
bring ill news ; and many men forbear to cast up their accounts, or 
so much as think upon their estates, who have reason to fear their 
affairs are in no very good posture." — Locke on the Understanding, 
B. IV. c. xx. § 6. See also §§ 12 and 16. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 37 

profession, or trade, or other body, adopt some opinion 
in which they have, or think they have, a common inte- 
rest, and urge it with almost unanimous vehemence 
against the public advantage. On occasions of this 
kind, the persons interested doubtless convince them- 
selves of the reasonableness of the view which they put 
forward ; they are guilty of no hypocrisy or insincerity ; 
but their judgment is warped by their belief as to their 
interest in the question. If, however, their view be 
in fact unsound and untenable, the more intelligent 
members of the class or body cannot fail, occasionally, to 
catch a few glimpses of the truth ; in searching for con- 
firmations of their opinion, they must sometimes stumble 
upon proofs of its weakness, and they must hence feel a 
misgiving as to the soundness of their cause. This mixed 
state of insincerity and interested prejudice is, probably, 
not uncommon in questions where the judgment is subject 
to a bias ; but, in general, the errors of mankind, both in 
opinion and action, so far as they arise from considera- 
tions of personal advantage, are to be attributed rather 
to sincere, though interested prejudice, than to the direct 
suggestions of conscious interest. 

When we speak of a man's conduct or opinions being 
determined by his interest, we of course mean, by his 
own opinions as to his interest. It is manifest that a 
man's real interest may differ from his apparent or sup- 
posed interest. In other words, the judgment of a 
foolish or ignorant man, with respect to his interest, may 
differ from that of wise and well-informed men on the 
same subject. When a man acts upon an enlightened 
view of his own interest — upon well ascertained grounds, 
and in accordance with the advice of judicious and dis- 
creet counsellors — he is said to act prudently. An im- 



38 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

prudent man may, however, equally act from views of 
personal advantage, though upon hasty, ill-considered, 
and uninformed views. The practical judgment of men, 
in private affairs, is constantly liable to be misled by 
erroneous opinions of self-interest, which, however, are to 
a great extent obviated and counteracted by professional 
and skilled advice. In political affairs, it is necessary, 
for reasons which will be considered in another chapter, 
to give a freer scope to the opinion of each individual 
respecting his interest. The operation of this principle 
is, however, (as we shall see hereafter,) counteracted by 
numerous influences, in public as well as private affairs.* 

It may be remarked, that many unsound opinions 
have a certain affinity with one another, and are formed 
in knots and clusters. Hence, if one of these is adopted 
from interested motives, it naturally leads a person to 
the others ; so that a small portion of unconscious interest 
will sometimes leaven a man's opinions with a whole 
mass of error. 

The influence of a personal interest in perverting the 
judgment may be resisted by steady honesty and integrity, 
even where the understanding is not remarkably strong. 
On the other hand, the moral sentiments may be so ill- 
directed as to deprave the judgment, even when the 
understanding is remarkably strong. Men of this sort 
may be great, but can not be wise; for by wisdom we 
mean the power of judging, when the intellectual and 
moral faculties are both in a sound state. Napoleon 
affords a striking instance of the corruption of the judg- 
ment, in consequence of the misdirection of the moral 



* See Chapter VIII. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 39 

sentiments. His intense selfishness and unscrupulous 
restless ambition seem at last to have completely dis- 
torted his mental vision. The ancients observed, that a 
man who had acquired great power and eminence in a 
State, being rendered giddy by his elevation, often lost 
his self-command, cast away the maxims of sobriety and 
moderation, by which he had been restrained when in a 
less exalted position, and thus came to a speedy down- 
fall. His newly-acquired power depraved his moral cha- 
racter — the depravation of his moral character destroyed 
his judgment — and, having lost his judgment, his career 
became like that of a ship without a rudder. But, in 
accounting for this sequence of events, according to 
their popular religion, they said that the gods, being 
envious of his greatness, predetermined his ruin, and in 
order to effect his ruin, filled his mind with vain and 
foolish thoughts : thus representing his folly as the con- 
sequence of a precedent decision that he was to be 
humbled, and not as its sole and ultimate cause. 

Generally, it may be said that the undue ascendancy 
of any passion or affection by which the calmness of the 
reason is disturbed, necessarily for a time impairs the 
judgment, by deranging its equilibrium. The state of 
mind most favourable to the formation of a sound opinion 
is, that a person should be eager about a subject — that 
he should (according to the common phrase) take an 
interest in it; but that his mind should not, in the con- 
sideration, be influenced by any suggestions of personal 
advantage. 

" To be indifferent which of two opinions is true, 
(says Locke,) is the right temper of the mind that pre- 
serves it from being imposed on, and disposes it to exa- 
mine with that indifferency, till it has done its best to 



40 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

find the truth, and this is the only direct and safe way 
to it. But to be indifferent whether we embrace false- 
hood or truth, is the great road to error."* 

For questions of practice, perfect honesty and freedom 
from personal bias are equally necessary in order to ensure 
trustworthy advice. Whether it be the opinion of a 
professional man in an individual case, or the exhorta- 
tions of a public speaker in a deliberative assembly, 
integrity of purpose, and an exclusive regard for the 
interests of those whom he advises, are qualifications 
requisite to render him worthy of their confidence, f 

§ 10. In order, therefore, to determine whether a 



* On the Conduct of the Understanding ', § 12. 

" Ou l'on est indifferent a la chose qu'on juge, et des lors on est 
sans attention et sans esprit pour la bien juger; ou Ton est vive- 
ment affecte de cette meme chose, et c'est alors l'interet du moment 
qui presque toujours prononce nos jugements. Une decision juste 
suppose indifference pour la chose qu'on juge, et desir vif de la bien 
juger. Or, dans l'etat actuel des societes, peu d'hommes eprouvent 
ce double sentiment de desir et d'indifference, et se trouvent dans 
l'heureuse position qui le produit." — Helvetius de V Homme, S. IX. 
c. xviii. 

"I" Cicero de Off. II. ix. § 8, describes the qualities which render 
a man trustworthy in matters of practice. The qualities are pro- 
bity, (justitia,) and prudence or wisdom, (prudentia.) "lis fidem 
habemus, quos plus intelligere quam nos arbitramur, quosque et 
futura prospicere credimus, et cum res agatur, in discrimenque 
ventum sit, expedire rem, et consilium ex tempore capere posse." 
Of these qualities he considers the former as the most important. 
Honesty without sagacity has considerable authority, but cleverness 
without honesty inspires no faith. " Harum igitur duarum ad 
fidem faciendam justitia plus pollet: quippe cum ea sine prudentia 
satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine justitia nihil valeat ad 
faciendam fidem: quo enim quis versutior et callidior est, hoc in- 
visior et suspectior, detracta opinione probitatis." — Compare Topica, 
c. xix. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 41 

person is a competent authority on a doubtful question, 
either of speculation or practice, it is necessary, as in 
the case of a witness to a fact, to go through a certain 
process of investigation and reasoning. With regard to 
a witness, we must satisfy ourselves that the alleged fact 
occurred within the range of his senses ; that he took 
note of it ; that he apprehended properly what he ob- 
served ; and that he reported it faithfully. With regard 
to an authority in a matter of opinion, we must be as- 
sured that he had time to study and consider the subject ; 
that he availed himself of his opportunity ; that he un- 
derstood what he studied ; and that he judged correctly. 
The process of investigating a person's competence as a 
guide in matters of opinion is, however, less difficult 
and tedious than an examination of the subject itself. 
For example, it would be much easier to ascertain who 
is a competent authority upon a question of mechanics 
or astronomy, than to master mechanical or astronomical 
science. Moreover, in practical questions, experience, 
which implies time, is indispensable. Thus, if any un- 
professional person wished to form an independent judg- 
ment upon a medical or surgical case, with a view to its 
treatment, he would be unable to decide and act with 
safety, however powerful and cultivated his understand- 
ing might be, and whatever diligence he might be will- 
ing to use in the study of the disease. The process of 
determining who is a competent authority is likewise, 
though a process of reasoning, not appropriate to the 
question. The truth of the opinion rests on evidence, 
which would be equally conclusive if the person whose 
authority is adopted had never existed. It is a second- 
best indication of the truth ; but nevertheless, in a vast 
number of cases, the only guide which is practicable. 
§ 11. Whenever, therefore, we seek to determine who 



42 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

is a competent authority to guide our opinion on any 
subject, we should select a person who combines the 
qualifications which have been just enumerated. We 
should look out for a man able, honest, and well-versed 
in the subject. Some further indications of trust- 
worthy authority, derived from other considerations, 
may however be obtained, which will assist us in this 
search. 

With respect to subjects of speculation and science, 
the existence of an agreement of the persons having the 
above qualifications is the most important matter. If 
all the able and honest men who have diligently studied 
the subject, or most of them, concur, and if this consent 
extends over several successive generations, at an en- 
lightened period, and in all or most civilized countries,* 
then the authority is at its greatest height. 

The agreement of competent judges upon a speculative 
opinion is analogous to the agreement of credible wit- 
nesses in their testimony to a fact. If ten credible wit- 
nesses agree in their testimony to a fact, the value of 
their concurrent testimony is more than ten times the 
value of the testimony of each.f So the joint probability 
of the agreement of ten competent judges in a right opinion 
is far greater than the sum of the probabilities of the rec- 
titude of the opinion of each taken separately. On the 
other hand, the joint probability of their agreement in 
error is far less than the sum of the probabilities of 
the erroneousness of the opinion of each taken sepa- 



* With respect to the influence of the political divisions of inde- 
pendent states in preventing the adoption of opinions without due 
examination, see Hume, Essay XIV. ; Works, vol. iii. p. 1 34. 
t See "Whately's Rhetoric, Part I. c. ii. § 4. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 43 

rately. Supposing that each person carefully checks 
and verifies the process of investigation, it is highly 
improbable that every one, of a considerable number, 
should overlook an ungrounded assumption, or a flaw in 
the reasoning, which may have escaped the attention of 
the original investigator; it is also very improbable 
that a tendency to error, which one person may have 
contracted, from peculiar habits of thought, or defective 
means of observation, should be shared by many others. 
Therefore, as the agreement in a scientific opinion among 
competent judges widens its area, the chances of rectitude 
increase, and the chances of error diminish, in a per- 
petually accelerated ratio.* 

Astronomy furnishes an example of a science, as to 
which there has been a general agreement of its profes- 
sors for more than a century. Additional discoveries 
have been made during that period, and subordinate 
differences have been removed ; but, as to the foundations 
of the science, there has, during that time, been a 
general agreement, and now even in details. This agree- 
ment extends to all scientific astronomers in all civilized 
countries. The astronomers of Berlin, Vienna, Milan, 
Paris, London, and New York, are agreed as to the 
motions of the bodies composing the solar system, and 
their mutual relations in space. The astronomical 
almanacs, calculated in different places, proceed on the 
same principles, and coincide in their predictions. 



* " In the unanimous or general consent of numerous and im- 
partial inquirers," Mr. Austin finds " that mark of trustworthiness 
which justifies reliance on authority, wherever we are debarred 
from the opportunity of examining the evidence for ourselves." — 
Prov. of Jurisprudence Determined, p. 84. 



44 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

These predictions, moreover, are always confirmed by 
the events.* 

On the other hand, the dissensions of scientific writers, 
— of acute and disinterested men who have applied their 
minds with earnestness and patience to the cultivation 
of any science — show that this science is still in an im- 
perfect and unsettled state, and diminish the value of 
the authority of all parties. 

Such was the case with a large part both of the ethical 
and physical sciences among the ancients. The divisions 
of the philosophical sects into Academic, Stoic, Epicurean, 
&c, the peculiar tenets which each sect adopted, upon 
the fundamental principles of moral and natural science, 
the pertinacity with which these peculiarities were main- 
tained, and the length of time during which they were 
transmitted in schools by a succession of teachers and 
disciples, weakened the authority of each, and rendered 
it difficult for an inquirer to give a preference to 
any, without learning and comparing the opinions of 
all.f 

At present, there is a prevailing approach to agreement 
in the sciences founded on an observation of outward 
nature. When controversies arise in these sciences, they 
are generally confined to limited questions, and to points 
upon which attention has been recently turned ; and after 
a time they are settled by investigation and reasoning. 
In the moral and political sciences, there is a less general 



* Upon the present agreement of astronomical predictions with 
observation, see Whewell, Hist, of the Ind. Sciences, B. VII. 
c. vi. § 6. 

t See Lucian's dialogue of Hermotimus, a summary of which is 
appended as a note to Chapter IV. Compare what Cicero says of 
the sceptical method of the New Academy. — Acad. Prior. II. 3. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 45 

consensus than in the physical.* Thus the science of 
political economy — a science which for nearly a century 
has been cultivated by various writers of great ability — 
is still (particularly with reference to certain branches 
of it) in a controverted and unsettled state ; and, hence, 
the writers on political economy who have arrived at 
true conclusions do not carry the authority which is due 
to them, because those conclusions are still disputed by 
other scientific writers. 

For this difference between the moral and political 
sciences on the one hand, and the physical sciences on 
the other,f there are many reasons, which do not belong 
to this inquiry; but there is one, which, as it concerns 
the formation of a body of authority on the subject, may 
be here noticed. The physical sciences (with the partial 
exception of medicine) are cultivated exclusively by 
scientific persons, who pursue the subject merely in the 
interests of truth and for purposes of discovery, or expound 
it systematically for purposes of education. They either 
seek to enlarge science by new observations and infe- 
rences, or they digest existing knowledge into text-books 
for learners. Such, for example, is the case with me- 
chanics, optics, geology, mineralogy, chemistry, anatomy, 
natural history. The treatment of these subjects is 
therefore always scientific. Even when the exposition 



* The reasons why authority in the moral and political sciences 
is less trustworthy than authority in the physical sciences, are ably 
set forth by Mr. Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 
pp. 63 — 67. Compare Mill, System of Logic, B. VI. c. i. 

t The ancients differed and doubted more as to physics than 
ethics. " Ut enim modo dixi, (says the academic interlocutor in 
Cicero's dialogue De Natura Deorum,) omnibus fere in rebus, et 
maxime in physicis, quid non sit citius, quam quid sit, dixerim." 
I. 21. Compare Grote, Hist, of Gr., Vol. i. pp. 498, 499. 



46 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

is rendered popular, in order to extend the circle of 
learners, yet it is always based on scientific principles. 

Now the moral and political sciences are, it is true, 
treated in a scientific manner by speculative writers. 
The principles of these sciences, however, are involved 
in the practical questions, to which the daily business of 
life gives birth, and which are discussed in newspapers 
and pamphlets, at public meetings and in large legislative 
assemblies. The best-ascertained principles are therefore 
constantly liable to be disputed, misinterpreted, or mis- 
applied, by persons imperfectly acquainted with the sub- 
ject, who take it up hastily and with a special object, 
and who are acted on by gusts of popular passion, or by 
the interests of particular individuals or classes. In this 
manner, opinions on moral or political subjects are mul- 
tiplied, the authority of sound and scientific principles 
is weakened, the judgment of the public is distracted and 
perplexed, the difficulty of a selection of safe guides is 
increased, and an anarchical state of public opinion is 
created. On the other hand, it ought not to be over- 
looked that municipal or positive law, among the political 
sciences, receives an exclusively scientific and professional 
treatment; and hence the utility of institutions which 
promote an enlightened spirit among the leaders of the 
legal profession, and the importance of improvements in 
jurisprudence, as directing the moral sentiments of a 
nation. 

The inconvenience of a popular treatment of the 
moral sciences, proceeding concurrently and in a parallel 
line with their scientific treatment, is illustrated by 
Dr. Whewell's remarks upon those technical terms, which 
have a popular acceptation in common discourse as well 
as a precise scientific import. " Since (he says) they 
have a meaning in common language, a careless reader 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 47 

is prone to disregard the technical limitation of this 
meaning, and to attempt to collect their import in scien- 
tific books, in the same vague and conjectural manner 
in which he collects the purpose of words in common 
cases. Hence the language of science, when thus 
resembling common language, is liable to be employed 
with an absence of that scientific precision which alone 
gives it value. Popular writers and talkers, when they 
speak of force, momentum, action, and reaction, and the 
like, often afford examples of the inaccuracy thus arising 
from the scientific appropriation of common terms."* 
In like manner, the scientific discussions of questions in 
the political and ethical sciences often lose their preci- 
sion and value, when all the principal terms come to be 
expounded according to their loose and fluctuating 
applications in popular language. The practical result 
is, that the writer on the moral sciences is nearly de- 
barred from the use of technical terms, or that his use 
of them is unaccompanied with the advantage which 
results from them in the physical sciences. When he 
has affixed a precise and restricted meaning upon a 
term, and has framed a definition, not taken from his 
own arbitrary notions of clearness, but founded on an 
investigation of the properties of the class which it 
represents, his labour is vain as soon as the term comes 
to be employed in popular language ; its precision and 
restriction are lost as soon as it slips from his hand, 
and passes into the mouths of the multitude ; n d the 
propositions into which he has introduced it, with a 
technical sense, become, as they are now interpreted, 
either pointless and unmeaning, or paradoxical and false. 



Philos, of Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 52. 



48 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

The diversities of opinion generated by popular dis- 
cussion are further aggravated by the rival pretensions 
of theorists and practicians to be considered as guides 
and authorities in practical affairs. Theorists, by an 
observation of particulars, and by generalizing upon 
them, attempt to construct a system of scientific propo- 
sitions with respect to a certain subject; upon which 
system a set of rules intended for the guidance of 
practice may be founded. These rules form an art. 
Many scientific investigations have been conducted, and 
scientific treatises composed, by persons unpractised in 
the corresponding art; thus, Aristotle composed a treatise 
on rhetoric, though not himself an orator and practical 
rhetorician. Clerk's work on naval tactics is another 
instance of a scientific treatise by an unprofessional 
writer. In other cases, scientific inquiries and treatises 
are due to practicians, as on medical and physiological 
subjects.* 

When a science has been fully developed, and the 
principles of the corresponding art fixed, its rules are 
recognised or adopted with little dispute, and the prac- 
tice is in as good a state as the bounds of our knowledge 
permit. The arts of navigation and of geodesy may be 
cited as examples in point. When an art is in this 
matured state, there is an agreement between theorists 
and practicians, and the rules of the latter conform with 
the principles laid down by the former. But when a 
science is still in an immature state, or when its con- 
clusions are still unrecognised, the practical men continue 
to follow certain traditional maxims which have become 



* On the relations of science and art, or of theory and practice, 
see Comte, Cours de Philos. Positive, Tom. iii. p. 280; Tom. vi. 
pp. 751, 870. Mill, System of Logic, B. VI. c xi. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 49 

current among the people, and have obtained authority. 
A conflict then takes place between these two classes as 
to the standard by which practice is to be tried. The 
theorists urge the application of their doctrines to prac- 
tice; the practicians deny their competency as judges, 
and contest their capacity of applying their principles to 
actual life. Sometimes this conflict arises from the real 
difficulty which exists in applying all abstract principles 
and rules to concrete cases; inasmuch as they are neces- 
sarily founded on hypotheses, which do not exhaust all 
the circumstances of the actual case. But while a 
theory is still in an imperfect state, practical men, 
attempting to apply it in reality, discover its defects, 
and often condemn it overhastily in toto, because they 
have satisfied themselves that a part is erroneous. Now, 
a precipitate and indiscriminating rejection of a theory, 
which contains the seeds of truth, though mixed with 
error, is always to be regretted, for it is by the succes- 
sive experiments of practical men, verifying what is 
sound in a theory, rejecting what is unsound, and sug- 
gesting the requisite corrections, that sciences are esta- 
blished and enlarged. Art, indeed, in an empirical 
form, or a technical practice of some sort, is necessarily, 
in almost every case, anterior to the corresponding 
science; the principles and maxims of which are sug- 
gested by the facts with which the art has to deal.* 

When any science is in an imperfect but constantly 
advancing state, the weight of authority increases as 
the tendency to agreement begins to exhibit itself; as 
the lines of independent thought converge ; as rival 
opinions coalesce under a common banner ; as sects expire ; 



* See Whewell, Hist of Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 333. 
E 



50 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

as national schools and modes of thought and expression 
disappear ; as the transmission of erroneous and unverified 
opinions from one generation to another is interrupted 
by the recognition of newly-ascertained truths. It is by 
the gradual diminution of points of difference, and by 
the gradual increase of points of agreement, among men 
of science, that they acquire the authority which ac- 
credits their opinions, and propagates scientific truths. 
In general, it may be said that the authority of the pro- 
fessors of any science is trustworthy, in proportion as the 
points of agreement among them are numerous and im- 
portant, and the points of difference few and unim- 
portant. 

The doctrine of Agreement applies to scientific or 
speculative opinions; it does not apply to advice given 
on a single question of practice. In the latter case, the 
professional person consulted advises about the facts of 
a given case, and as his opinion is founded on a know- 
ledge of those facts, no general agreement can exist. It 
is only indirectly that the doctrine of agreement applies 
to opinions on practical questions. When a person has 
mastered the system which is sanctioned by the general 
consent of competent judges, and has combined expe- 
rience with this knowledge, he is likely to advise well in 
any question belonging to his subject. 

§ 12. A further assistance in the selection of guides 
to opinion may be derived from a consideration of the 
marks of Imposture or Charlatanism, in respect both to 
science and practice. If such marks can be found, they 
will afford an additional means of distinguishing mock 
sciences from true ones, — the charlatan from the true 
philosopher or sound practitioner. 

In the first place, we may observe that mock sciences 
are rejected, after a patient examination and study of 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 51 

facts, and not upon a hasty first impression, by the 
general agreement of competent judges. Such was the 
case with astrology, magic, and divination of all sorts, 
at the beginning of the last century ; which, having been 
reduced to a systematic form, and received by the general 
credulity, have since yielded to the light of reason.* 
The errors of the ancients in natural history, which were 
repeated by subsequent writers after the revival of letters, 
have been exploded by a similar process. The same may 
be said of the influence of the heavenly bodies upon 
diseases, believed at no distant date by scientific writers.f 
Mesmerism, homoeopathy, and phrenology, have now 
been before the world a sufficient time to be fairly and 
fully examined by competent judges; and as they have 
not stood the test of impartial scientific investigation, 
and therefore have not established themselves in pro- 
fessional opinion, they may be safely, on this ground 
alone, set down under the head of mock sciences; 
though, as in the case of alchemy, the researches to which 
they give rise, and the new hypotheses which they pro- 
mulgate, may assist in promoting genuine science. J 

True sciences establish themselves after a time, and 
acquire a recognised position in all civilized countries. 



* Upon the prevalence of the belief in astrology among educated 
and enlightened persons at the end of the 17th century, see some 
remarks by Dr. Johnson, in his Life of Butler. 

t See Dr. Mead's treatise concerning the influence of the sun 
and moon upon human bodies, and the diseases thereby produced. — 
Medical Works, p. 151. 

% See Nov. Org. I. aph. 85, where Bacon applies to the 
alchemists the fable of the old man, who told his sons, on dying, 
that a treasure was concealed in his vineyard, but he had forgotten 
the place; whereupon they fell to digging the ground in all direc- 
tions, and found no gold, but improved the cultivation of the vines. 

E 2 



52 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

Moreover, they connect themselves with other true 
sciences; analogies and points of contact between the 
new truth and truths formerly known are perceived. 
Such has been the case with Geology, which has only 
taken its place as a science founded on accurate and 
extensive observation during the present century. But 
while it has assumed an independent position, it has re- 
ceived great assistance from comparative anatomy and 
other apparently unconnected sciences, and has thrown 
light upon them in return. Discoveries in medicine, too, 
which rest on a firm basis, as vaccination and the opera- 
tion for aneurism, are after a few years brought to a 
certain test, and make their way in all countries. 
Pseudo-sciences, on the other hand, are not accredited 
by the consentient reception of professional judges, but 
remain in an equivocal and unaccepted state. No ana- 
logies or affiliations with genuine sciences are discovered ; 
the new comer continues an alien, unincorporated with 
the established scientific system; if any connexion is 
attempted to be proved, it is with another spurious 
science, as in the case of plireno-mesmerism, where one 
delusion is supported by another. Mock sciences, again, 
not making their way universally, are sometimes con- 
fined to a particular nation; or, at all events, to a 
limited body of sectarians, who stand aloof from the 
professors of the established science. 

Another means of distinguishing real from unreal 
sciences, may be found in the character and objects of 
the persons by whom they are respectively cultivated. 
The professors of genuine sciences, for the most part, 
make the investigation or the communication of truth 
their primary object. Even teachers, who are remu- 
nerated for their services, are in general careful to 
communicate only true and sound opinions to their 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 53 

disciples, and would consider the inculcation of error as 
a breach of their duty. The desire of knowing the 
truth is, indeed, no preservative against error. No 
such preservative exists. But the desire of ascertaining 
the truth is a necessary condition for ascertaining it. 
He who does not seek will not find. The charlatan, on 
the other hand, is almost invariably actuated by the 
love of gain. His purpose is to dupe the world, and to 
extract money from the pockets of his dupes. Paracelsus 
and Mesmer afford an example on a large scale ; a village 
mountebank on a small one. Occasionally, there may 
be the love of attracting attention, for its own sake, and 
a disinterested pleasure in cheating the world ; but gain 
is the leading motive. 

Some indications may likewise be derived from the 
form and method in which a new science is propounded. 
Genuine science is in general simple, precise, perspicuous, 
devoid of ornament, dry and unattractive, modest in its 
pretensions, free from all undue contrivances for exciting 
applause or obtaining attention. Charlatanism, on the 
other hand, is tricky, obtrusive, full of display — now 
wearing the mask of impassioned enthusiasm — now as- 
suming an aspect of solemn gravity, vague and mystical 
in its language, sometimes propounding elaborate schemes 
of new classification and nomenclature, dealing in vast 
promises and undertakings.* 

Imposture, however, particularly in the cases where it 
is combined with mysticism, is rarely altogether inten- 



* " There are three forms of speaking, which are, as it were, the 
style and phrase of imposture. The first kind is of them who, as 
soon as they have gotten any subject or matter, do straight cast it 
into an art, inventing new terms of art, reducing all into divisions 
and distinctions; thence drawing assertions or positions, and so 



54 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

tional, and the result of mere knavery. There is a close 
affinity between imposture and credulity : a credulous 
man is generally a deceiver, and believes the delusions 
with which he ensnares the faith of others.* This is 
often the case with philosophical as well as religious 
enthusiasts. Pythagoras, for example, so far as we can 
discern him in the dim distance, may apparently be 
taken as a type of the union between the man of science 
and the impostor : and the same may doubtless be said 
of Van Helmont, and many of the other professors of 
mystical medicine, alchemists, astrologers, diviners, 
theosophs, and masters of occult sciences, whose lives are 
collected in the seven volumes of Adelung's curious 
History of Human Folly. f Nothing is more striking, 
in this repertory of self-deceit and imposture, than the 



framing oppositions by questions and answers. Hence issueth the 
cobwebs and clatterings of the schoolmen. 

" The second kind is of them who, out of the vanity of their wit, 
(as church poets,) do make and devise all variety of tales, stories, 
and examples, whereby they may lead men's minds to a belief, from 
whence did grow the legends and infinite fabulous inventions and 
dreams of the ancient heretics. 

" The third kind is of them who fill men's cares [qu. ears'] with 
mysteries, high parables, allegories, and illusions, which mystical 
and profound form many of the heretics also made choice of. By 
the first kind of these the capacity and wit of man is fettered and 
entangled; by the second, it is trained on and inveigled ; by the 
third, it is astonished and enchanted; but by every of them the 
while it is seduced and abused." — Lord Bacon, Of the several hinds 
of Imposture. Worhs, vol. i. p. 214; ed. Montagu. 
* See Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 42. 

t Geschichte der menschlichen narrheit, oder lebensbeschrei- 
bungen beruhmter schwarzkunstler, goldmacher, teufelsbanner, 
zeichen-und liniendeuter, schwarmer, wahrsager, und anderer phi- 
losophischer unholden. Leipzig, 1785 — 9. 7 vols. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 55 

gigantic dimensions of the supposed discoveries of these 
pseudo-philosophers, compared with their actual per- 
formances, and with the powers which man really 
possesses over outward nature. At every turn we meet 
with infallible remedies, with universal medicines — 
with receipts for changing one substance into another — 
with new methods of a universal philosophy. The per- 
formances of these " homines vaniloqui et phantastici," 
who, partly from credulity, and partly from imposture, 
a genus humanum promissis onerarunt," stand (according 
to Bacon's comparison) in the same relation to the works 
of genuine philosophers, as the exploits of Amadis de 
Gaul or King Arthur, to those of Julius Caesar or Alex- 
ander the Great.* 

No species of imposture is so captivating, so well- 
suited to the present time, and consequently so likely 
to meet with temporary success, as that which assumes 
the garb, and mimics the phraseology, of science. As 
hypocrisy has been said to be the homage which vice 
renders to virtue, so is the imitation of scientific forms 
the homage which imposture renders to science; it is, 
however, a species of homage by which the vassal often 
obtains, for a time, a superiority over the lord. Still, 
the existence of a scientific spirit, on which the delusion 
rests, proves, in the end, too strong for the delusion itself. 
Those who, with a mere smattering of scientific know- 
ledge, seek to impose on the multitude by a parade of 
mystical jargon, and a whole apparatus of learned phrase- 
ology, are quickly detected by competent and instructed 
judges. Their mode of proceeding is, in fact, only one 
degree removed above that of the well-known impostor 



* Nov. Org. I. aph. 87. 



56 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

in the novel, with his quotations of Greek and his 
appeals to Sanchoniathon and Berosus. " Qui stultis 
videri eruditi volunt, stulti eruditis videntur." * 

Even, therefore, if we are unable, from want of time 
or opportunity, or the requisite knowledge, to form an 
independent judgment upon a new scientific system, we 
may nevertheless be able to judge if the writer has pur- 
sued a sound and correct method of investigation, and 
if he has conformed to the rules by which the most emi- 
nent discoverers in that branch of science have been 
guided. If we find that a vitious method has been pur- 
sued, and that the requisite securities and precautions 
against error have not been adopted, we may reasonably 
distrust his fitness to guide our judgment. 

Nothing is more characteristic of the pretender to 
philosophy than his readiness to explain, without exami- 
nation or reflection, all phenomena which may be pre- 
sented to him. Doubt, hesitation, suspense of the judg- 
ment, inquiry before decision, balancing of apparently 
opposite facts, followed, perhaps, by a qualified and pro- 
visional opinion, — all these are processes utterly foreign 
to his mind, and indicative, in his view, of nothing but 
weakness and ignorance. Inasmuch as his real know- 
ledge is shallow, limited, and unprecise, it is nearly as 
easy for him to explain one thing as another; and his 
universal systems of philosophy are doubtless equally 
true for all subjects. f 



* Quintil. Hist. Orat. X. 7, § 21. 
t Fontenelle, Hist, des Oracles, Diss. I. ch. iv., after narrating 
the story of the boy with the supposed golden tooth, as an example 
of the ingenuity of philosophers in explaining false facts, proceeds 
thus: "Rien n'est plus naturel que d'en faire autant sur toutes 
sortes de matieres. Je ne suis pas si convaincu de notre ignorance 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 57 

It has been already remarked that, in the present 
state of our knowledge, the physical are better ascer- 
tained than the moral sciences. There is, however, one 
important exception to the comparative certainty of the 
physical sciences — viz., the science and art of medicine. 
The anatomy of the human body has been carefully 
studied, and is well understood. Pathology and the 
nature of diseases have likewise been carefully explored, 
and reduced to system; but they are still enveloped in 
much obscurity. Still more are the diagnosis of dis- 
eases in the living subject, and the treatment of them, 
(or therapeutics,) subject to great uncertainty. Dif- 
ferent opinions as to the nature of the malady with 
which any living person is afflicted, and as to the mode 
of treating it if ascertained, may be held by eminent 
professors of medicine, recognised by their profession as 
competent judges. Moreover, even in a case where there 
is a generally received mode of treatment, and where 
the diagnosis is certain, the patient, from ignorance of 
the limited powers of the medical art, is often unreason- 
able in his expectations, and dissatisfied with the pro- 
ceedings of the regular practitioner. Being unable, 
from defect of knowledge, to judge of the mode of treat- 
ment, he judges merely by the event, and if this does 
not correspond with his anticipations, he condemns the 
physician. Owing to these causes, medical practice 
always has been the favourite field of charlatans,* and 



par les choses qui sont, et dont la raison nous est inconnue, que par 
celles qui ne sont point, et dont nous trouvons la raison. Cela veut 
dire que, non seulement nous n'avons pas les principes qui menent 
au vrai, mais nous en avons d'autres qui s'accommodent tres bien 
avec le faux." 

* According to the fable of Phaedrus, a bad cobbler, unable to 



58 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

their success is proportionate to the credulity and igno- 
rance of the public. Medical impostors generally deal 
largely in panaceas and specifics — -in infallible and uni- 
versal remedies. Their success — so far as they are able 
to impose upon the public — is owing partly to the diffi- 
culty of ascertaining the true origin and nature of 
disease during life, and to the still greater difficulty of 
finding any means of removing or mitigating the disease 
when ascertained. The success of the charlatan is gene- 
rally proportioned to the obscurity of the malady, and 
the uncertainty of the treatment. Hence, he selects 
medical rather than surgical cases; and among medical 
cases, those which are chronic and constitutional, rather 
than those which are acute, and have a clearly defined 
seat.* 



gain a livelihood, took to practising medicine. The king sent for 
him, and proposed to him to find an antidote for a cup of poison: 
Timore mortis ille tunc professus est, 
Non artis ulla medicse se prudentia, 
Verum stupore vulgi, factum nobilem. 

(I. 14.) 

Lord Bacon remarks of medicine, that "its subject (the human 
body) being so variable, hath made the art by consequence more 
conjectural; an art being conjectural hath made so much the more 
place to be left for imposture." Other arts are judged by their 
acts or masterpieces, but physicians, and perhaps politicians, are 
judged only by the event. " "We see the weakness and credulity of 
men is such, as they will often prefer a mountebank or witch be- 
fore a learned physician In all times, in the opinion of the 

multitude, witches and old women and impostors have had a com- 
petition with physicians." — Adv. of Learn, vol. ii. p. 159. M. Comte, 
(Cours de Phil. Positive, torn. iii. p. 612 — 14,) remarks upon the 
prevalence of charlatanism in medicine, which he attributes to the 
unsettled and unsatisfactory state of physiological science. 

* The words which express the idea of charlatan generally agree 
in the common idea of loquacity and noise ; a clamorous attempt to 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 59 

§ 13. Lastly, it is worthy of consideration, what 
countries are important with reference to the general 
agreement of opinion. 

In determining the question as to the existence of a 
consensus of opinions on any speculative subject, it would 
be absurd to take barbarous or half-civilized communities 
into the account. Whether the question concerned the 
physical or the moral sciences, it would be needless to 
inquire what are the opinions of Australian savages, or 
of the native African or American tribes, or even of the 
Chinese, the Hindus, the Persians, or the Turks, on the 
subject. For, although these Oriental nations are not to 
be confounded with uncivilized societies, and although 
they have, at different periods, made considerable pro- 
gress in literature and the useful arts, yet their progress, 
both in political institutions and scientific knowledge, 
has been so limited, as to place them on a low intellectual 
level. u The prevalence of vague, visionary, and barren 
notions among these nations," (says Dr. Whewell,) " can- 
not surprise us ; for we have no evidence from them, as 
from Europeans we have, that they are capable, on sub- 
jects of physical speculation, of originating sound and 



attract the attention of a crowd is a leading characteristic of the 
charlatan. 

The Greek yorjg was originally a sorcerer, who howled over his 
magic rites. In Italian, ciarlatano is from ciarlare, to chatter 
(hence the French charlatan): cantambanco and saltimbanco derive 
their names from the habit of standing on a bench to address the 
people and exhibit their drugs, &c, like the English mountebank. 
Quacksalber, German, and quacksalver, English, (whence quack, 
by abbreviation,) are derived from the garrulity of the itinerant 
vender of drugs and nostrums. The German quackeln corresponds 
to our cackle. 'AyvpmQ, a collector of alms or money, resembles 
the Latin circulator, a vagrant mountebank. 



60 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

rational general principles. The arts may have had 
their birth in all parts of the globe; but it is only- 
Europe, at particular favoured periods of its history, 
which has ever produced sciences." * 

Our field of vision may therefore be narrowed to the 
civilized nations of Europe, at the head of which we may 
place the Greeks, together with the Eomans, whose 
scientific and literary cultivation was of Hellenic origin. 
All the branches of knowledge, not even excepting J:he 
moral sciences, have made an immense, though an 
unequal, progress since the close of ancient history : the 
world has likewise, since that era, obtained the expe- 
rience of many centuries, in which contemporary facts 
have been recorded with more or less diligence and 
accuracy. Nevertheless, the origin of all positive science 
and philosophy, as well as of all literature and art, in 
the forms in which they exist in civilized Europe, must 
be traced to the Greeks, and therefore the opinions of 
that extraordinary people can never be indifferent to us, 
even on subjects in which they have been far outstripped 
by modern discovery. They made the first great step 
from barbarism to scientific knowledge, which, perhaps, 
is more difficult and more important than any further 
advance which they left to be made by their succes- 
sors. 

On turning our eyes to modern nations, it can scarcely 
be disputed that France and Germany, on the continent 
of Europe, together with England, stand at the head of 
contemporary science and literature. Whatever pecu- 
liarities and excellences may belong to the national 
character of each, the decision of competent judges in 



Hist, of Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 302. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 61 

these three countries must be admitted to be of para- 
mount importance. With these may be ranked, as 
partaking of the same degree of civilization, and enjoying 
free institutions in education and religion, Holland, 
Belgium, and Switzerland, together with the three Scan- 
dinavian nations of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. 
Italy, to whom Europe owes so large a debt of gratitude 
for the revival of literature, of the arts, and of philo- 
sophy, after the stagnation of the mediaeval period, has, 
on account of the long-continued suppression of free dis- 
cussion and education by its various governments, lay 
and ecclesiastical, lost its former and well-merited pre- 
eminence. The benumbing influence of the Inquisition, 
of a severe censorship of the press, reaching uninter- 
ruptedly from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, 
and of despotic governments administered (with some 
remarkable exceptions) in a jealous and coercive spirit, 
has reduced Italy to a secondary intellectual position ; 
though it has never been able to extinguish all sparks of 
the fire which she had derived from her early cultiva- 
tion. Let us hope, however, that the recent political 
changes may lead to her intellectual emancipation and 
improvement, without exposing her to the evils of civil 
war, revolution, and social anarchy. The Spanish 
Peninsula has been reduced to intellectual decrepitude 
by the same causes which operated in Italy, but more 
intense in their force, and therefore acting with more 
decisive effect. Besides, after the revival of letters, 
Spain had, in every department of science and art, 
shown less mental vigour and activity than the kin- 
dred peninsula to the East. It had, therefore, less 
elasticity of force opposed to a more powerful com- 
pression, and hence, independence of thought, which had 



62 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

only been crippled in Italy, was fairly annihilated in 
Spain.* 

The kingdom of Greece has been too recently released 
from its Turkish yoke, and made a member of the 
European family of nations, to hold, as yet, any place in 
the intellectual scale. In Kussia, civilization is still an 
exotic, and it has never fairly taken an independent 
root among this semi-oriental people. 

In the United States of America, the places of educa- 
tion are gradually forming a body of scientific professors ; 
the study of jurisprudence and of some branches of poli- 
tics has made great progress ; the physical sciences are 
not neglected, and an active taste for literature pervades 
the whole country. The other American States appear 
to have no mental cultivation, and are even below their 
parent States, Spain and Portugal. As to the colonies 
and settlements of the European nations, so far as they 
are young communities, occupied with taming the wild 
earth, and performing the functions of pioneers of civi- 
lization, they cannot enjoy much leisure or opportunity 
for mental cultivation. But they are insensibly imbued 
with the opinions and culture of the mother country, 
and, by degrees, take their place in the great civilized 
community. 

§ 14. We have now endeavoured to show what are 
the indications by which trustworthy authority, in 
matters of opinion, may be best recognised. As has been 
already remarked, there is a necessity for inquiry, and 
room for judgment and discretion, in the application of 
these tests, and thus we may observe that judicious and 
discreet persons generally choose safe and able guides, 



* Compare Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, torn. vi. pp. 32, 
631—642. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 63 

in matters where they cannot, or ought not, to judge for 
themselves ; whereas unwise persons select unsound 
guides, who, from ignorance, inexperience, or weakness 
of judgment, are incapable of giving them good advice. 
Sometimes, indeed, the latter class of persons are so 
credulous that they fall into the hands of impostors, 
who intentionally mislead them for interested purposes. 

In the choice of guides of opinion, a double option is 
exercised. First, a person decides whether he will 
judge for himself, or rely on the opinion of others ; and 
secondly, having decided in favour of the latter alter- 
native, he has an option as to the guide whom he will 
select. Even when he has made this selection, he may, 
if he think fit, reject the opinion of the person whom 
he has selected. Nothing, therefore, can be more ex- 
clusively a man's own act than the choice of his guides 
and the adoption of their opinion. But, partly because 
the mind, when the choice has once been made, is passive 
in following an opinion, and partly because the word 
authority sometimes signifies compulsory power, it seems 
to be believed that a deference to authority, in matters 
of opinion, implies some coercive influence on the under- 
standing. If, however, such a belief is ever entertained, 
it is erroneous. The submission of the understanding 
to the opinion of another is purely voluntary, at more 
than one stage. The choice of a guide is as much a 
matter of free determination, as the adoption of an 
opinion on argumentative grounds. If I believe a truth 
in astronomy or optics because men of science believe it 
— if I adopt the advice of a physician or lawyer in a 
question of practice, my decision is as free and uncon- 
strained as if I judged for myself without assistance, 
although I arrive at the conclusion by a different road. 

§ 15. Hence, too, we may see that the opposition 



64 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. 

which is sometimes made between Authority and Eeason* 
rests on a confusion of thought. Authority is un- 
doubtedly opposed to reasoning, if, by reasoning, we 
understand a process of appropriate inquiry conducted 
by the person himself. But between Authority and 
Reason there is no opposition, nor does the one exclude 
the other. 

In the first place, as has been just remarked, a person 
who chooses his own guides, chooses them by the light 
of his own reason ; he exercises a free and unconstrained 
choice; and although the process of reasoning through 
which he travels does not bear directly upon his con- 
clusion, it bears directly upon the means of leading him 
safely to that conclusion. From the ultimate respon- 
sibility of this determination nothing can relieve him. 
A Eoman Catholic, who relies implicitly upon the au- 
thority of his own church, must decide for himself to 
prefer that authority to the authority of other churches ; 
or (what comes to the same,) to deny to other religious 
communions the appellation of churches. In the last 
result, he is driven of necessity to the exercise of private 
individual judgment. The appropriate grounds of 
decision may be removed from us a few steps by an 
intermediate process ; but the selection of our authority, 
and our reliance upon it, must be the work of our own 
reason. 

In the second place, it cannot be presumed, generally, 
that an appropriate process of reasoning upon any sub- 
ject is a better or wiser principle of judgment than a 



* See, for example, Hume's Essay XVI., near the beginning — 
Works, vol. iii. p. 561; "WheweU's Hist, of the Ind. Sciences, vol. i. 
p. 312 ; and the Pasquinade of Boileau, cited by him, vol. ii. 
p. 138. 



III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 65 

recourse to the authority of others. Even in speculative 
subjects, a person whose time, or habits of thought and 
study, do not incline him to a particular department of 
knowledge, may reasonably adopt the views of persons 
who are conversant with it. In practice, however, where 
special attainments and experience are necessary for a 
safe decision, a man who prefers his own judgment to 
that of competent advisers certainly does not follow either 
a wise or a usual course. It surely cannot be laid down 
as a general thesis, that a private individual is likely, 
in professional matters, to judge better than professional 
men. A person who thinks that in legal matters his 
own judgment is better than that of a lawyer, in medical 
matters better than that of a physician, in questions of 
building better than that of an architect, &c, is not 
likely to find that the rectitude of his practical decisions 
corresponds with the independence of his judgment. In 
such cases, (as we shall show more fully in a subsequent 
chapter,) reason does not forbid, but prescribes a reliance 
upon authority. Where a person is necessarily ignorant 
of the grounds of decision, to decide for himself is an 
act of suicidal folly. He ought to recur to a competent 
adviser, as a blind man relies upon a guide. 



66 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 



CHAPTER IV. 

ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY 
TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 

§ 1. In the preceding chapter a description has been 
given of the process by which, in scientific matters, an 
agreement of the competent judges, and consequently a 
body of trustworthy authority, is gradually formed.* 

In each subject, the first attempts at a scientific treat- 
ment are crude, imperfect, and alloyed with rash 
hypotheses; and there is much hasty induction from 
single facts or partial phenomena. Numerous discor- 
dant opinions thus arise, and there are rival schools and 
sects, each with its own set of distinctive tenets. But, 
by degrees, some system or body of doctrine acquires the 
ascendancy; there is an approach to agreement in im- 
portant matters ; a progressive improvement, a gradual 
advance, are visible; the controversies begin to turn 
chiefly on subordinate points, and peculiar opinions are 
no longer handed down in schools by a succession of mas- 
ters and disciples. Certain doctrines cease to predomi- 
nate in certain countries ; they are no longer hereditary 
or local, but are common to the whole scientific world. 
They are diffused by the force of mere evidence and 
demonstration acting upon the reason of competent 



* There is an Essay by Lord Bolingbroke concerning Au- 
thority in matters of Religion, vols. vi. and vii. of his fVorhs ; but 
its contents do not correspond with its title. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 67 

judges — not by persecution, or reward, or the influence 
of the civil government. A trustworthy authority is 
thus at length formed, to which a person, uninformed on 
the subject, may reasonably defer, satisfied that he 
adopts those opinions which, so far as existing researches 
and reflection have gone, are the most deserving of 
credit. 

§ 2. This description, however, is not applicable 
to religion, or at least is only applicable to it within 
certain limits. 

All mankind, at all times, and in all countries (with 
the exception, perhaps of some of the lowest tribes of 
savages) have agreed in recognising some form of re- 
ligious belief. All nations have believed in the existence 
of some supernatural and supersensual beings, whose 
favour they have sought to obtain, and whose dis- 
pleasure they have sought to avert, by sacrifices, prayers, 
and other ceremonies of worship. The argument of 
consensus gentium applies with peculiar force to the belief 
in a divine power, and accordingly it has always been 
placed in the front rank by writers on Natural Religion. 
Thus Cicero, speaking of the existence of a supreme 
God, says, " Quod nisi cognitum comprehensumque 
animis haberemus, non tarn stabilis opinio permaneret, 
nee confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nee una cum 
sseculis aetatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset. 
Etenim videmus caateras opiniones fictas atque vanas 

diuturnitate extabuisse Opinionum enim com- 

menta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat".* A passage 
from the Dissertations of Maximus Tyrius, a Greek 
philosopher who lived in the age of the Antonines, has 



* De Nat. Deor. II. 2. 
F 2 



68 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

often been quoted by modern writers as a proof of the 
general diffusion of a religious belief among the ancient 
nations : — " In the midst of universal disagreement and 
discord as to the divine attributes, and as to laws and 
customs, (he says,) one uniform maxim and doctrine 
may be seen in every land — that there is one God, the 
supreme governor and father of all, and many Gods, his 
sons and joint rulers. This the Greek says — this the 
barbarian — this the dweller on the mainland and the 
dweller on the sea- coast — the wise and foolish. " # 

Among modern writers it is sufficient to cite the 
words of Bishop Burnet : — " That there is a God, is a 
proposition which, in all ages, has been so universally 
received and believed, some very few instances being 
only assigned of such as either have denied or doubted 
of it, that the very consent of so many ages and nations, 
of such different tempers and languages, so vastly remote 
from one another, has been long esteemed a good argu- 
ment to prove that either there is somewhat in the 
nature of man, that by a secret sort of instinct does dic- 
tate this to him; or that all mankind has descended 
from one common stock, and that this belief has passed 
down from the first man to all his posterity. If the 
more polite nations had only received this, some might 
suggest that wise men had introduced it as a mean to 
govern human society, and to keep it in order: or if 
only the more barbarous had received this, it might be 
thought to be the effect of their fear and their ignorance ; 
but since all sorts, as well as all ages, of men have re- 



* Diss. XVII. 5, vol. i. p. 316; Reiske. Compare Cud worth, 
Syst. Intellect, vol. i. p. 685; ed. Mosheim, 1773; and Leland, 
Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation shown from 
the State of Religion in the Ancient World, vol. i. p. 422. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 69 

ceived it, this alone goes a great way to assure us of the 
being of a God."* 

It is, undoubtedly, true that, in the positive religions, 
and in the sacred rites, practices, and doctrines of the 
pagan world, the greatest diversity has existed ; and not 
only between barbarous or half-civilized tribes, but among 
the Greek and Eoman philosophers, whose controversies 
on the nature of the gods were interminable.f But in 
the substantial recognition of a Divine power, super- 
human and imperceptible by our senses, all nations have 
agreed. 

§ 3. The agreement, moreover, does not stop here. 
All the civilized nations of the modern world, together 
with their colonies and settlements, in all parts of the 
earth, agree, not merely in believing in the existence of 
a God — a belief which they have in common with Maho- 
metans, Hindus, and heathens generally — but in re- 
cognising some form of the Christian religion. Christen- 
dom includes the entire civilized world — that is to say, 
all nations whose agreement on a matter of opinion has 
any real weight or authority. 

§ 4. When, however, we advance a step beyond this 
point, and inquire how far there is a general agreement 
throughout Christendom with respect to any particular 
form of Christianity, and whether all Christians are 
members of one church, recognising the same set of 
doctrines, we find a state of things wholly different. We 



* Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles. On Art. I. 

■f Qui vero deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varietate ac dissen- 
sione, ut eorum molestum sit dinumerare sententias. Nam et de 
figuris deorum, et de locis atque sedibus, et actione vitae multa 
dicuntur: deque his summa philosophorum dissensione certatur. — 
Cicero de Nat. Deor. T. 1. 



70 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

perceive a variety of churches, some confined to a single 
country, some common to several countries, but each 
with its own ecclesiastical superiors and peculiar creed, 
and each condemning the members of other churches as 
heretics, schismatics, separatists, and dissenters, or, at 
least, as infected with grave errors; and sometimes not 
even recognising them as Christians.* 

§ 5. Various causes have conspired to prevent a 
general agreement throughout the civilized world re- 
specting the particular doctrines of Christianity. The 
Christian religion first assumed a dogmatic form in the 
hands of the later Greeks, who had received from their 
ancestors the inheritance of a subtle, refined, and abstruse 
metaphysical philosophy. This instrument of reasoning 
and exposition they applied to the Christian religion, 
and particularly to its more mysterious portions; such 
as the doctrine of the Trinity, the relations of the three 
Divine persons, and their common essence or substance; 
the union of the Divine and human natures in the 
Saviour; and the procession of the Holy Ghost. 
At a later time, the Christian theology, now reduced 
to a more systematic form, passed through the hands of 
the schoolmen, and was treated in the spirit of the scho- 



* For a complete account of the distribution of the several Chris- 
tian communions over the world, the constitution and tenets of 
each church, their mutual relations, and other characteristics, see 
the Kirchliche Statistik of Dr. Wiggers, 2 vols. 8vo; Hamburg, 
1842 and 1843. According to a calculation cited by him in vol. i. 
p. 22, the chief divisions of Christendom consist of the following 
numbers: — 

Roman Catholics . . 142,145,000 
Protestants .... 62,785,000 
Greek Church . . . 57,110,000 
Armenians, Copts, &c. 5,850,000 



IY.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 71 

lastic philosophy.* Afterwards, the Eeformation awakened 
new controversies, or gave increased importance to old 
ones, concerning the eucharistic sacrament, the commu- 
nion of the laity in both kinds, and the alleged substan- 
tial change and real presence in the consecrated elements ; 
also as to the nature and operation of grace and good 
works, and the theory of original sin, regeneration, 
justification, and predestination. These, combined with 
other questions as to church authority, tradition, general 
councils, the power of the pope and of national churches, 
episcopal government, ecclesiastical ceremonies and vest- 
ments, monastic vows, ordination, celibacy of the clergy, 
auricular confession, purgatory, baptism, individual in- 
spiration, &c, have served to divide Christians into 
numerous churches and sects, and to keep up continual 
controversies between their respective advocates, which 
have never received any final settlement, and, when 
intermitted, are rather discontinued than decided. 
The difficulty of determining the controversies re- 



* " It was gravely said by some of the prelates in the Council of 
Trent, where the doctrine of the schoolmen bare great sway, that 
the schoolmen were like astronomers, which did feign eccentrics 
and epicycles, and such engines of orbs, to save the phenomena, 
though they knew there were no such things; and, in like manner, 
that the schoolmen had framed a number of subtle and intricate 
axioms and theorems to save the practice of the Church." — Lord 
Bacon, Essay XVII. 

In his Novum Org anon he speaks of the Theologi Scholastici — 
" qui cum theologiam (satis pro potestate) in ordinem redegerint et 
in artis formam effinxerint, hoc insuper effecerunt, ut pugnax et 
spinosa Aristotelis philosophia corpori religionis plus quam par 
erat immisceretur." — Lib. I. Aph. 89. Compare his Apophthegms, 
274, 275, where a dictum of some Roman divines concerning the 
canons of the Council of Trent is reported; " that they were be- 
holden to Aristotle for many articles of their faith." 






72 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

spec ting the different questions to which the interpre- 
tation of the Christian records has given rise is, in great 
measure, owing to the fact that religion, as such, is con- 
versant with matters which are neither the subjects of 
consciousness or intuition, nor within the range of the 
senses. This is necessarily the case with all questions 
concerning the nature of the Deity and his attributes; 
his permanent relations with mankind; and the state 
of human existence after death. Upon these subjects, 
we have no experience, derived either from internal 
consciousness or external sensation, to guide us; and, 
accordingly, not only the abstract reasonings of natural 
religion, but the interpretation of the records of revealed 
religion, give rise to questions, for the settlement of 
which it is difficult to find any decisive rule of 
judgment. 

§ 6. Owing to the operation of these causes, the 
various Christian churches and sects into which the 
civilized world is divided continue to co-exist side by 
side with one another, and show little or no tendency 
to coalesce into a common belief, or to recognise a com- 
mon organ of religious truth. Eeligious opinions thus 
become hereditary, and national or local ; they sometimes 
run on for centuries in parallel lines, without converging 
to a central focus of agreement. 

Opinions on scientific matters, although they may 
spring from different sources, and follow for a time dis- 
tinct courses, at last flow together into one main stream ; 
whereas the distinctive tenets of the several Christian 
churches not only spring from different sources, but con- 
tinue to run in different channels. 

The religious state of Europe since the Eeformation 
bears witness to the truth of this description. The 
boundaries of religion, which were fixed in the sixteenth 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 73 

and seventeenth centuries, remain more unchanged than 
those of states.* A peculiar form of Christianity is, in 
each district of Europe, handed down faithfully from 
one generation to another. National laws and consti- 
tutions, and forms of civil government, undergo funda- 
mental changes. Even national manners and usages 
are modified by the reciprocal intercourse of persons 
and ideas which trade, literature, and newspapers 
promote, and by progressive inventions and improve- 
ments in the arts of civilized life. But national and 
local churches propagate their peculiar modes of 
faith and ecclesiastical discipline, without feeling the 
influence of the ideas which are moving in external 
spheres. Each continues to revolve in its own orbit, 
without altering its course, or approximating to other 
bodies.f 

We may discern a certain analogy between the per- 
petuation of a particular form of Christianity, and the 
perpetuation of a particular language. Both belong to 
a class of which the forms are various ; but each variety, 
having once arisen, is unchanging, and, when adopted 
by a nation, remains. Both prevail locally, and are 
transmitted, by a faithful tradition, from father to son. 
Moreover, it often happens that both are diffused by 
colonization or conquest. 

The diversity of Christian creeds is the more appa- 
rent, when it is contrasted with the general uniformity 



* On this subject, see the remarks of Mr. Macaulay, Essays, 
vol. ii. p. 304. {On Lord Bacon.) 

t With respect to the fusion of the peculiar creed of each nation 
with its native institutions, and the present equilibrium of opposite 
forces in the Christian world, see the observations of Prof. Ranke, 
in Note A. at the end of the chapter. 



74 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

upon moral questions which prevails throughout the 
civilized world. Amongst all civilized nations, a nearly 
uniform standard of morality is recognised: the same 
books on ethical subjects are consulted for the guidance 
of life; and if the practice differs, the difference is not, 
in general, owing to a diversity of theoretical rules of 
conduct.* It will be observed, that the great contro- 
versies between the Christian sects either turn upon 
questions which have no direct bearing upon human con- 
duct, (such as the doctrines of the Trinity and tran- 
substantiation,) or upon forms of church government 
and discipline, which are matters of positive institution. 
They rarely turn upon the moral doctrines which are 
involved in Christianity. Upon these, there is a pre- 
vailing tendency and approximation to an agreement.f 

Scientific opinions follow a certain law of progressive 
development. While error is gradually diminished, truth 
is established, by a continually enlarging consensus, like 
the successive circles made upon the surface of water. 
Opinion, however, in the several Christian churches, 
with respect to their distinctive tenets, is rather variable 
than progressive. It oscillates backwards and forwards, 
but does not tend by a joint action to a common centre. 

This permanent diversity of religious opinions through- 
out Christendom, exists not only in spite of the attempts 
which have been made to produce uniformity of belief, 



* Compare the celebrated passage of Cicero, on the universality 
of the moral law as to time and place. — De Rep. III. 22. 

t Perhaps one of the most practical of the tenets controverted 
between the Roman and Protestant churches is that relating to 
marriage, with respect to its indissolubility and its contraction 
within certain degrees of affinity. The Predestinarian doctrines, 
as has been often remarked, exercise little influence upon conduct. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 75 

but partly even in consequence of them. Governments 
have attempted to extirpate religious error by persecu- 
tion, and to favour religious truth by endowment ; but 
as the governments of different countries adopted dif- 
ferent creeds, that which was considered religious error 
by one government was considered religious truth by 
another. Hence, although governments have succeeded 
to a certain extent in producing uniformity of faith in 
their own territory by persecution, (as in Italy and 
Spain,) yet they have not been able to prevent other 
governments from encouraging the opinions which they 
discouraged. This has been the case with communities 
immediately contiguous to each other, and included even 
within the same national federation. Thus, after the 
thirty years' war, some of the German States remained 
Protestant and others Catholic, and the mutual rights of 
the two confessions were guaranteed by solemn treaty. 
And the Catholic and Protestant Cantons of Switzer- 
land remain as they were left by the great reformation. 
In other countries, as in Ireland, the faith of one sect 
has resisted all attempts of the government to produce 
uniformity, and the ancient landmarks of religion have 
been maintained in defiance of the endeavours of the 
civil power to obliterate them. 

§ 7. Now, it must not be supposed that this diversity 
of religious opinions, and the existence of heterodox sects 
within the pale of Christianity, has escaped the notice of 
the heads of the church. On the contrary, it has at- 
tracted the incessant attention of theologians and theo- 
logical politicians for ages, as indeed is sufficiently ap- . 
parent from the ineffectual attempts of governments to 
produce uniformity of religious belief, already alluded to. 
It has always been perceived and admitted that diversity 
of opinion, in religious as well as in scientific matters, is 



76 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

necessarily a mark of error, and that, of several con- 
flicting or discordant opinions, one only can be true.* 
It has, therefore, been the great aim of writers on 
theology, to whatever sect or denomination they might 
belong, to discover one standard or canon of religious 
truth, which should be universally applicable to the 
Christian world, should serve as a decisive authority in 
matters of faith, and thus give unity to the church. f 
All Christians, whatever might be their creed, would 
be glad to find any living person, or body of persons, 
whom they could conscientiously recognise as an infal- 
lible organ and exponent of religious truth. The 
general feeling on this subject is bluntly expressed by 
Dryden, in his Religio Laid, — 

Such an omniscient church we wish indeed; 
'Twere worth both Testaments, cast in the creed. 



* Cicero makes the following remarks upon the diversity of the 
religious opinions of his time: " Res nulla est de qua tantopere non 
solum indocti, sed etiam docti dissentiant; quorum opiniones cum 
tarn variae sint, tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto 
potest, ut earum nulla, alterum certe non potest, ut plus una vera 
sit." — De Nat. Deor. I. 2. Bossuet lays down the same maxim with 
respect to Christianity: " Lorsque, parmi les Chretiens, on a vu 
des variations dans l'exposition de la foi, on les a toujours regardees 
comme une marque de faussete" et d'inconsequence (qu'on me per- 
mette ce mot) dans la doctrine exposee." — Variations des Eglises 
Protestantes, Pref. § 2. 

t Sir T. More told his son-in-law and biographer, Roper, that 
if three things were well established in Christendom, he wished he 
were put into a sack and thrown into the Thames. The second of 
these three wishes was, that " whereas the church of Christ is at 
present sore afflicted with many errors and heresies, it were well 
settled in perfect uniformity of religion." — Lord Campbell's Lives 
of the Chancellors, vol. i. ch. xxxii. See also Lord Bacon's 
Essay on Unity in Religion, and his Tract on Church Controversies, 
vol. ii. p. 28—60. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 77 

§ 8. A large portion of the Christian world, viz., the 
Church of Rome and the Eastern Churches, together with 
that section of the Church of England which approxi- 
mates to the Roman doctrine, make the standard of 
religious truth to consist in the teaching of the church. 
They profess to be able to lay down certain marks of the 
true church ; and having determined the true church by 
means of these marks, they hold that whatever this 
church teaches is true, and is entitled to belief without 
examination, simply because the church so teaches.* 

§ 9. But when these marks come to be examined, it 
will be found that they are so vague and obscure as 
merely to shift the ground of controversy, and that there 
is as much doubt and difference of opinion respecting 
the determination of the marks, or their application to 
a particular church, as concerning the doctrines which 
that church teaches. 

In the first place, an attempt is made to determine 
the true church by representing it as " catholic" or 
" universal." But it cannot be disputed that, from the 
Apostolic age, there have been divisions among Christians, 
and separatist or heretical bodies, which prevented the 
universal reception of any one orthodox faith amongst 
the professors of the Christian religion.f Even in the 



* See Mohler's Symbolik, § 37; Palmer's Treatise on the 
Church of Christ, Part I. c. ii.; Burnet on Art. XIX. The 
marks of the true church, adopted by the Church of Rome, (see 
Catechismus Cone. Trid., Pars I. c. x.,) and retained by Mr. Palmer, 
are, that it is Una, Sancta, Catholica, and Apostolica. These 
marks are, as may be seen, too vague to characterize any church 
for a practical purpose. For example, every religious institute, 
not merely of Christendom, but of Mahometans and heathens, since 
the beginning of the world, has claimed to be " holy." 

t " The heretics, or seceders from the primitive church, were ex- 



78 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

first centuries, there never was a universal or catholic 
church, in the strict acceptation of the word ;* and since 
the separation of the Eastern and Western Churches, and 
the great reformation of the 16th century, the non- 
existence of one universal church, having external com- 
munion and membership, and recognising common 
ecclesiastical superiors, is still more apparent. To 
assume, therefore, that there is a really existing 
" catholic" or " universal" church, one and indivisible, 



tremely various, at least in name, and there is no period in eccle- 
siastical history in which dissent has appeared under so many- 
denominations as the earliest." — Waddington, History of the 
Church, vol. i. p. 138; ed. 2. These differences of opinion were, 
however, confined to small knots and sections of dissidents, who 
disappeared in the larger and more important heresies which came 
in the following centuries. 

* As to the origin of the name Catholic, which signified the 
prevailing and most widely spread church, as opposed to local and 
partial heresies, see Bingham's Antiquities of the Christian Church, 
B. I. ch. i. § 7. 

Pearson on the Creed, Art. IX., (vol. i. p. 584, ed. Oxford,) 
explains the Catholicism of the church to " consist generally in 
universality, as embracing all sorts of persons, as to be disseminated 
through all nations, as comprehending all ages, as containing all 
necessary and saving truths, as obliging all conditions of men to all 
kinds of obedience, as curing all diseases, and planting all graces, in 
the souls of men." 

Mr. Palmer states that the universality of the church " does not 
suppose a physical and absolute universality, including all men" 
[sed qu. all Christians?] All that is meant is a " moral univer- 
sality," which he explains to be a power of obtaining adherents in 
all the nations of the known world, and to extend its limits in pro- 
portion as new nations and countries are discovered. — On the Church 
of Christ, Part I. ch. vii. 

Walter, Kirchenrecht, §11, (ed. 9,) gives a similar explanation. 
He says that the church is called catholic or universal, because the 
work of salvation is destined for all nations and times, and the 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 79 

which acts as a body, and is capable of pronouncing 
decisions and expressing opinions, implies a manifest 
disregard of notorious facts ; and to found practical con- 
clusions upon this ungrounded assumption is a barren 
labour, which can only satisfy those who are already 
convinced of the proposition to be proved. 

No two churches whose tenets are substantially 
different agree as to the marks of the true church.* 
The Church of Rome holds that it is alone the true and 



church has always made this her aim. Klee, Katholische Dog- 
matik, vol. i. p. 93, says, that the catholicity of the church refers to 
its being intended for mankind at all places and times, and its in- 
cluding everything holy on earth and in heaven. The catechism 
of the Council of Trent is more distinct in its definition of catholica 
ecclesia. " Neque enim, ut in humanis rebus publicis aut haereti- 
corum conventibus, unius tantum regni terminis, aut uno hominum 
genere ecclesia definita est; verum omnes homines, sive illi barbari 
sint sive Scythae, sive servi sive liberi, sive masculi sive feminas, 
caritatis sinu complectitur. . . . Universalis etiam ob earn causam 
dicitur, quod omnes, qui salutem asternam consequi cupiunt, earn 
tenere et amplecti debeant." — Pars I. c. x. qu. 14. 

* Properly speaking, nothing is true but propositions. Truth 
can only be predicated where something is affirmed or denied. It 
is, therefore, an elliptical expression to speak of the true church. 
What is meant is, that the religious community in question can be 
alone truly said to constitute a church; whereas other communities, 
calling themselves churches, are not churches in fact. Thus, in 
cases of forgery, we speak of the true or genuine document or sig- 
nature, as opposed to the false or counterfeit one: hence crimen 
falsi. The true church does not mean the church which teaches 
the truth, though it may accidentally possess that attribute. " A 
true church (says Bishop Burnet) is, in one sense, a society that 
preserves the essentials and fundamentals of Christianity: in an- 
other sense, it stands for a society, all whose doctrines are true, 
that has corrupted no part of this religion, nor mixed any errors 
with it."— On Art. XIX. p. 237. 



80 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

catholic or universal church, and that no person who is 
not in communion with it is a member of the true church. 
All such persons it considers schismatics or heretics, 
unless they be Mahometans or heathens.* This position 
is denied by all Protestant churches. Many Protestant 
theologians hold that the Church of Pome is not even a 
portion of the true church. f One school of Anglican 
divines maintains that the Eastern Churches, the Church 
of Rome, and the Established Church of England and 
Ireland are members or portions of the true and catholic 
church ; but that the dissenting churches of England, the 
presbyterians of Scotland and Ireland, and the protes- 
tant churches of Germany, Holland, France, Switzerland, 
and North America, are not included in the true 
church. J It is, however, the general doctrine of Pro- 
testant divines, that (with a few exceptions, as quakers, 
unitarians, &c. ) all the protestant churches belong to the 
true church, and form an integral part of Christendom, 
though some of them may err in minor questions, both of 
faith and discipline. 

But no church or sect, whatever its doctrines may be, 
can ever admit any definition of the marks of the true 
or universal church, which excludes itself from that com- 
munion. No approach, therefore, is made to the recog- 



* Besides the infidels, and the heretics and schismatics, who are 
without the pale of the Church of Rome, there are also excommuni- 
cated persons, ( Cat. Cone. Trid. Pars I. c. x. qu. 8 ;) but their ex- 
clusion may be considered as penal and temporary. 

f Even Mr. Palmer admits that those who deny the claim of 
the Roman to the title of a true church since the Reformation " are 
not without some probability on their side." — Part I. ch. xi. § 2. 
See on this subject, Bossuet, Variations des Egl. Prot. XV. 26. 

J See Palmer On the Church of Christ, Part I. ch. ix.; ch. x. 
§ 4; ch. xi. § 2; xii. § 4; ch. xiii. § 1; Part II. ch. x. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 81 

nition of a common authority, or the establishment of 
christian unity, by laying down the maxim, that all 
that the true church teaches is true. There is as much 
difference of opinion respecting the truth of the church, 
as respecting the truth of the doctrines which it teaches. * 
" Those questions (says Bishop Jeremy Taylor) which 
are concerning the judge of questions, must be deter- 
mined before you can submit to his judgment; and if 
you can yourselves determine those great questions 
which consist much in universalities, then also you may 
determine the particulars, as being of less difficulty." f 
And, while we profess to give to each Christian a short 
and easy method of avoiding controversies, too abstruse 



* Burnet, on Art. XIX., (p. 234, ed. Oxford,) after adverting 
to the method of determining the true church by certain marks 
or notes, proceeds thus : " Upon all this endless questions will 
arise, so far will it be from ending controversies and settling us 
upon infallibility. If all these must be believed to be the marks 
of the infallible church, upon the account of which we ought to 
believe it and submit to it, then two inquiries upon every one of 
these notes must be discussed, before we can be obliged to acquiesce 
in the infallibility: first, whether that is a true mark of infallibility 
or not? and next, whether it belongs to the church which they call 
infallible or not? And then another very intricate question will 
arise upon the whole, whether they must all be found together? or 
how many, or which of them together, will give us the entire cha- 
racters of the invisible church." Afterwards he adds: " Thus it 
appears that these pretended notes, instead of giving us a clear 
thread to lead us up to infallibility, and to end all controversies, 
they do start a great variety of questions that engage us into a 
labyrinth, out of which it cannot be easy for any to extricate them- 
selves." In this view, Burnet agrees with Jeremy Taylor, whom he 
has followed. — Liberty of Prophesying, Sect. IX. Jeremy Taylor 
lays it down generally, that the church, in its diffusive capacity, is 
incompetent to be the judge of controversies. 

t Liberty of Prophesying^ Sect. IX. 
G 



82 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

and complex for ordinary men, we involve him in 
questions equally hard of solution. Of what avail is it 
to tell a man that the judgment of the universal church 
is infallible,* if the means of determining the univer- 
sality of the church are as much disputed between the 
contending sects, as the tenets to which this test of 
soundness is to be applied? It is only with regard to 
that intangible and indeterminate standard — the opinion 
of the universal church — that a claim is made for an 
infallible authority. With respect to the doctrines of 
particular churches, every church admits the possibility 
of error — except, indeed, for itself. Thus, the Church of 
England lays it down in Art. XIX, that "as the churches 
of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch, have erred, so 
also the Church of Eome hath erred, not only in their 
living and manner of ceremonies, but also in matters of 
faith." 

Therule of faith laid down by Vincentius of Lirinum, 
in the fifth century, Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab 
omnibus, is inapplicable as a practical guide; because 
none of the distinctive tenets of the Christian sects — . 
none of the doctrines which divide Christianity, answer 
this description. No article of faith has been held by 
all Christians, at all times, and in all places. None 
combines the three attributes required by him, of 
universality, antiquity, and agreement, f If, in order 
to make this maxim applicable, we arbitrarily exclude a 
certain portion of those who have laid claim to the 
appellation of Christians ; if we call certain sects heretical 
and schismatical, and thus eliminate them from the ag- 



* See Palmer, Part IV. c. 4. 
t Universitas, antiquitas, consensio. 



IT.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 83 

gregate body whose consent constitutes authority, then 
our reasoning proceeds in a circle. We begin by 
assuming as solved, the very problem of which we are 
seeking the solution. We propose to test the soundness 
of certain doctrines by the judgment of a certain tri- 
bunal, and we make the constitution of the tribunal 
depend upon those very doctrines. We exclude a part 
of the Christian world from our definition of " all Chris- 
tians," on account of the unsoundness of their doctrines, 
in order to ascertain what is sound doctrine. We say 
that a certain doctrine is true, because it was held at all 
times and in all places ; and when we find that it was 
not held by a certain Christian sect at a certain time 
and place, we say that they are not to be considered, 
because they are not a part of the true church; but 
when we inquire why they are not a part of the true 
church, we learn that it is because they do not hold the 
very doctrine in question. If the student asks what is 
the doctrine on the subject of the Trinity, which fulfils 
the condition, Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omni- 
bus, he is told that it is the Athanasian. If he then 
points to the Arians as having been a large portion of 
the Christian world who held a different doctrine, he is 
told that they were heretics, and not to be reckoned as 
a part of the church. If he asks why they are heretics, 
and excluded from the church, the answer is, because 
they rejected the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.* 



* Compare the circular reasoning of those ethical philosophers, 
adverted to by Mr. Mill, who take for their standard of moral 
truth what they deem to be the natural or instinctive sentiments of 
mankind, and explain away the numerous instances of divergence, 
by saying that they are cases in which the perceptions are un- 
healthy or unnatural. — System of Logic, vol. II. p. 466. 

g2 



84 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE P1UNCIPLE OF [CH. 

The doctrine of a " catholic" or " universal" church, 
when those terms are used, not as mere appellatives 
sanctioned by historical usage, or in some vague and 
mystical sense, but as an argument to establish the 
paramount authority of the church in matters of faith, 
is, in fact, nothing more than an attempt to give to a 
majority a decisive voice with respect to a question of 
opinion, as against a minority. Whether the majority 
be large or small, the catholic church is, as so under- 
stood, nothing more than a majority of Christians; its 
universality, in the view even of its advocates, is merely 
a preponderance of numbers over the heretical sects; 
and, therefore, an appeal to the catholicity of the church, 
in proof that its doctrines are true, is an appeal to the 
voice of the multitude upon a dispute as to truth. 
" The characteristic of the heretic," (says Bossuet,) 
"that is to say, of the man who has formed a private 
judgment, is, that he holds to his own notions ; the cha- 
racteristic of the catholic, that is, of the universal, is, 
that he prefers to his own opinions the common opinion 
of the entire church."* In the very passage in which 
Bossuet thus attempts to determine the question against 
the heretics, by assuming the universality of his own 
church, he opposes the catholics to the heretics, and 
virtually admits the claim of both to be Christians. At 
the same moment, therefore, that he is claiming to his 
own church the attribute of universality, he confesses 
that this universality is nothing more than a numerical 



* "Le propre de l'heretique, c'est-a-dire, de celui qui a une 
opinion particuliere, est de s'attacher a ses propres pen sees; et le 
propre du Catholique, c'est-a-dire, de l'universel, est de preferer a 
ses sentimens le sentiment commun de toute l'Eglise." — Hist, des 
Variations, Pref. § 29. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 85 

majority. Yet it has been thought that, by marks such 
as these, the true church could be discerned, and that 
the truth of the Gospel could be made to rest upon the 
authority of the catholic church. Hence the celebrated 
declaration of Augustine: " Ego vero evangelio non 
crederem, nisi me ecclesia3 catholicse commoveret auc- 
toritas." 

§ 10. But even if we admit the maxim, that " what 
the true church teaches is true," and are further agreed 
as to the marks by which the true church is to be re- 
cognised, there may still be serious differences of opinion 
within the precincts of that very church, as to what 
constitutes the authoritative voice of the church, and 
by what marks its valid decrees are to be determined. 
Thus, among Eoman divines, some hold that the decision 
of the pope, as head of the church, is sufficient, without 
the concurrence of a council; others require the con- 
currence of a council with the pope; while others hold 
that a council without the pope is infallible. * There 
are again further disputes as to what constitutes an 
oecumenical or universal council; as to the authority by 
which it is summoned, the members of which it is to be 
composed, the means by which it is to decide, and as to 
the necessity of a subsequent consent of the universal 



* The infallibility of the pope is stated by the highest autho- 
rities to be still an unsettled doctrinal question in the Church of 
Eome. See Walter's Kirchenrecht, § 178. Compare Bossuet, 
Variations des Egl Prot. XV. 165. That " the church is infallible," 
is a dogma universally admitted in the Church of Rome. The same 
doctrine is held by the Anglo-catholic school. See Palmer, Part 
IV. c. 4. But as soon as we proceed another step, and inquire 
how the infallible voice of the church is to be ascertained, the dis- 
cordance of opinions, even within the Church of Rome, becomes 
irreconcileable. See the quotations in Palmer, Part IV. c. 12. 



86 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

church to its decrees.* " There are so many questions" 
(says Jeremy Taylor) "concerning the efficient, the form, 
the matter of General Councils, and their manner of pro- 
ceeding, and their final sanction, that after a question is 
determined by a conciliary assembly, there are perhaps 
twenty more questions to be disputed before we can, with 
confidence, either believe the council upon its mere 
authority, or obtrude it upon others." f With regard to 
General Councils, the Church of England holds, that 
" when they be gathered together, (forasmuch as they 
be an assembly of men whereof all be not governed with 
the spirit and word of God,) they may err, and some- 
times have erred, even in things pertaining unto God." 
(Art. XXI.) 

The doctrine of the Church of England on the subject 
of church authority is contained in Art. XX. ; " The 
church hath power to decree rites or ceremonies, and 
authority in matters of faith. And yet it is not lawful 
for the church to ordain anything that is contrary to 
God's word written ; neither may it so expound one place 
of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another." In com- 
menting upon this passage, Bishop Burnet says — " Here 
a distinction is to be made between an authority that is 
absolute, and founded on infallibility, and an authority of 
order. The former is very formally disclaimed by our 
church, but the second may be well maintained, though 
we assert no unerring authority. . . . When any synod 
of the clergy has so far examined a point as to settle 
their opinions about it, they may certainly decree that 
such is their doctrine; and as they judge it to be more 



* Palmer, Part IV. ch. 7. 
t Liberty of Prophesying, § 6. See also Burnet and Tomline 
on Art XXI., and Bretschneider, Dogmatik, vol. I. § 43. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 87 

or less important, they may either restrain any other 
opinion, or may require positive declarations about it, 
either of all in their communion, or at least of all whom 
they admit to minister to holy things. This is only an 
authority or order for the maintaining of union and 
edification ; and in this a body does no more, as it is a 
body, than what every single individual has a right to 
do for himself. He examines a doctrine that is laid 
before him, he forms his own opinion upon it, and pur- 
suant to that he must judge with whom he can hold 
communion, and from whom he must separate. When 
such definitions are made by the body of the pastors of 
any church, all persons within that church do owe great 
respect to their decision This is due to the con- 
siderations of peace and union, and to that authority 
which the church has to maintain it. But if, after all 
possible methods of inquiry, a man cannot master his 
thoughts, or make them agree with the public decisions, 
his conscience is not under bonds; since this authority is 
not absolute, nor grounded upon a promise of infalli- 
bility."* 

§ 11. The argument in favour of establishing a true 
church, as a source of infallible authority, is further sup- 
ported by an attempt to represent it as having main- 
tained a continuous succession from the Apostles, and 
having handed down the true doctrines of Christianity, 
and the true interpretation of Scripture, by an uninter- 
rupted tradition, f 

Here, again, we meet with the same method of prov- 



* See, further, Tomline upon Art. XX., who agrees with 
Burnet. 

t For theKoman and Anglo-catholic doctrine of church tradition, 
see Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 17 ; Klee, Katholische Dogmatik, 



88 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

ing incertumper incertius, and of solving one indetermi- 
nate problem by substituting for it another equally in- 
determinate. There is no general agreement as to what 
constitutes authentic and catholic tradition ; or as to the 
distinction between the private opinions and inferences 
of the fathers of the church, by whom the doctrines are 
recorded, and tradition derived from an Apostolic source. 
The witnesses to whom reference is made often differ, 
and it cannot be proved that any constant and invariable 
oral tradition, ascending to the origin of Christianity, 
has continued to the present time. # Besides, the Chris- 
tian church never professed to be in possession of a secret 
and mysterious doctrine, inaccessible to the rest of the 
world, and preserved in its exclusive custody. It can- 
not, in this sense, be a tradux tradiiionum. The doctrines 
of Christianity have always been published and promul- 
gated; and there is no reason to suppose that a holy 
tradition would have been more faithfully preserved 
among the living members of the church than in the 



vol. I. pp. 271—84; Mohler, Symbolik, §§ 38, 39; and Palmer on 
the Church, Part II. c. 6; Part III. c. 3. 

* See J. Taylor's Lib. of Prophesying, § 5. As to the doctrine 
of the reformed churches, compare Bretschneider, Dogmatik, § 43. 

" The custom is so universal amongst those who wrestle to support 
the strength of every opinion in religion, to appeal to the judgment 
and the practice of the primitive times, that standers-by are apt to 
believe that every one of the litigants know very well where to 
find the judge to whom he appeals; and yet there was never any 
difficulty reconciled and determined by that judicatory: nor in 
truth do the appellants well understand what themselves mean by 
the appeal they make; nor would have reason to acquiesce in the 
judgment if they could receive it by agreeing upon it." — Lord Cla- 
rendon, Essay on the Reverence due to Antiquity, p. 218. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 89 

books and writings in which it was originally recorded. 
In fact, where there are contemporary records, the office 
of oral tradition ceases. Under such circumstances, 
oral tradition can only be supplementary to the written 
record ; where it agrees, the agreement gives little con- 
firmation, ' on account of the superior certainty of an 
authentic contemporary record, and the unfaithfulness, 
imperfection, and liability to foreign admixture, of tra- 
dition; where it differs, its claim to a Divine origin 
cannot be admitted until it is proved by direct evidence 
equal to contemporary attestation. 

If the rule of faith is to consist both of scripture and 
tradition, both of the written and the unwritten word of 
God, it is necessary that those doctrines which are 
referred exclusively to tradition as their origin, which 
are derived merely from the verbum Dei non scriptum, 
should be distinctly traced to their source, and that the 
tradition should be proved, by authentic evidence, to be 
not of a subsequent growth, but to be founded on a con- 
temporary recollection of the fact recorded.* A histo- 
rical event may be handed down by oral tradition as well 
as by a contemporary written record ; but, in that case, 
satisfactory proof must be given that the tradition is 



* Van Espen, as quoted by Walter, ubi sup. § 176, affirms 
that this is the case: " Indubitatum est ecclesiam Catholicam eandem 
semper et ubique fidem ex traditione apostolica sive scripto sive 
sine scripto conservasse, nee circa articulos fidei quidquam novi 
post tempora apostolorum accidisse." Compare Bossuet, Varia* 
tions, Pref. § 26. This position is disputed by all the Protestant 
churches. For example, Protestants would not admit that such 
doctrines as purgatory, works of supererogation, transubstantiation, 
the sacrifice of the mass, and adoration of images, can be proved by 
authentic evidence to have been taught by Christ, and to be of 



90 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

derived from contemporary witnesses.* The mere pre- 
valence of a belief in a certain tenet within a church 
does not prove that tenet to have been derived from an 
authentic source, as Bossuet assumes ;f its pedigree must 
be deduced from the first ancestor, and it must be 
proved by positive evidence, not by general presump- 
tions, to have formed a part of primitive and Apostolic 
Christianity. 

§ 12. An additional support of the doctrines of an 
infallible universal church, and of an authoritative 
church-tradition, is sought to be derived from the dis- 
tinction between Fundamentals and Non-fundamentals, or 
(in other words,) between matters of faith, to be held de 
fide, and matters of mere opinion. It is afiirmed, that 
the authority of the true church, and of church-tradi- 
tion, is decisive with respect to fundamentals and matters 
of faith, but that, in other things, entire agreement is not 
necessary ; so that a Christian who rejects any of the 
latter, does not incur the sin of heresy. 

But here, again, the difficulty is merely shifted, not 
solved; it is transferred to another point, but it is not 
diminished. There is no received or certain test for dis- 
tinguishing between fundamental and non-fundamental 
doctrines — between matters of strict faith and matters of 



apostolic institution. The theory of a gradual development of the 
Christian doctrines from certain seminal principles, which was pro- 
pounded a few years ago by Mr. Newman, is, if not peculiar to 
himself, at all events quite inconsistent with the systems both of 
the Church of Rome and of Protestantism. 

* See Note B. at the end of the chapter, 
f " Toutes les fois qu'on trouvera en un certain temps une doc- 
trine etablie dans toute l'eglise catholique, ce ne sera jamais que 
par erreur qu'on croira qu'elle est nouvelle." — Var. des Egl. Prot. 
XV. 97. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 91 

mere opinion. That which one divine or one church 
may consider fundamental, another may consider imma- 
terial, and the converse. We know from experience, that 
the most discordant views as to the character and ex- 
tent of fundamentals have been taken by different theo- 
logians of authority in different countries, and under 
the influence of different general views on the Christian 
scheme. 

" Unity in the fundamental articles of faith," (says 
Dr. Waterland, who has treated this subject ex professo,) 
" was always strictly insisted upon as one necessary con- 
dition of church-membership; and if any man openly 
and resolutely opposed those articles, or any of them, he 
was rejected as a deserter of the common faith, and 
treated as an alien. . . . Hence it is, that we have almost 
as many different rules for determining fundamentals, 
as there are different sects or parties ; and that which 
might otherwise serve (if all men were reasonable) to 
end all differences, has itself been too often made one 
principal bone of contention."* 

" A distinction," (says Burnet,) " is to be made 



* A Discourse of Fundamentals, Works, vol. VIII. p. 90. Water- 
land, however, proposes his own enumeration of fundamentals. 
Compare Palmer on the Church, Part I. ch. 5; App. Various 
writings on the subject of fundamentals are cited by Waterland; 
others are mentioned in Bretschneider, Dogmatik der Lutherisch- 
evangelischen Kirche, vol. I. § 47. 

Mr. Gladstone, The State in its relations with the Church, ch. 2, 
§ 105; ch. 7, § 97, (ed. 4,) agrees as to the uncertainty of the defi- 
nition of fundamentals. Dr. Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p. 352, 
ed. 2, condemns the distinction as being a remnant of scholasticism. 
Klee, on the other hand, Katholische Dogmatik, vol. I. p. 60, (ed. 3,) 
considers it a Protestant invention, and rejects it as inconsistent 
with the Catholic doctrine. Compare Chilling worth, Works, 
vol. I. ch. 3. Hallam, Lit. of Eur., vol. II. ch. 2, § 31. 



92 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

between those capital and fundamental articles, with- 
out which a man cannot be esteemed a true Chris- 
tian, nor a church a true church; and other truths, 
which, being delivered in Scripture, all men are, indeed, 
obliged to believe them, yet they are not of that nature 
that the ignorance of them, or an error in them, can 
exclude from salvation." 

" Here," (he continues,) " a controversy does natu- 
rally arise, that wise people are unwilling to meddle with 
— what articles are fundamental, and what are not? The 
defining of fundamental articles seems, on the one hand, 
to deny salvation to such as do not receive them all, 
which men are not willing to do. And, on the other 
hand, it may seem a leaving men at liberty as to all 
other particulars that are not reckoned up among the 
fundamentals."* 

§ 13. The attempt to give authenticity to religious 
opinions by defining the church, and to establish a living 
standard and canon for the right interpretation of 
Scripture, independently of the intrinsic grounds of the 
decision, never met with entire success; inasmuch as 
there were heretical sects, who denied the authority of 
the predominant, or self-styled orthodox catholic church, 
from the earliest period of Christianity. Its failure was, 
however, rendered most conspicuous by the Eeformation 
in the sixteenth century, when rival churches were set 
up, under the protection of the state, in the most civilized 
countries of Europe, contesting the pretensions of the 
Church of Eome, and, indeed, denouncing it as false and 
unchristian. 

The leaders of the Eeformation, and the protestant 



On Art. XIX., (p. 236.) 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 93 

churches in general, rejected the maxim that " the 
church," (however determined,) is the decisive authority 
for religious truth ; and they laid little or no stress on 
the doctrines of tradition and Apostolic succession as 
guides in the interpretation of Scripture. For the most 
part, the protestant churches framed certain authorita- 
tive summaries of their faith, (such as the Augsburg 
Confession, the Thirty-nine Articles, &c. ;) but they 
founded the authority of their creeds, and the obligation 
of Christians to adopt them, not on the teaching of their 
church, and its possession of an authentic tradition and 
an authoritative voice, but on their accordance with 
Scripture.* 

The creeds of all the reformed churches are particu- 
larly explicit on this point, which was, indeed, a funda- 
mental and characteristic doctrine of Protestantism. 
Instead, like the Church of Rome, of recognising a com- 
pound rule of faith, which comprehended both Scripture 
and oral tradition, and placed the two upon an equal 
footing, the Protestant churches, however they might 
differ in other respects, agreed in establishing a simple 
rule of faith, consisting exclusively of Scripture. This 
principle is expressed in the clearest terms in the Articles 
of the Church of England, and, indeed, pervades their 



* With respect to the doctrines of the early reformers on Scrip- 
ture and tradition, and their condemnation by the Council of 
Trent, see Sarpi, Hist, du Concile de Trente, 1. II. c. 43 — 6, 56, 
trad, de Courayer. Sarpi states that one of the members of the 
council urged their laying down, " that every Christian is bound to 
believe in the Church;" but that this proposition was unanimously 
rejected, partly on the ground that the heretics would pretend to 
be the true church, to which so much authority was given, c. 45. 
Compare Mohler, Symbolik, § 44 — 51; Bretschneider, Dogmatik, 
vol. I. § 33; Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 35. 



94 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

whole substance. Art. VI. states that " holy Scripture 
containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that 
whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved 
thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should 
be believed as an article of faith, or to be thought requi- 
site or necessary to salvation."* Art. VIII. declares 
that the three creeds — the Mcene, Athanasian, and 
Apostles' creed — " ought thoroughly to be received and 
believed," not because they were received by the early 
church, and founded upon an authoritative tradition, but 
because " they may be proved by most certain warrants 
of Scripture." So, again, Art. XX. lays it down that 
the church cannot ordain or decree anything contrary 
to holy writ, or enforce anything beside the same, to be 
believed for necessity of salvation; and Art. XXI. 
decides, that things ordained by General Councils as 
necessary to salvation have neither strength nor autho- 
rity, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of 
holy Scripture. f Again, Art. XXXIV. says that " it is 
not necessary that traditions and ceremonies be in all 
places one, or utterly like, for at all times they have 
been diverse, and may be changed according to the 
diversity of countries and men's manners, so that nothing 
be ordained against God's word." In all these passages, 
the reference to Scripture as the paramount and exclu- 
sive standard of faith is manifest. 



* See Burnet's commentary on this article, as to the antithesis 
between the doctrines of the church of Rome and that of England 
on this head. A similar view is taken by Bishop Tomline on the 
same article. 

t Commenting on this article, Burnet says of the early coun- 
cils — " We reverence those councils for the sake of their doctrine, 
but do not believe the doctrine for the authority of the councils." 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 95 

The distinctive theories of the Church of Eome and of 
the Protestant churches on this subject, may be stated 
thus : — 

According to the Church of Rome, there are certain 
marks by which the one true Christian church can be 
recognised. 

Those marks exist in the Church of Rome, and in no 
other. 

The true and genuine doctrines have been preserved 
by an uninterrupted tradition in the true church. 

Therefore, whatever the Church of Rome teaches is 
true, and her authority is a legitimate ground of belief 
in things spiritual. All Christians who reject her au- 
thority in matters of faith are heretics, and without the 
pale of the church. 

On the other hand, the Protestant churches hold that 
the scriptures of the Old and New Testament contain 
everything which goes to make up Christianity, and that 
they are the exclusive and ultimate rule of faith. They 
deny the existence of any uninterrupted and exclusive 
transmission of true doctrine in any church since the 
time of the Apostles. Each Protestant church lays down 
certain doctrines, which it considers to constitute, in the 
aggregate, the true exposition of the Christian religion ; 
but it claims Divine authority to this body of doctrines, 
simply on the ground that they are all expressly con- 
tained in Scripture, or can be inferred from it by a legi- 
timate process of deduction. 

It was on account of this exclusive reference to Scrip- 
ture, that the Protestant divines laid more stress on the 
inspiration of the holy writings than the theologians of 
the Church of Rome ; and that the Protestants were ac- 
cused of bibliolatry. 

Owing to this deposition of church authority, and to 



96 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

the adoption of the maxim that " the Bible only is the 
religion of Protestants,"* it has been commonly asserted 
that the reformed churches have admitted the right of 
private judgment in religious matters. 

Now, in a certain sense, every church which possesses 
a fixed written confession of faith predetermines the most 
important articles of Christian belief, and therefore can 
hardly be said to leave a free scope to private judgment.f 
But the reformed churches agree in making the Scrip- 
tures the exclusive canon of religious faith; they admit 
that their creed is only entitled to acceptance so far as 
it is supported by Scripture ; and they do not assume 
that their church, in its collective capacity, is alone 
competent to decide on the correct interpretation of the 
Divine records. In this sense, therefore, the reformed 
churches admit the right of private judgment. They do 
not claim for the decrees of any church an authority 
independent of, or extraneous to, Scripture. 

It has been stated by an eminent text writer, that, 
when the two forms of belief are reduced to their ele- 
ments, Catholicism is the complete recognition of the 



* Chillingworth, Religion of Protestants, ch. 6, § 56, (vol. 2, 
p. 450.) 

t The Church of England declares that " they are to be accursed 
that presume to say that every man shall be saved by the law or 
sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life 
according to that law and the light of nature," (Art. XVIII.) This 
article, however, appears from its sequel to refer to heathens, or 
others not professing Christianity, and to be intended to exclude 
from salvation only those who are not Christians. It does not 
affect those who claim to be Christians, though they may not be 
members of the Church of England. As to the sense in which pro- 
testantism involved the principle of private judgment, see the re- 
marks of Mr. Hallam, Literature of Europe, vol. I. ch. 6, § 33. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 97 

authority of the church; while Protestantism is the 
negation of that authority, and the substitution of the 
private judgment of each individual.* But although a 
Protestant denies the authority of the Church of Kome, 
he recognises the authority of his own Church. The 
difference properly does not consist in the recognition of 
the principle of authority by one party, and the rejection 
of that principle by the other, but in the recognition of 
different authorities. 

§ 14. On looking back to what has been said, it will 
be seen that no one church can justly make any claim 
to authority in matters of religious belief, upon the 
grounds on which opinions in matters of science acquire 
authority. There is no consent of competent judges 
over the civilized world. Inconsistent and opposite 
forms of Christianity continue to exist side by side. 
There is not any general agreement among divines of 
different churches, as there is among men of science as 
to their respective subjects in different countries; and 
scarcely even any tendency to such an agreement. f 
Attempts at mutual conversion on a large scale entirely 
fail ; while those which are limited in their numbers give 
rise to questions as to the motives of the converts, and 
add but little strength to the church which receives 
them. J Even a government cannot safely adopt any 



* See Klee, Kath. Dogm. vol. i. p. 312. 

t Compare Note C. at the end of the chapter. 

% Lord Clarendon, in his Essay Against the Multiplying Con- 
troversies, remarks upon the fact, " that all the conferences held, 
and all the books written, between those of the Roman and those 
of the reformed religion, for the space of above 150 years, by men 
of unquestionable knowledge and virtue, should not work upon any 
one man, for ought appears, to change the opinion he brought with 

H 



98 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

authority in ecclesiastical matters, or assume the exclu- 
sive truth of any one form of Christianity. It must 
look mainly to the numbers of each religious persuasion, 
in deciding the question of endowments for religious 
and educational purposes; and to the religion of 
parents in establishing the rules for determining the 
creed in which children, incapable of judging for them- 
selves, are to be brought up.* 

The Church of Rome makes boldly the claim of autho- 
rity for its own decisions. But there is a large, and 
that not the least enlightened and intelligent, portion of 
the Christian world which peremptorily denies this 
claim. Moreover, even among its own members, there 
is great difference of opinion as to the organs of that 
authority. The ultramontane doctrines differ on this 
head from those of some of the national churches. 
Decisions, which some classes of Roman-catholics consider 
as authoritative, others refuse to admit as genuine ex- 
pressions of the voice of the church. 

Even if it is conceded that the teaching of the church 
carries with it an authority binding upon the consciences 
of all the faithful, yet there is no general agreement as 



him; for of those who run from one communion to another, they 
are such who do not pretend to judge of arguments, or such who 
seldom give an account of their true inducements," &c, p. 241, ed. 
fol. And in his History of the Rebellion, he says — " Our observa- 
tion and experience can give us few examples of men who have 
changed their religion, and not fallen into some jealousy and dis- 
trust, or disreputation, even with those with whom they side, that 
have made their future life less pleasant and delightsome; which, it 
may be, happens only because we have rare instances of men of 
extraordinary parts, or great minds, who have entertained those 
conversions," vol. iv. p. 317, ed. 12mo. 

* On this subject, some further remarks are made in Chapter IX. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 99 

to the extent of the church, or the communion signified 
by this term. The member of the Church of Eome limits 
the acceptation of church to his own church ; Protestants 
include under it different ecclesiastical communities, 
agreeing only in the profession of the Christian faith, 
or agreeing in certain fundamental tenets, such as the 
Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity — or in a certain form 
of church government, such as episcopacy. Even as to 
the term '• Catholic church," there is no general agree- 
ment in Christendom. The historical usage limits this 
term to the Church of Eome, which never was a uni- 
versal church, in the sense of its including, de facto, all 
Christians; but was universal, or Catholic, only in the 
sense of its claiming to be orthodox, and therefore to 
include, de jure, all Christendom, and also as not being 
a merely national church, but comprehending several 
nations and countries. Protestant divines in general, 
however, extend the term Catholic church either to all 
Christendom,* or they limit it by some condition, as to 
which there is a variety of opinion. The " Catholic 
church," or " Catholic consent " of the modern Oxford 
school, is a perfectly arbitrary standard, which can 
satisfy no marked denomination of Christians. Of what 
avail is it to imagine an invisible ideal church, formed 
of such heterogeneous and mutually repelling bodies, as 
the Church of Eome, the Greek Church, and the Church 
of England? What agreement exists, or can exist, 
between them, and how can it be defined or expressed? 



* As to the claim of the reformed churches to be members of the 
Catholic church, and the declarations on the subject in their con- 
fessions, see Klee, Kathol. Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 98. See Bretschn eider, 
Glaubenslehre, § 55, for the views of the modern German Pro- 
testants on the meaning of " Catholic church." As to Jurieu's doc- 
trine, see Palmer, vol. i. p. 128. 

H 2 



100 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

The Church of Borne, by its authentic organs, proscribes 
the Church of England as heretical, and will hold no 
communion or church-membership with it. The Church 
of England lays it down, in an equally authentic man- 
ner, that the Church of Eome has erred in matters both 
of faith and discipline; and authoritative divines of 
the Anglican Church teach that the Church of Eome is a 
church without a religion. Under these circumstances, 
no practical solution of sectarian differences can be 
derived by a reference to " Catholic consent," so deter- 
mined. 

It follows that no person can accept the doctrines of the 
Church of Eome, upon the mere authority of the rulers 
and doctors of that church, with the same well-founded 
security against error which he possesses for his belief 
in adopting the established truths of astronomy or 
mechanics, upon the mere credit of mathematicians and 
men of science. 

The same objection, founded on the absence of a 
general agreement, or tendency to agreement, among the 
principal theologians of Christendom, applies also to 
each of the Protestant creeds. The existence of the 
non-Protestant sects weakens the authority of the 
divines of the Protestant churches ; the existence of the 
non-Catholic sects weakens the authority of the divines 
of the Church of Eome. The authority of each Pro- 
testant church is, again, still further weakened by the 
existence of mutual differences between Protestants as 
to their respective tenets.* 

Besides which, the Protestant writers lay less stress 
on the authoritative teaching of the church ; they admit 



See Bossuet, Variations des Eglises Protestantes, Pref. sect. 16. 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 101 

that national churches have erred ; and they hold that 
no doctrine of any church is binding, unless it can be 
proved by Scripture. The teaching of the church is 
not, as such, according to them, decisive; it must be 
demonstrably founded on Scripture authority. Add to 
which, that while they refer to Scripture as their ex- 
clusive canon of religious truth, they scarcely claim to 
possess any rule of interpreting Scripture, or of resolving 
doubts as to the signification of particular passages. 
For the interpretation of Scripture, each Protestant 
church relies upon the expositions of approved commen- 
tators, and, in doctrinal passages, principally on those of 
its own communion, but without setting up any infallible 
rule or standard of interpretation.* 

§ 15. On account of the intrinsic obscurity and 
transcendental nature of the leading ideas in theology, 
and of the difficulty of arriving, even with the aid of 
revelation, at distinct and intelligible conclusions on 
subjects lying without the domain of human consciousness j 1 
or sensation, it would be extremely desirable, for the . 
guidance of people in general, that a consentient autho- ) 
rity in questions of Christian theology should exist. The 
attempts to remove error, to enlighten dissidents from 
the true faith, to create a trustworthy authority in 
things spiritual, and to produce a unity of the church, 
have been ill-devised and unsuccessful — but they have 
almost invariably been sincere. They have originated 
in a sense of the evils springing from diversity of religious 
opinion, without a common living point of reference, and 
of the advantages likely to accrue from uniformity of 



* See the Protestant doctrine of Scripture-interpretation ex- 
plained at large, by Jeremy Taylor, in the Liberty of Prophesying, 
sect. 4. 



102 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

faith and church discipline. Instead, however, of re- 
sorting to conciliatory courses, and of endeavouring to 
diminish differences by amicable explanations and mutual 
concessions, the teachers of theology and leaders of 
churches and sects have, in general, condemned diver- 
sities of opinion with asperity, and in a confident and 
intolerant spirit, which has provoked retaliation and 
perpetuated division. By seeking thus to propagate 
truth in a matter in which allowances ought peculiarly 
to be made for difference of opinion, divines have multi- 
plied controversies beyond all reasonable limits ; so that 
the most patient student is bewildered in the labyrinth 
of discussion, and the most deferential inquirer is at a 
loss to which authority he is to bow. When, however, 
a person, either from a firm reliance on the creed of the 
church in which he has been brought up, or from inde- 
pendent examination, is satisfied of the general truth of 
the doctrines of any particular church, he will naturally 
regard with respect the divines who are considered as 
authorities within that religious communion. In all 
controversies and discussions, too, carried on between 
members of the same church, the works of the received 
text-writers and leading divines of that church will be 
referred to as a common authority and standard of deci- 
sion. It is in this sense that the Church of England, 
according to the opinion of the best expositors of its 
articles, claims authority in matters of faith, (Art. XX.) 
Its authority is limited to its own members. 

This is, in substance, the view of church authority 
which is taken by Hooker. In determining the Kule of 
Faith, he places Scripture in the first rank; and, in the 
next, such direct and manifest inferences from it as each 
person may make by his own unassisted judgment. The 
last place he assigns to the authority of the church, 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 103 

which he justly considers as more competent, in a corpo- 
rate capacity, to decide doubtful questions than any of 
its individual members.* 

§ 16. On reviewing what has been said above on the 
state of religious opinion in Christendom, and the claim 
to authority possessed by any one of its churches or 
sections, we are led to the following conclusions : — 

1. That no agreement as to the distinctive or charac- 
teristic doctrines of the several Christian sects exists 
among the theologians of Christendom, and, consequently, 
that no church or denomination of Christians can claim 
assent to its tenets, and by its legitimate authority com- 
mand the belief of a conscientious inquirer, on the 
grounds on which a reasonable deference may be paid to 
authority in secular matters. 

2. That although there is no agreement as to the 
peculiar doctrines of any Christian church, there is an 
agreement among all civilized nations in accepting some 
form of Christianity, and in recognising the Christian 
revelation according to some construction of its effect 
and intent. 

The practical deduction from these results seems to 



* "Be it matter of the one kind or of the other fi : . e., matter of 
order or of doctrine], what Scripture doth plainly deliver, to 
that the first place both of credit and obedience is due; the next 
whereunto is whatsoever any man can necessarily conclude by force 
of reason; after these the voice of the church succeedeth. That 
which the church by her ecclesiastical authority shall probably 
think and define to be true or good, must in congruity of reason 
overrule all other inferior judgments whatsoever." — Eccl. Pol. b. v. 
ch. viii. § 2. Compare also Pref. c. iii. §§ 1, 2, and b. ii., where, 
confuting the exaggerations of the Puritans, he shows that human 
reason is the ultimate test in judging of Scripture. A similar view 
of church authority is taken by Dr. Hampden, Bampton Lectures, 
Lect. 8, p. 372, ed. 2. 



104 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

be, that the mere authority of any church or sect cannot 
of itself reasonably command assent to its distinctive 
and peculiar tenets, while the present divisions of Chris- 
tendom continue ; and that a person born in a Christian 
country can only with propriety adopt one of two alter- 
natives — viz., either to adhere to the faith of his parents 
and predecessors, and that of the church in which he has 
been educated, or, if he is unwilling to abide by this 
creed, to form his own judgment as to the choice of his 
sect by means of the best independent investigation 
which his understanding and opportunities for study 
enable him to make. 

This conclusion is, in the main, identical with the 
result at which Jeremy Taylor arrives in his Liberty of 
Prophesying, with whose words I will conclude this 
chapter. 

" Although," (he says,) " we are secured in funda- 
mental points from involuntary error, by the plain, ex- 
press, and dogmatical places of Scripture, yet in other 
things we are not, but may be invincibly mistaken, be- 
cause of the obscurity and difficulty in the controverted 
parts of Scripture, by reason of the uncertainty of the 
means of its interpretation ; since tradition is of an un- 
certain reputation, and sometimes evidently false; 
councils are contradictory to each other, and therefore 
certainly are equally deceived many of them, and there- 
fore all may; and then the popes of Rome are very 
likely to mislead us, but cannot ascertain us of truth in 
matter of question ; and in this world we believe in part, 
and prophesy in part ; and this imperfection shall never 
be done away till we be translated to a more glorious 
state : either we must throw our chances, and get truth 
by accident or predestination, or else we must lie safe in 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 105 

a mutual toleration, and private liberty of persuasion, 
unless some other anchor can be thought upon, where 
we may fasten our floating vessels, and ride safely." — 
Sect. VII., ad fin. 



Notes to Chapter IY. 

Note A. (page 73.) 

" It is, indeed, true that the prevalence of internal differences dis- 
turbed the unity of collective Christendom; but, if we do not de- 
ceive ourselves, it is another universal law of human things that 
this disturbance prepared a higher and a larger development of the 
human mind. 

" In the press of the universal struggle, religion was conceived by 
different nations after the different varieties of its dogmatical forms. 
The peculiar dogma adopted was incorporated with the feeling of 
nationality, as a possession of the community — of the state or the 
people. It was won by the sword — maintained amidst a thousand 
dangers; it had become part of the life's blood of the nation. 

" Hence it has come to pass, that the states on either side have 
grown into great ecclesiastico-political bodies, whose individuality 
is marked — on the Catholic, by the measure of their devotedness to 
the Roman see, and of the degree of toleration or exclusion of non- 
Catholics; but still more strongly on the Protestant, where the 
departure from the symbolical books adopted as tests, the mixture 
of the Lutheran and the Calvinistic creeds, the greater or less 
approximation to an episcopal constitution of the church, form so 
many striking and obvious distinctions. The first question in 
every country is — what is its predominant religion? Christianity 
appears under various forms; but, however great be the dis- 
crepancies between them, no party can deny to another the pos- 
session of the fundamentals of faith. On the contrary, these 
several forms are guaranteed by compacts and by treaties of peace, 
to which all are parties, and which are, as it were, the fundamental 
laws of a universal republic. Never more can the thought of ex- 
alting the one or the other confession to universal supremacy find 
place among men. The only consideration now is, how each state, 



106 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

each people, can best proceed from the basis of its own politico- 
religious principles to the development of its intellectual and moral 
powers. On this depends the future condition of the world." — 
Ranke's Popes of Rome, vol. ii. ad Jin. Engl. Transl. 



Note B. (page 90.) 

The transmission of the evidence for an historical fact by oral tra- 
dition may be illustrated by the celebrated story of the ring, which 
the favourite Essex is said to have sent to Queen Elizabeth before 
his execution. This story was handed down by tradition in the 
family of the Earl of Monmouth, and was first published, in an 
authentic form, by Mr. Birch, in 1 749. The Countess of Notting- 
ham, who appears as a principal party in the transaction, was the 
wife of the Lord High Admiral, and sister of Robert, Earl of Mon- 
mouth. Henry, Earl of Monmouth, son of Earl Robert, had a 
daughter Martha, who married John, Earl of Middleton. Lady 
Elizabeth Spelman was the daughter of the Earl and Countess of 
Middleton; and from her report, (who was the great-granddaughter 
of the Countess of Nottingham's brother,) Birch published the par- 
ticulars of the tradition in the reign of George II. (Negotiations, 
p. 206.) The story had, however, obtained publicity at an earlier 
period; it was known in the reign of Charles I. to Mr. Hyde, who 
disbelieved it — to Sir Dudley Carleton, who told it to Prince Maurice 
in Holland, (see Birch's Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth, pp. 481, 
490,) and to Francis Osborn, who published it in his Traditional 
Memoirs on the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in 1658, pp. 92 — o. 
According to these versions of the story, the ring was sent by 
Essex to the Countess of Nottingham, to be given to the Queen; 
but according to Lady Elizabeth Spelman's version, the ring was 
sent to Lady Scrope, and given by mistake to her sister, Lady 
Nottingham. Upon the evidence of the tradition published by 
Birch, the story has been accepted as true by Hume and other 
historians. 



Note C. (page 97.) 

It is curious to compare the difficulties started by Lucian with 
respect to the choice of a particular sect among the several schools 
of ancient philosophy. The impossibility of personally investigating 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 107 

the doctrines of each sect, and the absence of all a priori authority 
in favour of any, are urged by him with his usual ingenuity and 
power of sarcasm in the dialogue entitled Hermotimus, f/ irepl 
alpe(T€(ov. In this dialogue, Hermotimus, a Stoic philosopher, is 
pressed by his friend Lycinus to state his reasons for selecting the 
Stoic sect in preference to the others. The following is an outline 
of the argument: — 

Lycinus begins by asking Hermotimus what induced him, when 
there were so many philosophic schools, to prefer the stoic sect, 
while he was still a common man, an ISiwrrjg, and ignorant of philo- 
sophy? Were you (he says) directed to it by the voice of an 
oracle? (c. 15.) Hermotimus answers that he made the choice 
upon his own judgment, and that, in choosing the true philosophy, 
he was guided by the numbers of its adherents. Being asked how 
he knew that the Stoics were more numerous than the Epicureans 
or Peripatetics, and whether he counted them as at a public vote, 
(fcaQaVfjO iv ralg x^poropiaig,) he says that he guessed their number. 
Lycinus remarks upon the unsatisfactory nature of this test, and 
Hermotimus then adds that he had another reason; he had heard 
everybody say that the Epicureans were addicted to pleasure, that 
the Peripatetics were fond of money, and the Platonics full of con- 
ceit; but that the Stoics were enduring and wise, and that their 
followers were the only perfect men, (c. 16.) Having furnished 
this second test, he is forced to admit that he did not take this 
favourable character of the Stoics from the Stoics themselves, or 
the unfavourable character of the other sects from those sects; and 
he does not deny that he took it from the ignorant and illiterate. 
Upon Lycinus expressing his wonder that any one should have 
derived his opinions respecting philosophy from such an authority, 
Hermotimus tries another ground. He had always observed (he 
says) that the Stoics were decent and serious in their demeanour, 
properly clothed, holding a fit medium between effeminacy and 
negligence, with their heads close shaven. Lycinus inquires 
whether we are to judge of merit merely by gravity of deportment, 
dress, and long beards. Surely (he says) there must be some 
universal criterion to judge by; and we are not left to decide 
whether a man is a good or bad philosopher by his outward appear- 
ance, (c. 18, 19.) 

Lycinus, unable to obtain from his friend any satisfactory mark 
of the true sect, says that he will try to discover it for himself, 
(c. 21.) 



108 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. 

He proceeds to compare philosophy with a happy and well- 
governed city, and to represent himself as seeking the way to it. 
Many persons offer themselves as guides, and point out different 
roads — one leading to the east and another to the west; one to the 
south and another to the north; one passing through a pleasant 
country, others rough and laborious, but all supposed to bring the 
traveller to the same city, (c. 22 — 5.) " Thus I am still left in 
doubt and uncertainty, for at the entrance of every path I am met 
by a man, worthy no doubt of all confidence, who stretches out 
his hand and desires me to follow him, telling me that his is the 
only right way, and that all the other guides are wandering in 
ignorance, having neither come from the city themselves, nor being 
able to direct others to it. The next and the next I meet tells 
me the same story of his own path, and abuses the other guides; 
and so will every one of them. It is this variety of ways which 
distracts and confounds us; where each guide contends for and 
praises his own, I cannot tell which to follow, or how I am ever to 
arrive at this happy city," (c. 26.) 

Hermotimus now says that he can remove all his friend's doubts : 
let him trust those who have gone the journey before him, and he 
cannot err. Lycinus, however, is not satisfied with this receipt: 
each guide (he says) praises his own road exclusively: one takes 
Plato's, another Zeno's, but no one knows more than his own, and 
it is impossible to be sure that the road leads, after all, to the right 
city: the guide may be mistaken, (c. 27.) 

Hermotimus then assures him that he may go the whole round, 
but he will never find better guides than the Stoics. Let him 
follow Zeno and Chrysippus, and they will lead him aright, (c. 29.) 

Lycinus repeats that this assurance is unsatisfactory, and that a 
similar one would be given by the Platonists and Epicureans of 
their leaders. Each thinks his own sect the best, and vaunts his 
own guide. Besides, you are only acquainted with your own doc- 
trines, and you condemn those of the other sects without knowing 
them. Hermotimus denies this. The Stoic teachers (he says) in 
their lectures always mention the tenets of the other schools, and 
refute them, (c. 32.) 

Lycinus treats this argument as futile. The other philosophers 
would not (he replies) be content to be so judged. Your philosophers 
set up men of straw, in order that they may be easily knocked 
down. Such a controversy is no real conflict, but a sham fight, in 
which the victory is certain beforehand. " In short, (concludes 



IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 109 

Lycinus,) while it remains uncertain which is the best sect in phi- 
losophy, I am resolved not to follow any one, as that would be an 
affront upon all the rest," (c. 34.) 

Hermotimus insists that it is needless to study the other philo- 
sophies. Truth (he says) may be learnt from the Stoics without 
going to all the other sects. If a man told you that two and two 
are four, it would not be necessar}' for you to suspend your belief 
until you had consulted all persons versed in arithmetical science, 
(c. 35.) 

Lycinus denies the applicability of this argument. The subjects 
about which the philosophic sects differ are doubtful; there is no 
mode of resolving the doubt, and no common agreement, (c. 36.) 

With regard to philosophy, the only man (he continues) in whom 
I can repose confidence is one who has mastered the doctrines of all 
the sects, has tried them all, and has chosen that which, by his own 
experience, he is satisfied is the only one which can guide him to 
true happiness. If we can meet with such a man, our labour is at 
an end. But such a man (says Hermotimus) cannot easily be 
found, (c. 46.) 

The two disputants then enter into a calculation as to the length 
of time which must be allowed for obtaining a familiar knowledge 
of the tenets of each sect, and they reckon ten sects at twenty years 
each, (c. 48.) Hermotimus remarks that, make what reduction 
they will, very few persons would be able to go through all the 
sects, though they began as soon as they were born. On this 
Lycinus repeats, that unless a man knows all the systems, he can- 
not select the best, except by chance; he can only stumble upon it 
accidentally in the dark, (c. 49.) 

Hermotimus complains that Lycinus requires impossibilities. He 
will neither accept the opinion of those who judge for themselves, 
unless they have lived the life of a phoenix, nor will he follow those 
who are satisfied with the consent of the multitude. Lycinus asks 
who are the multitude? If it consists of men who understand the 
subject, one will suffice; but if of the ignorant, their number does 
not influence his belief, (c. 53.) Hermotimus then returns to self- 
judgment. It may be right (he admits) to inquire into the opinions 
of each sect, but the length of time assigned by Lycinus is exces- 
sive. A judgment maybe formed from a portion or sample — ex 
ungue leonem. Lycinus replies that when the whole is known, it 
can be judged from a part; but in this case the whole is not known. 
If the philosophers had thought their principles simple and easy of 



110 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE, ETC. [CH. 

acquisition, they probably would not have written so many thou- 
sand volumes, (c. 54 — 6.) He adds, that if his friend is impatient 
of the time and labour necessary for examination, he had better 
send for a diviner, or draw lots for the best, (c. 57.) 

Hermotimus inquires if he is to give up the matter in despair, 
unless he can live a hundred years? (c. 63.) Lycinus then under- 
takes to point out the qualifications requisite for inquiring into the 
subject. These are acuteness of mind, long-continued labour and 
study, and perfect impartiality, (c. 64.) Even with these qualifica- 
tions, a person is not secured against error. It is possible that all 
the different sects of philosophy may be in error, and that the truth 
has not yet been discovered, (c. 65, 66.) 

Lycinus then proceeds to another objection. He asks his friend 
whether, in all the sects, there are not teachers who say that they 
alone understand the subject, and that all the others are mere pre- 
tenders to knowledge. Hermotimus assents to this proposition, 
and admits that it is difficult to distinguish between the true philo- 
sophers and the impostors, (c. 68.) If, therefore, (says Lycinus,) 
you can meet with a master who himself knows, and can teach you 
the art of demonstration, and how to determine in doubtful cases, 
your labour is at an end, for then what is good and true will im- 
mediately appear; falsehood will be detected; you will be able to 
make choice of the best philosophy — will acquire that happiness 
which you have so long been in search of, and possess everything 
that is desirable. Hermotimus is delighted with this view, and 
declares that he will instantly look out for such a guide, (c. 69.) 
Lycinus, however, immediately destroys his satisfaction by show- 
ing that this man, if found, could not be relied on, until another 
person was discovered, who could decide if he was a safe guide, and 
so on, to a third. His demonstrations, too, would be called in 
question; everything would revolve in a circle of uncertainty, and 
nothing would be determined, (c. 70.) 

After some further arguments of Lycinus against the Stoic 
system in particular, Hermotimus owns that he is convinced of 
his error, and declares his intention to renounce philosophy hence- 
forth, (c. 83.) Lycinus adds that he should have used precisely 
the same arguments if his friend had belonged to any one of the 
other philosophic sects, (c. 85.) 



V.] UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. Ill 



CHAPTEE Y. 

ON THE UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 

§ 1. It has been shown briefly in Chapter II., that a 
large portion of the opinions of mankind are necessarily 
derived from authority. Children necessarily imbibe 
the opinions of their parents and teachers ; the time and 
means for the independent investigation of speculative 
opinions on a large number of subjects are wanting; 
and on questions of practice it is necessary for a man to 
be guided by the advice of professional persons, having 
had a special training and experience in the matter. 

We have, in a subsequent chapter, attempted to trace 
the marks of a trustworthy authority in matters of spe- 
culation and practice, and have described the means by 
which trustworthy authority is gradually formed. This 
description, as we have further shown, does not apply, 
without considerable qualifications, to religious questions. 

We now turn to consider what are the proper uses of 
authority, and what are the circumstances in which it 
can be resorted to with advantage, for the guidance of 
opinion, and the management of the affairs of life, both 
private and public. 

As to speculative questions of science and philosophy, 
every person ought, as far as his leisure and opportuni- 
ties for reading and reflection will permit, to attempt to 
form for himself an independent judgment. Every 
person, however, will find in numerous subjects that he 



1T2 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

is unable to go through the processes necessary for 
forming such a judgment; and, with respect to these, he 
ought, in the choice of his authority, to be guided by 
the maxims stated above. Vita brevis, ars longa, says 
the old Hippocratean aphorism ;* and even when a per- 
son succeeds in mastering a great variety of subjects, the 
result is not always satisfactory. Men of encyclopsediacal 
minds are not always perspicuous or precise; still less 
often are they original and inventive. Multum leg ere, 
non multa, is a good maxim for all who desire to extend 
the bounds of a science, or to be sound practitioners in 
any art or profession. 

The division of scientific labour, like the division of 
mechanical labour, increases both its productiveness and 
its precision. Where the attention is concentrated upon 
the same intellectual object, the result is a performance 
at once more finished and more complete. It is, how- 
ever, necessary that men of comprehensive minds should 
survey the whole circle of the sciences, should under- 
stand their mutual relations, and adapt them to each 
other, as, in the progress of discovery, they change their 
respective positions. Those who devote the chief part 
of their thoughts and studies to one science, ought to be 
aware of its place in the scientific system, and to appre- 
ciate the extent to which it may be influenced by the 
cultivation of other sciences. They ought to avoid that 
narrowing influence which is produced by restricting 
the mind to the exclusive contemplation of one subject. 
Above all, every person should, as far as his means 
extend, make himself master of the methods of scientific 
investigation, so as to be able to judge whether, in the 
treatment of any question, a sound and correct method, 



See Hippocrat., Aphorism. I. § 1, (torn. iv. p, 458, ed. Littre.) 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 113 

conformable to the precepts of a philosophical logic, has 
been observed. Provided with this organon or instru- 
ment for determining the truth, he may, after apply- 
ing it to subjects lying out of his own special province, 
rest satisfied with a knowledge of the results, without 
attempting a verification of all the steps by which they 
have been obtained.* 

§ 2. Even in cases where a person undertakes to form 
an independent judgment for himself, by an examination 
of the appropriate evidence, and by the proper logical 
processes, he ought to treat with respect the opinions of 
competent judges, and yield a reasonable deference to 
their authority. Upon all doubtful questions, in which 
the elements of decision are numerous and complex, 
and the evidence conflicting, the opinion of able and 
honest judges is entitled to great weight, and will cause 
any candid and cautious person, if he comes to an oppo- 
site conclusion, to distrust his own judgment, and enounce 
his own opinion with modesty and hesitation. 

Whenever a person, having formed an opinion upon 
grounds which appear satisfactory to himself, asserts it 
confidently, and adheres to it resolutely, without show- 
ing due deference to the authority of others, he is 
justly exposed to the charge of arrogance or presumption 
in judging.f The opinion of experienced men, having 
a special acquaintance with the subject, is always en- 
titled to weight, even if it be unsupported by argu- 



* Compare Comte, Cours de Philosophic Positive, torn. i. pp. 
29-32; torn. iv. p. 214; torn. vi. pp. 462, 475; Whewell, Phil, of 
Ind. Sciences, b. XI. c. 6, § 9. 

t The appeal to authority is called by Locke argumentum ad 
verecundiam, because it is thought a breach of modesty to question 
the opinion of men of authority. — Essay on the Vender standing, 
b. iv. c. 17, § 19. 

I 



114 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

merit.* Hence, all young persons, who attempt to judge 
for themselves, either are, or appear to be, arrogant; as 
they can scarcely fail to set at nought the opinions of 
persons more experienced and of greater authority than 
themselves. It is difficult for a young man, on account 
of the narrow circle of his experience, to discriminate 
between the cases in which he ought to judge for him- 
self, and those in which he ought to defer to the opinions 
of others. He ought not to form, in youth, a habit of 
blind submission to authority, such as the Jesuits in- 
culcated upon their disciples ; but a spirit of docility, and 
respect for the opinions of their elders, undoubtedly be- 
comes the young ; and it is certain that their opinions, 
especially on practical questions, however formed, will 



* AeT ■KpoaLyziv t&v efnreipojv ical 7rpe<rj3vTep(i)y rj typovi/Jiwv ralg 
d.va7roceiKTOtg tydo-ecri Kal £o£cug ov-% rjrrov r&v aVo^et^ewv. &a yap 
to 'iyeiv eic rfjg kjiireipiaQ o/jjua bpwatv opdujg. — Aristot., Eth. 
Nic. VI. 12. 

The wisdom of the aged in council has been proverbial from 
antiquity downwards. Concerning fiovXal yepovriov, see Eurip. 
Melanipp. fr. 23. " Quod senior loquitur, omnes consilium putant," 
says Publius Syrus, v. 672. Anciennete a autorite, is a French 
proverb in Leroux de Lincy, torn. ii. p. 173. Compare Cicero de 
Senect. c. 6 and 17. Apex senectutis est auctoritas . . . habet 
senectus, honorata prsesertim, tantam auctoritatem, ut ea pluris sit, 
quam omnes adolescentia? voluptates. Wisdom in council belongs 
to age and experience, according to Hobbes, Leviathan, II. c. 25, 
p. 247. " If the comparison do stand between man and man, which 
shall hearken unto other; sith the aged for the most part are best 
experienced, least subject to rash and unadvised passions, it hath 
been ever judged reasonable that their sentence in matter of counsel 
should be better trusted, and more relied upon than other men's. . . 
Sharp and subtle discourses of wit procure many times very great 
applause, but being laid in the balance with that which the habit 
of sound experience plainly delivereth, they are overweighed." — 
Hooker, Eccl. Pol. b. v. c. 7, § 1. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 115 

in general be of very little value to others,* however 
important it may be to themselves to cultivate a habit 
of independent and conscientious judgment. 

Persons who have formed habits of independent 
thought and examination likewise generally subject 
themselves to the same reproach — inasmuch as they often 
attach an undue weight to a chain of reasoning which 
they have gone through in their own minds, as compared 
with the opinions of persons who appear to be entitled, 
by their experience, to pronounce authoritatively on the 
subject. It is no easy matter to define the point where 
presumption, arrogance, and obstinacy end, and where 
firmness, resolution, and proper self-reliance begin. It 
is difficult, again, to discriminate between teachableness, 
humility, and reverence for high authorities, and a tame 
and passive submission of the understanding. 

Universally, indeed, it may be said, that no person 
ought to express a confident opinion upon speculative 
grounds, until he has ascertained, by careful investiga- 
tion, the unsoundness of the reasons for a different 



* Young men understand geometry, &c, but are not wise or 
prudent, because wisdom is concerned about particulars, which are 
derived from experience, and for experience a lapse of time is 
requisite. — Aristot. Eth. JYic. vi. 9. Compare I. 1, where he 
says that a young man is not able to understand social science, for 
it relates to human life and conduct, of which he is inexperienced. 
In Rhet. II. 12, § 14, he says that young men always violate the 
maxim, fxrjUv ayav — ne quid nimis. They love in excess, and 
hate in excess, and do everything in excess. For the same reason, 
they think they know everything, and assert it with confidence. 
Hence the precept of Cicero : Est igitur adolescentis majores natu 
vereri, ex que his deligere optimos et probatissimos, quorum consilio 
atque auctoritate nitatur. Ineuntis autem aetatis inscitia senum 
constituenda et regenda prudentia est. — De Off. I. 34. 

I 2 



116 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

opinion, held by practical and experienced men. If, 
however, after a due examination, he differs from their 
conclusion, he cannot, even if he be wrong, justly be 
taxed with arrogance. To persist in error after proper 
inquiry and reflection, is not presumptuous, although it 
may imply other moral or intellectual defects.* 

§ 3. Undoubtedly, it is to be desired that a man 
should be able to judge for himself; and he ought to 
avoid any undue reliance on the authority of others. 
The general soundness of opinions will be promoted by 
the prevalence of a free exercise of private judgment, 
in cases where the means of arriving at a correct con- 
clusion exist. But in a large number of subjects, and 
in multitudes of practical questions, an independent 
judgment is impossible, or inexpedient; and a great 
part of practical wisdom consists in the judicious selec- 
tion of authorities, and in a steady reliance upon their 
opinion. " That man," (says Hesiod,f in some cele- 
brated verses, which acquired in antiquity almost an 
oracular authority,) — " that man is the most excellent, 
who can always think for himself. He, too, is a good 



* On the want of humility charged to the Puritans, see some 
remarks of Dr. Arnold, Lectures on Modern History, pp. 209-10. 
" The excellence of veneration (he says) consists purely in its being 
fixed upon a worthy object; when felt indiscriminately, it is idolatry 
or insanity. To tax any one, therefore, with want of reverence 
because he pays no respect to what we venerate, is either irrelevant, 
or is a mere confusion." — p. 210. 

■f Op. et Di. 291. Compare Herod, vii. 16; and Soph. Antic/. 
719-23. Sapientissimum esse dicunt eum cui quod opus sit ipsi 
veniat in mentem; proxime accedere ilium, qui alterius bene in- 
ventis obtemperet. — Cicero, Cluent. c. 31. Ssepe ego audivi, 
milites, eum primum esse virum, qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit; 
secundum eum qui bene monenti obediat: qui nee ipse consulere, 
nee alteri parere sciat, eum extremi ingenii esse. — Livy, xxii. 29. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 117 

man who will take sound advice from others. But he 
who can neither think for himself, nor will listen to the 
sound advice of others, is a worthless man." If a per- 
son has not the capacity, or time, or means, requisite 
for forming an independent judgment on any question, 
speculative or practical, his first endeavour ought to be, 
to select as his guides those who are most likely to have 
judged correctly for themselves, or to give him safe ad- 
vice. If, as Hesiod says, he can neither form a correct 
opinion for himself, nor select as his guides such persons 
as are likely to judge soundly on the matter, his con- 
clusion cannot but be erroneous. 

With respect to decisions having an immediate 
bearing upon practice, every man of sense and pru- 
dence will, in a large number of cases, defer to the 
opinion of others. On legal questions, he will consult 
a lawyer; on medical questions, a physician; on 
pecuniary questions, a banker, a broker, or a land-agent; 
on the education of his children, a person engaged in 
tuition ; on the management of his garden, a horticul- 
turist; on the building of his house, an architect — and 
so on. The advantage of taking professional advice in 
practical questions, requiring special knowledge and ex- 
perience, is attested by the universal habit of resorting 
to it, where the means of payment exist; and also by 
such proverbs as, " He who is his own lawyer has a fool 
for a client."* 



* Men obey willingly a person whom they consider wiser than 
themselves. For example, the sick are anxious to call in a phy- 
sician to prescribe for them, and those in a ship gladly obey the 
steersman; and travellers are reluctant to be left by those who 
know the ways better than themselves. — Xen. Cyrop. I. 6, § 21. 

" Aussi le nouveau Consul parut-il avoir sur toutes choses, ou une 
opinion faite, ou une opinion qui se faisait avec la rapidite de l'eclair, 



118 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

§ 4. The practical convenience which results from 
the power of consulting a class of persons who make a 
particular subject their especial study and the business 
of their life, is also shown by the further subdivision of 
labour which takes place within a profession. Additional 
accuracy and skill is produced by an exclusive attention 
to a certain sub-department of a subject. Thus, in 
England, the medical profession is divided into physi- 
cians, surgeons, apothecaries, accoucheurs, oculists, 
aurists, dentists; the legal profession is divided into 
barristers practising in the common law courts, those 
practising in the courts of equity, conveyancers, special 
pleaders; attorneys and solicitors. Similar subdivisions 
of labour take place in other branches of practice as 
civilization advances, and the means of remunerating 
skilled advice increase. 

In disputed questions before courts of justice, involv- 
ing professional or scientific knowledge, persons having 
the requisite acquirements are often called as witnesses, 
not as to the matter of fact, but to guide the court by 
their opinion. Thus, in questions of violent death by 
drowning, wounds, poisoning, or other means, medical 
men are examined ; in cases of value of property, sur- 
veyors; and in various branches of trade, the persons 
belonging to each. Witnesses of this sort are called by 
the Italians periti, and by the French, experts ; there is 
no appropriate name for them in our law, but the prac- 
tice equally prevails.* 



surtout apres avoir entendu les hommes speciaux, qui etaient les 
seuls qu'il ecoutat, et uniquement sur l'objet qui concernait leur 
specialite." — Of Bonaparte, Thiers, Hist, du Consulat et de l' Em- 
pire, liv. i. (torn. i. p. 25.) 

* Cicero, in enumerating the circumstances which give autho- 



V.] PftOPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 119 

The judgment of professional men, generally, is re- 
spected, as compared with unprofessional men, on their 
own subject. But, as compared with one another, the 
opinion of some professional men carries weight in the 
profession, and of others does not. Thus, in the legal 
profession, there are certain text- writers and eminent 
judges and jurists, to whose opinion the practising mem- 
bers of the bar would generally defer, and whose dicta 
they would cite in argument, as carrying authority;* 
and in other professions, such as the military, naval, 
medical, &c, a similar pre-eminence would be conceded 
to certain persons by the general agreement of practical 
men. 

The advantage of taking professional advice, on cer- 
tain classes of practical subjects, is so generally reco- 
gnised as not to require proof. When cases of this sort 
arise, every man who is inops consilii feels his own 



ritj to testimony, places first, virtus, and afterwards, ingenium, 
opes, setas, fortuna, ars, usus, necessitas, and sometimes concursio 
rerum fortuitarum. With regard to the latter of these, he says — 
" Sed reliquis quoque rebus, quamquam in iis nulla species virtutis 
est, tamen interdum confirmatur fides, si aut ars quaedam adhibetur, 
(magna enim est vis ad persuadendum sciential,) aut usus; ple- 
rumque enim creditur iis qui experti sunt." — Topica, c. 19. 

* " Lorsque les auteurs se contrarient, ce n'est pas toujours l'opi- 
nion du plus grand nombre qu'il convient d'adopter. Les opinions, 
en pareil cas, s'apprecient et ne se comptent pas. 11 peut se faire 
qu'un seul ait raison, pendant que dix autres auront erre. C'est 
alors, qu'aide du savoir et de l'erudition, l'esprit peut montrer tout 
ce que peut la sagacite et la justesse du raisonnement; mais lorsque 
les auteurs sont unanimes, il faut etre bien sur de ses talens, pour 
se flatter qu'on ferajuger contre leur sentiment. Leurs suffrages 
accumules font comme un contrepoids qui l'emporte necessairement." 
— Merlin, Repertoire de Jurisprudence, Art. Autorite. § 7 (of 
Opinions of Text-writers.) 



120 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

helplessness, and flies for advice to a person who has 
knowledge and experience in the matter. But many- 
persons, in taking professional advice, forget that, by so 
doing, they virtually surrender their own independent 
judgment ; and instead of observing faithfully the course 
prescribed to them, pursue a track compounded out of 
the advice of the professional man and their own notions. 
Such a proceeding as this can, however, rarely lead to 
a good result, and is always contrary to the dictates of 
reason. The discretion of the layman— the I^iwdjc — 
is to be exercised in the choice of the professional man 
whom he consults; but having made his choice, he 
should give his confidence to his adviser, and follow the 
rules prescribed for his guidance. And if his choice 
has been carefully made, he should not (unless an urgent 
case may render a different course expedient) be ready 
to withdraw his confidence, and try a new adviser, even 
if the results of the advice should appear at first sight 
unsatisfactory, and should not correspond to the hopes 
which he originally entertained. It is particularly in 
the choice of a medical adviser, that the levity of judg- 
ment which induces the trial of successive persons is 
observable. Patients labouring under incurable or chronic 
maladies expect a rapid cure; and if this impossibility 
is not accomplished, they change their physician. On 
the other hand, it would be absurd to say that, where 
there has been a manifest error of judgment, or want of 
success in the treatment of a medical case, the patient 
should never resort to fresh advice. Perhaps one of 
the best practical rules is this : that where a medical 
man proves on trial to have taken an erroneous view 
of a case, and does not perform what he undertook at 
the commencement, a change of advisers should be tried ; 
but that his treatment should not be condemned, until 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 121 

his own promises and predictions can be compared with 
the event.* 

§ 5. Much discretion is requisite in the selection of 
advisers in professional and other matters requiring 
special qualifications, and in turning their advice to good 
account. When we see one man almost always selecting 
good advisers, and acting on good advice, and when we 
see another man always selecting bad advisers, and acting 
on bad advice, we may be sure that this difference is not 
owing to accident. There is sometimes as much practi- 
cal wisdom in choosing good counsellors as in judging 
for one's self. The marks of a trustworthy guide in 
matters of practice are, indeed, (as we have shown in a 
previous chapter,) tolerably distinct; but in the appli- 
cation of these, there is ample scope for the exercise of 
a discreet judgment. Hobbes, it must be admitted, 
exaggerates the difficulty of this choice when he says, 
that we cannot safely select an adviser, without being 
able to judge of the soundness of his rules. " To know 
(he says) who knows the rules almost of any art is a 
great degree of the knowledge of the same art ; because 
no man can be assured of the truth of another's rules, 
but he that is first taught to understand them."f By 



* Lord Bacon gives the following precepts respecting the choice 
of a physician: — "Physicians are, some of them, so pleasing and 
conformable to the humour of the patient, as they press not the 
true cure of the disease; and some other are so regular in proceed- 
ing according to art for the disease, as they respect not sufficiently 
the condition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or, if 
it may not be found in one man, combine two of either sort; and 
forget not to call as well the best acquainted with your body, as the 
best reputed of for his faculty." — Essay XXX., on Regimen of 
Health. 

t Leviathan, part ii. c. 30, p. 339. Cicero says nearly to the 



122 ON THE UTILITY AND [CE\ 

pursuing the indications of a trustworthy adviser, which 
we have formerly adverted to, a selection may unques- 
tionably be made with less labour than would be requi- 
site for forming an independent judgment upon the rules 
of the art. The authentication of practitioners by 
diplomas, and by other marks of public sanction, likewise 
serves as a guide to the unprofessional person.* Never- 
theless, the discrimination between sound and unsound 
counsellors, implies attentive thought and inquiry. 
Good advice, too, when given, does not always thrive in 
foolish hands. It is often misapplied, or misunderstood, 
or neglected. It is like good tools in the hands of an 
artisan ; though indispensable in itself, it cannot be used 
without skill. 

§ 6. There is, or at least has been, much popular pre- 
judice against the learned professions; and this feeling 
has been fomented by satirists and writers of comedy, 
who have ridiculed their weaknesses and failings, such 
as their pedantry and their groundless pretensions to 
science. It is thought that, as lawyers and physicians 
live upon the follies, the quarrels, and the diseases of 
mankind, they have an interest in augmenting the 
pabulum on which they subsist. But the truth is, that 
the legitimate and recognised end of these professions is 
to provide preventives and remedies for the ills to 
which human nature and human society are subject. 
The ills are inevitable; but they can be mitigated by 
prudence and good management. Now this mitigation 



same effect — " Quod dicunt omnia se credere ei quern judicent 
fuisse sapientem; probarem si id ipsum rudes et indocti judicare 
potuissent. Statuere enim qui sit sapiens, vel maxime videtur esse 
sapientis." — Acad. Prior. II. 3. 

* See further, on this subject, Chapter IX. § 17. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 123 

is what professional advice undertakes to provide, and, 
in fact, to a great extent does provide.* It is not to 
be expected that all the members of a large profession 
should be morally perfect, or that there should not be 
cases in which their advice is prompted by an interested 
motive. But that the public is, on the whole, essen- 
tially benefited by the advice of professional men is 
apparent from the earnest and universal desire to obtain 
their services, and from the pecuniary sacrifices made 
for the purpose of obtaining them. According to the 
Italian proverb — 

Quei consigli son prezzati, 
Che son chiesti e ben pagati. 

A similar inference may be drawn from the provision 
made by governments for the gratuitous supply of pro- 
fessional advice, where it cannot be procured without 
charitable assistance. In almost all countries, medical 
attendance is provided in this manner for the poor, to a 
greater or less extent ; and, in certain cases, advocates 
are furnished at the public expense to enable poor 
litigants to recover their rights. 

§ 7. A custom similar to that of professional advice 
is adverted to by Bacon, as having existed among the 
Romans. Speaking of the Wisdom of Business — that 
is, of the discreet management of private affairs, he 
remarks as follows, " Of this wisdom, it seemeth some 
of the ancient Romans, in the sagest and wisest times, 
were professors; for Cicero reporteth that it was then in 
use for senators that had name and opinion for general 



* " Legistes, docteurs, medecins, quelle chute pour vous, si nous 
pouvions tous nous donner le mot de devenir sages!" — La Bruyere, 
c. 12. But until this change is effected, it is fortunate that there 
should be a substitute for individual wisdom. 



124 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Laslius, and many 
others, to walk at certain hours in the place, and to give 
audience to those that would use their advice ; and that 
the particular citizens would resort unto them, and con- 
sult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the 
employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of 
an accusation, and every other occasion incident to man's 
life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even 
in private causes, arising out of an universal insight 
into the affairs of the world; which is used, indeed, 
upon particular causes propounded, but is gathered by 
general observation of causes of like nature."* 

The system of auricular confession and the direction 
of consciences, as practised in the Church of Kome, is 
founded on a theory similar to that on which the custom 
of professional consultations rests. f The confessor may 
be considered as a vicarious conscience, in like manner 
as professional advice is vicarious prudence. If the 
penitent makes a full and true confession, the confessor 
or spiritual director pronounces or advises with a com- 
plete knowledge of the circumstances of the case, pro- 
bably with a knowledge of the penitent's character and 
position, and always with the impartiality of a judge — 
free from personal concern in the matter, and unbiassed 
by passion or interest. Seeing how blind and partial 
a judge each man is in his own case, and how uncon- 
sciously the moral judgment with respect to our own 
actions is perverted by the inclinations, it cannot be 
doubted that such a counsellor, in ambiguous cases of 



* Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 260. Compare Cic. de Orat. III. 
33, 34. 

t See Malebranche, Recherche de la Verite, eel. 13, sur liv. iii. 
upon the Consultation of Physicians and Confessors. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 125 

conduct, such a ductor duhitantium, would be generally 
beneficial, if the moral code which he administers was 
well framed, and if his opinion or advice was always 
honest and enlightened. Unfortunately, however, it hap- 
pens, that the system of moral rules which guides the 
discretion of the Catholic confessor is founded on a 
narrow-minded and somewhat superstitious theology, so 
far as it proceeds upon the distinctive tenets of the 
Church of Rome ; and that the desire of domestic dicta- 
tion, and of regulating the affairs of families,* so natural 
in an unmarried clergy, gives too often an improper bias 
to the influence of the spiritual director. The theory is 
alluring, but the practice disappoints the expectation. 
The only admissible substitute for self-judgment, in 
domestic affairs and questions of private conduct, is the 
advice of relations and trustworthy friends.f To these 
a person can with safety and propriety unbosom himself, 
and from them he will receive the best advice which, 
under such circumstances, he can obtain. 



* " Je vois bien que le gout qu'il-y-a a devenir le depositaire du 
secret des families, a se rendre necessaire pour les reconciliations, a 
procurer des commissions ou a placer des domestiques, a trouver 
toutes les portes ouvertes dans les maisons des grands, a manger 
souvent a de bonnes tables, a se promener en carrosse dans une 
grande ville, et a faire de delicieuses retraites a la campagne, a voir 
plusieurs personnes de nom et de distinction s'interesser a sa vie et 
a sa sante, et a menager pour les autres et pour soi-meme tous les 
interets humains ; je vois bien, encore une fois, que cela seul a fait 
imaginer le specieux et irreprehensible pretexte du soin des ames, 
et seme dans le monde cette pepiniere intarissable de directeurs." — 
La Bruyere, Caracteres, ch. 3. 

t Plurimum in amicitia, amicorum bene suadentium valeat aucto- 
ritas: eaque adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam 
acriter, si res postulet. — Cicero de Amic. c. 13. Monere et 
moneri proprium est verae amicitiae: et alterum libere facere, non 
aspere; alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter. — lb. c. 25. 



126 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

It may be here remarked, that an unjust prejudice 
has not unfrequently been raised in Protestant countries 
against the treatises which are prepared for the use of 
confessors in the Church of Rome. When confession, 
and the judgment of the confessor upon sins confessed, 
exists as an institution of the church, the office of the 
priest becomes judicial, and it is necessary, in order 
to prevent erroneous decisions, and to preserve con- 
sistency, that a system of rules should be laid down 
for the general guidance of his discretion. The more 
difficult and doubtful of the cases likely to come 
before the confessor have been discussed separately, 
and have given rise to the branch of practical divinity 
called casuistry* Casuistry is the jurisprudence of 
theology; it is a digest of the moral and religious maxims 
to be observed by the priest, in advising or deciding upon 
questions which come before him in confession, and in 
assigning the amount of penance due to each sin. As 
confession discloses the most secret thoughts and acts of 
the penitent, and as nothing, however impure, is con- 
cealed from the confessor, it is necessary that he should 
be furnished with a manual in which these subjects are 
discussed. Now such a manual, if properly considered, 
is not more justly obnoxious to the charge of gratuitous 
indecency, than a legal or medical treatise, in which 
similar subjects are expounded without any reserve of 
language. The necessity for treating the subject in 
this manner, and the danger of suggesting what it is 



* For the history of casuistry, see the Art. Casuistik in Ersch 
and Gruber's Encyclopadie, vol. xxi. p. 117. Casuistical theology 
was not abandoned by the Protestant churches till a considerable 
time after the Reformation : and several casuistical treatises were 
written by Protestant divines. Compare Hallam, Lit. of Europe, 
vol. III. c. 4, §§ 1—20. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 127 

intended to discourage, may be reasons against the 
practice of confession; but if the expediency of this 
practice is once admitted, the rest follows by a necessary 
consequence. 

§ 8. One important part of the practical dealings of 
life consists in the purchase of such articles as each 
person requires for the use and consumption of himself 
and his family. If he is capable of judging for himself as 
to the quality and value of the goods which he purchases, 
he will thus avoid imposition. If he is not, he will 
(unless he calls in the advice of some competent judge) 
either be imposed upon, or he must pay what Mr. 
Babbage has called the Price of Verification.* That is 
to say, he must deal only at shops whose honesty can 
be safely relied upon, and which, inasmuch as they take 
the trouble to verify their own goods, and guarantee the 
quality of them, charge an additional sum for this trouble 
and responsibility. The additional payment is a species 
of insurance against fraud and mistake. A shop of this 
sort may be considered a shop of authority: the know- 
ledge of its managers as to their trade, and their 
integrity, render it probable that their articles are of 
excellent quality, and induce the customer to pay an 
additional price on this account. Wanting the requisite 
knowledge himself, he is willing to pay a certain sum 
for authenticating the quality of the article which he 
buys. For example ; a person ignorant of jewels would 
give an additional sum in purchasing them from a 
jeweller of established character and reputation, lest, if 
he bought them of an unknown dealer, he might be 
cheated by the substitution of paste or glass for genuine 
stones. On the other hand, a person possessing this 



Economy of Machinery and Manufactures^ c. 14. 



128 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

knowledge might rely on his own judgment, and spare 
himself the cost of throwing on others the task of veri- 
fication. In like manner, a bookseller, by making a 
careful and judicious selection of the books which he 
publishes, might create so much confidence in the good- 
ness of his publications, as to enable him to charge an 
extra price for them. 

In some cases, the determination of value is so labo- 
rious and difficult a process, that it has given rise to a 
separate class of professional men, as land-valuers, sur- 
veyors, appraisers, &c. In these valuations, the price 
of verification is not a small per-centage, confounded 
with the price of the article, but it is of suflicient import- 
ance to stand apart, and form a substantive item. 

§ 9. Besides professional advice, there is another 
species of advice not less important, which is given with 
the grounds assigned, but in which the practical con- 
viction is generally produced by a mixture of reasoning 
and authority. This is advice given in joint delibera- 
tion and consultation, or debate. 

Deliberation is concerning a future practical con- 
clusion; it is an inquiry concerning a course of action 
to be adopted, in a matter undetermined and uncertain, 
but believed to be within the power of those whose con- 
viction the adviser seeks to influence. It consists some- 
times in recommending, sometimes in dissuading, a 
certain course, and occasionally in a mere statement and 
examination of different courses. In oral deliberation, the 
end is attained by reaching the conviction of the hearer 
through his understanding or feelings; and a statement 
of reasons for the course indicated, or of incentives to 
it, is presented to his mind. On the other hand, in the 
cases of professional consultation noticed above, the 
advice is in general given absolutely, without reason 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 129 

assigned. Sometimes the reasons of professional advisers 
are even intentionally concealed, lest they should deter 
the ignorant or timid consulter from following the 
advice; as is usually the case in the practice of phy- 
sicians. Professional advice is followed, as such, blindly, 
and without any comprehension of its grounds, upon the 
mere authority of the adviser, just as a stranger follows 
the advice of a native as to the choice between roads, in 
a country with which he is unacquainted. 

Deliberation takes place, in particular, on the most 
important practical conclusions of public interest, as 
it is with respect to these that men most distrust their 
own judgment. Thus, there are deliberations of legally- 
constituted bodies, as councils of state, parliaments, 
courts of justice, municipal bodies, and synods of 
divines ; in free countries, also, many questions of general 
or local concern are deliberated upon in voluntary 
meetings and associations. In all organized political 
bodies, which have a corporate action, and a common 
place of meeting, and which decide by a majority of 
votes, the business is transacted by a joint deliberation 
and consultation of the members.* Deliberation may 
likewise take place among professional advisers, or 
friends of the parties, upon private affairs. 

Deliberation or consultation always has a practical end 
in view, and never mere speculative truth. We may 
discuss scientific truths, but we do not deliberate or 
consult about them. This distinction may be illustrated 
by comparing a philosophical dialogue with a parlia- 
mentary debate. If a scientific society discuss a ques- 
tion of astronomy, geology, or natural history, they do 
not deliberate; but they may deliberate about the 



* On this subject, see further, Chapter VII, § 12. 
K 



130 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

management of their funds, or the appointment of their 
officers. The exercitations of a rhetorical school, or the 
discussions of a debating society, are not deliberations.* 
As discussion about abstract truths differs from deli- 
beration or consultation about practical conclusions, so 
the qualities requisite for producing conviction differ in 
the two cases. In the former, mere intellect suffices ; a 
peculiar faculty for observation of facts, or for inductive 
or deductive reasoning from them, will alone render a 
man fit for discussing questions of pure science, without 
reference to his moral qualities or character. But in 
joint deliberation it is otherwise. In order that a man 
should convince in deliberation, he ought not merely to be 
able and experienced, but also honest; and, moreover, the 



* The subject of deliberation (fiovkevaio) was carefully considered 
by Aristotle, to whom many of the remarks in the text are due. 
See Eth. Nit. iii. 5; vi. 8, 10; Magn. Mor. i. 17, 18; Eth. Eud. 
ii. 10; and Rhet. i. 3; and compare Quintilian, Inst. Or. iii. 8. 
Concerning the ends of deliberation in political matters, see Grotius, 
J. B. et. P. II. 24, § 5. 

Deliberation, strictly speaking, may be confined to a single per- 
son; it may signify the reflections of an individual upon the future 
practical conduct of himself or others. Thus, in the fine verses of 
Milton, applied by Sir J. Mackintosh to Mr. Pitt — 

Deep on his front engraven 
Deliberation sat, and public care. 

In the text, however, I have used deliberation exclusively with 
reference to oral deliberation in the presence of other persons. It 
is in this sense that we speak of deliberative oratory, a deliberative 
assembly, &c. 

Hobbes, Leviathan, part I. c. 6, following Yossius, says that 
deliberation is so called, " because it is a putting an end to the 
liberty we had of doing or omitting, according to our own appetite 
or aversion." But the word seems, in fact, to be derived from libra, 
a balance, and to signify weighing in the mind. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 131 

audience ought to feel that he is not indifferent to the 
welfare of the persons whom the decision is to affect, but 
that he has their interest at heart. By exhibiting these 
qualifications, he will acquire a weight and ascendancy 
in their counsels, and his advice will be adopted, partly 
on account of the reasons which he addresses to them, 
and partly on account of the authority which his opinion 
carries by itself. The amount of the confidence which 
his audience, or a large portion of it, may place in his 
opinion, independently of his reasons, is governed by a 
vast variety of circumstances, which it is impossible to 
enumerate, or bring under a general description. They 
are, in fact, as numerous and different as those which 
enable us to form an estimate of a man's moral and in- 
tellectual worth. For example, with respect to the 
various reasons which may induce a council of state to 
place confidence in the advice of a particular minister, a 
council of war to place confidence in the advice of a 
particular general, a legislative assembly to place con- 
fidence in the advice of a particular member, as such, in- 
dependently of his reasons, — it can only be said, that 
their confidence is owing to their belief, founded on ante- 
cedent events, that his judgment is likely to be sound, 
and disposition honest.* 



* On the importance of moral character in deliberative oratory, 
see Aristot. Rhet. ii. 1, § 3. In § 5, he enumerates the qualities 
which the deliberative orator ought to possess — viz., virtue, wisdom, 
and good inclination towards his audience. So Quintilian: "Valet 
in consiliis auctoritas plurimum. Nam et prudentissimus esse 
haberique, et optimus is debet, qui sententiae suae de utilibus atque 
honestis credere omnes velit. In judiciis enim vulgo fas habetur 
indulgere aliquid studio suo: consilia nemo est qui neget secundum 
mores dari." — Inst. Orat. iii. 8, § 12. See also Whately's Rhetoric, 
part II. ch. 3, §§ 4, 5. As to the qualifications of a good coun- 
sellor, see Hobbes, Lev. part II. c. 25. 

K 2 



132 ON THE UTILITY AND [OH. 

Addresses to a court of justice or a judicial body, by 
a paid advocate, although they tend to a practical con- 
clusion, do not fall under the head of deliberative oratory. 
The advice is not given upon the personal credit and 
authority of the speaker, nor is he understood to speak 
his own convictions, but merely to follow his instructions, 
and to present the facts of the case and the application 
of the law to it, in the light most favourable to his 
client. Hence, a paid advocate speaks without moral 
weight, and his arguments merely pass at their intrinsic 
value, without deriving any additional force from the 
source from which they proceed. Whenever a lawyer, 
in pleading a case, attempts to strengthen it by throwing 
in the weight of his personal conviction and character, 
he exceeds his proper province ; he attempts to gain an 
advantage in argument, without, in fact, undertaking 
the responsibility which his assurance ought to imply, 
and, in so doing, he violates the principles upon which 
the very beneficial system of hired advocacy is founded. 

§ 10. In all deliberations, we seek to determine the 
best mode of dealing with some practical question, which 
is as yet undecided, and, therefore, our consultation, as 
has been already remarked, concerns the future. Now 
it is the uncertainty of the future which is the main 
cause of the difficulty of judgment in practical deci- 
sions ; and, hence, in the cases where the future events 
are the most uncertain, and the least reducible to laws 
of regular sequence, we are most disposed to rely upon 
the advice of sagacious and honest counsellors — of per- 
sons whose foresight and clearness of mental vision has 
been proved by experience. 

The subject of prediction is too extensive to be con- 
sidered here at length; besides, it belongs generally to 
the province of logic and scientific method, and specially 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 133 

to the respective sciences and arts conversant about each 
branch of knowledge and practice. A few remarks may, 
however, properly be introduced, with reference princi- 
pally to the peculiar difficulty of prediction which is 
supposed to be inherent in the moral sciences. 

In some departments of physical science, not merely 
hypothetical but actual problems consist of so few, so 
simple, and so well ascertained elements, that their 
solution can be completely effected. Whenever the data 
are the whole set of actual circumstances, and the problem 
admits of solution, the future can be predetermined with 
certainty, and all the sequences of the phenomena ex- 
hausted by a preliminary view. This is eminently the 
case with the science of astronomy, which has now been 
brought to such a pitch of perfection that all the im- 
portant events relating to the motions of the solar 
system can be predicted with unerring precision. In 
consequence of the movement of these bodies being round 
a centre, the events of astronomy, and those dependent 
upon them, such as the course of the seasons, and the 
inequality of day and night on the earth, recur in con- 
stant cycles. In other departments of physics, also, the 
data of real problems can be reduced to so great sim- 
plicity, that future events, though not recurring in 
cycles, can be determined beforehand with a close ap- 
proach to certainty. Thus, (with a small margin of 
allowance for the operation of those causes which we are 
compelled to group together under the name of chance,) 
we can predetermine the growth of a plant ; being able, 
from a knowledge of its habits, to suit our management 
to its nature. So, the elementary facts upon which the 
sciences of mechanics and chemistry are founded are 
completely within our grasp, and we can command them 
for the future, from our experience of the past. The 



134 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

experiments relating to the lever, the inclined plane, the 
wheel, and the pendulum, as well as those relating to the 
composition of water, gases, &c, can all be repeated at 
pleasure. So, our knowledge of the laws of optics is 
not only sufficient to enable us to foretel the principal 
phenomena of light, but also, by the help of this know- 
ledge, to construct telescopes, microscopes, and other 
optical instruments. 

Extensive, however, as our command over nature has 
become, and wide as is the domain of the useful arts, 
still every fresh invention, whether mechanical or che- 
mical, is of uncertain success until it has been verified 
by actual trial and experiment. It is almost as difficult 
to predict the working of a new machine, as of a new 
law or social institution. When the problem is simple, 
calculation can master it; but when the elements are 
numerous and complex, and when we are not sure that 
all the influencing circumstances are included, the result 
is uncertain, and requires verification by experiment, in 
physics as well as politics. The ablest writers on the 
physical sciences, however they may differ in many of 
their philosophical views, agree, indeed, in trying the 
soundness and value of a scientific theory, by its power 
of predicting the future. Thus, Dr. Whewell says that 
"it is a test of true theories, not only to account for, 
but to predict phenomena." * M. Comte, in his Cours 
de Philosophie Positive, lays it down repeatedly, that 
prediction is the proper end of all science. Science, 
he says, proceeds on the assumption of the recurrence 
of phenomena in an invariable sequence; and, if this 
sequence has once been determined completely for the 



* Aph. 12, concerning Science. Phil, of the Ind. Sciences, vol. i. 
p. xxxix. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 135 

past, the determination will hold good for the future. 
What distinguishes science from mere erudition or 
learning is, that the former aims at prevision, whereas 
the latter relates facts without reference to the future. 
Science leads to prediction, and prediction to action.* 

Such, undoubtedly, is the goal which science strives to 
reach, but, in a large proportion of cases, its effort is 
unsuccessful. Every science attempts to predict, but its 
predictions are often mere approximations to the truth. 
A theory which has attained a high degree of perfection 
may, nevertheless, when it comes to be applied in prac- 
tice, be under the necessity of dealing with so many 
data, that it may be unable to cope with the problem, 
and may furnish imperfect, and even inconsistent, pre- 
dictions in the hands of different theorists. Notwith- 
standing the advanced state of mechanical theory, we 
know that engineers differ widely in their plans for 
constructions, machines, and other practical works, and 
that there are practical problems which mechanical 
science cannot effectually solve. 

Such are the limits upon prediction, even in those 
physical sciences which have reached a high degree of 
theoretical perfection. But there are other departments 
of physics in which observation is more difficult, in 
which many of the phenomena elude our powers of inves- 
tigation, and whose theory, therefore, is not better ascer- 
tained than that of the moral sciences. Such, for ex- 
ample, is meteorology, which has for its subject the 
successive states of the earth's atmosphere, and of the 
vapours, moisture, &c, which it contains. The climate 
of each place can be reduced to certain laws, and the 



* See torn. i. pp. 62, 63; torn. ii. pp. 28, 401, 426, 428; torn. iii. 
pp. 10, 304, 407, 413; torn. vi. p. 723. 



136 ON THE UTILITY ATS D [CH. 

deviations from these can be brought within assignable 
limits, so as to guide the works of the farmer and gar- 
dener ; but the temperature of any place, and the nature 
of the weather on any given day, cannot be predicted 
with any approach to precision. An equal uncertainty 
besets the science of medicine. The functions of the 
living body, which physiology undertakes to describe, 
are in great part, so long as they are in action, with- 
drawn from the observation of the senses, and are not, 
like our mental processes, the subject of consciousness. 
These functions, therefore, even while the organs are in 
a healthy state, to a great extent defy our powers of 
observation; when they assume a morbid action, the 
diagnostics of the disease are often obscure and ambi- 
guous ; and even supposing the nature and seat of the 
malady to be accurately determined, there is further 
uncertainty as to the mode of treating it — as to the in- 
fluence of medicines, regimen, &c, upon the organs 
affected. Hence, the most experienced physicians are 
often unable to detect the source of a malady, to foretel 
its course, or to judge as to the effect of a complex set 
of influences acting on the human body. Still less are 
they in general able to determine the laws for the diffu- 
sion of an epidemic disease — to predict the course which 
it will take, or the time for which it will last. Although 
the average value of human life at successive ages can 
be approximatively calculated, yet it cannot be predicted 
with certainty how long any given person will live ; and 
it is only by a compensation of errors that companies for 
life-insurances can subsist. 

In practical questions, lying within the scope of the 
moral and political sciences, prediction is always pecu- 
liarly difficult, partly on account of the immense number 
of influencing circumstances which it is necessary to 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 137 

take into consideration, and partly on account of the 
uncertainty which belongs to all events dependent on 
human volition. Not only do moral and political pro- 
blems consist, in general, of more numerous and complex 
data than those which grow out of the physical sciences, 
but the matter to which they refer is different. The 
matter of a physical problem is either insentient, and 
follows an invariable and mechanical law of sequence ; 
or, where it concerns animal and vegetable life, it deals 
only with a living organization, destitute of the power 
of free moral volition and progressive intelligence. The 
matter of a moral and political problem, when it con- 
cerns practice, is always the human will; and though 
the general tendencies of human nature can be deter- 
mined, so that it is properly a subject of science,* 
yet the operation of peculiar feelings, fancies, wishes, 
caprices, and inclinations, in individuals, and their 
influence upon others, are uncertain and incalculable. 

When a physical problem has been once solved, it is 
solved for ever. The theorems of Archimedes upon the 
lever, and the observations of Aristotle upon animals, 
retain their truth, unaffected by the lapse of ages. If 
the habits of bees, which Virgil describes in his fourth 
Georgic, had been true of the Italian bees in his own 
time, they would be true of bees at the present time. 
But bees, though a gregarious and (as they have been 
called) a political, are not a progressive animal. Man 
alone, among organized beings, possesses the moral and 
intellectual qualities which render one generation of 
human beings unlike another, and which enable him to 
alter his own condition and that of others by self-culture. 
Hence he alone, of all living beings, possesses a history ; 



* See Mill's System of Logic, b. VI. c. 3. 



138 ON THE UTILITY AND [ CH * 

other tribes of animals are described by enumerating all 
the properties of their species or kind, and when this 
task has been completely accomplished, the problem is 
exhausted, except so far as varieties may be produced 
by domestication. One generation of elephants, or mon- 
keys, or lions, has nothing to distinguish it from another. 
But man, in addition to that physiological character 
which he has in common with other animals, and which, 
like their physical type, is unvarying, has also attributes 
which distinguish one community of men from another — 
and, again, one generation of the same community from 
another generation. It is the sum of the acts of a 
society, as they occur in succession, which constitutes its 
history, and distinguishes its state, not only from that of 
other societies, but also from its own states, both ante- 
rior and subsequent. 

With respect to the determination of the future in 
human affairs, there are two cases, which, though they 
do not admit of being very precisely distinguished from 
each other, yet require to be considered separately. 

The first is, when, from a view of all those circum- 
stances which, taken in the aggregate, constitute the 
actual state of any society, we predict its state at some 
definite future period. Although a philosophical survey 
of the course of history may lead to certain general 
results as to the progress of society, and the order in 
which certain political and social changes may be 
expected to follow one another, yet it is impossible to pre- 
dict a future social state with any approach to certainty :* 

Prudens futuri temporis exitum 
Caliginosa nocte premit Deus. 



* Upon the meaning of " a state of society," and the extent to 
which it can be predicted, see Mill's Syst. of Logic, b. VI. c. 10. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 139 

Such anticipations, even of the most sagacious judges, 
can have scarcely better claim to confidence than the 
predictions of a weather-almanac. For example, who, 
in the year 1788, could have predicted the social and 
political state of France and a large part of Europe at 
any period of the Revolution, the Consulate, or the 
Empire? That an extensive and profound study of 
history did not necessarily give an insight into this 
futurity, is proved by the remark of G-ibbon upon the 
early stages of that great change. "How many years," 
(said he, writing at the end of 1789,*) "before France 
can recover any vigour, or resume her station among the 
powers of Europe ! " And even if he had then predicted 
the great development of popular and military energy 
which ensued in France upon the invasion of the French 
territory, and the attempts to restore the royal authority, 
his prediction must have been founded on such uncertain 
and arbitrarily chosen grounds, as to deserve little more 
than the name of a guess. Who, in January, 1848, could 
have predicted the series of events which have occurred 
on the continent of Europe since that period ; and who, 
if he had happened to conjecture something near the 
truth, could have ventured to say that his prediction 
was derived from sure data? 

But, secondly, in the practical management of affairs, 
the problem for our solution presents itself in a less 
intricate and more tractable shape. We are commonly 
called upon to predict the effects of some given cause, 
viz., of some proposed legislative or administrative 
measure, or of a treaty or war with a foreign country. 
Predictions of this sort, with respect to the body politic, 



* Milman's Life of Gibbon, p. 338. 



140 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

are analogous to the predictions of the effects of a certain 
medicine or diet with respect to the body natural. They 
are also analogous to predictions with respect to the 
working of a new and untried machine, or instrument. 
Having been framed by means of inferences from observed 
and generalized facts, they approximate more or less 
closely to the truth ; but the plan requires a process of 
verification before its actual working can be securely 
ascertained. 

In human affairs, whether relating to public or private 
interests, such predictions, (as Mr. Mill has truly re- 
marked*) can never be absolute; they must be limited 
to the affirmation of tendencies, and not venture to lay 
down positive effects. In dealing with human actions, 
we can only presume to say that a certain cause, if not 
counteracted, will produce a certain effect; and that, 
therefore, its tendency is to produce that effect. But 
those future miscellaneous causes which we cannot cal- 
culate, and which we are forced to set down to the 
account of chance, are so numerous, as to prevent us 
from saying that it will produce that effect. Even our 
predictions of tendencies, moreover, in the great majority 
of cases, can only be made by empirical maxims — by 
propositions not true universally, but qualified by con- 
siderations of time and place. For example, the expe- 
diency of a new legislative proposal must be judged by 
very different criteria in England and in Hindostan. 
The differences of climate, race, religion, degree of mental 
and moral culture, political habits and institutions, state 
of the useful arts, and other determining circumstances, 
would necessitate the application of different rules of 



System of Logic, vol. ii. pp. 523, 565. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 141 

judgment, and different canons of prediction, in the one 
case, from those applicable in the other. 

It may be remarked, that those things which are com- 
prehended under the denomination of news — which are 
collected in newspapers, and circulated in this shape, for 
the information of the public — belong in general to the 
class of events to which our powers of prediction apply- 
either imperfectly, or not at all. Sometimes a newspaper 
may describe the appearances of an eclipse, or other 
remarkable celestial phenomenon, which astronomers have 
foreseen ; but no newspaper informs its readers of the 
course of the seasons, the succession of day and night, 
the rising and setting of the stars, or the alternation of 
the tides. Storms, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, and other similar incalculable events in the 
realm of nature, together with the acts and fortunes of 
men, both in a political and a private character — battles, 
revolutions, debates of senates, trials by courts of justice, 
accidents, crimes, voyages, births, marriages, deaths, &c. 
compose the intelligence which a newspaper furnishes. 
The avidity for news is owing to the difficulty or impos- 
sibility of foreseeing the events : in proportion as the 
events are important and unexpected, is our curiosity 
to learn them. 

Even, however, with the assistance of all those means 
which the admirable inventions of modern science have 
contrived for the accelerated despatch of intelligence, we 
are hardly ever, in any complicated case, informed at 
the moment of decision and action with respect to all the 
contemporaneous events. Circumstances are changing, 
more or less, at every instant ; and we are left to infer 
the present state of things from their state at a recent 
period. Hence the necessity, according to the just 



142 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

remark of Turgot, of predicting the present : our belief 
as to the immediate present must always be founded, to 
a certain extent, upon conjectures derived from an ante- 
cedent period. A general, for example, when he issues 
his orders successively in a battle, cannot know the state 
of things, at each moment, so exactly and completely as 
he may ascertain them after the battle, from the infor- 
mation of different persons and the comparison of their 
several accounts. 

§ 11. Now in the attempt to predetermine the future, 
with reference to some practical measure, the deliberation 
of competent judges affords the best security; though 
we see, especially from the debates of legislative as- 
semblies, to what an extent their judgments and pre- 
dictions conflict with respect to practical affairs. Do 
what we will, the future, to a great extent, eludes our 
grasp, in all matters dependent upon the volitions of 
other men. Nevertheless, by careful deliberation and 
the adoption of prudent counsels, and by a rigid ad- 
herence to a sound method of observation and reasoning 

or by following the advice of persons who themselves 

adhere to such a method, we can reduce the amount of 
uncertainty ; we can eliminate many elements of chance, 
and, to a considerable extent, bring the future under our 
control. From time to time, undoubtedly, great catas- 
trophes occur, which no prudence could have anticipated, 
and whose consequences, not having been guarded against, 
must be endured. Such great moral convulsions are like 
storms and hurricanes in the physical world, which, 
though doubtless they have their appropriate and con- 
stant laws not less than the equable course of the 
weather, yet defy the predictions of the meteorologist. 
But, in the ordinary course of human affairs, the future 
can, to a great extent, be anticipated for practical pur- 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 143 

poses ; care, prudence, sagacity, practical wisdom, and 
good counsel, can be recognised by their good fruits; 
neglect, rashness, folly, shortsightedness, and bad counsel, 
can be recognised by their bad fruits. 

§ 12. In proportion, therefore, as men's conduct in 
doubtful questions of practice is influenced by reason, 
they will defer to the opinion of the most competent 
advisers where their own judgment is at fault. By 
these means they will, as far as is practicable, subject 
the future to their control. If they are ignorant and 
superstitious, they will be impatient of merely human 
advice, and unwilling to resign themselves to the 
guidance of a judgment which does not lay claim to in- 
fallibility. They then fall into the hands of diviners 
and soothsayers, who undertake, by supernatural aid, 
and by some occult method, to prognosticate the future.* 
Hence the prevalence of the arts of divination by 
auguries, auspices, omens, oracles, dreams, necromancy, 
evocations of spirits, judicial astrology, cabbala, magic, 
palmistry, second-sight, &c, which at one time flourished 
among the civilized nations of Europe,f and still exer- 
cise a potent, sway over the Oriental and savage nations. 
The desire to penetrate into the future by supernatural 
means is particularly manifested upon the eve of un- 
certain events of great moment; hence, in antiquity, 
diviners always accompanied armies, and were consulted 
before a battle. 

These arts of foretelling the future doubtless, in part, 



* See Adelung, Geschichte der Menschlichen JVarrheit, vol. ii. 
p. 27. 

t The belief in divination is ably defended by Q. Cicero, ac- 
cording to the Stoic doctrine, in the first book of Cicero's Dialogue 
de Divinatione. 



144 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

owe their success to the fallacy of attending only to the 
lucky, and neglecting the unlucky predictions ; of count- 
ing the hits, and not counting the misses;* in part, 
also, to the use of an obscure and ambiguous phraseology, 
which can be accommodated to the event however it 
may turn out.f But — granted the desire to know the 
future — their chief foundation is a belief in the super- 
natural character of the source from which they emanate, 
which induces the consulters of the oracle to resort to 
any shift for saving its honour, in case its predictions do 
not prove true. 

§ 13. As it is the part of prudence and wisdom to 
follow, in practical questions, the advice of good coun- 
sellors, so is it incumbent on those who assume the office 
of counsellor to discharge it with a due sense of the 
moral responsibility which they undertake. In all matters 
of professional or deliberative advice, the counsellor 
ought to look exclusively to the benefit of the persons 
whose interest is in question, and by whom he is con- 
sulted. As trust is reposed in his practical judgment, J 



* See Mill, System of Logic, b. V. c. iv. § 3. Compare Wach- 
smuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, II. ii. p. 270. 

t See Aristot. Rhet. III. v. § 4, where he remarks that diviners 
do not individualize objects, but describe them by generic terms. 
Ambiguity and indistinctness are the general characteristics of the 
ancient oracular prophecies. Compare Cic. de Divin. II. 54. It is 
scarcely necessary to refer to such predictions as Kpoicrog "A\w £m/3de 
fieya.\r]v apxw ^aXvcrei, and " Aio teiEacida Roman os vincere posse." 
See also Adelung, ut. sup., on the obscurity of the predictions of 
Gauricus and Nostradamus, two astrologers of the sixteenth century, 
vol. ii. p. 261; vol. vii. pp. 125, 135. Compare vol. iv. p. 212. 
Some further remarks on this subject will be found in Note A. at 
the end of the chapter, 

J It was on account of the importance of this trust, and the 
obligations growing out of it, that the sacredness of counsel was 



Y.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 145 

he ought to advise without any view to his own ad- 
vantage, and upon a full knowledge of the circumstances 
of the case. It is only by complying with these con- 
ditions, and by a consciousness of the binding nature of 
the obligation which he contracts, that the professional 
man, in advising his client — or the deliberative coun- 
sellor, addressing a council of state or a legislative as- 
sembly, can acquire authority for his opinion, indepen- 
dently of his reasons. 

§ 14. It would be improper to close this chapter with- 
out adverting to the marks of trustworthiness in a 
historian; inasmuch as his province does not distinctly 
fall under any of the heads above considered. 

Before, however, we attempt to assign the qualifica- 
tions of the trustworthy historian, it will be necessary 
first to settle what is his proper province ; for the pro- 
gress of knowledge, the extension of literature, and the 
increased habit of recording successive changes in the 
same object, have of late given an enlarged and some- 
what indefinite meaning to the term History. 

By History, is properly understood a narrative of the 
acts of a political community, or nation, as represented 
by its government, and of events important to it in its 
collective capacity. 

The works of the great historians of antiquity — as 
Thucydides and Tacitus — which have served as the 
types of history since the revival of letters, describe 
the Greek and Roman States in action ; their wars, nego- 
tiations, treaties, intestine tumults, public deliberations, 
legislation — 

Res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella. 



proverbial from an early time among the Greeks, (hpdv fj avfjiflovXri, 
Zenob. IV. 40, cum not.) 

L 



146 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

These form the proper subject-matter of history. Geogra- 
phical and ethnographical descriptions,* accounts of the 
social state of the people, of its wealth, manners, literature, 
religion, and the like, however interesting and instructive 
they may be in themselves, cannot be considered as 
forming strictly an integral part of political history, 
and ought only to be introduced incidentally, as illus- 
trating the course of the narrative. History is essentially 
dramatic: it describes a series of actions; and is dis- 
tinguished from biography in taking for its subject a 
nation, not an individual. f Hence, history has been 
considered a species of composition peculiarly suited to 



* The ancient historians, on account of the defective knowledge 
of geography then existing, and the total want or comparative 
scarcity of geographical treatises, were forced to introduce 
geographical descriptions into their works to a greater extent than 
modern historians. See Polyb. III. c. 36, 37. 

t According to the definition in Gellius, N. A., V. 18, history 
is " rerum gestarum narratio." The office of history is to narrate, 
according to Plin. Epist. V. 8. Lucian, Quom. Hist, sit conscrib. 
c. 55, says that, with the exception of the proem or introduction, 
history is nothing but a long narration. The following definitions 
from modern dictionaries present the same leading idea: — " Storia: 
Diffusa narrazione di cose seguite." — Voc. della Crusca. " Histoire: 
Narration des actions et des choses dignes de memoire." — Diet, de 
VAcademie. " History: A narration of events and facts, delivered 
with dignity." — Johnson's Diet. " L'histoire est l'exposition ou la 
narration, temperee quant a la forme, et savante quant au fond, 
liee et suivie des faits et des evenemens memorables les plus propres 
a nous faire connaitre les hommes, les nations, les empires, etc." — 
Diet, des Synonymes de la Langue Frangaise, ed. G-uizot, torn. i. 
p. 469. All these definitions are wanting in precision; they all, 
for example, include biography as well as history. The word 
laropia first occurs, in its modern sense, in the Poetic of Aristotle, 
c. 18; 38, ed. Tyrwhitt. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 147 

an orator, because he is able to describe a succession of 
events with perspicuity and vividness.* 

An historical narrative, so understood, is usually con- 
ceived as following the chronological series of events, 
and as comprehending a sufficient portion of them to be 
interesting and instructive. If the number of events 
be small, or confined to a particular class or subject, the 
work is considered rather as materials for history than 
as history itself; and falls into the subordinate category 
denominated by the French, Memoires pour servir a 
Phistoire.f On the other hand, a history may narrate 
events connected only by chronological co-existence or 
sequence, and not linked together by any mutual de- 
pendence. In this respect, a history differs (according 
to the remark of Aristotle J) from an epic poem, which 
must relate to a complete and connected action. 

History, again, if it be worthy of the name, ought to 
be composed with a due regard to impartiality, and with 
a requisite amount of sobriety and calmness of judgment. 
Without these attributes, it becomes a mere party 
pamphlet, or the pleading of an advocate. History, 
like science, ought to be treated without any view to a 
practical application, and merely for its own sake. It 
ought to narrate, and illustrate its narrative by appro- 
priate comments ; but to abstain from all precepts. 

Such appear to be the essential constituents of our 



* According to Cicero de Leg. I. 2. History is " opus oratorium 
maxime." Compare De Or at. II. 12. 

t According to Bacon, " memorials" are " history unfinished," 
"the first or rough draughts of history," or "preparatory history." 
— Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 106. 

% Poet. c. xxxviii. ed, Tyrwhitt. 
L 2 



148 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

idea of history; and, to a person who writes such a 
composition, we properly give the appellation of a his- 
torian. But the use of the terra has been extended 
beyond these bounds; and almost any narrative de- 
scribing the successive changes in any object may be 
called a history. Thus, there are histories of philosophy 
and literature; of languages; of the mathematical and 
physical sciences ; of the useful and the fine arts ; and 
of particular inventions, as of the printing-press, the 
steam-engine, &c. ; of nautical discovery, commerce, and 
geography. There may even be histories of the changes 
in the earth's surface. In political history, the nation 
and its government, considered as a moral person and 
agent, is the central point of the narrative : in the other 
sort of histories, the subject is a science, for example, 
or an art, or a mechanical invention, round which, as a 
centre, the narrative turns, and whose successive changes, 
under the influence of different men and minds, are de- 
scribed. Accordingly, histories of the latter sort belong 
more properly to the special subjects about which they 
are concerned, than to the general province of the his- 
torian. Thus, a history of languages is the work of a 
philologist; a history of mathematics is the work of a 
mathematician; a history of medicine, the work of a 
physician ; a history of the earth, the work of a geologist ; 
political history alone is the work of the historian, pro- 
perly so called.* 



* See Whewell's Philosophy of Induction, b. X. c. i. ; Bacon, 
Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 102. The term "Natural History" 
may have assisted in extending the application of the word history 
to the physical sciences, but it had a special and accidental origin, 
quite unconnected with the latter use of the word. Aristotle's 
work on animals was entitled 7repl ra>v £&W laroplcu, " Inquiries (or 
Researches) concerning Animals" which has, in the modern editions, 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 149 

The following remarks, therefore, will be confined to 
the political historian ; leaving the other class of his- 
torians to be distributed under the departments of their 
respective subjects. 

A historian, then, as so understood, may, in the first 
place, be looked upon as a chronicler and recorder of 
contemporary events, of which he is either a direct and 
personal witness, or of which he collects the evidence 
himself from original witnesses.* 

The original witnesses, from whose information the 
contemporary historian builds up his narrative, cannot 
themselves be styled historians, although their materials 
are necessary for his work. They are, to the historian, 
what the quarryman and mason are to the architect. 
A short-hand writer, who reports a parliamentary debate, 
or the proceedings before a court of justice ; a person 



been literally rendered into Latin, as Naturalis Historia. The 
encyclopaediacal work of Pliny, too, was called by the comprehen- 
sive title of Naturalis Historia, " A Description (or Exposition) of 
Nature." On account of the titles of these two celebrated works, 
the term Natural History has been applied to a scientific description 
of animals and other natural objects. But (according to a just re- 
mark of Mohs, cited by Dr. Whewell, Hist, oflnd. Sciences, vol. iii. 
p. 486), " Natural history, when systematically treated, rigorously 
excludes all that is historical, for it classes objects by their perma- 
nent and universal qualities." The essence of history, properly so 
called, is, that it narrates a series of successive states, all differing 
from one another. In this sense, the history of a science or an art 
is properly a history; but not a description of the species of animals, 
and of their characteristic differences and resemblances. 

* Gellius, N. A., V. 18, mentions an opinion that historia, as 
distinguished from annales, is a narrative of events by a contempo- 
rary witness: " Earum proprie rerum sit historia, quibus rebus 
gerendis interfuerit is qui narret." He remarks, however, that 
this limitation was not consistent with the received use of the 
term. 



150 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

who procures intelligence for newspapers ; a collector of 
statistical facts, such as those relating to population, 
public revenue and expenditure, military and naval 
force, exports and imports, currency, &c. ; also heralds 
and framers of pedigrees; registrars of births, deaths, 
and marriages, and other civil facts ; keepers of judicial 
records and journals of parliament; compilers of procla- 
mations, laws, charters, deeds, wills, state-papers, treaties, 
and other authentic documents; copiers of inscriptions 
and coins; — all belong to that useful class of persons, 
who prepare the materials out of which the framework 
of political history is constructed. Such functions do 
not, indeed, themselves deserve the name of history; 
but we ought not to forget that it is to these obscure, 
though important, services that we owe the superior cer- 
tainty and completeness of modern, as compared with 
ancient history. Everything in history depends upon 
the accuracy and fulness of the contemporary records — 
upon the sufficiency of the means adopted by the original 
witnesses for perpetuating the memory of the events. 
Without an authentic memorial derived from the actors 
in the events, or from contemporary observers, history 
is a fiction, more or less specious. Without this solid 
foundation of well-attested fact, it is, at the best, but an 
historical romance, in which a general probability of 
manners, institutions, and state of society, is maintained. 
A faithful registrar of contemporary events is like a 
painter of portraits or landscapes after nature : the 
author of fictitious history is like the painter of an ideal 
history-piece, which may resemble the truth, but does 
not portray it. 

The first approach to contemporary history, properly 
so called, is the composition of diaries, journals, and 
personal memoirs; narratives of events in which the 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 151 

writer plays a part himself, or of which he is merely a 
passive spectator. When these are confined to a parti- 
cular transaction — as a siege, a battle, the negotiation of 
a treaty, the deliberations of a synod, the formation or 
overthrow of a government — they hold, in general, an 
intermediate place between the materials for history and 
history itself. When, however, they include a long 
series of memorable events, affecting the destinies of one 
or more nations, they rise to the dignity and amplitude 
of history. As examples of the latter class, it will be 
sufficient to mention such periodical works as the Annual 
Eegister, and other previous publications of the same 
sort — and such histories as those of Herodotus, Thucy- 
dides, Xenophon, Polybius, Sallust, Caesar, Tacitus, 
Froissart, Comines, Sleidan, Guicciardini, Thuanus, 
Sully, Clarendon, Burnet, &c. Works of this sort 
are valuable as original testimony, and constitute 
the materials out of which other histories are formed, 
not less than mere collections of state papers or docu- 
ments. Their most essential quality, therefore, is vera- 
city, and contemporary historians are mainly to be 
considered as witnesses and relaters of events. They 
may have other good qualities besides veracity ; they 
may show discretion in selecting, and skill in arranging 
facts; their style in narration may be perspicuous and 
impressive ; they may judge events and characters with 
sagacity and penetration ; but it is principally as 
authentic witnesses and recorders of contemporary facts 
that they are important.* If we did not consider their 



* Since the time of Thucydides, (see I. 21, 22,) the essence of 
history has been made to consist in its veracity. Thus, Cicero says 
that History is " testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, 
magistra vitae, nuncia vetustatis." — De Orat. II. 9. Again: " Quis 



152 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

testimony as true, we should pay no regard to their 
writings. "It is the true office of history (says Lord 
Bacon) to represent the events themselves, together 
with the counsels, and to leave the observations and 
conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every 
man's judgment."* 

In order to determine how far a historian of this class 
is trustworthy, we should apply to him the tests which 
are used for trying the credibility of testimony. This 
process may lead only to uncertain results, and there 
may be, as in evidence before a court of justice, conflict- 
ing considerations on the question ; but the contemporary 
historian and annalist is mainly to be regarded as a wit- 



nescit primam esse historic legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? 
deinde, ne quid veri non audeat? nequa suspicio gratiae sit in scri- 
bendo? ne qua simultatis? haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt om- 
nibus." — lb. c. 15. So Lucian (jQuom. Hist, sit conscrib. c. 9.) 
lays it down that the end of history is utility, which arises from 
truth alone. The two principal qualifications of a historian (he 
says) are penetration and judgment in political affairs, and a good 
style of writing (c. 34); moreover, a historian ought to have had 
some civil and military experience. Truth is the goddess to whom 
alone he must sacrifice; and he must be impartial, independent, and 
incorrupt, so as not to distort facts either from fear or favour, 
(c. 37 — 41.) Polybius likewise says, that as an animal is 
rendered useless by the loss of its sight, so history, without truth, is 
an idle tale, (I. 14, § 6.) In another place he says, that the end of 
tragedy is to produce emotion by fiction — the end of history is to 
convey instruction by truth, (II. 56, § 11.) 

Dr. Arnold, in his Lectures on Modern History, (lect. viii.,) also 
lays it down that " the one great qualification in a historian is an 
earnest craving after truth, and utter impatience, not of falsehood 
merely, but of error," (p. 293.) He adds, that these qualities "are 
intellectual as well as moral, and are as incompatible with great 
feebleness of mind as they are with dishonesty," (p. 297.) 
* Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 114. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 153 

ness, or a collector of original evidence, and to be esti- 
mated as such. 

There is, however, another class of historians, who 
are not themselves witnesses, or the original collectors 
and reporters of the oral testimony of others. For the 
most part, they are not contemporary with the events 
which they describe; and when they are, it is usually 
as narrators of the history of foreign countries, in which 
case they have to deal with what Madame de Stael called 
" contemporary posterity." These are what may be 
termed the Learned Historians : who compile history 
from the recorded testimony of original witnesses, and 
the contemporary monuments and accounts. Among 
the Greeks — Ephorus, Timseus, Diodorus, Dionysius, 
Plutarch, and Arrian: among the Latins — Livy, Cor- 
nelius Nepos, and Quintus Curtius ; among the moderns 
— Machiavel, Raleigh, Muratori, Giannone, Mariana, 
Hume, Eobertson, Gibbon, Rollin, Sismondi, Niebuhr, 
&c, may serve as examples. Their business consists in 
collecting and collating the evidence of the original 
witnesses, either preserved by contemporary writers, or 
handed down by a faithful oral tradition ; in balancing 
inconsistent or contradictory accounts; in illustrating 
past events and past states of society by the light of 
subsequent experience and knowledge; and in tracing 
the successive steps in which the progress of mankind 
consists. It is to this class of historians that we princi- 
pally owe that which is styled philosophical or serolo- 
gical history ; that is to say, history accompanied with 
deductions of causes and effects, often extending over 
long periods of time, and therefore only possible upon a 
retrospect of past ages. Writers of this class, having no 
value as witnesses or original reporters of events, seem 
peculiarly required to comment upon the transactions 



154 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

which they describe ; and being, as judges, exempt from 
the passions and interests of contemporaries, and neces- 
sarily free from all personal bias, their comments ought, 
on this account, to be the more enlightened and im- 
partial. 

For success in this difficult and important department 
of history, a writer ought to possess qualifications similar 
to those indicated above with respect to science; he 
ought to have studied the subject with attention for a 
considerable time; he ought to have ability sufficient to 
master it, and also an honest desire of arriving at the 
truth, and not perverting the evidence to suit his own 
interests or inclinations. 

Looking to the unsettled state of many portions of 
the moral and political sciences, and to the unpractical 
nature of the reveries in which speculators on an ideal com- 
monwealth have indulged, it is natural that writers of 
history should be the chief guides of opinion on questions 
of government. As the historian's subject keeps him in 
perpetual contact with facts, his general conclusions 
always possess some value, and represent some fraction 
of truth, even when they are founded on an imperfect 
induction, or derived from a mass of contemporary facts 
not sufficiently dissected and decomposed. Besides, if 
the facts are fully and faithfully stated, his conclusions 
may be corrected and limited by his premises, which is 
never the case where the forms of an ideal state are 
constructed out of first principles, according to what Mr. 
Mill has styled the Geometrical Method of Political 
Reasoning. The increased tendency of modern times to 
historical studies, to the collection of a well-ascertained 
body of facts respecting the successive states of a civil 
community, and to their philosophical appreciation, as 
illustrating the progress of society, corresponds with the 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 155 

tendency to careful observation and induction in the 
physical sciences.* Hence, with the exception of the 
writers on the law of nations, on positive law, and on 
political economy, historians are now the great teachers 
of political wisdom — of civilis sciential And it is only 
by a close examination of the results obtained by trust- 
worthy and enlightened historians, and by a careful 
generalization from them, assigning each effect to its 
proper cause, that Political Philosophy can ever be 
placed on a sound basis. 



* See the just remarks of M. Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. iv. 
p. 284, upon the benefits to be anticipated from the historical ten- 
dency of the present age. 

t The following remarks of Bacon illustrate the applicability of 
history to practical politics: — " The form of writing which of all 
others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occa- 
sion, is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for govern- 
ment — namely, discourse upon histories or examples ; for knowledge 
drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the 
way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater life for 
practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when 
the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of 
order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance; for when the example 
is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down 
with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse 
thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for 
action ; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake are 
cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile 
aspect toward the discourse which they are brought in to make 
good." — Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 266. Legal precedents, in 
like manner, are of little value, unless the case cited has been re- 
ported fully, so that it can be seen whether the rule of law, said to 
have been laid down, was necessarily involved in the decision of 
the case. 



156 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. 

Note to Chapter V. 

Note A. (p. 144.) 

Some of the numerous guesses of diviners have, as is not wonderful, 
hit the truth with great exactness. Thus John Cario, the astro- 
loger of Joachim I., elector of Brandenburg, published in the year 
1 522 a Prognostication constructed according to the rules of the art, 
in which he predicted a destructive inundation, famine, pestilence, 
and civil and ecclesiastical troubles, for the year 1524,* and the 
birth of Antichrist for the year 1693. But the year 1789 was to 
be the most terrible of all. In this year, there were to be great and 
marvellous events, changes, and catastrophes. Adelung, who re- 
ports this prediction in a volume published in 1787, does not doubt 
that the astrologer will prove to be as much mistaken with respect 
to the year 1789, as he had already proved to be with respect to the 
year 1693. — Geschichte der Narrheit, vol. iii. p. 118. 

There is likewise a curious prediction of the extinction of the 
independence of Venice, in the Satire of Luigi Alamanni, an 
Italian poet, who died about the middle of the sixteenth century, 
and whose poems were published at Lyons in 1532-3. In Satira xii. 
is the following address to Venice : — 

Se non cangi pensier, Tun secol solo 
Non contera sopra'l millesimo anno 
Tua liberta, che va fuggendo a volo. 

Gringuene, who first called attention to this passage, (Hist. Litte- 
raire d'ltalie, torn. ix. p. 144, ed. 2,) remarks, that the election of 
the first doge falls in 697; and that if to this epoch we add 1100 
years, we obtain the year 1797, which is the precise year next after 
that in which Venice ceased to be independent. 

Few predictions, however, were so lucky as those of Cario for 
the year 1789, and of Alamanni for the year 1796; and, accordingly, 
it was in general necessary to alter them after the event, in order to 



* It seems that the astrologers had predicted the destruction of 
the world by inundation in 1524, and that some persons had pro- 
vided themselves with ships in order to be prepared against the 
calamity. — Bodin. de Rep. IV. c. ii. 



V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 157 

produce a close agreement between the prediction and the thing 
foretold. Thus in the Quatrains of Nostradamus, first published 
in 1555, there was the following stanza: — 

Gand et Bruxelles marcheront contre Anvers, 
Senat de Londres mettront a mort leur roy: 

Le sel et vin luy seront a l'envers, 
Pour eux avoir le regne en desarroy. 

After the execution of Charles L, this passage of Nostradamus 
was applied in France to the striking event, and it was long con- 
sidered by his admirers as a strong proof of his prophetic power. 
Adelung, however, considers the supposed prophecy as taking its 
origin in the troubles in Flanders, which were contemporary with 
its composition; and he refers " leur roy" to the Flemish cities, not 
to the senate of London. He understands Nostradamus to have 
meant, that the English government would put to death some sup- 
posed King of Flanders. — Ut sup. vol. vii. p. 133. 

Another more remarkable example of the subsequent perversion 
of a prophecy, in order to adapt it to an important event, may be 
added: — A German writer, named Gaspar Brusch, published the 
following prophetic verses in the year 1553: — 

Post mille expletos a partu virginis annos, 

Et post quingentos rursus ab orbe datos, 
Octogesimus octavus mirabilis annus 

Ingruet: is secum tristia fata trahet. 
Si non hoc anno totus malus occidet orbis, 

Si non in nihilum terra fretumque ruent: 
Cuncta tamen mundi sursum ibunt atque deorsum 

Imperia, et luctus undique grandis erit. 

The most remarkable event of the year 1588 was the Spanish 
armada. The prediction was forgotten for two hundred years, and 
was reprinted in the Mercure de France in the middle of the last 
century, with the substitution of " septengintos" for " post quin- 
gentos," in v. 2, and a story about its having been found in the 
tomb of Regiomontanus, at Liska, in Hungary. Since the French 
revolution — which recalled attention to the supposed prophecy — the 
true origin of the verses, and the nature of the fraud, have been 
pointed out. — Biog. Univ. in Brusch. It is singular that, by some 
similar adaptation, a Jacobite should not have applied it to the Eng- 
lish revolution of 1688. Compare the remarks of Mr. Grote, Hist. 



158 UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

of Gr. vol. vi. p. 214, upon the flexibility of the Greek prophecies, 
and the manner in which they were moulded to suit any striking 
occurrence. 

We must not, however, suppose that all astrological diviners were 
conscious impostors, and intentionally fabricated their predictions in 
such a manner as to admit of no certain interpretation. Many, or 
perhaps most, of them doubtless believed, to a certain extent, in the 
reality of the art which they practised. Thus Andrew Goldmayer, 
who was offered the professorship of mathematics at Strasburg in the 
year 1635, composed a chronicle of that city upon astrological princi- 
ples. He complained that ordinary historians paid no attention to the 
state of the stars, in connexion with the events which they narrated; 
whereas these events could not be understood without their causes, 
and their causes could only be explained by astrology. He began, 
therefore, to compose, not only a history of Strasburg, but also a 
universal history, according to this method, and believed that he 
would thus throw great light both upon astrology and history. For 
this purpose, he extracted the chief events out of chronicles; he 
calculated the position of the stars backwards, and believed himself, 
by this process, to have discovered the true cause of every im- 
portant event. — Adelung, ut sup. vol. iv. p. 215. The process 
here described is a scientific process, and was an attempt to found 
judicial astrology upon inductive reasoning. It therefore proves 
the good faith of the astrologer. Compare also Kepler's astro- 
logical doctrine in Bethune's Life of Kepler, c. vii. ; and the opinions 
of Bodinus de Rep. IV. c. 2. 



VI.] NUMBER OF THE PERSONS, ETC. 159 



CHAPTER VI. 

ON THE NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE 
OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE 
NUMBER OF THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY. 

§ 1. It has been shown, in the preceding pages, that 
the men of special information and experience, combined 
with the proper moral and intellectual qualifications, are 
the competent judges on each branch of knowledge, and 
therefore the legitimate guides of opinion. Now if we 
take each subject, whether of speculation or practice, in 
succession, these persons must always be a small section 
of the community ; in fact, a mere handful, as compared 
with the entire population. In sciences and arts, the 
persons versed in those particular departments of know- 
ledge, — in history, historians; in general literature, 
literary men and poets; in practical questions of law, 
medicine, architecture, navigation, &c, the men of the 
respective professions — who form respectively the standard 
and canon of authority, are but few in number, if set 
against the body of their fellow-countrymen. Moreover, 
even with respect to each of these classes, it is prin- 
cipally the ablest, the most learned, the most experienced, 
the most skilful, whose opinion constitutes authority. 
So long as we admit the maxim, " Unicuique in sua 
arte credendum," the class or body of persons competent 
to judge in each matter must be numerically insignificant 
in comparison with the whole people. If we divide the 
nation into two parts-^-one consisting of a profession, or 



160 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

body of persons specially conversant with a particular 
subject, the other consisting of the rest of the popula- 
tion, the numbers of the latter portion will immensely 
preponderate : 

The few, by nature formed, with learning fraught, 
Born to instruct, as others to be taught. 

§ 2. In each subject, therefore, the opinion of the 
great bulk of the people is, taken as a standard of truth 
and rectitude, unworthy of consideration, and destitute 
of weight and authority. It is the opinion of uninformed 
and inexperienced persons, whose incapacity to judge is 
not cured by the multiplication of their numbers. The 
mere aggregation of incompetent judges will not produce 
a right judgment, more than the aggregation of per- 
sons who have no knowledge of a matter of fact, will 
supply credible testimony to its existence.* 

This is equally the case, whether the multitude agree 
in opinion with the few competent judges, or disagree 
with them. 

If they agree, the opinion of the unscientific or un- 
professional many, whether right or wrong, can scarcely 
fail to be derived, more or less remotely, from that of a 
few persons either being, or considered to be, competent 
judges. Now, whether the opinion be sound or unsound, 
it is in general derived without any adequate process of 
examination or verification, and is held merely upon 
trust; so that the concurrence of the multitude adds 
little or no weight to the judgment of the former.f 



* " An quicquam stultius quam quos singulos (sicut operarios, 
barbarosque,) contemnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos?" — 
Cicero, Tusc. QucbsL V. 36. 

f " Les hommes, en general, approuvent ou condamnent au 
hasard, et la verite me me est, par la plupart d'entre eux, recue 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 161 

Thus, at present the Newtonian system of the world is 
accepted by the people at large, in all civilized countries, 
who therefore believe that the world moves round the 
sun. But they entertain this opinion merely on the 
authority of the agreement of scientific astronomers, and 
with no better knowledge of the grounds of their belief 
than their ancestors, who recognised the Ptolemaic system, 
and believed that the sun moves round the earth. On 
the other hand, the agreement between men of science 
and the multitude may exist in cases where the opinion 
is erroneous; and it may arise from the absence of 
original research and of an enlightened scepticism, from 
the passive retention of ancient errors and the blind 
adherence to traditionary prejudices. Of this state of 
things, the history of the physical sciences in antiquity 
and the middle ages affords numerous examples, which 
it would be useless to particularize, and many examples 
might be cited from the moral sciences at the present 
time. 

If they disagree, the preference is justly due to the 
opinion of the few competent judges, and the opinion of 
the uninformed and inexperienced multitude is inferior 
in authority to that of the select body. In cases where 
there is an agreement of opinion between the competent 
few and the incompetent many, the concurrence adds 
little or no weight to the opinion of the former. In 
cases where there is a conflict of opinion between the 
same two classes of persons, the preference must be given 
to the latter, as a measure of truth, and a canon for the 
judgments of others. 

So numerous are the cases in which the opinion 



comme Terreur, sans examen et par prejuge." — Helvetius de 
VHomme, sect. XI. ch. 8. 

M 



162 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

of the multitude conflicts with that of the few competent 
judges, that a majority of voices has, in questions not 
involving a legal decision, been considered as a mark of 
error. " Argumentum pessimi turba," says the Latin 
proverbial verse, cited by Seneca.* It has been said, 
not only that a majority of voices is no conclusive proof 
of rectitude, and that moral questions cannot be decided, 
like questions in a legislative assembly, by a division of 



* " Est turba semper argumentum pessimi." 

Publius Syrus, v. 190. 

That is to say, " the concurrence of the crowd is a proof of the 
worst side." 

Compare Seneca, De Vit. Beat, c. 1,2. " Sanabimur, si modo 
separemur a coetu: nunc vero stat contra rationem, defensor mali 
sui, populus. Itaque id evenit, quod in comitiis, in quibus eos 
factos prastores iidem qui fecere mirantur, quum se mobilis favor 
circumegit. Eadem probamus, eadem reprehendimus: hie exitus 
est omnis judicii, in quo secundum plures datur. Quum de beata 
vita agitur, non est quod mihi illud discessionum more respondeas: 
' Hsec pars major esse videtur.' Ideo enim pejor est. Non tam 
bene cum humanis rebus agitur, ut meliora pluribus placeant: 
argumentum pessimi turba est." 

There is likewise a verse of the old tragedian, Attius : 

"Probis probatum potius quam multis fore." 

P. 201, ed. Bothe. 

Cicero gives the following description of the manner in which 
opinions were formed in his time: — " The seeds of virtues are (he 
says) planted by nature in our minds; but as soon as we are born, 
we are surrounded with false opinions, so that we almost imbibe 
error with our nurse's milk. As our education proceeds, we contract 
further errors from our parents and teachers, and we learn the 
fables of the poets, which take root in our mind: ' Cum vero 
accedit eodem quasi maximus quidam magister, populus, atque 
omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, turn plane inficimur 
opinionum pravitate, a naturaque desciscimus."' — Tusc. Qucest.lII. 
1, 2. Compare a similar passage in De Off. I. 32. 






VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 163 

the ayes and noes — but that a person ought to be ashamed 
of finding his opinion or conduct approved by the mul- 
titude, and that the concurrence of the many raises a 
presumption of being in the wrong.* " Pessimum 
omnium est augurium (says Lord Bacon) quod ex con- 
sensu capitur in rebus intellect ualib us : exceptis divinis 
et politicis, in quibus suffragiorum jus est. Nihil enim 
multis placet, nisi imaginationem feriat, aut intellectum 



* Plutarch relates a celebrated saying of Phocion, who, on 
receiving the applause of the people for a speech which he had 
made in the Athenian assembly, turned round to his friends, and 
expressed his fear that he had said something which he ought not 
to have said. — {Phocion, c. 8.) 

Speaking of the Optimates, or aristocratic party in the Roman 
State, about the time of the Gracchi, Cicero says : " Qui autem 
adversabantur ei generi [to the popular party], graves et magni 
homines habebantur: sed valebant in senatu multum, apud bonos 
viros plurimum; multitudini jucundi non erant : suffragiis offende- 
batur ssepe eorum voluntas : plausum vero etiamsi quis eorum ali- 
quando acceperat, ne quid peccasset, pertimescebat. Attamen, si 
qua res erat major, idem ille populus horum auctoritate maxime 
commovebatur." — Pro Sextio, c. 49. 

Plutarch, De Lib. Educ. c. 9, advises that youths should 
not be allowed to listen to popular speeches or discourses at 
the public festivals: to yup rdlg koWoTq apiffKeiv, roig ao<poig kartv 
aTrapetTKetv. He cites also some verses of Euripides, showing 
the opposition between wisdom in council, and fitness for popular 
oratory. 

The opposition between philosophy, or science, and popular 
opinion is well-known and established. Thus, Cicero says : " Est 
enim philosophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto 
ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa." — Tusc. Disp. II. 1. 
Hence the paradox, that it is better even to err with a great philo- 
sopher, than to be right with inferior minds. " Errare mehercule 
malo cum Platone .... quam cum istis vera sentire." — lb. I. 17. 
A similar sentiment occurs in a letter of Hume to Adam Smith; 
" A wise man's kingdom is his own breast; or, if he ever looks 

M 2 



164 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

vulgarium notionum nodis astringat. Itaque optime 
traducitur illud Phocionis a moribus ad intellectualia ; 
ut statim se examinare debeant homines, quid erraverint 
aut peccaverint, si multitudo consentiat et complaudat."* 
This inference, however, holds good only in cases where 
the majority put themselves under the guidance of bad 
leaders, and reject the advice of the persons best qualified 
to form a sound judgment. It is only when the public 
array themselves against the opinion of the fittest 
counsellors, that they are more likely to be wrong than 
right. 

§ 3. We have already had occasion to advert to the 
old adage — " Unicuique in sua arte credendum" — as 
expressive of the doctrine that the competent few, and 
not the incompetent many, constitute the standard of 
authority. There is another proverb, equally handed 
down to us from antiquity — " Ne sutor ultra crepidam"f 
— which forms, as it were, the complement of the other. 
As the former teaches us to place confidence in the 
qualified few, in subjects within their own province, so 



farther, it will only be to the judgment of a select few, who are 
free from prejudices, and capable of examining his work. Nothing, 
indeed, can be a stronger presumption of falsehood than the appro- 
bation of the multitude; and, Phocion, you know, always suspected 
himself of some blunder, when he was attended with the applauses 
of the populace." — Burton's Life and Correspondence of Hume, 
vol. ii. p. 57. 

* Nov. Org. lib. i. aph. 77. The exception for religious ques- 
tions refers to the decisions of councils and synods of divines, by a 
majority of voices. 

f See the story of Apelles, in Plin. H. N. xxxv. 36, § 12. 
Compare the verse of Euripides, Fragm. Incert. 94. Dindorf. 
rsKTtov yap £)V ewpaaaeg oh ^vKovpyiKa.', and of Aristoph., Vesp. 1431, 
iphoi rig f)v ekcuTTog elhirj Teyvr)v, referred toby Cicero, Tusc. I. 18. 
" Bene enim illo G rascor um proverbio pra?cipitur, ' Quam quisque 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 165 

the latter warns us not to rely on their judgment with 
respect to other subjects. Similar in its import is the 
sound maxim : " Auctoris aliud agentis parva est auc- 
toritas " — a rule of construction useful in estimating the 
value of an authority who is cited in proof of any 
position. The opinion of each person is only good for 
the purpose to which it professedly and directly relates : 
it must not be applied to incidental and collateral 
matters. Subjects not bearing immediately upon the 
main question may have been considered imperfectly, or 
passed over without consideration ; and, therefore, ought 
not to be treated as decided, although the opinion may, 
from the generality of its terms, appear to include them. 

In considering the seat of authority, it should be 
borne in mind, on the one hand, that no man is a 
competent judge on all subjects; and, on the other, that 
every man is a competent judge on some. 

The authority of every scientific or professional man, 
every man having a special aptitude of judgment, is 
limited to his own subject or class of subjects. Out of 
this range his opinion is worthless, or, at all events, 
only on a par with that of any other man of sense, and 
of practised habits of thought, having no special know- 
ledge or experience of the matter. The opinion of an 
astronomer or a geologist upon a question of juris- 



norit artem, in hac se exerceat.'" Horace gives this precept twice 
over: 

Optat ephippia bos, piger optat arare caballus : 
Quam scit uterque, libens, censebo, exerceat artem. 

Ep. I. 14, v. 43. 
Navem agere ignarus navis timet. Abrotonum aggro 
Non audet, nisi qui didicit, dare. Quod medicorum est 
Promittunt medici. Tractant fabrilia fabri. 

Ep. II. 1, 114—6. 



166 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

prudence, of a lawyer upon medicine, of an agriculturist 
upon military or naval tactics, of a sailor upon chemistry 
or painting, of a botanist upon navigation, would cer- 
tainly be of no more value than that of any other person 
taken at random from the midst of society. Every man, 
however highly endowed by nature, and however qualified 
by study, reflection, and experience, to pronounce on a 
particular subject, is a mere undistinguished cipher, 
only one of the great multitude, upon all other subjects. 
Upon these, his opinion ranks with that of any ordinary 
person. A scientific or professional man may, therefore, 
be compared to a court of limited jurisdiction, which is 
competent to pronounce on one class of questions, but 
is without power of deciding on any others. 

§ 4. On the other hand, there is scarcely any man — 
however uncultivated his faculties, and however limited 
his powers of observation — who is not qualified to form 
an opinion upon some subject — if not of speculation, at 
least of practice. An unskilled labourer, an artisan, a 
domestic servant, or a petty trader, each in his own 
calling, becomes acquainted with certain facts and pro- 
cesses, acquires a certain experience, and is thus qualified 
to form a judgment on that particular subject, confined 
and comparatively simple as it may be. A similar 
remark applies to the knowledge of household manage- 
ment, the care and nurture of children, and the tending 
of the sick, which falls peculiarly within the province of 
women. Knowledge of this kind may be disregarded 
by those who have mastered more abstruse and difficult 
subjects ; but it is essential to the conduct of life, and 
the persons who possess it are as much entitled to be 
considered authorities in their own department, as those 
who have pursued more elevated studies in their branches 
of science. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 167 

§ 5. It follows, from these remarks, that there is no 
one body of persons who are competent judges on all 
subjects, and who are qualified to guide all sorts of 
opinion ; that there is no one intellectual aristocracy, 
separated from the rest of the community, and pre- 
dominating over them indiscriminately. Every subject, 
in turn, has its own peculiar set of competent judges, 
which vary for each; and he who belongs to this select 
body for one science or art, or other practical department 
of knowledge, is confounded with the crowd in all others. 
Again, a person whose opinion is without authority on 
this, and that, and the other subject, at last arrives at 
some branch of knowledge, or some portion of the busi- 
ness of life, on which his opinion has a claim to attention. 

Inasmuch as each person has his own special depart- 
ment, — as an astronomer reckons with the peasant on a 
question of law or medicine — and as a lawyer or physi- 
cian, on questions of military or naval warfare, is un- 
professional and destitute of authority, — every man 
ought to know the bounds of his own subject, and not 
venture to pronounce an authoritative and independent 
opinion on questions lying out of his proper province; 
" Non parum est scire quid nescias." Upon questions 
of this sort a man ought to defer to the opinions of 
others, who may be wholly unacquainted with his own 
subject, and who, with respect to that subject, ought, in 
their turn, to defer to his opinion : a Hanc veniam 
petimusque damusque vicissim." Even the infallibility 
of the Pope is, by the most rigid theologians of the 
ultramontane school, not extended beyond matters of 
faith. 

§ 6. As the acceptance of an opinion by the multi- 
tude does not afford presumptive evidence of its truth, 
unless it be also entertained by the competent judges; 



168 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

so the mere prevalence of an opinion does not prove its 
soundness.* 

Prevalent opinions may have sprung from the most 
impure sources. Mere unauthenticated rumour or tra- 
dition, imperfect and unverified observation, hasty and 
illogical generalizations from single facts, or inductions 
from facts in a lump, uncorrected by any analytical 
process, and even deliberate imposture, are often the 
originating causes of wide-spread opinions. Sometimes 
these errors are deeply rooted in the popular conviction, 
and descend from generation to generation. 

We know that false and unfounded opinions have been 
entertained by entire communities, without question, for 
ages. Not merely has this been the case with respect to 
false religions,f and legendary accounts of early history, 
interwoven with the religious and patriotic feelings of 
the people, but even with respect to facts in the natural 
sciences, which admitted of being verified by easy and 
simple observations or experiments. The works of the 
ancient naturalists (as Pliny and iElian) abound with 
such accredited fables, many of which retained their hold 
on popular belief till a late period, as may be seen by 
the collection in Sir T. Browne's Vulgar Errors: 
" Permit me to ask you, sir, (says Bayle to his anta- 



* Non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis. In omni 
enim arte, vel studio, vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, opti- 
mum quidque rarissimum est. — Cicero, de Fin. II. 25. 
t Sic observatio crevit, 
Ex atavis quondam male csepta; deinde secutis 
Tradita temporibus, serisque nepotibus aucta. 
Traxerunt longam corda inconsulta catenam, 
Mosque tenebrosus vitiosa in saecula fluxit. 

Prudentius contra Symmach. I. 240-4, with respect 
to the ancient heathen religion of Italy. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 169 

gonist) if you have ever paid attention to the multitude 
of authors who have said, one after another, that * a 
man weighs more when fasting than after a meal/ that 
1 a drum of sheepskin bursts at the sound of a drum of 
wolfskin,' that ' vipers kill their mothers at their birth, 
and their fathers at the moment when they are formed,' 
and several other things of the same nature. Not only 
have these been reported as ascertained facts, but 
attempts have been made to determine their cause : they 
have been the subject of wonder; moral saws have been 
deduced from them ; advocates have referred to them at 
the bar; preachers have drawn multitudes of com- 
parisons from them : endless themes on these subjects 
have been proposed in the classes of schools. Never- 
theless, they are all things contrary to experience, as 
those who have had the curiosity to investigate them 
have ascertained."* 

The belief in astrology, and other mock sciences of 
divination — in the ominous nature of eclipses and comets, 
as well as in witchcraft, sorcery, and magic, prevailed in 
Europe for many centuries. Yet no one would think of 
alleging the former prevalence of this belief, or the 
popular faith in ghosts and fairies, as a proof of the 
reality of these unseen influences and existences. In 
like manner, many of the popular opinions respecting 
the communication of diseases by contagion and infec- 
tion, which have served as the basis of an intricate 
system of Quarantine regulations, derive their origin 
from fanciful analogies, or rash inferences from imperfect 
and ill-ascertained data.f 



* Pensees sur les Cometes, § 46. CEuvres, torn. iii. p. 35. 
f " Even in what is called natural astrology, the dependence of 
the weather on the heavenly bodies, it is easy to see what a vast 



170 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

In the above cases, the erroneous opinion has been 
permanent in its character; it has made its way slowly, 
and has yielded by a similar process to the gradual in- 
roads of science and reason. At other times, popular 
delusions appear in the form of a transient influence, 
powerfully affecting the minds, or rather the nervous 
susceptibilities, of the multitude, and propagating itself 
in all directions, like an infectious disease. Such, for 
example, was the panic which seized the Athenians in 
the affair of the Mercuries ; such the dread of the Un- 
tori at the plague of Milan, described by Manzoni ; and 
such the wicked delusion of the Popish Plot. The 
opinions of some fanatical sectaries have likewise been 
diffused by a similar process, 

So great is the influence of authority in matters of 
opinion, that the extensive diffusion of any belief does 
not prove that numerous persons have examined the 
question upon its own merits, and have founded their 
conclusion upon an independent investigation of the 
evidence : an opinion may be held by a large number 
of persons, but they may all have been misled by some 
erroneous authority — they may have all mechanically 
followed the same blind guide;* so that their number 



accumulation of well-observed facts is requisite to establish any 
true rule; and it is well known how long, in spite of facts, false 
and groundless rules (as the dependence of the weather on the 
moon) may keep their hold on men's minds." — Whewell. Hist, of 
Ind. Sci. f vol. i. p. 301. 

* Nihil magis prsestandum est, quam ne, pecorum ritu, sequamur 
antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundum est, sed qua 

itur Quod in strage hominum magna evenit, quum ipse se 

populus premit, nemo ita cadit, ut non alium in se attrahat : primi 
exitio sequentibus sunt: hoc in omni vita accidere videas licet: 
nemo sibi tantummodo errat, sed alieni erroris et causa et auctor 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 171 

has, in fact, no weight, and they are no more entitled to 
reckon as independent voices, than the successive com- 
pilers who transcribe a historical error are entitled to 
reckon as independent witnesses.* 

§ 7. Whenever the people can be considered in the light of 
a body of witnesses — whenever they are capable of verify- 
ing an opinion by a simple and easy process of observa- 
tion — their concurrence is of weight. Moreover, the pre- 
ponderance of numbers in favour of any opinion is always 
an imposing fact, and it is often attended with the most 
important practical consequences. The opinions of a 
large body of people are likewise always sincere, and 



est. Nocet enim applicari antecedentibus : et dum unusquisque 
mavult credere, quam judicare, nunquam de vita judicatur, semper 
creditur : versatque nos et prsecipitat traditus per maims error, 
alienisque perimus exemplis. — Seneca de Vit. Beat. c. 1. 

* " Illud etiam de consensu fallit homines, si acutius rem intro- 
spiciant. Verus enim consensus is est qui ex libertate judicii (re 
prius explorata) in idem conveniente consistit. At numerus longe 
maximus eorum, qui in Aristotelis philosophiam consenserunt, ex 
prasjudicio et auctoritate aliorum se illi mancipavit; ut sequacitas 
sit potius et coitio quam consensus."— Bacon, Nov. Org. I. aph. 77. 

" Que ne pouvons nous voir ce qui se passe dans l'esprit des 
hommes, lorsqu'ils choisissent une opinion ! Je suis sur que si cela 
etait, nous reduirions le suffrage d'une infinite de gens a l'autorite 
de deux ou de trois personnes, qui, ayant debite une doctrine que 
Ton supposait qu'ils avaient examinee a fond, l'ont persuadee a 
plusieurs autres par le prejuge de leur merite, et ceux-ci a, plu- 
sieurs autres, qui ont trouve mieux leur compte, pour leur paresse 
naturelle, a croire tout d'un coup ce qu'on leur disait, qu'a l'exa- 
miner soigneusement. De sorte que le nombre des sectateurs cre- 
dules et paresseux, s'augmentant de jour en jour, a ete un nouvel 
engagement aux autres hommes, de se delivrer de la peine d'exa- 
miner une opinion qu'ils voyaient si generate, et qu'ils se persua- 
daient bonnement n'etre devenue telle, que par la soliditc des 
raisons desquelles on s'etait servi d'abord pour l'etablir, et enfin on 
s'est vu reduit a la necessite de croire ce que tout le monde croyait, 



172 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

they thus obtain that guarantee for truth, so far as it 
extends, which is afforded by sincerity. From these 
various causes has arisen the modern acceptation of the 
proverb, Vox populi, vox Dei. This proverb, in its 
original sense, appears to be an echo of some of the 
sentences in the classical writers, which attribute a 
divine or prophetic character to common fame or rumour : 
words casually thrown out, or predictions flying about 
the mouths of the people, were supposed by the ancients 
to spring from a supernatural source.* This was the 



de peur de passer pour un factieux, qui veut lui seul en savoir plus 
que tous les autres et contredire la venerable antiquite : si bien 
qu'il y a eu du merite a n'examiner plus rien, et a s'en rapporter a 
la tradition. Jugez vous-meme si cent millions d'hommes engages 
dans quelque sentiment, de la maniere que je viens de representee 
peuvent le rendre probable, et si tout le grand prejuge qui s'eleve 
sur la multitude de tant de sectateurs, ne doit pas etre reduit, 
faisant justice a chaque chose, a l'autorite de deux ou trois per- 
sonnes qui apparemment ont examine ce qu'elles enseignaient." — 
Bayle, CEuvres, torn. iii. p. 12. 

Hooker makes similar remarks with respect to the church. Ecc. 
Pol. Pref. c. 5, § 8. 

* <&r)pr) d'ovTig 7rdfi7rav a.7r6X\vrai, r\vriva 7ro\\ol 
Aaol (prjjjii^ioffL' deog vv tlq iarl kcu avr//. 

Hesiod, Op. 764. 

These verses are quoted by Aristot., Eth. N. vii. 14, to illus- 
trate the position, that pleasure is the summum bonum, because all 
men and animals seek it. The universality of the feeling is taken 
as a proof of its divine origin. Compare iEschin., Timarch. 
§ 127-8, where the divine and prophetic attributes of popular fame 
are illustrated. Virgil, JEn. iv. 173, deifies fame. See also Ovid 
Met. xii. 39-63. The sudden appearance of a popular feeling, 
without apparent reason, was ascribed to divine influence: hence 
tpofioQ iraviKOQi in the same manner that epilepsy and sneezing were 
thought divine. The views of the Greeks on this subject are 
copiously illustrated by Mr. Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. v. p. 260, note. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 173 

proper sense of the adage in question ; # but of late years 
it has assumed a different meaning, and has been taken 
to express the supposed unerring truth of popular opinion. 
Understood in this general sense, the proverb is mani- 
festly untrue : the utmost that can be said is, that the 
opinion of the multitude is sometimes right and some- 
times wrong ; according to the dictum of Horace — 

Interdum vulgus rectum videt, est ubi peccat. 

(Ep.II. 1,63.) 

Popular opinion (as has been just remarked) is pecu- 
liarly deserving of attention in cases where the people 
can be considered in the light of separate and inde- 
pendent witnesses; where the opinion relates to some 



* " ' Vox populi, vox Dei,' in vulgarem ob id jactatum est ser- 
monem, quod populus interdum aliquid temere ac intempestive 
fundere soleat, quod perinde quasi divinasset, evenit. Cujusmodi 
vaticinium fuit illud populi Judaici supplicium Christi affectantis, 
cum repente exclamavit, ' Sanguis ejus super nos, et super filios 
nostros.' \Matth. xxvii. 25.] Id quod imprecationis plane contigit, 
et usque nunc durat, nam haud ita multo post insigni affecti cala- 
mitate a Yespasiano et Tito, tanti sceleris psenas digno impietatis 
pretio, ut Hegesippus ait, persolventes, fere omnes cum patria 
periere. Unde est cunctis seculis observatum, non usquequaque 
vanum evadere, quicquid fuerit vulgi rumore jactatum, perinde 
Deus in mortalium ora quasi ante immittat, quod brevi tempore sit 
futurum." — Polidor. Virgil. Adagia Sacra, No. 199. [Preface 
dated London, 1519. The allusion in this passage appears to be 
to a Latin translation of part of the Jewish War of Josephus, 
which was published under the name of Hegesippus, in 1511.] 

Machiavel also, writing at the same time, refers this saying to 
the supposed prophetic qualities of popular opinion: "E non 
senza cagione si assomiglia la voce d'un popolo a quella di Dio, 
perche si vede una opinione universale fare effetti maravigliosi nei 
pronostici suoi, talche pare che per occulta virtu ei prevegga il suo 
male e il suo bene." — Disc. I. 58. 

The Italian proverb, "Voce di Dio, voce di popolo," is in Pescetti, 



174 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

fact, which admits of being observed and verified by each 
person for himself. Accordingly, (as Machiavel * has 
said,) popular opinion is more often right on particulars 
than on generals. Thus, the judgment of the public is 
more correct on questions of morality, and individual 
behaviour and conduct, than on questions of speculation 
and abstract truth, or of general expediency and a course 
of policy. f Thus, too, in affairs of state, the opinion of 
the people is entitled to greater weight with respect to 
the existence of political evils, than with respect to their 
remedies. The people can, by their own feelings and 
observation, ascertain the existence of physical and 
patent evils — such as famine, high prices, mercantile 
ruin and panic, oppressive taxes, corrupt and partial 
administration of justice, insecurity of life and pro- 
perty. But what are the proper remedies for these 
evils, or, indeed, how far they may be remediable by the 
power of the government, the people are in general less 
able to form a correct opinion. Accordingly it may be 
observed that, when once satisfied that the existence of 
the evil is admitted, they are often disposed to defer to 
the authority of statesmen and political leaders with 



Prov. It. et Lat. (1618) p. 13 b. "Voix du peuple, voix de Dieu," 
is cited by Leroux de Lincy, (torn. i. p. 16,) from a collection of 
French proverbs of the sixteenth century. Korte, Sprichworter der 
Deutschen, p. 455, gives the German proverb, " Volkes Stimme, 
Gottes Stimme;" but his explanation, which refers it to the inter- 
pretation of omens by heathen priests, seems untenable. 

* Discorsi, i. 47. 

t " The general voice of mankind," (says Dr. Whewell,) " which 
may often serve as a guide, because it rarely errs widely or perma- 
nently in its estimate of those who are prominent in public life, is 
of little value when it speaks of things belonging to the region of 
exact science." — Hist, of Ind. Sci., vol. i. pref., p. x. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 175 

respect to the choice of a remedy. It should be added, 
that popular opinion is more to be relied on in refer- 
ence to complaints against old, than against new laws 
and institutions. With respect to the former, the 
people judge, in general, from observed facts; against 
the latter, they are sometimes prejudiced by a few in- 
terested or passionate leaders, before the institution has 
been established, or the law been carried into effect, in 
such a manner as to be fairly judged by its results ; and 
a popular clamour, not founded on any real suffering or 
inconvenience, is thus excited. # 

Generally, it is true that public opinion is of great 
value, where it can be resolved into the testimony of a 
multitude of witnesses with respect to a matter of fact. 
Many persons on the look-out can observe better than a 
few; and hence it is more easy to deceive one than 
many,f except, indeed, in cases where special knowledge 
is requisite. For example : it would be easier to deceive 
a hundred ordinary persons by false jewels than a single 
jeweller; or a hundred ordinary persons by a copy of an 
old picture, than a single connoisseur in painting. 

It may be observed, too, that popular sentiment, in- 
cluding large numbers of persons, is for the most part 
directed towards objects of extensive interest, though 
it may seek those objects by inadequate or perverse 



* " The people cannot see, but they can feel;" " The people 
are deceived by names, but not by things." — Harrington's 
Political Aphorisms, (ed. 1737,) p. 516. 

t " Melius omnibus quam singulis creditur. Singuli enim decipere 
et decipi possunt; nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt." Plin. 
Pan. c. 62. Also Rochefoucauld, Max. 416 : "On peut etre plus 
fin quun autre, mais non pas plus fin que tous les autres." On the 
other hand, there is the proverbial verse of Publius Syrus, v. 698 — 
" Saspe oculi et aures vulgi sunt testes mali." 



176 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

means; and that there is often something generous, 
humane, and comprehensive in its sympathies.* 

§ 8. Aristotle, in several passages of his Politics, 
speaks of the defect of virtue, or knowledge, in the 
people, or majority of a state, considered as separate 
individuals, being supplied by their aggregate number; 
upon the ground that, though each person's share of 
virtue and good sense is small, yet, when these separate 
amounts are added together, they make a large quantity. 
In this manner, he thinks, the wisdom and virtue of the 
many may, in the aggregate, exceed those of the wise 
and virtuous few — as a feast formed of contributions of 
the guests may be more splendid than a banquet given 
by a single person. So, in judging of anything, the 
unskilled many may be equal or superior to the skilled 
few ; for different persons will judge of different portions, 
and the judgments of the body, when put together, will 
exhaust the entire subject. f 



* " Sous quelque idee de legerete et d'inconsideration qu'on se 
plaise a nous representer le peuple, j'ai eprouve que sou vent il em- 
brasse a la verite certaines vues, vers lesquelles il se porte avec 
chaleur, ou plutot avec fureur; mais que ces vues ont pourtant tou- 
jours pour objet un interet commun, et d'une certaine generalite, 
jamais un interet purement particulier, comme peuvent etre les 
ressentimens et les passions d'un seul honime, ou d'un petit nombre 
de personnes. Je hasarde meme de dire, que sur ce point, le juge 
le moins faillible est la voix de ce peuple meme." — Sully, Memoires, 
lib. xiv., (torn. iv. p. 341; ed. 1778.) 

According to Livy, xlii., 30, 63, the people generally favours 
the weaker side. It shows this disposition even in the public 
games. On the other hand, Juvenal says that the Roman people 
always sympathized with the strong against the weak. 

Sed quid 
Turba Remi? Sequitur fortunam, ut semper, et odit 
Damnatos. (x. 72.) 

t III. 6. 8. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 177 

It is true that, in cases where each person is, to a 
certain extent, capable of forming an opinion, an increase 
in the number of the judges may compensate the sepa- 
rate deficiency of each. But whenever either eminent 
virtue or wisdom is required, this process of arithmetical 
addition will not avail to produce a large amount, by 
clubbing the intelligence and honesty of many persons, 
each of whom is destitute of these qualities in a high 
degree.* We cannot create great political ability and 
fitness by combining the opinions of a large body, as 
military power can be created by rendering an army or 
navy numerically strong, or as a large sum of money 
can be produced by the subscriptions of many persons of 
small means. As well might we attempt to make one 
great poet, by combining the efforts of several minor 
poets ;f or a great painter, by employing several inferior 
artists on the same picture ; or a great captain, by com- 
bining the ideas of several military officers of moderate 



* Speaking of a change in the financial department made in 
France in 1594, by which a board of eight members was substi- 
tuted for the former office of superintendent, Sully observes, first, 
that the measure was ill-devised, because it is more difficult to find 
several persons fit to manage the finances than one. He proceeds 
to say — " L'erreur n'est pas moins visible de s'imaginer, que toutes 
ces personnes y apportant chacune de leur cote une bonne qualite 
differente, il en resultera le meme effet que d'un homme qui les 
auroit toutes : puisque c'est supposer que cette bonne qualite ne 
sera pas rendue inutile et par ses propres defauts, et par ceux de 
ses associes." — Memoires, lib. VII. torn. II. p. 427. 

t " L'on n'a guere vu jusques a present un chef-d'oeuvre d'esprit 
qui soit Touvrage de plusieurs." — La Bruyere, Caracteres, c. 1. 
It has been justly objected to the Woman hypothesis respecting 
the Homeric poems, that it assumes the possibility of putting the 
genius of Homer in commission. — Compare the remarks of Comte, 
Cours de Philosophic Positive, torn. IV. p. 614-6. 

N 



178 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

powers. For political and other purposes, in which 
capacity of a high order is requisite, there must be single 
persons possessing that degree of power, in order to 
arrive at sound practical conclusions. This want can- 
not be supplied by numbers, more than a wall could be 
battered down by musket-balls, however thickly poured 
in, though the same weight of metal, cast into cannon- 
shot, would instantly lay it prostrate. 

§ 9. One form in which the general voice and senti- 
ment embodies itself is Proverbs, or apophthegms whose 
authority is derived from their popular reception.* For 
this reason, the attention, both of philosophers and 
practical men, has from an early date been directed to 
proverbs. Their importance has been recognised, as 
representing and concentrating the experience of many 
men, and even of many generations ; as being the brief 
and pointed expression of the inferences which popular 
observation and sagacity have collected from human life. 
The Jews were guided by the proverbs of their wise 
king, and a moral apophthegm was attributed to each of 
the seven sages of Greece. Aristotle even thought that 
proverbs were the remains of the philosophy of an extinct 
race of men, which had been preserved on account of 
their conciseness and wisdom. f Every modern nation 
possesses its collection of proverbs ; many of which are, 
with the necessary changes of expression and form, com- 
mon to all the European languages, and have a general 
currency by a sort of jus gentium. 

Proverbs being maxims, in the nature either of obser- 



* " The wit of one man, and the wisdom of many," is a definition 
of proverbs attributed to a living statesman. 

f See Schneidewin Prcef. ad Parcem. Gr. p. I. Compare 
JRket. II. 21. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 179 

vation or of precept, upon human life or conduct, are 
accredited by the tacit verification which they have un- 
dergone in their tradition from one individual and one 
generation or nation to another. If their truth or 
soundness had not been recognised by those who used 
them, and handed them on, they would soon have gone 
into oblivion. 

In general, however, proverbs express only empirical 
laws of human nature* — that is to say, being generali- 
zations from partial experience, they are only true within 
certain limits, and subject to certain conditions. Before, 
therefore, a popular proverb can be safely used for phi- 
losophical purposes as evidence of a general truth, it 
must undergo a process of analysis ; it must be limited 
according to the mental tendencies which it involves, 
and the circumstances in which it is applicable. In 
this manner, proverbs which are apparently contradic- 
tory may be reconciled, and the partial truth which 
they contain will be extracted and rendered profitable. 

Thus, to take a familiar example of opposite pro- 
verbial precepts: there are adages in all languages 
warning against precipitation — as " Festina lente;" 
"Hatez-vous lentement;" " Eile mit weile ;" " Kommt 
zeit, kommt rath ;" " The more haste, the worse speed ;" 
" Haste makes waste." On the other hand, there are 
proverbs against procrastination and delay, as — a Bald 
gethan ist wohlgethan ;" " Delay not till to-morrow what 
may be done to-day;" " A stitch in time saves nine." 
These opposite maxims, though absolute and universal 
in their form, require to be limited and qualified, in 
order to adapt them respectively to the cases in which 
it is expedient to act with deliberation and caution, 



* See Mill's System of Logic, b. III. c. 16; b. VI. c. 5, § 1 

n2 



180 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

and those in which a rapid glance and speedy decision 
are requisite. In order to make this adaptation, the 
circumstances of the several cases must be analyzed, and 
the causes of the difference in the mode of treatment for 
each class, must be investigated. By this process, the 
empirical law will be converted into a scientific law, and 
the generalization will be restricted to the limits within 
which it holds good. 

So, if we compare the following French proverbs — 
" Force passe droit," " Sagesse vaut mieux que force," 
" Chose forcee de petite duree,"* we may easily see that 
each expresses a partial truth, but is not true uni- 
versally. Again, such adages as — " II est plus facile de 
conseiller que de faire," " Familiarity breeds contempt," 
" Necessity is the mother of invention," " The town 
for wealth, the country for health," and the Italian pro- 
verb cited by Bacon — 

Di danaro, di senno, e di fede, 
C'e ne manco che non crede — 

are doubtless often true; but they are generalizations 
from a limited and variable experience, and not scientific 
truths expressive of tendencies in human nature. 
Hence, these abbreviations of past experience, these con- 
cise expressions of popular wisdom, cannot be used as 
substitutes for scientific inquiry ; nor can they take their 
place in a system of accurate knowledge without under- 
going a process of correction and adaptation. 

§ 10. Wherever, in the preceding pages, the opinion 
of the skilled or enlightened few has been preferred to 
that of the uninformed many, and the judgment of the 
general public has been treated as unimportant, the re- 



* Leroux de Lincy, torn. II. pp. 201, 224, 316. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 181 

mark must be understood to be confined to popular 
opinion considered as a standard of truth. Regarded as 
a fact, popular opinion, whether right or wrong, must 
always be important, since there are many things in 
which the preponderance of numbers necessarily exer- 
cises a decisive influence. It is always a material con- 
sideration when we can say of any party, or body of 
persons, what Cicero said of the Epicurean sect, " Qui 
auctoritatem minimam habet, maximam vim, populus 
cum illis facit." * 

§ 11. Thus, with respect to affairs of state, the 
acquiescence of the majority of the population in the 
acts of the government, or their dislike of these acts, 
and their consequent desire to resist, thwart, or evade 
them, must always command attention. The state of 
feeling among the people towards their government, is 
always a matter of moment, whether its acts be intrin- 
sically right or wrong. The existence of a disaffected 
or rebellious spirit among the people can never be a 
subject of trifling concern, however just, wise, and politic 
the conduct of the government may have been, and 
however unmerited the disfavour into which it may have 
fallen. So, with respect to the imposition of a tax, and 
the administration of criminal law, it is not sufficient 
that the fiscal measure, or the scale of punishments, 
should be defensible on rational grounds — it is necessary 
that they should enjoy some portion of popular favour, 
or, at least, not shock the feelings and prejudices of the 
public. Unpopularity, in short, in all political matters, 
is a fact which never can be safely overlooked; and 
even where the measures of a government, or the conduct 
of a statesman, may have been misunderstood and mis- 



* De Fin. II. 14. 



182 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

judged, merely because they were founded on views in 
advance of public opinion, it must always be taken into 
account as a material element in all political calculations. 
Popularity is as important in affairs of government as 
numbers are in war; and it would be as impossible for 
a statesman to succeed who could not obtain the support, 
or at least the acquiescence, of a large portion of the 
population, as for a general to gain a victory with a 
handful of men against overwhelming forces. 

The stability and success of every government must 
mainly depend upon the approbation, or acquiescence, 
with which its measures are viewed by the great mass 
of the community. By internal concord, a small state 
may become powerful; by internal discord, a large state 
is sure to be rendered weak. Although the theory of 
the social compact is groundless, yet government rests 
ultimately on a tacit agreement for a common end. It 
exists by the voluntary obedience of the majority of 
the people, and, armed with that support, it enforces 
its laws against each individual who successively vio- 
lates them. The introduction, therefore, of the nume- 
rical principle, in one form or other, becomes necessary 
for every government which is to be established on a 
firm basis. As to the manner in which this principle is 
legally recognised in the constitution of free States, and 
in which its operation is modified in practice, more will 
be said in the following chapters. 

§ 12. There are other subjects, besides government, 
in which the predominant practice, or usage, or taste, of 
the great body of the people is a matter of sovereign 
importance, as establishing a standard, whether good or 
bad, for the guidance of all those whose business it is to 
supply the wants of the public, in the way either of 
comfort, or amusement, or intellectual gratification, or 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 183 

by speech and writing to reach their feelings and con- 
victions. 

For example : in questions of language, the usage of 
the greater number is practically the standard of decision, 
according to the well-known dictum of Horace. In order 
that a person should be intelligible, it is necessary that 
he should conform to the grammatical forms and signi- 
fications of words generally recognised by those whom 
he addresses. Even here, however, the judgment of the 
learned few has great weight ; on questions of grammar, 
grammarians — on questions of the meaning of words, 
lexicographers and philological writers are consulted; 
and their authority is recognised as guiding usage, and 
determining its correctness. In fixing the sense of a 
word, its etymology, and the use of early writers, are 
attended to, and not merely the popular acceptation. "It 
is admitted that there are vulgarisms and inaccuracies 
in language, for which general use affords no sufficient 
justification. It is true that, in dealing with common 
words, the scientific writer is bound to respect existing 
usage — to regard language as a precious depositary of 
ancient observations and ideas, and not to deface or 
falsify the coins which constitute its currency.* Yet, 
in seeking to restrict vague popular meanings without 
departing from their prevalent tendency, and in aiming 
at scientific precision, without imposing an arbitrary 
signification merely for the sake of clearness, he will 
find it necessary to look beyond the mere contemporary 
usage; he must ascend to the origin of the term, and 
pursue its history through the various changes it has 



* See this subject treated with great ability by Dr. Whewell, 
Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, b. III. c. 10, § 8; and Mr. Mill, 
System of Logic, b. IV. c. 4, § 6. 



184 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

undergone, and the writings of the several authors by 
whom it has been used. In this research, therefore, the 
language of the learned few, as well as of the unlearned 
many, will serve as his guide. 

§ 13. Again, as to questions of style and eloquence, 
the judgment of the people, or at least of the persons to 
whom the composition is addressed, must be taken as the 
test of its answering the purpose for which it is intended ; 
since, in the department of rhetoric, the object is to make 
an impression on the hearer or reader, and thus to in- 
fluence his conviction or rouse his feelings. According 
to the maxim quoted by Lord Bacon : " Loquendum ut 
vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes."* 

But for all compositions, involving an appeal to the 
reason or the emotions of a circle of readers or hearers, 
there are two questions to be considered; one, as to 
success — the other, as to the means by which the success 
is effected. With regard to success, popular favour is 
the only criterion, as it is in acting, painting, or any 
other art which is addressed to the public at large. In 
this respect, the poet, the orator, or the painter, is in 
the same condition as a manufacturer or mechanic with 
respect to his customers. He is the most successful, 
whose work is most admired by the persons for whom it 
is destined. As to the goodness of any work of skill, or 
product of industry, the person who consumes or uses it, 
and not merely the artist or mechanic who fashioned it, 
must practically be the ultimate judge. A person who 
cannot build a house or a carriage, will decide for himself 
whether a house or carriage is built to his liking; and 



* De Augm. Sclent. 1. V. c. 4; also, Advancement of Learning, 
vol. II. p. 192. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 185 

the test of a good dinner is the approbation of the guests, 
not of the cooks.* 

On the other hand, it is the business of the philoso- 
phical inquirer to determine the causes of success, either 
in oratory or written composition, and to frame a system 
of rules which will assist the speaker or writer in ex- 
pressing himself with perspicuity and energy — in adapt- 
ing his discourse to the taste and feelings of his audience, 
and in arranging his topics in a convenient order, f 

§ 14. But although, in the liberal arts, success de- 
pends on the multitude of admirers, yet it does not 
follow that the standard by which the multitude judge is 
correct. In the creations of the poet, the orator, the 
painter, the sculptor, and the architect, not merely the 



* See Aristot. Pol. III. 11; and the epigram of Martial, IX. 82: 
Lector et auditor nostros probat, Aule, libellos : 

Sed quidam exactos esse poeta negat. 
Non nimium euro; nam coenae fercula nostrse 

Malim convivis quam placuisse coquis. 

" Dans toute judicieuse division du travail," (says M. Comte,) 
" il est clair que l'usage d'un instrument quelconque, materiel ou 
intellectuel, ne peut jamais etre rationnellement dirige par ceux qui 
Font construit, mais par ceux, au contraire, qui doivent l'employer, 
et qui peuvent seuls, par cela meme, en bien comprendre la vraie 
destination speciale." — Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. III. p. 384. 

"f The question as to the test of the goodness of oratory — whether 
it is to be judged by the applause of critical judges or of the public 
— is fully discussed by Cicero, Brut. c. 49-54. He states dis- 
tinctly that the goodness of oratory can only be tried by its success, 
and that the critical judge can only inquire into the causes of that 
success. " Etenim necesse est, qui ita dicat ut a multitudine probe- 
tur, eundem doctis probari. Nam quid in dicendo rectum sit aut 
pravum, ego judicabo, si modo is sum qui id possim aut sciam judi- 
care; qualis vero sit orator, ex eo quod is dicendo efficiet, poterit 
intelligi. . . . Itaque nunquam de bono oratore, aut non bono, doc- 



186 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. 

judgment of the multitude, but also that of persons of 
cultivated and refined taste, concerning the particular 
object, is to be considered. 

With respect to composition, both oral and written, 
there are canons of criticism, which are established by 
those who have devoted their minds to a special study of 
the subject ; and there are tests of excellence independent 
of popular approbation. An impure style of speaking 
and writing does not recommend itself to fastidious and 
refined judges, merely because it pleases a popular 
audience, or a wide circle of readers.* A discourse full 
of tawdry ornament, false brilliancy, far-fetched meta- 
phors, and turgid exaggeration, which might obtain the 
applauses of an uneducated audience, would offend the 
taste of a more instructed class of hearers. The same 



tis hominibus cum populo dissensio fuit. ... Id enim ipsum est 
summi oratoris, summum oratorem populo videri. . . . Denique 
hoc specimen est popularis judicii in quo nunquam fuit populo cum 
doctis intelligentibusque dissensio. Cum multi essent oratores in 
vario genere dicendi, quis unquam ex his excellere judicatus est 
vulgi judicio, qui non idem a doctis probaretur, (c. 49, 50.) Qui 
praastat igitur intelligens imperito? magna re et difficili; si quidem 
magnum est scire quibus rebus efficiatur amittaturve dicendo illud 
quicquid est, quod aut effici dicendo oportet aut amitti non oportet." 
— c. 54. Compare de Oral. I. 3. 

* Ssepe stylum vertas, iterum quae digna legi sunt 

Scripturus; neque, te ut miretur turba, labores, 

Contentus paucis lectoribus. 

Sat. I. 10, 72. Compare Ep. I. 19, 37—40. 

Horace seems to imply, by the j uxtaposition of these two pre- 
cepts, that a carefully polished style is not acceptable to the general 
body of readers. This view certainly appears to be inconsistent 
with experience. His own universal and long-sustained popu- 
larity has been in great measure owing to his curiosa felicitas (as 
it is called by Petronius) — to his laboured felicity of language; 
and the same may be said of Pope and Gray. 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 187 

may be said of many popular writings, whose ephemeral 
success is not a proof of their excellence, tried by a 
right standard. So, again, when we get below the class 
of persons who have cultivated a taste for art, a collec- 
tion of painted wax figures would certainly attract more 
spectators than a museum of Grecian statues ; and a set 
of highly-coloured pictures, full of contortion and melo- 
dramatic postures, would captivate a larger multitude 
than a series of paintings by Raphael. And, even in the 
culinary art, the taste of a student of the Almanack des 
Gourmands is, doubtless, more refined than that of a 
clown; and, in spite of Martial's saying, the judgment 
of a professed cook is to be regarded, although there 
may be many guests who would not appreciate his skill. 
True excellence in each art is to be decided by the 
judgment of persons of exercised taste and observation 
in that art, and not by the opinion of the multitude. 
Nevertheless, as has been stated, success is measured by 
popular favour, and is often (at least for a time) inde- 
pendent of excellence tried by the correct standard.* 
Artists cannot, in general, afford to be teachers; they 
are compelled to adapt their powers of invention and 



* Anacharsis is said to have expressed his wonder that, among 
the Greeks, professional actors and musicians contended in the 
theatres for the prize, and that unprofessional judges decided on 
their merit — Diog. Laert. I. 103, where the commentators cite a 
passage from Quintilian: "Felices artes essent, si de illis soli arti- 
fices judicarent." Gellius tells the following anecdote of Menander: 
"Menander a Philemone, nequaquam pari scriptore, in certaminibus 
comoediarum ambitu gratiaque et factionibus ssepenumero vince- 
batur. Eum cum forte habuisset obviam; Quseso, inquit, Philemon, 
bona venia, die mihi, cum me vincis, non erubescis?" — (N. A. XVII. 
4.) Aristotle, however, says that the multitude are the best judges 
of the productions of music and poetry, Pol. III. 1 1 . 



188 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT |_CH. 

imitation to the varying demands of the popular temper. 
Actors must accommodate their representations to the 
public fancy, and must be contented to amuse their 
audience in the manner in which they desire to be 
amused, without undertaking to purify or elevate their 
taste. 

The drama's laws the drama's patrons give; 

For we who live to please, must please to live. 

Even artists, however, of all sorts, who are compelled 
to adapt their performances to the public taste, appre- 
ciate the approbation of cultivated and refined judges, 
and often pursue a disinterested love for the higher de- 
partments of their art, without reference to profit or 
immediate fame. Men of genius, likewise, may create 
new tastes, and form in the public a new sesthetical 
sense. But this power, both of forming the appetite, 
and furnishing the food which it demands, is given to 
few.* 

Similar remarks apply to the works of the useful arts. 
Products of this kind must fall in with the general 
taste, and be suited to the wants and convenience of 
numbers, in order to be appreciated, and be in demand. 
In all vendible commodities, public favour is the test of 
success. The empire of fashion, with respect to taste in 
building, furniture, dress, gardening, and decoration of 
all sorts, is notoriously as capricious as it is paramount; 



* Valerius Maximus, III. 7, ext. 1, tells an anecdote of Euripides 
having been required by the Athenian people to expunge some sen- 
timent from one of his tragedies; whereupon he came forward in 
the theatre, and said that he was in the habit of composing trage- 
dies in order to instruct the people, not in order to learn from them. 
Compare, also, the anecdote of Antigenidas, a musician, ib. 2, who, 
when a promising disciple of his own was not appreciated by the 
people, said to him: " Mihi cane et Musis." 



VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 189 

and the shifting of public taste in these respects may 
sometimes remind us of the French proverb, that fools 
invent fashions, and wise men follow them.* We may 
thus often find that the taste of the public is erroneous ; 
that, in works both of the fine and the useful arts, the 
people may admire contrary to the opinion of competent 
judges; and may find excellence in works which the 
latter condemn, and fail to appreciate what the latter 
esteem highly ; yet the general taste must be accepted 
as the criterion of success, whether deserved or unde- 
served. 

The arbitrium popularis aurce is decisive as a test of 
success, where a person seeks to obtain followers, sup- 
porters, admirers, or customers. But where he desires 
to submit his opinions to the standard of truth, it 
ought to be disregarded, in comparison with the sentence 
of the few competent judges, either contemporary or 
future. 

§ 15. As the majority of the public are enabled to 
give currency to their own opinions and tastes, by 
making a conformity with them the condition of success 
and worldly prosperity, or, at least, the surest road to its 
attainment, they ought to be satisfied with this import- 



* " Les fous inventent les modes, et les sages les suivent." — 
Leroux de Lincy, Proverbes Frangais, torn. I. p. 160. Lord Bacon 
has a similar remark on superstition. " The master of superstition 
is the people, and in all superstition wise men follow fools." — 
Essay XVII. 

" II est etonnant qu'avec tout l'orgueil dont nous sommes 
gonfles, et la haute opinion que nous avons de nous-memes et de 
la bonte de notre jugement, nous negligions de nous en servir pour 
prononcer sur le merite des autres. La vogue, la faveur populaire, 
celle du prince, nous entrainent comme un torrent. Nous louons 
ce qui est loue, bien plus que ce qui est louable." — La Bruyere, 
Caracteres, c. 12. 



190 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT, ETC. [CH. 

ant influence, without attempting to enforce their own 
standard upon a reluctant minority. " Experience," 
(says Mr. Mill,) "proves that the depositaries of power, 
who are mere delegates of the people — that is, of a 
majority — are quite as ready (when they think they can 
count on popular support) as any organs of oligarchy to 
assume arbitrary power, and encroach unduly on the 
liberty of private life. The public collectively is abun- 
dantly ready to impose, not only its generally narrow 
views of its interests, but its abstract opinions, and even 
its tastes, as laws binding upon individuals. And our 
present civilization tends so strongly to make the power 
of persons acting in masses the only substantial power 
in society, that there never was more necessity for sur- 
rounding individual independence of thought, speech, 
and conduct, with the most powerful defences, in order 
to maintain that originality of mind and individuality 
of character which are the only source of any real 
progress, and of most of the qualities which make the 
human race much superior to any herd of animals."* 

As soon as we are out of the province of civil govern- 
ment, it is most important to assert the principle of 
individual independence in matters of opinion, taste, and 
judgment, as against the principle of numerical prepon- 
derance. Whether an individual exercises this inde- 
pendence by forming his own conclusions, or choosing 
his own guide, it is equally desirable that the majority 
should not force their opinion upon him against his incli- 
nation, by the semi-penal sanction of the popular censure. 



* Principles of Political Economy, vol. II. p. 508; compare 
vol. I. p. 248. See also some similar remarks of Mr. Grote, in 
reference to the Funeral Oration of Pericles, Hist, of Greece, 
vol. VI. p. 201-2. 



VII.] APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE, ETC. 191 



CHAPTER VII. 

ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY 
TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 

§ 1. From what has been said above as to the 
qualifications of a trustworthy authority, and the pro- 
vince for its proper exercise, we perceive that the best 
guide is the opinion of persons specially conversant with 
a subject, and not the general opinion of persons having 
no peculiar information or experience in the matter; 
that, whenever an individual acts for himself, and is not 
fettered by legal rules, he ought to weigh opinions, and 
not to count them. Whence it follows, that the persons 
whose opinion on any subject is endowed with authority, 
always form a small minority as compared with the 
entire community. 

There is, however, one subject in which it is necessary 
that opinions should be counted and not weighed", that 
the greater number should prevail over the less, without 
reference to the intrinsic value of their opinions, and 
should decide the practical course of action. This sub- 
ject is Civil Government, so far as it depends on the 
decisions of Political Bodies. In the following remarks, 
I propose to examine the causes of this necessity, and 
the extent to which its consequences are moderated and 
counteracted in practice by a voluntary deference to the 
contrary principle. 

§ 2. For this purpose, it will be necessary to trace 
briefly the historical origin of Political Bodies, and of 
the principle upon which their mode of action is founded. 



192 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

In the earliest governments which history presents to 
us, viz., those of the great empires of Western Asia, 
everything, from the monarch down to the lowest civil 
functionary, was organized on the principle of individual 
action. Being all absolute or despotic monarchies,* the 
principle of a political body was, indeed, necessarily 
excluded from the form of their supreme government; 
the sovereignty always resided in a single person, and 
not in any council of nobles or popular assembly. But 
no trace of corporate action — no vestige of the existence 
of any board, or jury-court, or collegium — can be dis- 
cerned even in any subordinate part of the political 
system of the purely Oriental States ; nor have they, at 
the present day, advanced beyond this very simple and 
primitive organization. In this respect, their civil 
government exactly resembles our military and naval 
constitution.! There is, it is true, a gradation of powers, 
and a subordination of authority, descending from the 
Emperor, or Rajah, or Shah, or Sultan, down to the petty 
head of a village, or the collector of revenue ; but each 
officer acts for himself, on his individual responsibility, 
without colleagues, and not as a member of a body. In 
the Oriental States, whenever councils are mentioned, 
they either are consultative councils of the sovereign 
or of his minister, destitute of legal power, capacity for 
corporate action, and real freedom of speech ; or else they 
are assemblies of high officers of state, (like the levees of 
European princes) in which each person attends in order 



* As to all the Oriental governments of antiquity being despot- 
isms, see the passages quoted by Grotius, De J. B. et P. I. 3, § 20; 
particularly Aristot. Pol. III. 1 4. See also the remarks of Heeren 
upon the character of the Asiatic despotisms, Ideen, I. 1, p. 423-8. 

t The reason why the military and naval services, in civilized 
States, are organized upon this principle, is stated lower down. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 193 

to pay his court to the Sovereign, or to receive his 
audience on occasions of state ceremony. In authentic 
Oriental history, there is no example of an harangue or 
public address to a constituted deliberative body. 
Oriental civilization has never yet reached the stage 
which is compatible with discussion concerning common 
interests, by a body of counsellors possessing equal 
rights, each of them entitled to give advice to the 
rest, and to express an independent opinion.* The 
qualities essential to oral discussion in a numerous as- 
sembly are, toleration of contradiction and censure, with 
such a power of self-command and suspension of the 
judgment, as enables a person to listen to, and under- 
stand, arguments hostile to his own views — to treat them 
with deference, and to give them a suitable answer. If 
these qualities do not prevail throughout the assembly, 
the assertion of adverse opinions, and their comparison 
and examination, are rendered impossible; the speaker 
is interrupted by clamour, vociferation, denials, insults, 
and threats — the entire assembly becomes a scene of 
turbulence and confusion, and intelligible debate is at 
an end. It is partly from the absence of the qualities 
just described, (which, even in highly-civilized countries, 
are not very common,) that no Oriental country has ever 
arrived at discussion in a public body. The absence of 
deliberative councils or assemblies in Oriental Kingdoms 
has arisen, however, in part, from the confirmed habit of 
adulation, and servile compliance with the wishes of the 
prince, which their despotic system has established. It 
is true of every Oriental ruler, what Tacitus says of 
Vitellius : " Ita formatis principis auribus, ut aspera quae 



* See Note A. at the end of the chapter. 




1 94 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

utilia, nee quicquam nisi jucundum et laesurum acci- 
peret."* 

The Greeks were, it seems, the first nation who formed 
a distinct conception of political management by a Body, 
and carried it into practical effect. Without this arrange- 
ment, a free or popular constitution, such as began to 
exist in their small city communities before the dawn of 
authentic history, could not have arisen. Originally, 
in the Grecian States, the assembly of free citizens was 
merely convened and consulted by the kings at their 
pleasure, and did not exercise any legal power; but, in 
process of time, it obtained a potential voice in the con- 
stitution, and its decisions acquired the force of law. 
This principle of corporate action, and of decision by a 
majority of voices, was not confined, in the Greek re- 
publics, to the general assembly of the citizens, but it 
was extended to courts of justice, and to smaller councils 
and administrative bodies, such as the Athenian senate 
and board of generals, the Spartan Gerusia and board of 
ephors.f 

The principle of corporate action in political affairs 
was borrowed from the Greeks by the republic of Car- 



* Hist. III. 56. Compare the statements as to Artemisia and 
Coes, in Herod. VIII. 67-9, and IV. 97; also Dohsson, Tableau 
de VEmpire Othoman, torn. VII. p. 229, with reference to the 
council of the grand visier: " Les membres du conseil sont arretes 
par la crainte de contrarier les intentions du premier ministre. 
C'est en vain qu'il les exhorte, qu'il les presse de parler, qu'il in- 
voque leur zele pour le bien dela religion et de 1 etat; on lui repond 
qu'il est plein de lumieres, qu'il possede la confiance et les pouvoirs 
du maitre de l'empire, que c'est a lui a prononcer, a commander, et 
que l'obeissance est leur unique partage. S'il insiste, ils inclinent 
de nouveau la tete, et portent la main sur la bouche et sur le front." 

t See Note B. at the end of the chapter. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 195 

thage, a colony of the Asiatic Tyrians,* and also, perhaps, 
in later times, by the Jews.f Being common to all the 
Hellenic commonwealths of Greece, Asia Minor, and 



* It appears from Aristot. Pol. II. 11, that the assembly of 
citizens at Carthage had both power of debate and decision on 
questions brought before it by the magistrates. Also, that there 
was a Gerusia like the Spartan, and a council of 104 members. 
Compare Botticher, Geschichte der Cartkager, pp. 48 — 51. These 
institutions could not have been Phoenician, as Heeren supposes, 
Ideen, II. 1, p. 115, but were doubtless borrowed from those of the 
neighbouring Greek republics in Sicily and Italy. In like manner, 
the influence of Greek ideas and civilization had reacted from an 
early period upon the Phoenicians in their own country. See 
Movers, Die Phonizier, vol. I. pp. 82-3. 

The Phoenician cities formed a league, of which Tyre was the 
leading member; and in it (at least in later times) was held a sort 
of diet, or federal council, having large powers of deliberation. — 
Diod. XVI. 41. Tyre, however, and the other cities, were each 
under the government of hereditary kings, ( Josephus cont. Apion. I. 
§§ 17, 18 ; Herod. VIII. 67; Diod. XVI. 42, 43 ; Arrian, Al. Exp. 
II. 24;) and although the influence of commerce (as Heeren con- 
jectures, Ideen, I. 2, p. 20) may have created wealthy and powerful 
families, and thus have placed some checks upon the regal power 
— and although they may have acquired from their intercourse 
with the Greeks some practical notion of a free government, yet, 
in early times, the constitution of each city was doubtless purely 
monarchical^ after the Oriental model. The detailed account, in 
Diodorus, XVI. 41-5, of the treachery of Tennes, the Sidonian king, 
at the time of the revolt against Ochus, shows that the government 
was, even at that late period, purely monarchical. The silence of 
Aristotle respecting Tyre, in his Politics, likewise proves that its 
constitution was not popular, like that of Carthage. 

t The Sanhedrim, or Synedrion, in the Jewish commonwealth, 
was a body consisting of seventy -two members, whose functions were 
chiefly judicial. How its decisions were formed does not appear. 
It is first expressly mentioned at the time of Antipater and Herod, 
or, at the earliest, in the time of the Seleucidae. If it decided by a 
majority, (which is not probable,) its constitution had doubtless 
been influenced by the contagion of Greek notions. 

o 2 



196 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

Italy, it was adopted by the Romans,* who, in the deve- 
lopment of their empire, gave it all the solidity and 
definiteness which political and legal institutions acquired 
in their hands. 

The principle of decision by a political body was 
known both to the Gauls and Germans in their semi- 
barbarous state; whether as a native institution, or as 
derived from the imitation of the Greek and Roman 
usage, is uncertain.*)* But the national assemblies of the 
Germanic and Gaulish tribes have exercised little in- 
fluence upon posterity; it is principally through the 
municipal institutions of the free towns of the middle 
ages, and partly, also, through the councils of the 
church,J that corporate action has descended from the 
Romans to the civilized nations of the modern world, 



* Dionysius states that, according to the institution of Romulus, 
it was the province of the king to convene the senate, to assemble 
the people, to preside over their deliberations, and to carry into 
effect the decision of the majority.— A. R. II. 14. He adds, that 
the king gave only a single vote in the senate, and that the majority 
decided; which institution Romulus borrowed from Lacedaemon. 
See also what is stated of Lucius Junius Brutus, in VII. 36, 39. 

Concerning the Roman mode of voting, see Diet, of Gr. and R. 
Ant. in Suffragium. 

In the Roman law, a board or political body was termed a col- 
legium. A collegium was either a subordinate body under the 
State, as the collegium augurum, or a fraternity, guild, &c, for a 
semi-public or political purpose. A similar body was also called 
universitas. Both these words are now, in English, limited to 
places of education. 

t See Note C. at the end of the chapter. 

% The expression to vote was borrowed from the practice of the 
councils of the church, according to Sarpi, 1. II. c. 30. (Courayer, 
torn. I. p. 212.) 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 197 

and has become one of the most familiar ideas and habits 
of our political existence.* 

§ 3. The principle of corporate action is, perhaps, the 
most important improvement which, since the dawn of 
civilization, has been introduced into practical politics, 
and it is the chief instrument of a popular constitution ; 
but, like other political refinements, it is accompanied 
with many serious difficulties in the working. The com- 
plexity of the mechanism sometimes deranges and im- 
pedes its action. 

In the case of judicial and administrative bodies, the 
plurality of membersf tends to insure a more careful 
and deliberate consideration of the question to be de- 
cided, J on account of the diversity of opinions which are 
likely to be brought to bear upon it, as well as of the 
variety of appropriate knowledge and information, and 
of individual character and disposition. 

The number of counsellors concurring in the decision, 



* As to the nature of a persona moralis, compounded of several 
individual persons, but acting as a corporation or political body, see 
Puffendorf, Law of N. and N. I. 1, §§ 13, 14, Compare Note D. 
at the end of the chapter. 

| Ancient writers, both sacred and profane, concur in recom- 
mending plurality of counsellors. Thus, Proverbs, XI. 14: " In the 
multitude of counsellors there is safety." XVI. 22 : " Without 
counsel, purposes are disappointed; but in the multitude of coun- 
sellors they are established." So Apollon. Ehod. IV. 1336: 7ro\eW 
& re fiijrig dpeluv. Pliny the Younger says, in reference to the influ- 
ence of an assembly upon the speaker who addresses it: " In numero 
ipso est quoddam magnum collatumque consilium; quibusque sin- 
gulis judicii parum, omnibus plurimum." — Epist. VII. 17, § 10. 
Compare, however, the remarks above, in ch. 6, § 8. 

% " Things will have their first or second agitation: if they be not 
tossed upon the arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the 



1 98 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

and responsible for it, is a considerable security against 
precipitate, uninformed, and incautious judgments, 
founded upon partial data. " We are all (says Locke) 
short-sighted, and very often see but one side of the 
matter; our views are not extended to all that has a 
connexion with it. From this defect I think no man is 
free. We see but in part, and we know but in part, 
and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right 
from our partial views. This might instruct the 
proudest esteemer of his own parts how useful it is to 
talk and consult with others, even such as come short of 
him in capacity, quickness, and penetration ; for since no 
one sees all, and we generally have different prospects of 
the same thing, according to our different, as I may say, 
positions to it ; it is not inconsistent to think, nor beneath 
any man to try, whether another may not have notions 
of things which have escaped him, and which his reason 
would make use of if they came into his mind."* Hence, 
when a plan, prepared by one or two persons, is sub- 
mitted to a consultative body for discussion, the advan- 



waves of fortune, and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, 
like the reeling of a drunken man." — Bacon's Essay on Counsel. 

Bov\?)v airavroQ 7rpay/zaVo£ 7TjooXa^i/3av€, 

is a verse attributed to Menander, Sentent. Sing. v. 70. 

Deliberandum est diu, quod statuendum est semel, — 
Deliberare utilia, mora tutissima est, 

are two proverbial verses of Publius Syrus, v. 166-7. But all such 
maxims as these must be taken with the limitation, that the delibera- 
tion ought to be long and full, where the case admits of delay, and 
there is no need of prompt action, as in military affairs. No one 
would call a council to deliberate what was to be done to save a 
burning house or a sinking ship. 

* On the Conduct of the Understanding, § 3. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 199 

tage of a number of counsellors is particularly seen, in 
the amendment of details, in the removal of partial 
blemishes, and the improvement of subordinate parts. 
Here numbers do not confuse, if the unity of the original 
plan is preserved.* The number of counsellors also 
prevents the decision from being determined by the 
caprices, and the personal friendships or dislikes, of an 
individual. With respect to an executive body it is 
likewise often important, that deliberations respecting 
the application to practice of any general enactment 
should be assisted by that knowledge of public feeling 
and expectation on the subject, and of the circumstances 
of different localities, which is afforded by a plurality of 
counsellors. f The decisions of an executive body may, 
therefore, be expected to carry more weight, to command 
more respect, and to be more in accordance with general 
sentiment, than those of a single functionary, and thus to 
meet with more ready obedience from the community. 
On the other hand, joint deliberation and consultation, 



* " Reason is of two parts, invention and judgment: — 

Judgment is most perfect in an assembly. 

Invention is most perfect in one man. 

In one man, judgment wants the strength which is in a multitude 
of counsellors. 

In a multitude of counsellors, invention is none at all." 

Harrington's Political Aphorisms, Nos. 111-17, p. 522. 

+ " And though it were confessed that reason would be better dis- 
covered and stated, and conclusions easier made, by a few than by 
a greater number, yet when the execution depends on the many, 
and the general interpretation so much depends on the success, and 
the success on the interpretation, we see those counsels most pros- 
perous, whereof the considerations and deliberations have been 
measured by that standard which is most publicly acknowledged 
and received." — Clarendon, Hist, of Reb. b. VII. vol. IV. p. 287, 
ed. 1 mo. 



200 APPLICABILITY OF £HE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

and the process of reconciling discordant opinions by 
compromises and modifications of plans, lead to slowness, 
irresolution, vacillation, and inaction. # Hence, in war, 
where rapidity of decision, and energy as well as unity 
of action, are indispensable for success, it is preferable to 
vest the chief command in a single person, and not in a 
plurality of generals.f Councils of war are proverbially 



* Clarendon, Hist, of Reb. b. III. (vol. I. p. 319), after dwelling 
on the too great facility in admitting persons into the king's privy- 
council, proceeds thus: — " B y this means the number hath been 
increased, which in itself breeds great inconveniences, since a less 
number are fitter both for counsel and despatch in matters of the 
greatest moment, that depend upon a quick execution, than a 
greater number of men equally honest and wise; and for that and 
other reasons of unaptness and incompetency, committees of dex- 
terous men have been appointed out of the table to do the business 
of the table. . . . And though it hath been, and will be, always 
necessary to admit to those counsels some men of great power, who 
will not take the pains to have great parts, yet the number of the 
whole should not be too great, and the capacities and qualities of 
the most should be fit for business — that is, either for judgment 
and despatch, or for one of them at least — and integrity above all." 

Hence the proverb : " Deliberando ssepe perit occasio." — Publ. 
Syrus, v. 165. 

A person is sometimes admitted into a consultative body, in order 
to neutralize his opposition, by advising with him in the first in- 
stance. A character such as that described by Tacitus is, unfor- 
tunately, not very uncommon : " Consilii quamvis egregii, quod non 
ipse adferret, inimicus, et adversus peritos pervicax." — Hist. I. 26. 

t Accordingly, Homer, who looked on a king chiefly as a com- 
mander in war, says : — 

ovk dyaBbv 7ro\vicoiparir). elg Kolpavog 'iaroj, 
eh fiacnXevg. Iliad, II. 204. 

Compare the advice of Hermocrates to the Syracusans concerning 
their fifteen generals, Thucyd. VI. 72, and the proverbial verse: — 
7ro\Xoi crrparrjyol Kaptav airuykeaav. 

DlOGENIAN. VII. 72. 

In the year 309 u.c, the consuls, T. Quinctius and Agrippa 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 201 

said never to fight.* The same reason applies, indeed, 
to the entire organization of the military and naval ser- 
vices, from the highest to the lowest. It is to be borne 



Furius, being sent on an expedition against the iEqui, the latter 
consented that the entire command should be entrusted to his col- 
league. Livy, describing this event, says: "In exercitu Romano 
quum duo consules essent potestate pari; quod saluberrimum in ad- 
ministratione magnarum rerum est, summa imperii, concedente 
Agrippa, penes collegam erat." — III. 70. Again, in 329 u.c, three 
tribunes, with consular power, were sent against the Fidenates and 
Veientines, and their dissensions caused the expedition to fail, on 
which Livy remarks: " Tres, delectu habito, profecti sunt Yeios, 
documen toque fuere, quam plurium imperium bello inutile esset. 
Tendendo ad sua quisque consilia, quum aliud alii videretur, 
aperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti." — IV. 31. See the com- 
ment of Machiavelli, Disc. III. 15, upon these passages. He con- 
cludes thus: " II che e contrario a quello che oggi fanno queste 
nostre repubbliche e principi, di mandare ne'luoghi, per ministrarli 
meglio, piu d'un commissario e piu d'un capo, il che fa una inesti- 
mabile confusione. E se si cercasse la cagione della rovina de li 
eserciti Italiani e Francesi ne'nostri tempi, si troverebbe la potis- 
sima cagione essere stata questa." Compare also the remarks of 
Mr. Macaulay, Hist of England, vol. I. p. 542, who refers to the 
well-known example of the Dutch deputies. Livy, in comparing 
the Roman captains with Alexander the Great, points out, among 
the disadvantages to which the former were subject, the short 
period of their command, and their liability to have their plans 
hindered by the incapacity or ill will of a colleague. " At, hercule 
(he continues) reges non liberi solum impedimentis omnibus, sed 
domini rerum temporumque, trahunt consiliis cuncta, non se- 
quuntur." — IX. 18. The unity of command in war is at its maximum, 
when the general is not only unincumbered with a colleague or a 
council, but is also the sovereign of the country, and therefore re- 
ceives no instructions from home. Now this state of things, as in 
the cases of Frederic the Great and Napoleon, is the most favour- 
able for military success. 

* In the earliest, as well as, perhaps, the most interesting council 
of war which is on record — viz., that held before the battle of 



202 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

in mind, that unity of command does not exclude volun- 
tary consultation with others. A military commander, 
having an undivided power, is not, indeed, encumbered 
with field deputies, whose consent he must obtain — or a 
council, in which the voices of others are equal to his 
own ; but there is nothing to prevent him from gathering 
the opinions of others, or asking advice from those com- 
petent to give it.* 

From these few remarks, it will be seen that the 
governments of civilized nations act wisely in intrusting 
judicial and administrative powers, sometimes to one 
person, and sometimes to a body of several persons, 
according to the nature of the functions to be performed. 

§ 4. The advantages arising from a plurality of mem- 
bers, indicated above, exist also with respect to a legis- 
lative body; but in this case there is another important 
reason for the adoption of the corporate constitution. 



Marathon, the decision was carried in favour of fighting (as was 
stated in a previous note) only by the casting vote of the Pole- 
raarch Archon. 

Clive called a council of war before the battle of Plassy, which 
decided by a majority of thirteen to seven against fighting. Clive, 
however, disregarded the decision of the council, in which he had 
himself concurred, and commenced the action. On this occasion 
Orme remarks: " It is very rare that a council of war decides for 
battle; for as the commander never consults his officers in this 
authentic form but when great difficulties are to be surmounted, 
the general communication increases the sense of risk and danger, 
which every one brings with him to the consultation." — Hist, of 
Hind. vol. II. p. 171. See Thornton's Hist, of the Brit. Empire in 
India, vol. I. pp. 235, 281. 

* Quid fieri debeat tractato cum multis: quid vero facturus sis, 
cum paucissimis ac fidelissimis, vel potius ipse tecum. — Vegetius 
de Re Mil. III. c. 26, who includes this rule among the general 
maxims of war. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 203 

Unless a Dictator, voluntarily chosen by the people, is 
to be considered a popular form of government,* with- 
out a corporate action of the supreme legislature, a 
popular constitution cannot exist. Whatever advan- 
tages, therefore, belong to a popular or non- despotic 
form of government, whether aristocratic or democratic, 
they can only be obtained by vesting the supreme 
power in a body of persons. Without this arrangement, 
no government except a pure monarchy or despotism 
can exist. 

Supreme political bodies have, even in ancient times, 
generally delegated to single functionaries, or to small 
boards or tribunals, the chief part of their executive 
powers; so that the only part of their power which they 
exercise constantly is their legislative power. Now, in 
general, the necessity for immediate action does not 
exist with respect to the making of laws ; and therefore a 
legislative body possesses the advantages of consultation 
which arise from a number of counsellors, without the 
disadvantage of hindering prompt and decisive action, 
which springs from the same cause. It may be added, 
that a sovereign body generally delegates to subordinate 
officers the power of making subsidiary laws, the nearest 
to practice, in which delay is most inconvenient, and 
which require the most frequent alterations, f 



* See Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. III. p. 130. In the Greek 
republics, such a dictator was called an al<jv<xvriTriQ. cuper?) rvpavviQ. 
— Aristot. Pol. III. 9, 10; cf. IV. 8. 

t "La difference qu'il y a entre la monarchic et les deux autres 
formes de gouvernement, et qui rend la premiere beaucoup plus com- 
mode que les dernieres, c'est que, dans les democracies et dans les 
aristocracies, il faut qu'il y ait certains lieux regies, pour pouvoir 
deliberer et faire des ordonnances, c'est a dire, pour exercer actu- 
ellement Tautorite souveraine: au lieu que dans une monarchic, du 



204 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

§ 5. Now, whenever any deliberative political body, 
or collegium, exists, whether its functions be legislative, 
judicial, or administrative, there arises a necessity of 
determining the manner in which its decisions are to be 
formed; that is to say, whether the concurrence of all, 
or only of a portion, of the members, and if so, of what 
portion shall be required. 

§ 6. In the case of a court of justice, or an adminis- 
trative board, consisting of a small number of persons, it 
may be sometimes possible to render unanimity necessary 
to its decisions. 

Trial by jury, as organized in England and the United 
States, affords an example of an unanimous decision by 
a judicial body of twelve persons ; and a large part of 
the civil and criminal jurisdiction of these countries is 
founded on this antique institution. It gives rise in 
practice to many inconvenient results, such as unmeaning 
compromises, tossing up for verdicts, the necessity of 



moins lorsqu'elle est absolue, le souverain peut deliberer et dormer 
ses ordres en tout temps et en tout lieu, de sorte que, comme le 
disoit un ancien, ' Rome est partout ou se trouve l'Empereur.' 
En effet le peuple, et les senateurs, n'etant qu'un corps moral, ne 
peuvent agir sans s'assembler. Au lieu que le monarque est une 
seule personne physique et individuelle; et par consequent il a tou- 
jours un pouvoir prochain, d'exercer les actes de la souverain ete." 
— Puffendorf, Droit de la Nature et des Gens, VII. 5, § 9; trad, 
de Barbeyrac. 

If this argument held good, the superiority of a purely mo- 
narchical to a popular form of government would be unquestion- 
able. But the difficulty here indicated is, in limited monarchies 
and republics, obviated by a delegation of the executive power to 
single functionaries, the only power which requires to be exercised 
on a sudden. In general, no serious inconvenience arises from the 
necessity of convening an assembly for the exercise of the legisla- 
tive sovereignty. Even these rare exceptional cases are provided 
for in modern free constitutions. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 205 

urging the jury to a decision by debarring them from 
food while they are in consultation; but it has been 
found consistent with a regular, if not a very intelligent, 
administration of justice. In other countries, where 
trial by jury has been long practised or recently intro- 
duced, the rule of unanimity has not been followed, and 
the verdict of a simple majority, or some other proportion, 
of the jury has been received. According to the law of 
Scotland, the jury in criminal cases (except that of 
treason) consists of fifteen, and they decide by a simple 
majority. In Jersey and Guernsey the Eoyal Court, 
consisting of twelve jurats, also decides by a simple 
majority. In France, before the Kevolution of 1830, the 
jury, in criminal cases, consisting of twelve, decided in 
the same manner; but, by an alteration made in 1831, 
a majority of two-thirds, or of eight to four, was re- 
quired.* 

The difficulty of obtaining an unanimous decision, 
even from small judicial and administrative bodies, is 
indeed so great, that (however desirable it might be to 
require unanimity) the almost universal rule is, that 
their decision is made by a simple majority. The 
necessity of unanimity in a small body, judicial or ad- 
ministrative, does not, it may be observed, ensure a 
careful consideration, as the agreement may be the result 
of a blind reliance on the opinion of one or two of the 
members of the body, or it may be produced by a sense- 
less compromise. Lord Campbell, in his Lives of the 
Chancellors, says of Lord Eldon : " I have heard him 
cite with great glee, a saying of Lord Thurlow — that the 
decrees of the Scotch judges were least to be respected 
when they were unanimous, as in that case they probably, 



* Code d'Instr. Crim. Art. 347. 



206 APPLICABILITY OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

without thought, had followed the first of their number 
who had expressed an opinion; whereas, where they 
were divided, they might be expected to have paid some 
attention to the subject."* 

§ 7. In bodies belonging to, or composing, the supreme 
legislature, (such as the Ecclesia in the Greek Republics, 
the Roman Senate, the Houses of Parliament in England, 
the Chambers in France, Belgium, &c, the various legis- 
lative bodies of the United States,) it has been the 
constant practice for the decision to be determined by a 
mere majority. The same rule likewise obtains in sub- 
ordinate legislatures, as in colonial Houses of Assembly. 

In legislative assemblies, as in judicial and adminis- 
trative bodies, it would doubtless be desirable to obtain 
the concurrence of all the members to the decision. In 
many simple questions, and in which the feelings or 
interests of the members of the body are not involved, 
this unanimity is practicable, and often occurs. But in 
other questions, and those the most important, irrecon- 
cilable differences of opinion always prevail among the 
members of such an assembly, and unanimity of decision 
is therefore impossible. To require unanimity for the 
acts of such a body, would be to renew the evils of the 
Tribunitian power of Eome, or the Liberum Veto of the 
Polish Diet ; f it would place the assembly at the mercy 
of any perverse, factious, or corrupt person, who hap- 
pened to be one of its members — as he might, by his 
single voice, arrest its action and paralyse all its pro- 
ceedings. Entire unanimity, therefore, is plainly incon- 



* Vol. VII. p. 665. 

t Concerning the Liberum Veto, see Lord Brougham's Political 
Philosophy, vol. II. p. 81. The United Provinces, on questions of 
great importance, also admitted this mode of voting. See Barbey- 
rac's note on Puffendorf, VII. 2, § 15. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 207 

sistent with the habitual working of such a body; and 
so great are the difficulties of obtaining the concurrence 
of a large body of men, to a uniform plan of political 
management, or even to a complex legislative measure, 
amidst the distractions and disturbances caused by the 
alternations of popular feeling, that it has been found 
inexpedient to require the consent of more than a ma- 
jority in supreme legislative bodies, and the practice of 
deciding by a plurality of votes has met with universal 
acquiescence. 

It seems scarcely necessary to prove that, if the deci- 
sion is not to be unanimous — if the concurrence of all the 
members of the body is not required — it must be made 
by a majority, and not by a minority, however deter- 
mined. If a minority could prevail over the majority, 
those who were in favour of a proposition would vote 
against it, or would abstain from voting, in order to in- 
sure a minority to their side of the question. Besides, 
there would be no inducement to discuss a question, if, 
by converting a person to your opinion, you did not 
strengthen your side in the division when the votes 
came to be counted. It would be unprofitable to pursue 
this argument further, as it is obvious that the hypo- 
thesis of the minority of a political body prevailing, by 
their votes, over the majority, leads to all sorts of prac- 
tical absurdities. 

§ 8. Whenever the mode of deciding by a majority of 
votes obtains, whether it be a legislative assembly, a 
court of justice, or an administrative board, the opinion 
of the greater number of the members of the body, pro- 
perly ascertained and authenticated, acquires the legal 
effect and power of the opinion of the entire number. 

This majority is, in general, any number greater than 
half the entire number: for example, 51 out of 100 



208 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

votes. When the numbers on both sides are even, the 
president or chairman may have a casting vote,* or the 
question may be lost,f or (in the case of a judicial pro- 
ceeding) the accused party may be acquitted. J Some- 
times a majority of two-thirds, or some number greater 
than a bare excess over a moiety, may be required. § 



* A casting vote may mean either one of two things. It may 
mean that the president may give a second vote in case of 
equality; or, that he may only give his one vote, in cases where, 
without his vote, the numbers are equal. Concerning a casting 
vote, see Rutherforth, ib. § 3. 

t The rule of the House of Lords, in case of equality of votes, 
is — " Semper prassumitur pro negante." — May's Law of Parlia- 
ment, p. 215. 

J The rule that, where the votes were equal, the accused was 
acquitted, obtained both in the Athenian and Roman law. See 
^sch. Eum. 752-3; Eurip. El. 1268-9; Aristot. Problem. XXIX. 
13; Dig. 42, t. I. 1. 38. Numerous reasons for this humane regu- 
lation are assigned by Aristotle, ibid. Also, Senec. Epist. 81, 
§ 25. " Reus sententiis paribus absolvitor, et semper quicquid 
dubium est, humanitas inclinat in melius." Compare Grotius, ib. 
§ 18; Puffendorf, VII. 2, § 17; Rutherforth, ib. § 3. The Athenian 
legend supposed the last white ball, in the trial of Orestes by the 
court of Areopagus, to have been placed in the urn by Minerva, 
which vote rendered the numbers equal, and thus Orestes was 
acquitted. As this vote decided the question, the xpfjtyog 'Aflame, 
or calculus Minervse, came to mean a casting vote generally. See 
Dio Cassius, LI. 19. I cannot accede to the interpretation of 
Otfried Miiller, in his Dissertation on the Eumenides, § 73, who 
supposes that the votes of the Areopagites are equal, and that 
Minerva gives the thirteenth vote. According to this view, 
Orestes would have been already acquitted before she gave her vote, 
and the all-important calculus Minervas would have decided nothing. 
The rule of acquittal by equality of votes is evidently understood 
to be in existence at the trial of Orestes ; and the decisive or 
casting vote was called the vote of Minerva by the Athenians, on 
account of her supposed decision on this celebrated occasion. 

§ Grotius, ib. § 20. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 209 

This has been the rule of voting in some confederations 
of States,* where, on account of the imperfect fusion of 
the members, the minority is unwilling to be bound by 
the act of the mere majority. According to the canon 
law, the pope is elected by the votes of two-thirds of the 
cardinals. f A similar majority was required, in certain 
cases, for the votes of the Athenian judges, and is some- 
times rendered necessary by our law in the voting of 
municipal bodies. In the constitution of the United 
States, this rule of voting occurs several times. Thus, 
a member of either house of congress may be expelled by 
the votes of two- thirds of the members; a bill which 
has been rejected by the president becomes a law, if it is 
passed, on re-consideration, by two-thirds of each house ; 
the president can make treaties with the consent of two- 
thirds of the senators present ; when two-thirds of both 
houses concur, a convention for making amendments in 
the constitution may be called, and these amendments 
may be made by three-fourths of the States. 

In reckoning the majority, the body may be considered 
as consisting of its entire number of members, as the 
English grand jury, which is properly composed of twenty- 
three members, and, therefore, a verdict of less than twelve 
cannot be received. Or it may be considered as consisting 
only of the members voting on the particular question. 
The latter is the ordinary rule ; but, in this case, a mini- 
mum number, or quorum, whose presence is necessary, is 
established. J Thus it may be laid down that, in the case 
of a division, one-half, or some other proportion of the 



* For example, the German and Swiss. 
f Walter's Kirchenrecht, § 228. 

t As to the reasons for establishing a quorum, se^e Story's 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the U. S. vol. II. §§ 832-3. 

P 



210 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

entire body, must be present and voting. According to 
the Eoman law, the act of a majority of a collegium was 
only valid when two-thirds of the entire body were 
present.* In the English House of Commons, there must 
be at least forty members voting in a division. 

Moreover, the votes of the members actually present 
at the meeting of the body may alone be received, or 
absent members may be allowed to signify their vote in 
writing, or to vote by proxy, as in the House of Lords.f 

§ 9. Decision by a majority places all the members of 
the body upon the same footing, and gives an equal value 
to the opinion of each. It makes no distinction between 
them as to competency, but allows the same weight to 
the vote of the persons most able, and of those least 
able to form a correct judgment upon the question to 
be decided. It therefore proceeds upon a principle 
directly opposed to the principle adopted voluntarily by 
those who are not restrained by legal rules — -in guiding 
their practical conduct by the opinions of others, they 
look not to numbers, but to special fitness. J 



* Dig. III. 4, § 3; Cod. X. 32, § 46. According to the common 
law of England, the act of the major part of a corporation is 
esteemed the act of the whole, 1 Blackst. Com. p. 478 ; and by 
33 Hen. VIII. c. 27, the act of the " more part" of every college 
or other corporation is valid, notwithstanding that the local sta- 
tutes may have given power to a single member to prevent such 
act. 

t Concerning the votes of absent members, see Grotius, ib. 
§ 20; Rutherforth, ib. § 5. 

% Anacharsis is reported to have expressed his wonder that, in 
the legislative assemblies of the Greeks, the wise spoke and the 
ignorant decided. — Plutarch, Solon, c. 5. 

Referring to a decision of the Roman senate, of which he did 
not approve, Pliny the Younger says : " Sed hoc pluribus visum 
est. Numerantur enim sententiae, non ponderantur : nee aliud in 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 211 

The necessity, however, of having recourse to this 
principle arises from the nature of political government, 
and the expediency of a coercive supreme power which 
it implies. Whenever the ultimate decision is vested in 
a body, there is, by the supposition, no ulterior authority 
which can, in case of difference of opinion, determine 
who are competent judges and who are not. There is, 
therefore, no other alternative than to count the numbers, 
and to abide by the opinion of the majority. The con- 
trivance may be rude, but it is the least bad which can 
be devised.* 

A decision by the majority of a political body is, in 
some respects, analogous to a battle between the armies 
of two independent nations. It settles a question which 
must be settled, and which cannot be settled in any other 
manner. The one is an appeal to physical force — the 
other is an appeal to moral force ; it is the right of the 



publico consilio potest fieri: in quo nihil est tarn inaequale quam 
aequalitas ipsa. Nam quum sit impar prudentia, par omnium jus 
esC—Epist. II. 12. 

Cicero lays it down, not with reference to votes, that citizens 
must be weighed, and not counted. " In dissensione civili, quum 
boni plus quam multi valent, expendendos cives, non numerandos 
puto." — De Rep. VI. 4. There is no reason for limiting this re- 
mark to times of civil war. 

Bodinus is of opinion, that the principle of decision by a majo- 
rity is incurably defective. Arguing against the probability that 
the voices of the better citizens will predominate, either in an 
aristocracy or a democracy, he says : " Utrumque imperio inutile 
est, propterea quod in omni coetu ac universitate, seu optimatum, 
seu populi totius, suffragia non ad pondus exiguntur, sed ad nu- 
merum; ac optimorum bona pars semper a deteriore superatur: 
quo fit ut optimorum paucitas in magna multitudine, perinde ut 
salis scriptulus in lacu, nullam vim exserere possit." — De Rep. 
VI. 4, (p. 1103.) 

* See Note E at the end of the chapter. 

p2 



212 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

stronger reduced to a legal expression. This view is 
implied in the verses of Prudentius, quoted by Grotius : 

Infirma minoris 
Vox cedat numeri, parvaque in parte silescat. 

Contra Symmach. I. 606-7. 

Nobody, however, supposes that such a decision does 
more than determine the legal question; nobody ima- 
gines that it concludes the moral question of what ought 
to have been the decision, more than a battle decides the 
question as to the righteousness of the cause of the vic- 
torious army :* it hardly raises a presumption in favour 
of the winning side. No historian, in discussing the 
justice or propriety of any decision of a legislative body, 
or of a court of justice, thinks of defending the decision 
of the majority by saying that it was the decision of the 
majority. 

Hence, too, in the management of a popular assembly, 
there is a tactic which is beyond the mere argumentative 
defence or attack of a legislative measure, or course of 
policy. There is a skill analogous to that of the mili- 
tary commander; and there is a triumph in success, 
which is not always dependent on the mere goodness of 
the cause. The same remark applies, though in a minor 



* " Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil," (Exod. 
xxiii. 2,) is an ancient maxim, which has never been disputed, 
however often it has been violated. 

li II faut fair e comme les autres : maxime suspecte, qui signifie 
presque toujours, it faut mal faire, des qu'on l'etend au-dela de 
ces choses purement exterieures qui n'ont point de suite, qui 
dependent de l'usage, de la mode, ou des bienseances." — La 
Bruyere, Caracteres, ch. 12. The verse of Juvenal, (II. 46) — 

"Defendit numerus, junctaeque umbone phalanges" — 

is the expression of the fact, not its justification. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 213 

degree, to the arguments of advocates addressed to a 
judicial tribunal deciding by plurality of votes. 

A supreme political authority might, after having 
referred a question to several persons, be guided by the 
opinion of the most competent judges among them, dis- 
regarding the preponderance of numbers. In like man- 
ner, a court of appeal would naturally be influenced in 
its decision by the character of the judges in the inferior 
court, and not merely by their number, in case those 
judges were divided in opinion. But this discrimination 
is only possible, because these are subordinate and not 
supreme bodies.* 

§ 10. The necessity of decision by a majority in a poli- 
tical body,f whether its power be legislative, judicial, or 
administrative, is a defect inherent in the nature of corpo- 
rate action. There is, indeed, no infallible security for 
the right decision of practical questions in politics, as in 



* It has been remarked, above, that the Pope is elected by two- 
thirds of the conclave of cardinals. The canon law, however, 
adds that this rule does not apply to other churches, where the 
opinion, not only of the majority, but of those whose judgment is 
the soundest, is to prevail. Puffendorf, Law ofN. and N. VII. 2, 
§16, properly remarks, that this rule is only possible in cases 
where there is a superior to decide who are the persons having 
the soundest judgment. Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 226, states that 
it is no longer observed, as it would lead to interminable dis- 
cussions. 

t The remarks in the text are limited to political bodies; but 
they apply equally to councils, synods, and other ecclesiastical bodies 
having the ultimate decision of questions of religious doctrine. 
Whatever claim they might make to a supernatural guidance, their 
decision has, in fact, been determined by the numerical majority 
of votes. See, on this subject, the dictum of Selden, in his Table- 
talk, Art. Council. They apply likewise to voluntary societies — 
of a private nature — exercising for themselves the power of 
decision. 



214 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

other matters. Unfortunately the judgment of the 
wisest counsellors is very far from infallible.* But the 
decision of competent judges is less likely to be erroneous 
than that of incompetent ones ; and if any means of dis- 
criminating between them could exist, it would un- 
doubtedly be desirable that the decision should be con- 
fined to those who are most able to form a sound opinion. 

§ 11. There are, however, several circumstances, both 
in legislative and executive bodies, which, in spite of 
the principle just mentioned, tend to guide the body to 
a right decision, and to give a considerable degree of 
weight to the opinions of the more competent judges. 

First, in courts of justice, consisting of several judges, 
and in administrative bodies, joint consultation neces- 
sarily exists ; by which means the opinions of the ablest, 
the most experienced, and best informed members, 
will naturally be brought before the entire body, and 
will in general produce their effect in gaining the 
assent of the other members. In any tolerably nume- 
rous executive body, however composed, the persons of 
sound practical judgment, combined with the appro- 
priate knowledge and experience, may be always ex- 
pected to be in a minority ; but their opinion is likely to 
be voluntarily adopted by the majority. Moreover, the 
members of a judicial or administrative body generally 
divide the business among one another, according to 
their respective qualifications; so that each person is 



* " Quanto sieno false molte volte le opinioni de li uomini, l'hanno 
visto e veggono coloro che si trovano testimoni delle loro delibe- 
razioni, le quali molte volte se non sono deliberate da uomini ec- 
cellenti, sono contrarie ad ogni verita." — Mach. Disc. II. 22. 
Bayle, (Euvres, t. III. p. 205, also has a passage on the erroneous 
decisions of popular assemblies, and remarks that the liability to 
err is not confined to those of antiquity. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 215 

principally occupied about those questions with which he 
is most conversant.* 

Secondly : wherever the members of courts of justice 
and administrative bodies are selected by the govern- 
ment, in a civilized State, the selection is made under 
circumstances which insure a considerable degree of fit- 
ness on the part of the person appointed. The choice, 
even in the European countries under a despotic govern- 
ment, is influenced by a sense of responsibility to public 
opinion, and often by a sincere desire to appoint a fit 
person, even if it is merely for the sake of facilitating 
the operations of the governing power. In many cases, 
too, the choice of the government is practically limited to 
persons having the requisite professional qualifications — 
as in the appointment of members of military or naval 
boards, or of courts of justice. Although the person ap- 
pointed may not be absolutely the best whom the pro- 
fession might have supplied, yet he has the special 
qualifications suited to the office. Consequently, in an 
executive body, the number of persons qualified to form 
a correct opinion upon the questions submitted to it may 
be expected to be a large proportion of the whole — the 
quantity of dross, as compared with that of the purer 
metal, is likely to be small. 

§ 12. In a supreme legislative body, the decisions are 
always preceded by joint consultation and debate ; and 
therefore (as in executive bodies) the opinions of the 
ablest and wisest members, particularly if they possess 
the gift of eloquence, or even of perspicuous and forcible 
statement, are likely to influence the rest of the assembly. 



* This is analogous to the reference, in a legislative assembly, 
of certain questions to select committees ; of which more will be 
said lower down. 



216 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

Hence, although each question is decided by the votes of 
the majority, the votes of the majority are generally 
determined by the opinions of the minority. # 

The manner in which the opinions of the majority of 
a numerous legislative assembly are influenced by the 
opinions of the minority, depends upon its constitution 
and character. In the assemblies of the ancient re- 
publics, which consisted of the entire body of citizens, 
the attendance was uncertain and infrequent, the numbers 
were large, and no system of political party could be 
organized amongst the persons who met for the occasion. 
In Athens, and the Greek democracies generally, the 
popular assembly was for the most part guided by some 
powerful leader and orator, whose influence was some- 
times beneficial and sometimes mischievous, but who 
swayed the judgment of the people by his counsels, and 
gave a practical effect to the principle of authority. At 
Eome, the great party leaders — by their military suc- 
cesses, their enormous wealth, and consequent means of 
acquiring popularity — were able to enlist numerous ad- 
herents to their cause, and to determine the elections of 
magistrates and the vote of the popular assembly, but their 



* Laplace, Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilites, p. 158, ed. 5, 
admits that the probability of the decisions of an assembly can- 
not be subjected to calculation; but he lays it down, as a general 
maxim, that if the question is of such a nature that it is more 
than an even chance that each member of the assembly will form an 
erroneous opinion upon it, then the decision of the assembly will 
probably be wrong. Hence, he concludes that numerous assemblies 
ought to decide only upon questions which are within the compre- 
hension of the multitude. This reasoning entirely overlooks the 
fact, that members of an assembly who do not understand a subject 
may place themselves under the guidance of persons on whose 
judgment they may safely rely. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 217 

following was purely personal — the attachment was to 
Sylla, or Marius, or Caesar, or Pompey, and not to any 
public cause; and the system was essentially unlike the 
party organization of modern States.* The same was also 
the case, to a great extent, with the parties in the Italian 
republics. Although the Guelfs and Ghibellines, the 
Bianchi and Neri, &c, professed to have a principle, in 
a short time they had only a name; and the party divi- 
sions were mere struggles for political power under rival 
leaders. 

In the legislative assemblies of modern States, the 
system of political party is organized in such a manner, 
as to afford a more effectual assistance to the disposition 
of the majority, to defer to the opinions of the most 
competent judges within its own circle. Unlike the 
numerous and fluctuating assemblies of citizens in the 
ancient republics, a representative assembly consists of 
a limited and comparatively small number of persons — 
whose attendance is more or less regular, and who thus 
acquire a sort of professional acquaintance with the 
business and forms of legislation. They are thus able 
to form themselves into parties and knots of members, 
who are in the habit of consulting and acting together ; 
they likewise become aware of each other's characters and 
capacities ; and they are able to estimate fairly the weight 
due to the opinion of each upon the subject to which 
it relates. The person whom each party select as their 
leader guides their proceedings by his advice, appears 
as their organ in the public deliberations, and generally 



* Speaking of the popular assemblies of the Romans, Cicero 
says : " Concio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen judicare solet 
quid intersit inter popularem, id est, assentatorem et levem civem, 
et inter constantem, severum, et gravem." — De Amic. c. 25. 



218 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

determines their vote by his opinion. If the leaders of 
the several sections and parties in the assembly are well 
selected, the inconveniences arising from the naked ope- 
ration of the numerical principle of decision are power- 
fully counteracted. 

The system of parties in a legislative body leads to 
preliminary and separate discussions among its members, 
out of the chamber, upon the questions to be discussed 
within it, and to a prior settlement of the course which 
each party is to take. This renders the assembled body 
less accessible to the influence of speeches delivered in its 
debates, and prevents it from being carried away by the 
sudden and vehement impulse of an impassioned appeal 
to its feelings. A greater ascendancy is thus secured to 
calm and prudent counsels than in the ancient republics 
— where the citizens generally came together without 
any fixed opinion, and were convinced by the speech of 
the most eloquent demagogue. 

To a great extent, however, the proceedings of every 
legislative assembly are influenced (particularly after the 
debate) by the public discussions of its members; and, 
in proportion as the ablest, the wisest, and the most 
competent to guide its counsels, take a prominent part 
in its deliberations, the greater is the probability of its 
decisions being correct, and its policy consistent and 
steady. It may be observed that the effect of delibe- 
rations, in inducing the bulk of the assembly to adopt 
the opinions of its ablest and wisest members, is mate- 
rially assisted by the publication of the debates, through 
reports in the daily newspapers. The arguments ad- 
vanced on both sides of a question can thus be sifted 
and compared at leisure by the public, out of doors ; the 
chances of justice being done to a really sound and well- 
supported argument are increased ; the nature of factious 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 219 

and dishonest votes is more generally understood, and 
the conduct of those who resist good advice is better 
appreciated. Unquestionably, the success of a repre- 
sentative system of government has been materially 
facilitated by the invention of printing. 

Another check upon the majority of a deliberative 
assembly is derived from the forms of its proceedings. 
These forms are generally so arranged, as to secure to 
the minority the power of stating their objections both 
to the principle and details of every measure proposed 
for adoption by the assembly, and of retarding its 
progress by adverse criticism, and the moving of 
amendments. The forms of the English House of 
Commons are avowedly contrived for the protection of 
minorities; and they are so effectual for their purpose, 
as frequently to defeat the will of the great body of the 
House, and to enable a few members to resist, at least 
for a time, a measure desired by the majority. 

The precise nature of the regulations for conducting 
the business of a deliberative assembly is not here in 
question ; but it is important to observe, that the securing 
of due weight to the opinions of the minority, and a 
limitation of the immediate action of the majority, 
listening to no compromise, and proceeding straight to 
its end — is admitted to be a legitimate object of the 
forms of such a body. Even the permission sometimes 
given to members of a minority to enter protests, in an 
authentic form, against the decisions of the majority is, 
to some extent, a security against improper or hasty 
decisions. In general, however, (as we shall see pre- 
sently,) it is desirable that, when the decision has once 
been made, no steps should be taken for weakening its 
effect, and that it be considered as the decision of the 
whole, and not merely of a part of the body. 



220 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

Another contrivance in the proceedings of a legislative 
assembly, for obviating the evils of decision by an unin- 
formed majority, and securing due weight to the opinion 
of a few competent judges, is the reference of subjects 
to the deliberation and examination of select committees 
of its members. The members of the body selected for 
acting on such committees are naturally those who are 
best qualified, by their experience, knowledge, and mental 
capacity, to form a right judgment on the matter. The 
opinion of such a committee, although consisting only of 
a small fraction of the entire body, generally carries 
weight with the majority, in proportion as the credit 
of its members stands high for good sense and intelli- 
gence, and for peculiar qualifications in the given case; 
and also according as they have investigated the subject 
with diligence and impartiality. 

A further support to the minority of a legislative body 
is afforded by the institution of a double chamber, or 
what some writers have termed bicamerism* When- 
ever the majorities of both chambers are agreed on any 
question, this effect is not produced ; but if they happen 
to differ, the majority of one chamber may support the 
minority in the other. If this state of things was per- 
manent, or even frequent, the legislative power would be 
paralysed, the constitution would not work, and a revo- 
lutionary struggle would be the consequence ; but if the 
differences between the two houses are not serious or 
frequent, and (when they occur) are terminated by 
amicable compromises, some protection to a minority in 
one of the houses may for a time be afforded. 

From these considerations it results that, although 



* See this subject fully discussed in Story's Commentaries on the 
Const, of the U. S. b. III. c. 8. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 221 

the decision by a majority, both in executive and legis- 
lative bodies, is opposed to the principle which we gene- 
rally follow for obtaining rectitude of judgment, where 
our course is free, and unfettered by legal rules, never- 
theless it is necessary for securing the advantages of 
corporate action ; and that the evils flowing from the 
plan of counting votes, without reference to their in- 
trinsic value, are counteracted and neutralized to a great 
extent, not only by the forms of business contrived for 
the purpose of controlling the direct and simple action 
of the numerical principle, but also by the spontaneous 
homage of the individual members of the body to the 
principle of authority. 

§ 13. In all cases where the act of the majority of any 
political body is valid, it is highly desirable that the de- 
cision, when come to, should be considered as the act of 
the entire body ; that the comparative numbers of the 
majority and minority should not be adverted to as a 
ground for impugning the decision ; and that the law or 
other act should be obeyed without any question of its 
validity, on the ground of the smallness of the majority 
by which it may have been carried. Decision by a 
majority is a mode of cutting a knot which cannot be 
untied ; it is, therefore, on every account expedient that 
the knot should be cut effectually. 

For a similar reason, it is fitting that any section of 
a deliberative body, who may be unable to induce the 
majority to adopt their propositions, should acquiesce in 
its decisions, and should continue to attend its meetings, 
without seceding, on the ground that their advice is dis- 
regarded. In every popular assembly there is a minority 
which is unable to carry its views ; and if such mino- 
rities were to be discouraged by the rejection of their 
motions, and to withdraw from their duties, the ultimate 



222 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

success of their opinions could never take place, at least, 
not in consequence of their exertions. Unless a de- 
feated minority is willing to act upon this principle, the 
unity of the body is weakened and impaired, and a dis- 
ruption is produced, similar to that which took place in 
the Roman State when the Plebs separated themselves 
from the rest of the citizens, and seceded to the Mons 
Sacer.* 

§ 14. It is likewise fitting that the members of a ma- 
jority should bear in mind, that their assent to the pro- 
positions of the leaders of the assembly is voluntary; 
that the advice which is tendered to them by members 
of their body is merely advice, which they can reject or 



* At the congress of the Achaean League, in 198 B.C., when the 
proposal of an alliance with the Romans was made, no one would 
speak. Aristasnus the praetor, after urging them to deliver their 
opinions, concludes his exhortation thus : " Ubi semel decretum 
erit, omnibus id, etiam quibus ante displicuerit, pro bono atque 
utili fcederedefendendum." — Livy, XXXII. 20. Compare Thirlwall, 
Hist. ofGr. vol. VIII. p. 301. In Polyb. V. 49, and Dion. Hal. A. 
R. XI. 56, there is likewise the expression of the same principle. 
Pliny states that, in the proceeding on a complaint of the Bithynians 
against Varenus, their pro-consul, a question was decided in favour 
of Varenus by the senate, and was afterwards, on an appeal to the 
emperor, remitted by him to the senate for their re-consideration. 
When the point was discussed on this re-hearing, most of the mem- 
bers who had voted against Varenus on the former occasion now 
voted for him; alleging that they were bound by the act of the 
majority: — " Singulos enim, integra re, dissentire fas esse; peracta, 
quod pluribus placuisset, cunctis tuendum." — Epist. VI. 13. Mr. 
Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. IV. p. 478, remarks upon " the admirable 
conduct of the five dissentient generals [at Marathon], when out- 
voted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating 
heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated." 
Story, Comm, on the Const, of the U. S. § 833, also speaks of the 
" baneful practice of secession." 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 223 

adopt, as they think fit; and that, when any measure 
has been sanctioned by the deliberate vote of the as- 
sembly, it becomes the act of the entire body, whoever 
may have been its author and proposer. Unless this prin- 
ciple is kept in view, there is a tendency, when any 
measure has proved unsuccessful, (either from its own 
defects, or from untoward circumstances, or from the 
unskilfulness or neglect of the persons charged with its 
execution,) to throw the blame upon its originator, and 
to forget that it was deliberately approved and accepted 
by the entire body.* 

§ 15. It has been remarked above, that with respect 
to the members of an Executive body, the mode of their 
selection offers a considerable security for their special 
fitness, and, consequently, for rectitude of decision by the 
majority. In cases, however, where the members of a 
supreme assembly are determined by the choice of a 
popular constituency, the chances against a selection of 
fit persons are more numerous. 

The principle of decision by a majority is requisite, as 
well for the choice of a representative by a constituent 



* Xenophon, Rep. Ath. II. § 17, complains that, if any evil con- 
sequence results from a measure agreed to by the people, they 
attribute it to the authors and advisers of the measure, who, they 
allege, persuaded them to it, contrary to their interest. Ma- 
chiavel also remarks upon the tendency of the people to visit 
the failures caused by its own rash and foolish counsels upon the 
heads of its instruments, Disc. I. 53. He points out, in another 
place, the-disposition of men to judge merely by the result, and the 
consequent danger of advising either a prince or a people; for if 
the advice turns out ill, the blame is imputed to the counsellor, even 
by those who voluntarily adopted it, having the power of rejection. 
Hence, he recommends every counsellor to give his advice with 
moderation and calmness, so that the people or prince who adopts 
it may seem to adopt it voluntarily, and not in consequence of the 
importunity of the adviser. — III. 35. 



224 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

body, as for the acts of an executive board or a legislative 
assembly. The same reasons apply in this case as in the 
case of smaller bodies, only with more force. Unanimity, 
in a body which may consist of several thousand persons, 
is plainly impossible; decision by a majority is there- 
fore necessary. But many of the securities for guiding 
the majority to a sound judgment, which exist in a 
legislative assembly, are here wanting; joint delibera- 
tion is nearly impossible, and the vote of each elector is 
frequently determined by accidental considerations, af- 
fecting his individual position. The decision is accord- 
ingly formed by an imperfect process.* 



* Cicero describes in strong terms the inconstancy of the people 
in the choice of magistrates, and the uncertainty of the event of an 
election in the comitia : " Non enim comitiis judicat semper popu- 
lus, sed movetur plerumque gratia : cedit precibus : facit eos a 
quibus est maxime ambitus. Denique, si judicat, non delectu 
aliquo aut sapientia ducitur ad judicandum, sed impetu nonnun- 
quam, et quadam etiam temeritate. Non est enim consilium in 
vulgo, non ratio, non discrimen, non diligentia: semperque sapientes 
ea, quae populus fecisset, ferenda, non semper laudanda duxerunt." 
— Pro Plancio, c. 4. 

Again, in the oration Pro 3Iurend, c. 17, he dwells on the 
uncertain event of the popular choice : " Quod enim fretum, quern 
euripum tot motus, tantas, tarn varias habere putatis agitationes 
fluctuum ; quantas perturbationes et quantos sestus habet ratio 
comitiorum? Dies intermissus unus, aut nox interposita, saepe per- 
turbat omnia; et totam opinionem parva nonnunquam commutat 
aura rumoris. Ssepe etiam sine ulla aperta causa fit aliud atque 
existimamus, ut nonnunquam ita factum esse etiam populus admi- 
retur: quasi vero non ipse fecerit. Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil 
obscurius voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius ratione tota comitio- 
rum." Compare also Seneca, de Vit. Beat. c. 1, cited above; c 6, 
§ 3. " Non ego ventosce plebis suffragia venor," says Horace, Ep. 
I. 19, 37, who, in his first ode, speaks of the mobiles Quirites. Our 
word mob was abbreviated from the Latin, mobile vulgns, in the 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 225 

The choice of a candidate by the majority of a popular 
constituency is thus subject to the same remark as the 
decision of a question by the majority of a popular 
assembly. It solves the practical problem, but leaves 
the question as to the real comparative merits of the 
candidates undecided. This imperfection is, however, 
inseparable from popular election, and it is counter- 
balanced by the advantages which result from the repre- 
sentation of apparent interests, and from the deference 
to the numerical principle in government. Moreover, 
in a popular constituency, the majority is practically 
influenced by the opinions and wishes of a minority, 
although this influence operates in a different manner 
from that in which a legislative assembly is acted upon. 

There is, again, another serious difficulty in the way 
of an enlightened choice of representatives by a popular 
constituency, a difficulty, it may be observed, which 
extends to every mode of selection, and equally besets 
the choice of members of a house of peers by the Crown. 

The subjects which may be submitted to the decision 
of a supreme legislative assembly are unlimited, not only 



reign of Charles the Second, as we learn from North's Examen. 
The expression seems to have been borrowed from the verse of 
Claudian : u Mobile mutatur semper cum principe vulgus," De IY. 
Cons. Honor. 302, which certainly is a singular origin for a saying 
upon popular instability. 

For a curious illustration of the arts practised in canvassing a 
numerous constituency in ancient times, see the monitory tract 
De Petitione Consulatus, addressed by Q. Cicero to his brother, 
when about to come forward as a candidate for the consulship. On 
the election of magistrates by the senate under the empire, see Pliny, 
Epist. III. 20. 

Mr. Macaulay says that the common people are constant to their 
favorites, but almost always choose them ill. — Hist, of Engl. 
vol. I. p. 631. 

Q 



226 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

in number, but also in hind. It has not, like an ad- 
ministrative board, a special department, bnt it exercises 
a general control over all the branches of the adminis- 
tration, and it superintends every function of the govern- 
ment. It is called on to decide questions involving 
relations with foreign states and dependencies, the 
management of the army and navy, the defences of the 
country, its trade, agriculture, and manufactures, its 
finances and currency, its religious and ecclesiastical 
concerns, the civil and criminal law, and the judicial 
procedure, the state of public health, the internal com- 
munications, and, in short, all the other interests of life. 
There is no department of knowledge which may not be 
put in requisition for guiding the decision of a legislative 
body. Consequently, no special or professional training 
to fit a person to be a member of such an assembly is 
practicable; and the choice of the popular constituency 
is not directed to any definite class or section of persons, 
or guided by any obvious and easily recognisable quali- 
fications, such as those of a physician, a soldier, or an 
architect, in their respective lines.* 

The possession of such varied and extensive know- 
ledge and experience as would render a person com- 
petent to judge for himself upon all the questions which 
may be submitted to a legislative assembly being impos- 
sible, the next best qualification is, general soundness of 
judgment and perspicacity of understanding. These 
will render a person least likely to err in the midst of 
the heterogeneous multitude of practical questions, to 
the decision of which he may have to contribute. But 
the qualities just described are often not easily discerned, 
and, moreover, do not obtrude themselves upon the 



* This subject is pursued further in ch. 8, § 2, 



YII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 227 

public attention. Qualities of a more conspicuous and 
attractive character, particularly if accompanied with 
activity and energy, are likely to arrest the attention 
and obtain the favour of a popular constituency. Mere 
facility of elocution or impressiveness of manner is like- 
wise often mistaken for wisdom in counsel.* A large 
aggregate of persons, acting together casually, and not 
forming a deliberative body, may likewise be captivated 
by earnest and often repeated, though insincere, profes- 
sions of a regard for the public welfare, or their own 
peculiar interests. f 

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the choice of fit 
representatives is, in itself, easier and less subject to 
error than the decision upon a long series of public mea- 
sures ; and it must be admitted that a popular consti- 
tuency is better qualified to discharge the former than 
the latter duty with success. J Besides, there are certain 



* Plato calls eloquence (paivofjiivr} crotyla. 

t Bodinus, in his treatise De Republica, maintains that the best 
and wisest men can never be chosen as rulers in any common- 
wealth. " Quod si populum (he says) ad haec ipsa virtutis suffragia 
cieri placeat, sui dissimiles, id est optimos, nonseliget; sed quam 
maxime similes, id est, stultos, improbos, impudentes, cum boni ac 
sapientes viri, si modo sunt aliqui, minimum efficiant ubique civium 
numerum. Quid autem turpius, quam sapientium decus ad digni- 
tatem pendere ab insipientium judicio dicam, an temeritate? Demus 
tamen esse bonos aliquot ac sapientes in civitate viros, conspectum 
certe fugient improborum ac desipientis multitudinis, nee si ad 
comitia venient, seipsos sapientes judicabunt." — II. 6, (p. 340.) 
The experience of representative governments does not confirm 
these views. 

X " Le peuple est admirable pour choisir ceux a, qui il doit con- 
fier quelque partie de son autorite. II n'a a se determiner que par 
les choses qu'il ne peut ignorer, et des faits qui tombent sous les 
sens. . . Comme la plupart des citoyens, qui ont assez de suffisance 
pour elire, n'en ont pas assez pour etre elus; de meme le peuple, 

Q2 



228 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

circumstances which tend to guide the choice of con- 
stituencies in the election of their representatives, and 
to induce them to give a preference to fit over unfit can- 
didates. 

In the first place, no person who has not received a 
fair education can, in the ordinary state of things, 
present himself as a candidate for the representation of 
a large popular body. The necessity of addressing the 
people, and of expounding his opinions orally, excludes 
any person who is unable, from defect of education or 
intelligence, to make such a statement as is suited to a 
tolerably critical audience. In the next place, the 
members of a legislative assembly, particularly of the 
more important ones, must make such sacrifices of time 
and money, as are scarcely compatible with the means 
of those who do not belong to the educated classes of 
society. Besides which, there is a disposition prevalent 
throughout a constituency, to select as their representa- 
tives persons who, from their social station, are distin- 
guished from the mass, and are, on that account, better 
known and more conspicuous than persons of a humbler 
position in society.* 



qui a assez de capacite pour se faire rendre compte de la gestion 
des autres, n'est pas propre a gerer par lui-meme." — Montesquieu, 
Esprit des Lois, 1. II. ch. 2. The broad distinction is correctly 
taken in this passage; but the facility of a choice of fit persons for 
a public trust is stated too strongly. See also a similar passage in 
1. XI. ch. 6: " II y avait un grand vice, &c," where the superiority 
of the representative principle over the direct voting in the ancient 
republics is pointed out. 

* " There is an unconquerable, and to a certain extent (in the 
present state of society at least) a beneficial proneness in man, to 
rely on the judgment and authority of those who are elevated above 
himself in rank and riches. From the irresistible associations of 
the human mind, a feeling of respect and deference is entertained 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 229 

These safeguards for the discreet exercise of the power 
of selection by a popular constituency, may be expected 
to produce an assembly containing an amount of intelli- 
gence and wisdom beyond the average of the educated 
classes, in the country over which it presides. Besides, 
the variety of experience and information, which no one 
person can possess, is in some degree supplied by the 
presence in the assembly of members belonging to dif- 
ferent professions and pursuits, and familiar with dif- 
ferent branches of knowledge. In this manner, atten- 
tion to each separate subject is insured, and some imme- 
diate professional advice. But it is to be borne in mind, 
that there is no security that the professional persons 
who become members of the assembly will be the most 
eminent in their respective professions ; and, after all, it 
will probably be necessary to consult professional men 
not members of the assembly. It may, moreover, happen, 
that a professional man of unsound judgment in an 
assembly, (particularly if he has a power of persuasive 
address,) may lead it to an erroneous decision, by in- 



for a superior in station, which enhances and exalts all his good 
qualities, gives more grace to his movements, more force to his 
expressions, more beauty to his thoughts, more wisdom to his 
opinions, more weight to his judgment, more excellence to his 
virtues Hence the elevated men of society will always main- 
tain an ascendancy, which, without any direct exertion of influence, 
will affect the result of popular elections ; and when to this are 
added, the capabilities which they possess, or ought to possess, from 
their superior intelligence, of impressing their own opinions on 
other classes, it will be seen that, if any sort of despotic control 
were justifiable, it would be superfluous for any good purpose." — 
Ba yley's Rationale of Represent. Government, p. 269-70. It should 
not, however, be overlooked, that the feeling of deference to supe- 
rior social rank (described in the above extract) is liable to be 
counteracted by a variety of political influences. 



230 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

during it to reject the advice of more competent judges, 
who, not being members of the assembly, cannot attend 
it in order to support their own views. 

§ 16. The objections to decision by a mere numerical 
majority, without reference to the competency or qualifi- 
cations of the voter, have naturally presented themselves 
to politicians, both speculative and practical; and various 
contrivances have been devised to modify and mitigate 
its operation, retaining, however, the corporate principle. 

One of these is the method of voting by composite 
units* Thus, when the Eoman people were in Comitia 
Tributa, the votes of each tribe, which consisted of 
several thousand citizens, were taken separately, and 
the decision of the tribe was thus formed. The votes of 
the several tribes, considered as units, were then taken, 
and the ultimate decision depended on the majority of 
the tribes. Now, if some of the tribes were considerably 
smaller than others, and if the members of a particular 
order or section of the people were predominant in the 
small tribes, they would have a greater legal influence 
on the decision than the citizens included in the larger 
tribes. The influence of the Italians, when admitted to 
Eoman citizenship by the Julian law, was at first 
neutralized by this contrivance. 

In the constitution of Servius, a similar result had 
been produced by the distribution of the people into 
centuries : the centuries of the rich contained fewer per- 
sons than the centuries of the poor ; but the vote of each 
century (determined by a majority within its own body) 
reckoned as one. By this contrivance it was provided, 
(according to Cicero's expression), " Ne plurimum 



* On this mode of voting, see Bodinus, De Rep. II. 7, p. 360. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 231 

valeant plurimi."* The absolute numerical majority of 
the people did not prevail in counting the votes. 

A system of voting, founded upon the same principle, 
was adopted in some of the councils of the church. 
Inasmuch as the bishops from distant provinces did not 
attend a council in so large a number as those who came 
from the neighbouring provinces, a rule was established 
that the vote should be taken by nations — that is to 
say, the bishops of each nation first decided the vote of 
the nation by a majority of voices ; and then the general 
decision was made by a majority of nations. This 
mode of voting was observed at the councils of Constance 
and Basle.f 

The votes of independent nations in a federal council 
have generally been regulated in the same manner. 
Each nation has been taken as a unit, and has exercised 
one vote, whatever might be its power and importance 
as compared with others. In the Amphictyonic League, 
for example, the confederate States were all on an 
equality, so that Sparta and Athens had not more votes 
than the smallest town which was a member of the 
league. J 

In the American confederation of 1781, each State 
was to be represented in Congress by not less than two 
nor more than seven members, but to have only one 
vote.f But in the constitution which was ultimately 



* De Rep. II. 22. Compare Livy, I. 43 : " Non viritim suf- 
fragium eadem vi eodemque jure promiscue omnibus datum est; 
sed gradus facti, ut neque exclusus quisquam suffragio videretur, et 
vis omnis penes primores civitatis esset." 

f See Sarpi, 1. ii. c. 30. 

% See Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. II. p. 325-6. 

§ See Story's Commentaries, § 231. 



232 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

adopted, a compromise between the national and federal 
principles was introduced. The members of the House 
of Eepresentatives were determined by the population of 
each State; but each State, whatever its size, returned 
two members to the senate. A similar principle has 
been established in the Pacte Federal of the Swiss Can- 
tons, as recently remodelled. 

The structure of the English House of Commons, and 
of other representative chambers, is partly arranged 
upon an analogous principle, in so far as each member 
is considered as exclusively representing his own con- 
stituents. For in apportioning the members to the 
several constituencies, a preference is given to certain 
classes of the people, or to certain parts of the country. 

§ 17. Another contrivance for obviating the evils of 
a simple enumeration of the voters is the giving a plu- 
rality of votes to certain members of the body. This 
mode of voting was sometimes employed in the ancient 
Greek republics ; and it is called by Aristotle the timo- 
cratic principle — that is, the government according to 
the ri^jua, or assessment of property.* Sometimes 
likewise, a federation of independent States was formed 
upon this principle. Thus, in a league between the city 
of Cibyra and three neighbouring towns, it was arranged 



* See Eth. Nic. VIII. 12. Hermann, Pol Ant § 59. n. 8. 
Aristotle says that the democratic principle was, that the majority 
of all the citizens should decide; the oligarchical principle, that the 
citizens having the largest valuation should decide. He proceeds 
to illustrate his meaning, as to the latter principle, thus: — There 
are ten rich and twenty poor; six of the rich and five of the poor 
vote on one side; four of the rich and fifteen of the poor on the 
other; then, if the valuations of each are added on both sides, 
that side is to prevail whose aggregate valuation is highest. — 
{Pol VI. 3.) 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 233 

that, whereas these latter had one vote each in the 
federal congress, the former should have two votes, on 
account of her furnishing a larger share of the federal 
army.* The same was also the case with the league of 
twenty-three cities in Lycia, the largest of which had 
three votes ; those of middle size, two ; and the others, 
one — the contributions to the common federal treasury 
being in the same proportions. f In modern times, like- 
wise, this principle of voting has been sometimes applied 
to a confederation of States on account of their unequal 
importance : thus, in the Smalcaldic league, the electo- 
rate of Saxony had a double vote. J In general, how- 
ever, this principle has been confined to cases where the 
main purpose of the body is the administration of a 
common fund, and where the weight of each member is 
determined by the amount of his contribution or share. 
Thus, in the poor-law of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 
this mode of voting has been established for the election 
of the managing body by the rate-payers, because the 
rate-payers are considered as interested in the manage- 
ment of a common fund for the relief of the poor. The 
same principle is recognised by our legislation for the 
election of managing bodies, in the case of town improve- 
ments and sanitary measures. § The members of rail- 
way and other companies for purposes of public improve- 
ments likewise vote according to a property scale ;|| and 
the same is the rule of voting for the court of pro- 
prietors of the East India Company. 

The equity of this arrangement for the administration 



* Strabo, XIII. ad fin. 

t Strabo, XIV. 3. 

% Grotius, note on Jus B. et P. II. 5, 22. 

§ See 10 and 11 Vic. c. 16, § 24. 

|| See 8 and 9 Vic. c. 16, § 75. 



234 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

of a joint stock is recognised by Grotius,* as well as by 
Dr. Rutherforth, who remarks, that " The equity of the 
case seems to be on this side ; as it is equitable to allow 
each person a weight, in determining upon any question, 
proportionable to the interest which he has that the 
whole stock should be rightly managed. But (the same 
writer adds) the reason of the thing is on the other side; 
since there is no more likelihood that a man should judge 
rightly about the management of such stock because 
he has ten shares in it, than there would have been if 
he had been possessed of no more than one share."f 

This last remark is often true, but it must be taken 
with many qualifications. For example, if two persons 
of equal wealth are joint contributors to a common fund, 
and if one contributes his entire fortune, while the share 
of the other is only a small part of his capital — it is 
manifest that the former has a stronger interest in a 
prudent and cautious management than the other; for, 
if the entire fund was lost in some hazardous enterprise, 
the former would be deprived of his means of subsistence, 
whereas the loss of the latter would be inconsiderable in 
proportion to his means. Besides, the one can afford 
to forego all present income, and can postpone his re- 
turns to a distant period, whereas the other cannot. 



* J. B. et P. II. 5. § 22. 

t Institutes of Natural Law, b. II. c. 1, § 4, (vol. II. p. 9.) 
Aristotle, Pol. III. 5, remarks, that this would be true if men 
formed a political society merely for the sake of property. But 
he adds, that the end of a state is more extensive, and therefore 
the arguments of the oligarchs in favour of timocracy is unsound. 

The principle of regulating the political franchises, exclusively 
by the amount of property, is examined at length in Bayley's 
Rationale of Political Representation, pp. 243-8. See also Lord 
Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. II. c. 10. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 235 

On the other hand, if the share of each person is suffi- 
ciently large to give him a strong interest in the proper 
management of the fund, there is no reason why he 
should not have an equal vote with those who have 
larger shares. The principle of the widow's mite seems 
equally applicable to the interest in a common fund. 

With regard to the distribution of political franchises 
and rights, the timocratic principle, so far as it rests 
upon the doctrine of a proportionate interest in a com- 
mon object, cannot be admitted without large qualifi- 
cations. All persons, whatever their amount of property, 
have in fact an equal interest in the well-being of the 
State, provided that interest be well understood. Never- 
theless, the establishment of a property franchise, and the 
exclusion of all who do not possess it, is a virtual adoption 
of this principle. Suppose a body of a thousand persons, 
of whom four hundred possess a certain amount of pro- 
perty, and six hundred do not. According to the timo- 
cratic principle, each of the four hundred would have 
plural votes, and each of the six hundred would have 
one vote. But the same result is even more effectually 
attained, if each of the four hundred has one vote, and 
the others are not enfranchised. 

Owing to the importance of securing the rights of 
property, and the indistinct notions which exist on this 
subject among the working classes, a property qualifi- 
cation for political franchises has been found advisable 
in the European States having free constitutions. In 
the ancient democracies, this problem was to a great 
extent solved by the fact, that the working classes were 
slaves, and excluded, not only from political franchises, 
but from civil rights. 

§ 18. It has been the main object of this chapter to 
show that, in the constitution of a Political Body, and 



236 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

in its mode of decision by a majority of votes, the Prin- 
ciple of Numerical Equality among its members — which 
its constitution and mode of decision generally imply — 
is in practice counteracted and modified, to a great 
extent, by the Principle of Special Aptitude, which attri- 
butes a greater weight to the qualified few than to the 
unqualified many. It has been explained how, partly 
by subordinate legal regulations and rules of procedure, 
and partly by voluntary arrangements on the part of the 
members of the body themselves, the direct and crude 
action of the one principle is neutralized and corrected 
by the other. It may, however, be objected, that any 
institution which is founded upon a conflict of opposite 
principles — whose predominant legal character tends in 
one direction, and whose practical working tends in 
another — labours under some inherent and incurable 
defect. Why, it may be asked, do you first establish a 
principle, and then counteract it by another antagonist 
principle ? It would have been surely better, either not 
to establish the original principle at all; or, having 
established it, to give it free play, and encourage its full 
development. 

To this objection it may be answered, that, in moral 
and political matters, nothing is more common, or more 
beneficial, than to establish a principle, on account of 
certain effects which it produces, and, as far as regards 
these effects, to allow an unimpeded course to their action ; 
but with respect to other effects, which would, if per- 
mitted to arise without restraint, be productive of mis- 
chief, to try to neutralize and impede them by adverse 
and repressing influences. Upon this subject I may 
cite some judicious and discriminating remarks of Mr. 
Mill, in reference to the style of reasoning upon political 
questions which prevails among French writers and 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 237 

speakers. " The common-places of politics in France, 
(he observes,) are large and sweeping practical maxims, 
from which, as ultimate premises, men reason downwards 
to particular applications, and this they call being logical 
and consistent. For instance, they are perpetually 
arguing that such and such a measure ought to be 
adopted, because it is a consequence of the principle on 
which the form of government is founded — of the prin- 
ciple of legitimacy, or the principle of the sovereignty 
of the people. To which it may be answered, that if 
these be really practical principles, they must rest upon 
speculative grounds : the sovereignty of the people (for 
example) must be a right foundation for government, 
because a government thus constituted tends to produce 
certain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, however, as no 
government produces all possible beneficial effects, but 
all are attended with more or fewer inconveniences, and 
since these cannot be combated by means drawn from the 
very causes which produce them, it would be often a 
much stronger recommendation of some practical arrange- 
ment, that it does not follow from what is called the 
general principle of the government, than that it does. 
Under a government of legitimacy, the presumption is 
far rather in favour of institutions of a popular origin — 
and in a democracy, in favour of arrangements tending 
to check the impetus of popular will. The line of argu- 
mentation so commonly mistaken in France for political 
philosophy tends to the practical conclusion, that we 
should exert our utmost efforts to aggravate, instead of 
alleviating, whatever are the characteristic imperfections 
of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under 
which we happen to live."* 



* System of Logic, vol. II. p. 618. 



238 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

An apt illustration of these remarks may be drawn 
from the Spartan State. The institutions and laws of 
Sparta were framed with a view of training the citizens 
into good soldiers, and of making the republic efficient 
for military purposes. Looking to the peculiar circum- 
stances of Sparta, this policy might have been useful 
and commendable up to a certain point ; but a wise legis- 
lator, having once established the principle, would have 
moderated its excesses by introducing institutions of a 
different tendency — instead of giving to the city of 
Sparta the character of a camp, of making its public 
education little more than a military drill, and of 
banishing literature and science, and all that tends to 
refine the taste and elevate the understanding ; which was 
the course actually pursued. 

The organization of a modern army will serve as an 
additional illustration. It is the policy of a general to 
create among his soldiers a spirit of forward courage, 
and promptitude in attacking, harassing, and pursuing 
the enemy : on the other hand, it is necessary that this 
spirit should be controlled by an exact discipline, by a 
ready obedience to orders, and by a habit of unreasoning 
submission to the will of the commander. It may be 
difficult to combine the courage of a hero with the regu- 
larity of a machine. Yet it is by the due admixture 
of these opposite qualities that the modern soldier is 
formed. 

Another striking exemplification of the same view is 
afforded by the institution of a poor-law : — The object of 
a poor-law is to relieve the various forms of destitution 
and want out of a fund created by compulsory taxation. 
Its principle is, to take the property of the wealthier 
classes, and to divide it among the poorer, upon the 
petition of the latter, and without obtaining from them 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 239 

any equivalent. Now, that the relief of severe distress 
is a legitimate object of public policy cannot be disputed ; 
it has, to a greater or less extent, and in one form or 
another, been recognised as such in all countries. The 
principle of a poor-law is, therefore, laudable and bene- 
ficial. But if this principle be carried beyond a certain 
limit; if it be not carefully guarded by counteracting 
forces ; if precautions be not taken, with the express in- 
tention of deterring applicants for the public bounty, 
and of keeping the numbers of the state-paupers within 
reasonable bounds — a poor-law will become a system of 
legal spoliation, which will impoverish one part of the 
community in order to corrupt the remainder. 

In these, and many other cases, we set in motion a 
principle from which, while it is under control, we derive 
signal advantage, but which, if it breaks loose, and fol- 
lows its own tendencies unchecked, is highly dangerous; 
of which we may say, as of fire, that it is a good servant, 
but a bad master. In the moral, as in the physical 
world, we perpetually act by the composition of forces ; 
and by repressing, governing, and guiding, an impetus 
which we have created. In almost all cases, the moral 
sentiments require to be impelled in a given direction, 
but to be restrained from pursuing that path beyond a 
certain point. They need, not simultaneously indeed, 
but at short intervals, both the spur and the bit. 
Courage must not be permitted to proceed as far as 
foolhardiness, or caution as far as timidity. Liberality 
must not degenerate into profusion, or frugality into 
parsimony. Firmness must not become obstinacy or 
churlishness, nor mildness and forbearance become weak- 
ness. Even benevolence, though in itself it cannot be 
excessive, yet requires to be regulated by prudence and 
wisdom. It has, in fact, become a common-place of 



240 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

morality to say that extremes are to be avoided ; that 
moderation is virtue ; and that excesses are dangerous. 
There is scarcely any practical principle in politics or 
ethics, which (however good it may be in its general 
tendency, and when placed under proper regulation) may 
not be carried to a vicious excess. 

Sunt certi denique fines, 
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum. 

In applying these remarks to the case of decision by 
a majority of votes, we may perceive that the principle 
of a body, invested with supreme political power, is 
attended with important advantages, and affords the best 
solution of the most difficult problem in government. 
For the action of such a body, decision by a majority, as 
a legal rule, is a necessary condition. Decision, how- 
ever, by a majority is, as we have already seen, a very 
imperfect mode of arriving at a conclusion, and is, in 
general, opposed to the principle of judgment, which 
reason and usage equally prescribe. What, then, is the 
inference which a prudent politician, mindful of practical 
consequences, and regardless of an apparent logical con- 
sistency, will draw from these premises ? He will 
neither, on the one hand, rigorously follow out the prin- 
ciple of decision by a majority to all its most remote 
conclusions, and enforce them with inflexible consis- 
tency: nor, on the other, will he abandon the system 
of a political body, because it involves, as necessary to its 
working, a principle which, if logically developed, and 
fairly pursued to its ultimate results, would lead to prac- 
tical inconveniences. But, having secured the establish- 
ment of a political body on account of its important 
advantages, and, as a necessary condition for the action 
of such a body, recognised the principle of decision by 
a majority, he will seek to regulate and temper that 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 241 

principle; he will encourage its good and mitigate its 
evil tendencies, and counteract the latter by subordinate 
influences and checks, derived from the adverse prin- 
ciple of special aptitude. Having recognised, as a rule 
of law, the principle of perfect numerical equality in the 
members of the body, and given the legal ascendency 
to the simple majority of votes, he will modify the prac- 
tical operation of that principle by the principle of 
authority, and of the moral superiority of the most com- 
petent judges. 



Notes to Chapter VII. 

Note A. (page 193.) 

A counsellor of King David is mentioned in 1 Sam. xxiii. 23, 
and counsellors of King Nebuchadnezzar in Dan. iii. 27; but such 
counsellors are meant as Histiaeus was of Darius, (Herod. V. 24,) 
and not members of a council of state, having defined powers, and 
forming a constitutional check upon the royal omnipotence. 

The Persian king might sometimes summon mere consultative 
councils, particularly on such an occasion as that described by 
Herod. VIII. 67-9, when a council of war was held before the 
battle of Salamis: it was, however, understood that, even at such a 
crisis as this, the person who gave advice contrary to the supposed 
wishes of the king, gave it at the risk of his life. The debate of 
the seven Persian conspirators about the best form of government, 
and its decision in favour of monarchy, against aristocracy and 
democracy, by a majority of votes, as described by Herodotus, 
(III. 83,) are circumstances which he has borrowed from Grecian 
ideas, and which could not have had any foundation in reality. 
(Compare Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. IV. p. 300.) The same may be 
said of his account of long harangues in a council of Persian 
grandees, convened by Xerxes to deliberate upon his proposed 
invasion of Greece, VII. 8-11. Heeren, Ideen, I. 1, p. 469, remarks, 
that there was no council of state, properly so called, in the ancient 
Persian empire. A similar absence of organized political bodies 
prevailed throughout all the Asiatic nations of antiquity, so far as 

R 



242 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

our accounts reach, not even excepting Phoenicia; and the primi- 
tive government of Egypt was doubtless also formed upon the 
Oriental type. 

The Indian king is directed, by the laws of Menu, to appoint 
seven or eight ministers of state. " With them, (says Mr. Mill, 
Hist, of India, vol. I. p. 179,) he is commanded perpetually to con- 
sult on the affairs of his government: but a singular mode of deli- 
beration is prescribed to him — not to assemble his council, and 
laying before them, as in the cabinets of European princes, the 
subject on which the suggestions of their wisdom are required, to 
receive the benefit arising from the mutual communication of their 
knowledge and views: a plan, apparently more artful and cunning, 
more nearly allied to the suspicious temper and narrow views of a 
rude period, is recommended — to consult them opart, and hear the 
opinion of each separately; after which, having consulted them 
in common, when each man is swayed by the opinion he had for- 
merly given in private, and has a motive of interest and vanity to 
resist the light which might be thrown upon the subject by others, 
the king himself is to decide." The plan of consultation here de- 
scribed is mainly dictated by the dread of corporate action on the part 
of an Oriental despot, and by the desire of preventing such a union 
among the members of his council as might lead to the formation of 
a check upon his power. — (See Institutes of Menu, VII. 54, 56, 57, 
ed. Haughton. Compare Bohlen, Altes Indien, vol. II. p. 53.) 

This very mode of consultation is, however, recommended by 
Bacon, even to European princes, in his Essay on Counsel: " It is 
of singular use to princes if they take the opinions of their council 
both separately and together ; for private opinion is more free, but 
opinion before others is more reverend. In private, men are more 
bold in their own humours, and in consort men are more obnoxious 
to others' humours; therefore it is good to take both: and of the 
inferior sort rather in private, to preserve freedom — of the greater, 
rather in consort, to preserve respect." Similar advice is also 
given by Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II. c. 25, p. 247 : " Supposing 
the number of counsellors equal (he says,) a man is better 
counselled by hearing them apart, than in an assembly." He pro- 
ceeds to give detailed reasons for this precept, which, however, 
apply rather to a large popular assembly than to a small cabinet 
council. 

The modern king of Persia is absolute: there is no constitutional 
check upon his power; no assembly or council in his kingdom. — 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 243 

Malcolm's History of Persia, vol. II. p. 428-9. In some of the 
independent wandering tribes of the Persian territory, important 
judicial questions are entertained by a council of elders, and decided 
by a majority of votes. — Ib. p. 459. 

The Turkish Divans are sometimes consultative councils of the 
Sultan or the Grand Vizier, (in which, however, no real freedom 
of discussion exists,) or they are occasions of public audience, for 
administering justice, or receiving officers of state and foreign 
ambassadors. See Dohsson, Tableau de V Empire Othoman, torn. 
VII. p. 211-32. With respect to the meaning of the Arabic word 
divan, see d'Herbelot, Bibl. Or. in v. The Indian durbar appears 
to be its equivalent. 

The Emperor of China has two councils; one, the great council 
of state — the other a select or privy council, (Davis's Chinese, vol. I. 
p. 211); but it cannot be supposed that these councils possess any 
legal powers, by which the acts of the Emperor are controlled. 
There are likewise six chief administrative boards, (ib.) which are, 
doubtless, merely executive departments, consisting of numerous 
members, but presided over by their proper heads. An account 
of an assemblage of the great officers of state in China, to do 
honour to the emperor, is cited from Sir G. Staunton, ib. p. 208. 



Note B. (page 194.) 

As to the character of the Homeric or heroic ecclesia, see Grote, 
vol. II. pp. 91-2; vol. III. p. 7. Aristotle, Pol. IV. 4, describes the 
people acting as a body, by comparing it with a monarch: M6vap\og 
6 Sfjjdog yiverat, avvderog eig etc 7roXku>V ol yap 7to\\ol nvpiol elcriv, ov^ 
tbg etcaoTog, aWh irdvreg. He then goes on to observe that, when 
Homer speaks of TroXvKoipavir] being a bad thing, it is uncertain 
whether he means this sort of plurality of rulers, or where there 
are several rulers acting singly. It may seem presumptuous to 
decide a question of this sort, which Aristotle left in uncertainty ; 
but I can hardly doubt Homer's meaning to have been, that there 
should not be several kings acting independently of each other, 
especially as commanding in war. His poems contain no trace 
of a political body, (see Odyssey, VIII. 390, on the Phasacian 
kings,) nor do they mention voting. As the Athenian courts de- 
cided by a majority in later times, JEschylus supposes the Areo- 
pagus to have voted on the trial of Orestes, (Eumen. 748-53;) 

R 2 



244 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

thus carrying back this comparatively recent principle to the 
heroic age. Other cases of a similar prochronism occur. Thus, 
Ephorus (ap. Strab. IX. 2, § 4) tells a mythical story relating to 
Dodona, in which a vote of a judicial court, consisting of three men 
and three women, is introduced. Again, Myseelus of Argos, the 
founder of Crotona, is said to have been condemned to death, by 
the unanimous votes of the judges, for the crime of preparing to 
leave his native city. Hercules changed the colour of the pebbles 
from black to white, and thus saved the culprit. — Ovid, Met. XV. 
19—48: 

Mos erat antiquus, niveis atrisque lapillis, 
His damnare reos, illis absolvere culpa. 

Where there was a board consisting of several functionaries, the 
ancient practice probably was, that the powers were divided among 
them, and that each exercised certain functions separately, as in 
the case of the Athenian archons. 

Aristotle lays it down generally, that the principle of decision by 
a majority applies to all republics, whether oligarchies or demo- 
cracies: to cTon av doty tolq irXelocnv, kv ndaaig v7rap^£L' Kal yap kv 
oXiyapyia Kal kv apiaroKparia Kal kv dfjfjoig, uri av doty rw ttKeiovl fiiptL 
tuiv jj,ere)(6vT(t)v rfjg 7roXiTEiag, tovt karc Kvpiov. IV. 8, cf. IV. 4. teat yap 
kv Talg oXiyapyiaig Kal Travraypv to kXeov pipog Kvpiov. Also, VI. 2. 
For an example of this principle in a treaty between independent 
states, see Thucyd. v. 30 : eiprjuivov Kvptov elvai ort av to TrXrjQog 
twv cvfxiJidxuv i^^' 0,7 ? 7 " 01 ^ Compare Grotius, de J. B. et P. II. 5, 
§ 17; III. 20, § 4, with Barbeyrac's notes. 

Before the battle of Marathon, the ten strategi were equally 
divided in opinion. The polemarch archon (who, Herodotus says, 
had from early times an equal vote with the generals) gave his 
vote in favour of fighting, and decided the question, upon which 
the minority acquiesced. — (Herod. VI. 109.) This is the earliest 
decision by a majority of votes recorded in authentic history. We 
know from Thucydides, that the Spartan kings had not each a 
double vote in the Council of Thirty, though such was the popular 
belief throughout Greece in his time. — I. 20. The five Spartan 
ephors decided by a majority of votes: hence, if three agreed, the 
consent of the board was obtained. — Xen. Hellen. II. 4, § 29. 

The Greeks voted openly, by holding up the hand; and in the 
Spartan assembly, by shouting. For secret voting, pebbles, pots- 
herds, and sometimes leaves, were used. 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 245 



Note C. (page 196.) 

In a German tribe, (according to Tacit. Germ. c. 11,) during peace, 
the supreme decision of its affairs was vested in a general assembly 
of the fighting men, the subjects having previously been considered 
in a smaller council of the chiefs. One of the chiefs addressed the 
general assembly, which expressed its opinion, not by a regular 
vote, but by a murmur, or a clashing of arms: the former, in token 
of disapprobation — the latter, of approbation. This state of things 
corresponds with the second form of the Greek eccl^ia, after it 
had passed out of the Homeric stage, and had acquired a supreme, 
though not strictly defined power. It closely resembles the Spartan 
ecclesia, as described by Thucydides, in which the magistrates 
alone spoke, and which expressed its decision by shouting, and not 
by a division with counted votes. (kqIvovoi fiorj iced ov \pr/(p(o. — Thuc. 
I. 87. See Miiller, Dor. III. 5, §§ 9, 10.) In the case referred to, 
the ephor, not satisfied with this rude method of voting, required 
the ayes and the noes to stand apart, in order that their respective 
numbers might be seen. As to the German concilia, see Gibbon, 
Decline and Fall, vol. I. pp. 290-1; Ukert, Geogr. III. 1, p. 231; 
Grimm, D. R. p. 244; Mannert, Geschichte der alien Deutschen, 
vol. I. p. 62, who says that counting votes would have been too 
tedious a process; and observes that, in the Hungarian Diet, the 
ancient mode of voting was still retained. As to the national 
assemblies of the early German empire, Eichhorn, D. R. und R. 
Geschichte, vol. I. §§ 137, 161, 220. 

There was likewise an assembly or concilium in the tribes of 
Gaul in Caesar's time, as well as a senate. — B. G. VI. 20, 23; 
Ukert, Geogr. II. 2, pp. 248, 250, 255. Concilia of the Cisalpine 
Gauls are also mentioned, Livy, XXL 20. A congress of Gallic 
deputies was held at Bibracte, at which. Vercingetorix was chosen 
commander by a majority of voices. — Caesar, B. G. VII. 63. 
" Multitudinis suffragiis res permittitur." It is not unlikely that 
the practice of a regular vote may have been learned by the Gaulish 
tribes from their intercourse with the Greek and Roman republics 
in their vicinity. Thus, the Gauls borrowed from the Massiliots 
the important invention of alphabetical writing, and used Greek 
letters both for public and private purposes. — B. G. VI. 14. 



246 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 



Note D. (page 197.) 

One important incident of a political body is, that it is pre- 
served, by the perpetual substitution of new members in the 
vacancies as they occur, against the effects of natural death, and is 
kept in constant existence. Hence, there is no ground for holding 
that its acts have only a temporary force, or that treaties and other 
engagements made with it are not perpetual. (See Grot, de J. B. 
et P. II. 9, § 3.) 

There may, indeed, be a continual succession of single persons, 
and each newly-substituted individual may regard himself only as 
a link in a chain, and may be bound by the acts of his predecessors. 
But the doctrine of the English law respecting a corporation sole is 
only suited to a refined state of society, and in the succession of 
individual rulers the tendency in rude times has been to a different 
doctrine. In the Oriental governments, the acts of a sovereign or 
minister are almost invariably set aside by a successor when it suits 
his purpose; and the doctrine of mere personal responsibility in 
political matters is, in Asia, fully established. A similar doctrine 
obtained to some extent among the Greeks and Romans, particu- 
larly in the case of absolute princes, whose acts were generally set 
aside when they were killed or dethroned. (Cic. ad Att. XIV. 6, 
9.14.) It is well known, that, in our early history, important 
laws made by one king were often expressly renewed by his suc- 
cessors. 

So treaties made with kings have been frequently disavowed by 
their successors, on the ground that the engagement was merely 
personal.— See Grot, de J. B. et. P. II. 16, § 16; Vatel, §§ 183-97. 

The principle of fieri non debuit, factum valet, is of great im- 
portance in politics. When once a government has been established, 
its acts are legal, however unjust or inexpedient; and although it 
may be displaced by a violent revolution, or other sudden change, 
it is desirable that its acts should be recognised, and be only 
altered, when necessary, by legislative amendment. 



Note E. (page 211.) 

The reason for the rule of decision by a majority is thus given 
by Grotius : " Omnino ea credenda est fuisse voluntas in societatem 
coeuntium, ut ratio aliqua esset expediendi negotia : est autem 



VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 247 

manifeste iniquum, ut pars major sequatur minorem : quare natu- 
raliter, et seclusis pactis ac legibus quae formam tractandis negotiis 
imponunt, pars major jus habet integri." — De J. B. et P. II. 5, 
§ 17. This explanation amounts merely to saying, that it is natural 
and equitable that the vote of the majority should prevail over 
that of the minority. Dr. Rutherforth is more explicit on the 
subject : " The next question will be, whether it is more reason- 
able and more equitable that the minority should be bound by 
the act of the majority, or the contrary? The answer to this 
question is obvious. It is plainly most consistent with reason, that 
the sentiments of the majority should prevail and conclude the whole; 
because it is not so likely that a greater number of men should be 
mistaken, when they concur in their judgment, as that a smaller 
number should be mistaken. And this is likewise most consistent 
with equity; because, in general, the greater number have a pro- 
portionally greater interest that the purposes of the society should 
succeed well, and have more at stake if those purposes should mis- 
carry or be disappointed." — Institutes of Nat. Law, II. 1, § 1. Of 
the two propositions here laid down by Dr. Rutherforth, the first 
is decidedly false. It cannot be affirmed generally, either that a 
larger number of men is less likely to be mistaken than a smaller 
number, or that a smaller number is less likely to be mistaken than 
a larger number. The second proposition, with respect to the 
interest of the majority, is subject to the deduction, that by interest 
must be understood their true interest, as determined by competent 
judges, and not their interest as conceived by themselves. The 
truth is, that no explanation can be given of this rule, except that 
it is resorted to as the only possible expedient. The problem is 
well solved by Puffendorf, whose remarks exhaust the question: — 
" Dans toutes les assemblies, ce qui a passe a la pluralite de 
voix est regarde comme l'avis de chacun des membres; non que 
cela soit necessaire en vertu du droit naturel, mais parcequ'il n'y a 
presque point d'autre expedient pour terminer les affaires, et pour 
prendre quelques mesures: quoique par la il arrive quelquefois, 
que le sentiment le plus honnete et le plus avantageux a l'Etat est 
rejete. Comme les affaires humaines sont souvent fort diversifies 
et fort embrouillees, et que dans ces sortes d'assemblees etablies 
pour en decider, il n'est pas possible de trouver quelque voie qui 
soit sans aucun inconvenient, il faut prendre le parti, ou il y en a 
le moins, et qui est d'ordinaire le plus avantageux. C'est done en 
vain qu'on objecte qu'il repugne a, la nature, que l'avis des moins 



248 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE, ETC. [CH. 

sage prevaille sur celui des plus sages, parceque ceux-ci se trouvent 
en plus petit nombre, et que les premiers meme puissent obliger les 
autres a faire, contre leur propre sentiment, quelque chose de mal 
concerte. J'avoue qu'en matiere de verites speculatives il faut 
peser les voix, et non pas les compter; et que souvent meme Tap- 
probation de la multitude est regardee avec raison comme une 
marque d'erreur. Mais on ne sauroit appliquer cette maxime a la 
decision des affaires, qui sont entre les mains d'une assemblee, dont 
les membres ont tous un droit egal. En effet, qui decidera laquelle 
des deux opinions est la plus conforme aux regies de la prudence? 
Ce ne seront pas les parties memes: car aucune ne voudra rece- 
voir l'autre pour juge en sa propre cause. Et y a-t-il quelcun 
qui ne se croie pas plus eclaire et plus habile que les autres? ... II 
n'y a guere moyen non plus de s'en remettre au jugement d'un 
tiers: car on peut aisement con tester sur l'habilete ou sur 1'integrite 
de l'arbitre; et alors voila une nouvelle dispute, pour la decision 
de laquelle il faudroit un autre arbitre, et ainsi de suite." — Droit 
de la Nature et des Gens, trad, de Barbeyrac, VII. 2, § 15. See 
also Grot, de Imp. Summ. Pot. circa Sacra, cap. 4, § 6; Bayle, 
(Euvres, torn. III. p. 194. 



VIII.] RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE, ETC. 249 



CHAPTER VIII. 

ON THE RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO 
THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE, A 
TIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. 



THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE, AND TO THE REPRESENTA- 



§ 1. In the preceding chapter, we have considered the 
bearing of the principle of authority upon the action of 
a political body, and have shown how its mode of deci- 
sion, though contravening that principle formally, is, in 
practice, brought more or less into conformity with it, 
and that the legal method of counting the votes is coun- 
teracted by many moral influences. It is proposed now 
to pursue the same subject further, and to inquire how 
far this principle serves as a basis for other political 
arrangements — and whether a similar conflict of forces 
may not be discerned in other departments of civil 
government. 

The question as to the principle of special fitness, and 
its opposition to the principle of a simple arithmetical 
majority, is not confined to the action of political bodies, 
but it extends to some of the fundamental considerations 
affecting the structure and composition of a government, 
and the collocation of the sovereign power. 

In former chapters, we have contrasted the small 
number of the competent judges on each subject — the 
guides to opinion who constitute authority — with the 
large majority who are uninformed and inexperienced in 
the matter, and unfit to guide others by their judgment. 
Now, the opposition between these two classes has always 



250 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

been recognised with respect to fitness for exercising the 
powers of government. The antithesis, in its various 
forms, more or less distinctly conceived, of — 

The few wise, and the many foolish; 

The few good, and the many bad; 

The few learned, and the many ignorant; 

The few philosophers, and the many anti-thinkers; 

The few competent, and the many incompetent; 

The few professional, and the many non-professional,* 

has been the foundation of all the arguments and in- 
stincts in favour of aristocratic as against democratic 
rule,f so far as they have not had an interested origin, 
and have not arisen from a desire of retaining political 
privileges for a class to which the individual himself 
belonged. 

On this principle, the words, ayaQol, apiGroi, KaXoi- 

KayaOoi, E7TI£ik:h£, caflAot, ao(j>oi 1 {SeXtigtoi, ^pr/oro/, 00711, 

optimi, optimates, were used by the Greeks and Romans 
to signify the governing few, while the majority, or mere 
people, were called kclkoi, ^owi/hm, &a\ot, mali cives, &c. 
By degrees, the former words lost their primitive moral 
acceptation, and came to signify merely the oligarchical 
class. J In like manner, the term apiaTOKparia^ which 
originally, as used by Plato and Aristotle, signified the 
government of the best citizens, has come to mean the 



* Or tdiajrcu, according to the Greek phrase. The word lay- 
man, Xdkug, though properly opposed to a clergyman, is in English 
sometimes used in the general sense of non-professional. 

f Compare Lord Brougham's chapter on the Natural Aristo- 
cracy. — Pol. Phil. vol. II. c. 4. 

t See Welcker's Pref. to Theognis, § 9—17; Grote, Hist, of 
Greece, vol. III. p. 62. Pindar, Pyth. II. 160, calls the Few (as 
distinguished both from the One and the Many) ol aocpoi. 

§ See Mr. Stanley on dpLaroKparta, Classical Museum, vol. IV. 
p. 286. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 251 

government of the Few, in a sense equivalent to oli- 
garchy. Expressions similar to those just mentioned 
occur in more modern times, as the German boni homines* 
and probi homines, or gude manner, the Italian buon- 
uomini, the French prudhommes, and the Witena-gemot 
of the Saxons, as applied to magistrates and governing 
persons. The councils of old men in antiquity, ((3ov\rj 
yepovrwv in Homer, the gerusia of Sparta, the senate of 
Eome,f ) and the seniors and aldermen of the Germanic 
nations,^ had likewise the same meaning; inasmuch as 
wisdom, the fruit of experience, was considered the 
attribute of old age, and the peculiar characteristic of 
aged councillors. On the other hand, many words 
which denoted originally a low class in society have, by 
a reverse process, acquired in modern times a moral 
signification ; thus villain, rogue, rascal, scoundrel, 
cattivo, chetif, and caitiff, from captivus, have been trans- 
ferred from baseness of social condition to baseness of 
conduct. 

It was upon the view just stated, that the opinions of 
the Socratic school of philosophers concerning govern- 
ment were mainly founded. They looked upon govern- 
ment as an art, which was to be exercised by the ablest 
and most virtuous men in the State for the general 
benefit, in the same manner that a ship was steered by 



* On the German boni homines, — Grimm D. Rechts alterthii- 
mer, p. 294. 

t BovXr) yepovTwv among the Greeks, Iliad II. 53; among the 
Trojans, III. 149-52. Sallust, Bell. Cat. c. 6, says of the Roman 
senate : " Delecti, quibus corpus annis infirmum, ingenium sapi- 
entia validum erat, reipublicae consultabant. Hi vel setate vel 
curse similitudine Patres appellabantur. Compare Bodin. De Rep. 
III. c. 1. 

% See Grimm, ib. pp. 266, 268. 



252 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

the best pilot for the sake of all the crew. Thus, Xeno- 
phon, in his tract upon the Athenian State, completely 
identifies the aristocratic and popular parties respec- 
tively with the good and bad in a moral sense : " In 
every country (he says) the best portion of the citizens 
is hostile to the democracy ; for among the best citizens 
there is the least dishonesty and irregularity of conduct, 
and the greatest strictness of principle, while among the 
people there is the greatest want of intelligence and of good 
conduct, and the least virtue. " # In another passage, he 
remarks that the people wish to be governed by a person 
of bad character and without education, but well-dis- 
posed to them, rather than by a person of good character 
and education, but hostile to them.f Elsewhere, he 
considers government in the light of a craft, for which 
nothing more than dexterity and management are requi- 
site. In the introduction to his Cyropcedia, he contrasts 
the proneness of men to revolt against their rulers with 
the obedience of horses to their grooms, and of cattle and 
sheep to their herdsmen ; whence he infers, that man is the 
most difficult of all animals to govern ; but, on considering 
the example of Cyrus, he thinks that the government of 
men is not an impossible, or even a difficult task, pro- 
vided it be performed with skill.% So Plato founded his 
aristocracy, or Perfect State, not on the family, or 
wealth, but on the intelligence of the ruling body.§ 
Aristotle says that " aristocracy is the government of 
the best men absolutely, tried by the standard of moral 
virtue, and not by some arbitrary standard of excellence." 



* De. Rep. Ath. c. 1. § 1-— 9, 14-15. See particularly § 5. 
t §7. 

J dv tlq l7TL(TTafxkvu>g tovto Trpaoay. I. 1, 3. 

§ See Hitter, Gesch. der Phil. vol. II. pp. 444-6. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 253 

{Pol. IV. 5.) " It is a government in which the magis- 
tracies are distributed according to virtue and moral 
worth" (III. 3). Xenophon and Aristotle agree in 
thinking that government is an art to be exercised by 
the best men in the State, for the benefit of the com- 
munity.* 

This view of the most perfect commonwealth prevailed 
generally among the ancient philosophers, of all sects. 
They agreed, almost universally, in holding that a State 
ought to be governed by the wisest and best citizens, 
selected from the entire body on account of those qualities. 
This opinion is shared by Cicero, and is expounded by 
him in his treatise De Republica. He shows, moreover, 
how this moral notion of government is obliterated in 
process of time. " As virtue (he says) is not only con- 
fined to a few, but can be recognised and discerned only 
by a few, the people begin to think that men of large 
possessions, as well as those of noble descent, are the best 
men. Accordingly, when, on account of this popular 
error, the wealth, not the virtue, of a few has come to 
govern the State, these great men continue to keep a 
firm hold on the name of Optimates, though they are 
devoid of the reality. For no form of government is 
worse than that in which the richest are considered the 
best" (I. 34). Nor does Cicero treat this as a mere 
speculative and ideal distinction, but he applies it in 
practice. In his oration Pro Sextio, in the celebrated 
passage on the opposition between the Optimates and 
Populares in the Roman State, in his own time, he rests 
the distinction mainly on moral grounds : " Those who 
said and did what they thought would be acceptable to 
the multitude were called Populares ; whereas they who 



* Xen. Mem. III. 2; Aristot. Pol. III. 4. 



254 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

so conducted themselves that their advice received the 
approbation of all the best men, were called Opti mates. " 
He proceeds to say that the latter class are numerous, 
and are to be found in every rank of citizens, from the 
leaders of the senate to men residing in municipia and the 
country, traders, and even freedmen. He concludes by 
declaring, that although this class of persons is widely 
diffused through the community, their character may be 
summed up in this brief definition : " Omnes optimates 
sunt, qui neque nocentes sunt, nee natura improbi, nee 
furiosi, nee malis domesticis impediti," (c. 45.) 

Many writers who witnessed the working of the 
popular influence in the republics of antiquity, and in 
those of Italy during the Middle age, have expressed, in 
strong terms, their sense of the unfitness of the people 
for guiding and governing the State. They have dwelt 
upon its ignorance, its incapacity, its want of virtue and 
moral principle, its inexperience in public affairs, and 
its inability to form a sound judgment, or to devise 
useful measures in reference to them, its proneness to 
be acted upon by sudden passions, its turbulence, and 
its blind headlong violence, which hurries it forward 
like a winter torrent. It would be as reasonable, they 
say, to consult the multitude about the management 
of public affairs, as to expect sanity of mind from a 
madman. # 

More modern writers have (with Cicero) remarked 
that the word people may have a double signification : it 
may either signify the populace, or the multitude, as op- 
posed to the rich and great; or it may mean ordinary 
persons, as opposed to the wise, the able, and the vir- 



See Note A. at the end of the chapter. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 255 

tuous; in which latter case it includes members of all 
classes in society, high as well as low.* 

In the free States of recent times, the direct action 
of the mass of the people upon the government has 
been moderated by the representative system, which has 
established an intermediate stage between the popular 
suffrage and the legislative measure. This circumstance, 
combined with the invention of printing, and the con- 
sequent diffusion of knowledge, has caused the democratic 
action to be regarded with less alarm. Nevertheless, a 
certain amount of intelligence and education has almost 
always been pointed out as a qualification for the exer- 
cise of the powers of government; and the existence of 
a franchise founded on property has been defended, in 
part, on the ground of its securing a requisite amount of 
education. This feeling in modern societies has likewise 
been sharpened by the fact, that the entire community 
consists of freemen, and that the working classes, forming 
the bulk of the poor population, are not slaves, as in the 
ancient republics. The alleged defect of capacity for 
government, and of a respect for order and the rights of 
property, in the multitude, has repeatedly been urged as 
a reason for excluding them from political power. 

§ 2. The theory of government, which we have now 
described in general terms, proceeds on the assumption, 
that there is a complete analogy between the choice of 



* " Qui dit le peuple dit plus d'une chose; c'est une vaste expres- 
sion; et Ton s'etonneroit de voir ce qu'elle embrasse, et jusques ou 
elle s'etend; il y a le peuple qui est oppose aux grands — c'est la 
populace et la multitude : il y a le peuple qui est oppose aux sages, 
aux habiles, aux vertueux ; ce sont les grands comme les petits." — 
La Bruyere, Caracteres, c. 9. 



256 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

governors and the choice of persons skilled in any pro- 
fession, art, or handicraft ; and that the choice of 
rulers can be made on the same principle as the choice of 
a lawyer, or physician, or skilled artificer. The analogy, 
however, fails in several essential points : — 

First : The province of government is so vast — it com- 
prehends so many, and such multifarious subjects, that 
it scarcely admits of any special training.* The very 
idea of a sovereign government is, that it can regulate 
all the concerns and interests of its subjects ; that its 
field of power is unlimited in the matters which it em- 
braces : " The union of several heads of families (says 
Grotius) into a Nation or State, gives to the body the 
greatest power over its members which it can possess — 
for it is the most perfect of societies ; and there is no 
external act of a man which does not, of itself, refer to 
that society, or which may not refer to it under certain 
circumstances." f There is no branch of human know- 
ledge, no art or applied science, which may not be put in 
requisition for the purposes of civil government. For 
this reason, (as has been already remarked,) no special 
or professional training can be devised which will fit a 
person for a civil governor, in the same manner as a 
person may be fitted for the profession of a lawyer, a 
physician, a soldier, or a clergyman. To a certain ex- 
tent, indeed, a person may qualify himself professionally 
for the career of a statesman. He may study political 



* See above, c. 7, § 15. Aristotle refers to an idea entertained 
by some that there is a training proper to a ruler; thus, he says, the 
sons of kings are taught the management of horses, and political 
knowledge; and he cites some lines of Euripides bearing on the 
subject. — Pol. III. 2. As to the inexpediency of the profession 
of politician, see Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. II. pp. 29 — 33. 

t B. J. et P. II. 5, § 23. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 257 

science and political history — he may acquire some 
knowledge of general jurisprudence, and of the positive law 
of the country — he may, by experience, learn all the 
practical questions of the day — he may become con- 
versant with the forms of business, and the proceedings 
of parliamentary, judicial, and official bodies — he may 
study public opinion in its various manifestations — he 
may watch the character and feelings of the different 
classes and sections of the community — he may observe 
international relations, the changes and interests of 
foreign states, and the commerce of the world. It can 
scarcely be disputed that such a habit of mind as this 
will fit a person for the work of government better than 
an entire absence of such a direction of the thoughts. 
Sach qualifications are, however, to a certain extent, 
possessed or claimed by almost every educated man, and 
every reader of a newspaper ; and it is difficult to judge 
as to their comparative degree.* 

It is true that there may be a special training for 
persons employed in subordinate executive offices under 
a government — as judges, soldiers, sailors, &c. Each 
one of these may qualify himself, by study and expe- 
rience, for a definite and limited department of public 
business ; and he may continue to discharge his functions, 



* Aristotle remarks that to perceive a political evil in its germ, 
before it has become considerable, requires a statesman, and is 
beyond the reach of an ordinary man : to kv apxfj yivofitvov kukov 
yvuivai oh rov Tvyovroc, aXkh. isokiriKov dvdpog — Pol. V. 8. 

Mr. Henry Taylor's able work, entitled the Statesman, is in fact 
a collection of practical maxims with respect to the transaction of 
official business, and the conduct of a public man in office ; very valu- 
able and instructive, as being the result of long, intelligent obser- 
vation; but it is confined within these limits. — See Note B. at the 
end of the chapter. 

S 



258 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

undisturbed by the changes which affect the persons 
composing the supreme legislative body. But the diffi- 
culty stated above arises, because the supreme govern- 
ment of a country has no limited department, (like a 
subordinate executive functionary,) but has a sphere of 
action perfectly indefinite. 

Secondly : in cases where we consult a professional 
person, or peritus, on a question relating to his own art, 
we invest him with no power over ourselves. We ask 
his advice upon a matter awaiting our decision, and if 
we think fit we abide by that advice. The physician pre- 
scribes a certain regimen of health, and we follow his 
prescription ; a lawyer advises us to bring an action, in 
order to establish or defend a right, and we commence 
legal proceedings accordingly. But in both cases the 
decision is our own; we act voluntarily, although we 
may follow the advice blindly, and without understand- 
ing its grounds. In the choice of our rulers, however, 
the case is widely different. By appointing persons to 
exercise the sovereign government of the country, we 
give them an absolute, unlimited, and irresponsible power 
over us, so far as legal securities are concerned. How- 
ever extensive may be their knowledge of politics, and 
however good their private character and morals, they 
cannot be treated as mere artists in government ; the 
temptation to the abuse of their power, for their own 
benefit and that of their own class, cannot be altogether 
overlooked.* The Greek demagogues, who acquired poli- 
tical power by defending the people against the oli- 
garchical party, and afterwards abused the confidence 
thus obtained by investing themselves with despotic 
power, were doubtless, in many cases, originally men of 



See Note C. at the end of the chapter. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 259 

patriotic sentiments, who yielded to the temptations of 
their position. # 

If it were true (as several speculators on politics have 
thought) that, by some contrivance of constitutional 
checks, and balance of powers, the supreme government 
of a country can be legally limited, this objection might, 
to a certain extent, be got over. The liability to abuse 
might be repressed by the system of checks ; and the 
ruler might be chosen merely for his skill and dexterity, 
as we choose the pilot of a ship. But unfortunately all 
these speculations are vain — there is no power to which 
a sovereign government is legally subject; it is only 
controlled by moral influences, and the force of public 
opinion. f 

Thirdly : it must be borne in mind that, even in cases 
where persons are disposed to select their governors on 
the principle in question, their choice is generally limited 
by considerations of political party. They may be will- 
ing to select their own party leaders, or persons recom- 
mended by their party leaders, or belonging to their 
own party — but they will not raise to power persons 
who are connected with a political party opposed to 
their own. 

Fourthly : it must not be overlooked that, in questions 
of government, it is often important to conciliate sup- 
port to public measures, by giving to persons a voice in 
the decision, and by interesting them in the proper 



*. See Herod. III. 82; Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. Ill, pp. 2.5, 29; 
eomp. Aristot. Pol. VI. 1 : aei yap Zwrovai to \aov /ecu to Bikcuov oi 
ijTTOVQ, ol Ze. tcpaTOVVTSQ older <ppovTL^ovai. 

t Majestas est summa in cives ac subditos legibusque soluta 
potestas. — Bodinus, De Rep. I. 8, (p. 113.) Summus dicitur qui 
nullius imperio tenetur, et caeteros cives, turn universos, turn singu- 
los, coercere potest. — Id. II. 2, (p. 292.) 

s2 



260 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

execution and success of the law, even although their 
advice or opinion may be intrinsically of little value. 
Besides, the opinions of the enlightened few may pre- 
scribe measures so distasteful to the bulk of the people, 
and founded on principles so little admitted by the 
general public, that great danger would arise from their 
adoption in a pure and unmodified shape ; the principle 
of authority and special fitness, if stretched far in matters 
of government, might lead to violent resistance, not 
because the measures of the government were bad, but 
because they were too good. It was on this account 
that the reforms of Joseph II. produced an insurrection 
in Austrian Flanders. Some temperament is necessary, 
in order to insure to the less advanced and enlightened 
part of the community, always a numerous body, their 
due share in the conduct of the government. In public 
affairs, people do not defer blindly to the judgment of 
their rulers, as in the case of professional advisers; nor 
is there always an easy and direct appeal to the result, 
as in the works of skilled artificers. A prudent ruler 
will not always adopt the course which he thinks most 
conducive to the general interest, if it is highly unac- 
ceptable to the body of the people. * 

In order that the analogy between the choice of rulers 
and the choice of professional men having special apti- 
tude should be complete — in order that political govern- 
ment should be considered as an art, and its exercise 
regulated on the same principles as an art — it would be 



* See Bacon's remarks on the danger of an ideal standard of 
perfection in practical politics. — Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 27. 
Cato, optimo animo utens, et summa fide, nocet interdum reipublicag. 
Dicit enim tamquam in Platonis ttoKlte'io., non tamquam in Romuli 
faece, sententiam. — Cic. ad. Att. II. 1, § 6. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 261 

necessary that the governors should be designated by 
some extraneous influence — enlightened, well-affected to 
the State, and incorruptible ; and should be renewed by 
the same choice if they were found wanting to their 
duties, and if they yielded to the temptations of their 
situation. A practical solution of the problem would be 
found, if the rulers could be appointed and removed in 
the same manner as a guardian for a minor is appointed 
and removed by a court of justice. But, as no such ex- 
ternal superintending influence can be obtained — as no 
foreign nation can or will be trusted in such a matter* 
— recourse must be had to other securities, and another 
principle of selection. 

§ 3. The only principle which presents itself for 
adoption, is the representation of individual interests, 
irrespective of the fitness of each person to judge of 
them, or the simple numerical principle of government. f 

In considering the manner in which this principle is 
to be applied, and the extent to which it is to be carried, 
we may observe, that great concessions have been made 
to the opposite principle of fitness, on the ground of 
special qualification, even in those States where the sys- 



* The Italian podesta was a chief magistrate, with extensive 
powers, chosen from a neighbouring State. The office was annual, 
and was intended to secure a person free from the partialities with 
which a citizen of the republic would be infected. In certain cases, 
he was not to marry, or have any kinsman resident within 
the territory over which he presided, and was even prohibited 
from eating or drinking in the house of a citizen. (See Mu- 
ratori, Diss. 46; and Hallam's M. A. vol. I. 386.) This singular 
institution was an attempt to secure such an impartial influence as 
is described in the text. 

t According to M. de Tocqueville, the power of the majority in 
the United States rests on the following foundations : " L'empire 
moral de la majorite se fonde en partie sur cette idee, qu'il y a plus 



262 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH 

tern of numerical equality has been carried to the farthest 
point. 

Beginning with the ancient republics, we see that, 
even in those which admitted the numerical or democratic 
principle to the fullest extent, there was, in the first 
place, a total exclusion of the numerous class of slaves, 
and, secondly, an exclusion of all free women, and 
males under a certain age. By these deductions 
from the principle of an universal comprehension of 
individual interests, the body of citizens exercising 
political franchises was reduced to a fractional part of 
the entire population. For example, in the Athenian 
State, during its purely democratic period, the numbers 
would stand thus : — 

Adult male free citizens, exercising poli- 
tical franchises 21,000 

Free women and children 63,000 

Slaves 400,000 

In the modern European States, and in the northern 
States of the American Union, there is no slave-class, 
and the entire community is personally free. But the 
pure numerical principle is, in all these communities, 



de lumieres et de sagesse dans beaucoup d'hommes que dans un 
seul— dans le nombre des legislateurs que dans le choix. C'est la 
theorie de l'egalite appliquee aux intelligences. Cette doctrine 
attaque l'orgueil de 1'homme dans son dernier asyle : aussi la mino- 
rite l'admet-elle avec peine; elle ne s'y habitue qu' a la longue. . . . 
L'empire moral de la majorite se fonde encore sur ce principe, que 
les interets du plus grand nombre doivent etre preferes a ceux du 
petit." — La Democratic en Amerique, vol. II. pp. 139-40. 

By interest is meant what each person supposes to be his inte- 
rest — what he wishes — not what a competent judge might consider 
as his true interest, looking to remote consequences, and taking a 
wide view. See Note D. at the end of the chapter. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 263 

seriously infringed by the elimination of the women* 
and children; and in the European States, the number 
of adult males exercising political franchises is reduced 
by various qualifications of property, residence, taxation, 
&c. In all these cases, the exclusion is made on the 
ground of unfitness for exercising the powers of govern- 
ment. The principle of fitness is further practically 
recognised by popular constituencies, as well as by 
popular representative assemblies, in the manner pointed 
out in the last chapter. 

The system of party, as has already been remarked, 
is one of the most potent means by which the principle 
of authority is rendered predominant over numbers, and 
the votes of the majority are brought under the control 
of a few persons. In almost all free States, the com- 
munity — so far as it takes an active concern in public 
affairs — is divided into two or more parties, each pro- 
vided with chiefs or leaders, who guide their policy, and 
each recognising some common doctrine or principle ot 



* Mr. Bayley, in his work on the Rationale of Political Repre- 
sentation, discusses at length the question of the exclusion of 
women from the elective franchise, (pp. 236 — 42.) He discards at 
once the argument, that their interest is involved in that of the 
male sex; since, as he truly states, the interest (or at least the 
supposed interest) of men and women is often not identical. He 
might have added, that if the interests of men and women 
are identical, there is no apparent reason why the women should 
not govern, and the men be excluded from the franchise. Mr. 
Bayley is a good deal embarrassed by this question; and after 
showing an inclination to the qualified admission of women, he 
ends by deciding the question, with reference to England, on 
special grounds. Women, he remarks, in boroughs, not being in 
general householders, would not be entitled to vote; and the fran- 
chise might be conferred on widows and single women, keeping 
houses of the requisite value. With respect to the admission of 
women into a supreme legislative assembly, he says nothing. 



264 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

action. In the ancient republics, these parties were 
founded on the distinction between the aristocratic and 
democratic interests, that distinction being differently 
determined at different historical periods — at one time, 
a few noble families against the rest of the citizens — 
at another, the rich indiscriminately against the middle 
class and the poor. In the Italian republics, the cele- 
brated party division of Guelfs and Grhibellines was de- 
rived from the conflict between the Emperor and the 
Pope; afterwards other party distinctions, as that of 
the Neri and Bianchi at Florence, were founded on 
incidents peculiar to each State. The party distinctions 
of modern times, beginning in England with the Civil 
War, and pervading both State and Church, are too well 
known to require more than a reference to them. It has 
been perceived from an early time, that organization is 
as necessary for success in political as in military affairs ; 
and that any political cause or principle is more likely 
to prevail, if its adherents, sinking minor points of dif- 
ference, act together under a common leader.* The 
interest of persons desirous of establishing certain poli- 
tical principles, has thus led them to merge their own 
individuality in the body, and to defer spontaneously to 
the principle of authority. 

We are now looking at political party on its favorable 
side; but the benefits which it tends to produce, by re- 
ducing to unity the discordant actions of a multitude, 
and by substituting the ascendancy of qualified leaders 
for the unchecked operation of the numerical principle, 



* Livy describes the plebeians, in their secession to the Mons 
Sacer, after the affair of Virginia, as unable to answer the mes- 
sengers of the senate, not because the}' had nothing to say, but 
because they had no leader (III. 50). Upon which event, 
Machiavel remarks : " La qual cosa dimostra appunto la inutilita 
d'una moltitudine senza capo." — Disc. I. 44. See above, c. 7, § 12. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 265 

are subject to serious deductions on account of the abuses 
to which it is liable. These abuses are so serious, as 
often to outweigh the advantages which would otherwise 
spring from the system. They may, for the most part, 
be referred to two heads: viz., 1st, the choice of bad 
leaders, and, 2nd, the hatred of the opposite party ; on 
both which subjects we shall make some remarks lower 
down, in connexion with the abuses to which the prin- 
ciple of authority is incident.* 

A leader of a political party, or a person in whom the 
people have confidence, and for whom they entertain re- 
spect, may, if he be inclined, often sooth them, and incline 
them to reasonable counsels when in a state of excite- 
ment ; according to the well-known description of Virgil : 

Ac veluti magno in populo cum saspe coorta est 

Seditio, saevitque animis ignobile vulgus; 

Jamque faces et saxa volant; furor arma ministrat; 

Turn pietate gravem et meritis si forte virum quern 

Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant; 

Ille regit dictis animos, et pectora mulcet. (JEJn. I. 148.t) 

Similar in its nature to the system of political party, 
(as subordinating the minds of many to a few, and 
turning them to a common object), is the system of 
association within a State for a definite political purpose. 
Associations of this sort have been often formed in free 
States, and have been attended with important effects. 
It has been, for some time past, a constant practice in 
this country to form associations for accomplishing certain 
public ends, and agitating certain political questions, 
whether connected with the reform of the law, the educa- 
tion of the people, pauperism, emigration, health, trade, 
or other subjects of general interest. In the United 



* Below, c. 10, § 7. 

f See Machiavel, Disc. I. 54, who refers to some historical ex- 
amples. 



266 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

States, numerous associations have likewise been formed 
for similar purposes.* By associations of this sort, 
the political influence and energies of large numbers 
are collected into a single focus, and brought to bear 
on a common point. They likewise call public atten- 
tion forcibly to the policy or measure which they are 
desirous of promoting; and they are often the means 
of throwing much light upon it, by bringing into 
existence, and training up, a set of persons who devote a 
large part of their time and thoughts to its illustration. f 
The influence of such associations is further increased 
by their preparation and diffusion of printed works, and 
their connexion with the newspaper press, of which more 
will be said presently. The whole of this influence is 
necessarily set in motion and directed by a few minds, 
whom the body of the members of the association follow 
as their leaders for this limited object. 

Generally it may be affirmed that, in proportion as the 
mass of the people are in a reasonable and well-disposed 



* M. de Tocqueville, De la Democratie en Amerique, torn. III. 
p. 231, appears to think that the United States are the only coun- 
try in which the principle of political associations is extensively 
used : " II n'y a qu'une nation sur la terre (he says) ou Ton use 
chaque jour de la liberte illimitee de s'associer dans les vues poli- 
tiques." But this assertion is equally true of England. 

t Tocqueville, ib. torn. II. p. 31 : " Une association consiste 
seulement dans l'adhesion publique que donnent un certain nombre 
d'individus a telles ou telles doctrines, et dans l'engagement qu'ils 
contractent de concourir d'une certaine facon a les faire prevaloir. . 
Quand une opinion est representee par une association, elle est 
obligee de prendre une forme plus nette et plus precise. Elle 
compte ses partisans et les compromet dans sa cause. Ceux-ci 
apprennent eux-memes a se connaitre les uns les autres, et leur 
ardeur s'accroit de leur nombre. L'association reunit en faisceau 
les efforts des esprits divergens, et les pousse avec vigueur vers un 
seul but clairement indique par elle." See below, ch. 9, § 20. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 267 

state of mind, they will make a good choice of their poli- 
tical leader ; that they will watch his conduct and scruti- 
nize his motives with an enlightened jealousy, but will, 
to a considerable extent, defer to his judgment, if 
his general behaviour should show him to be worthy of 
confidence. 

§ 4. The numerical principle is further controlled by 
the principle of special fitness, through the agency of 
the representative system of government. 

In the small city republics of antiquity, every citizen 
could, with little or no difficulty, attend the general 
assembly, the ecclesia or comitia, and the popular courts 
of justice. There was, therefore, in these minute and 
simply organized commonwealths, no physical impe- 
diment to a direct personal exercise, by each citizen, of 
his share of the sovereign power. When, however, the 
dominion of Eome was extended to the whole of Italy, 
and the Italian allies had fought their way to the rights 
of citizenship, it was found that the old system of 
government was no longer applicable, and the Eoman 
world submitted to a monarchical regimen. Since the 
middle age, a partition of the governing powers was, to 
a certain extent, recognised in the European States under 
a royal chief; and the power of granting supplies or 
aids to the crown, and, to some extent, of concurring in 
the enactment of laws, was generally admitted to reside 
in the estates of the realm — the clergy, nobles, and 
commons. Hence arose naturally the expedient of de- 
puting delegates from these bodies, or from the more 
numerous of them — the Commons — to represent the 
entire estate in negotiating with the Crown.* 



* The principles of representative government are stated in Lord 
Brougham's Pol Phil vol. III. p. 33. 



268 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

Such was the origin of the representative principle of 
government, which has become the foundation of the 
political edifice in the modern civilized world — has spread 
over a large part of Europe since 1815, and is likely 
to become universal in all countries above the semi- 
barbarous stage of society. 

This system, while it secures to the popular voice a 
decisive share in the conduct of the government, tends, 
by the several means described above, to give consider- 
able weight to the opinion of a few fit judges, and to 
substitute a firmer and more fixed rule of decision for 
the fluctuating and unconnected opinions of a large mul- 
titude. That tendency is further strengthened, if it be 
admitted that a representative is to judge for himself on 
public questions, taking for his general standard the 
welfare of the entire community, and not to act as the 
mere organ or delegate of his own constituency. 

Those, indeed, who wish to give the widest effect to the 
numerical principle of government, maintain that the 
representative ought to be a sort of envoy, sent from his 
constituents to treat with the other members of the 
supreme assembly — and, moreover, an envoy bound by 
his instructions, and not an envoy plenipotentiary.* 
But in taking this view of the functions of a deputy to a 



* According to M. de Tocqueville, this view of the position of a 
representative is gaining ground in the United States: " II se 
repand de plus en plus, aux Etats-Unis, une coutume qui finira par 
rendre vaines les garanties du gouvernement representatif : il arrive 
tres frequemment, que les electeurs, en nommant un depute, lui 
tracent un plan de conduite et lui imposent un certain nombre d'obli- 
gations positives dont il ne saurait nullement s'ecarter. Au tumulte 
pres, c'est comme si la majorite elle-meme deliberait sur la place 
publique." — La Democratic en Amerique, torn. III. p. 138. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 269 

supreme legislative body, they can scarcely have fully 
considered the consequences which it involves, or at- 
tempted to reconcile it with the working of such an 
assembly. Unless the proceedings of a legislative as- 
sembly are to be so paralyzed as nearly to deprive it of 
all independent action, its members must be allowed to 
originate motions and propositions, and numerous ques- 
tions will be brought before it by petition or message 
from other quarters. To these may be added, questions 
respecting the mode of transacting its business, the ap- 
pointment of select committees, and other matters re- 
lating to the procedure of the assembly. By these 
various means, numerous questions will arise from day 
to day which could not be anticipated, and as to which 
reference must be made by each member to his consti- 
tuents. In whatever way these references were disposed 
of, a delay would ensue, which would render the trans- 
action of business to any large amount, by a body so 
fettered, wholly impracticable. Furthermore, when the 
question has been remitted to the constituency for its 
decision, how is the decision to be obtained ? A con- 
stituency is not a deliberative body, which can meet in 
one place* discuss a question, and come to a vote upon 
it. Every such question would have to be decided, with- 
out joint deliberation, by a poll. The cumbrousness, 
imperfection, and even expense, of this process would 
render such a mode of government intolerable. An 
attempt to govern the United Kingdom by polling every 
constituency, upon all the questions involved in the daily 
business of Parliament, is so manifestly absurd, that the 
mere statement of it is a sufficient refutation. The Diet of 
a Federal Union might transact business on these terms ; 
but only provided that the questions were few in number, 



270 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

and the instructions were decided by a small deliberative 
assembly sitting in each State.* If, however, an assembly 
consisted only of members acting on positive instructions, 
it would be without any deliberative character, as its 
decision would, in each case, be predetermined, and 
each deputy would only have to vote as directed. An 
assembly composed of such puppets would be destitute 
of dignity or importance, and might as well not exist. 
It would be sufficient for a central office to collect the 
votes of the several constituencies, and to add them 
together, without giving each constituency the trouble 
of sending a messenger to convey its decision. It may 
be added that, even in the case of ambassadors, or other 
representative agents employed by a sovereign govern- 
ment, where instructions to a certain extent are neces- 
sary, experience has shown that the most successful plan 
is to select a person of ability, prudence, and honesty, 
and to give him a considerable latitude of discretion. 
Those governments and those ministers have, in general, 



* This is the case with the Swiss Diet, according to the descrip- 
tion of Mr. G-rote, in his Letters on the Politics of Switzerland: 
" It is to be remarked that every deputy present votes, not agree- 
ably to any opinion of his own, but to instructions received from 
the Great Council, or supreme legislative authority, in his own 
Canton; which may sometimes, though this does not often happen, 
confer upon him plenary powers of self-decision upon some given 
subject; but, excepting in these cases, the instructions prepared 
in each separate Canton include conditions, or adopt modifications, 
different from each other, which usually prevent any number of 

deputies from concurring in one substantive proposition In 

fact, the forms and language of the Diet consider each deputy as 
an ambassador from his Canton; he is always styled 'Der Gesandte 
des Standes — ' by the president, when inviting the opinions of 
every one at the table seriatim, and most frequently so styled 
throughout the course of discussion." (p. 28.) 



VIII.J TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 271 

been best served who have been careful in the selection 
of their instruments, but have given them large powers, 
and have treated them with confidence and consideration ; 
and a similar remark is applicable to the relation of a 
constituency and its representative. 

It has long been the established doctrine among con- 
stitutional authorities in this country, that a member of 
the Commons' House of Parliament represents the entire 
kingdom, and not merely the district for which he is 
returned.* The question of instructions or pledges has, 
however, been agitated for a long series of years ; though 
the public have always returned to the conviction, that 
any legally binding restraint upon the conduct of mem- 
bers of Parliament is neither expedient nor practicable. 
Humef remarked long ago that this question is, in fact, 
one of degree ; all admit, he says, that a member ought 
to attach some weight to the views of his constituents; 
all admit that he is not absolutely bound by their instruc- 
tions. The difficulty is, to hit the right mean between 
these extremes. It cannot, indeed, be disputed, that it 
is the duty of every representative to watch over the 
peculiar interests of that district which he more imme- 
diately represents, and to which he is directly respon- 



* Speaking of the Commons' House of Parliament, Blackstone 
says: " Every member, though chosen by one particular district, 
when elected and returned serves for the whole realm. For the 
end of his coming thither is not particular, but general; not barely 

to advantage his constituents, but the common wealth And 

therefore he is not bound, like a deputy in the United Provinces, 
to consult with, or take the advice of, his constituents upon any 
particular point, unless he himself thinks it proper or prudent so 
to do." — Comment, vol. I. p. 159; and see Lord Brougham, Pol. 
Phil. vol. III. c. 6. 

t Essays, Part I. Ess. 4. ( Works, vol. III. p. 36.) 



272 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

sible; and to secure, so far as lie is able, that a due 
regard be paid to its interests, in connexion with the 
general interests of the community. But he must not 
pursue that interest exclusively, or make it his para- 
mount object, as if he belonged to a federal diet, in 
which each member is an ambassador from a sovereign 
and independent State, treating with the other ambassa- 
dors according to his instructions.* 

The practice of binding members by peremptory in- 
structions obtains in the Hungarian Parliament ; and it 
cannot properly be considered as belonging to a demo- 
cratic, more than to an aristocratic form of government. 
It is, in fact, the mark of a narrow and jealous spirit, 
not comprehending the true spirit of the representative 
system, and it is sure to give way in proportion as that 
system is well understood. 

By the various means which have been adverted to, 
the principle of simple numerical equality within a repre- 
sentative assembly and a popular constituency is power- 
fully controlled and modified, in practice, by the principle 
of personal worth and fitness. In most countries, too, 
where a representative constitution exists, the principle 
of numerical equality is further encroached upon by 
limitations, more or less considerable, of the political 
suffrage, f 

* The subject of instructions to representatives, in a supreme 
legislature, is discussed by Mr. Bayley, in his Rationale of Repre- 
sentative Government, p. 122-37; and as to pledges, see pp. 313-26. 
As to the representation of local interests, see p. 137. 

f Respecting the limitation of the elective suffrage by quali- 
fications founded on property and age, see Bayley, Rationale of 
Repres. Government, p. 230-5. 

Aristotle remarks, that the oligarchical principle of personal 
worth dependent on wealth, and the democratic principle of entire 
political equality, were, in general, carried too far in the Greek 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 273 

§ 5. It will be proper here to advert to the remarks 
made by M. de Tocqueville, upon the ill effect of what he 
has termed the " omnipotence," the " tyranny," and the 
"despotism," of the majority, in the United States ; # 
inasmuch as they bear directly upon the subject we are 
now considering. 

We have already had occasion to observe that, what- 
ever is the supreme governing power in a State, its 
action is legally uncontrolled. If this be what is meant 



oligarchies and democracies; the Few thought that, because they 
were unequal in something, they ought to be unequal in every- 
thing; the Many, that because they were equal in something, they 
ought to be equal in everything. Hence, they drove these prin- 
ciples to extremes, and the governments were unstable. Where- 
fore, he adds, the principle of (absolute) numerical equality ought 
to be mixed with the principle of (proportionate) equality, according 
to personal worth. Pol. V. I. 

* "La toute-puissance me semble en soi une chose mauvaise et 
dangereuse. Son exercice me parait au-dessus des forces de 
l'homme, quel qu'il soit, et je ne vois que Dieu qui puisse sans 
danger etre tout-puissant, parceque sa sagesse et sa justice sont 
toujours egales a, son pouvoir. II n'y a done pas sur la terre d'au- 
torite si respectable en elle-meme, ou revetue d'un droit si sacre, 
que je voulusse laisser agir sans controle et dominer sans obstacles. 
. . . . Ce que je reproche le plus au gouvernement democratique, 
tel qu'on l'a organise aux Etats-Unis, ce n'est pas, comme beaucoup 
de gens le pretendent en Europe, sa faiblesse; mais au contraire sa 
force irresistible. Et ce qui me repugne le plus en Amerique, ce 
n'est pas l'extreme liberte qui y regne, e'est le peu de garantie qu'on 
y trouve contre la tyrannic" — La Democratic en Amerique, torn. II. 
p. 148. The whole of this reasoning is founded on the erroneous 
supposition that it is possible, in any form of government, to make 
the sovereign government legally responsible. The majority in 
the United States is omnipotent in the same sense in which the 
Parliament in England is said to be omnipotent — that is to say, its 
power is subject to no legal limitation. 

T 



274 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

by tyranny, the power of the Many is tyrannical in a 
democracy; but it is only tyrannical in the sense in 
which the power of the One is tyrannical in a monarchy, 
and of the Few in an aristocracy. To speak of tyrannical 
power in such a sense is, in fact, merely to affirm the 
admitted fact, (or rather the identical proposition,) that 
a sovereign government is not subject to any legal 
control. 

Those, however, who complain of the tyranny of the 
majority in the United States, probably have in view 
chiefly its moral influence, and not its legal power — or, at 
least, the combination of the one with the other.* 

Now, it is inevitable that the prevailing opinions and 
sentiments of the people, in every country, should in- 
fluence the public expression of thought. This is not in 
any way peculiar to America. The main difference 
between the United States and many European countries 
is, that in the former the press is legally free, while in 



* "De nos jours, les souverains les plus absolus de l'Europe ne 
sauraient empecher certaines pensees hostiles a leur autorite, de 
circuler sourdement dans leurs Etats et jusqu'au sein de leur cours. 
II n'en est de meme en Amerique: tant que la majorite est dou- 
teuse, on parle; mais des qu'elle s'est irrevocableinent prononcee, 
chacun se tait; et amis comme ennemis semblent alors s'attacherde 
concert a, son char. . . . Je ne connais pas de pays ou. il regne en 
general moins d'independance d'esprit et de veritable liberte de 

discussion qu'en Amerique En Amerique, la majorite trace 

un cercle formidable autour de la pensee. Au dedans de ces 
limites, l'ecrivain est libre, mais malheur a lui s'il ose en sortir. 
Ce n'est pas qu'il ait a craindre un auto-da-fe, [or, it may be added, 
a prosecution by the government, or a seizure by the police,] mais 
il est en butte a des degouts de tous genres, et a des persecutions 
de tous les jours. La carriere politique lui est fermee; il a offense 
la seule puissance qui ait la faculte de l'ouvrir; on lui refuse tout, 
jusqu'a la gloire." — lb. pp. 152-4. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 275 

the latter it is (or was till lately) subject to severe re- 
strictions. That there are many subjects on which, in 
the United States, a writer, perhaps without independent 
means of subsistence, may be unwilling to offend public 
opinion, cannot be doubted ; but similar prudential con- 
siderations will be found to influence the writers of all 
countries.* For the expression of political opinions in 
the United States, there appears to be the utmost prac- 
tical liberty, and the fullest opportunity. Every section 
and shade of opinion, every local interest, every part of 
the country, seems to possess its organ in the press. On 
the question of slavery, opinion has of late years been 
peculiarly envenomed, and attempts have been made by 
the predominant slaveholding interest to suppress the 
agitation of the question of emancipation by force ; but 
these efforts have been only partially successful, and 
have met with much resistance. On philosophical ques- 
tions, there may be less liberty of thought ; but this, as 



* For a proof (if any be needed) of the discouragement afforded 
by public opinion to men of science and original thinkers, in 
countries not democratic, see Montesquieu's description in his 
Lettres Persanes, No. 145. He says that formerly every man of 
science was accused of magic; he is now accused of irreligion: 
" S'il ecrit quelque histoire, et qu'il ait de la noblesse dans l'esprit, 
et quelque droiture dans le cceur, on lui suscite mille persecutions. 
On ira contre lui soulever le magistrat, sur un fait qui s'est passe 
il y a mille ans; et on voudra que sa plume soit captive, si elle n'est 
pas venale." He concludes thus: " Enfin il faut joindre a une 
reputation equivoque, la privation des plaisirs, et la perte de la 
sante." 

" Monarchies (says Hume) receiving their chief stability from a 
superstitious reverence to priests and princes, have commonly 
abridged the liberty of reasoning with regard to religion and 
politics, and consequently metaphysics and morals. All these form 
the most considerable branches of science." — Essays, Part I. Ess. 14. 

T 2 



276 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

we shall remark below, is only common to America with 
other countries. 

It is further complained that the omnipotence of the 
majority in the United States creates a habit of adula- 
tion towards the people, which lowers the morality of 
public men, by rendering them servile and insincere; 
and, in short, by giving them the character of the 
mob-courtier.* 

But it is vain to hope that this evil can be pre- 
vented by any constitutional arrangement ; by any 
modification of the form of government. Men will, in 
every State, find out the real seat of power ; and many 
will seek to gain the favour of its possessors by flattering 
their vanity, by exaggerating their good qualities, and 
by practising the various arts of cajolery, and affected 
attachment, and simulated deference, which are likely 
to serve their immediate purpose. Incense of this 
sort will be offered up on every altar, whatever may 
be the divinity to whose worship the temple is dedi- 
cated. Certainly, there never yet has been any 
country where power has not had its interested 
worshippers. In America, however, as in other free 
countries, the mere opposition of parties renders it nearly 
certain, that no defect in the conduct of the government 
will long remain unnoticed ; and whatever sensitiveness 
the people may there exhibit with respect to the expo- 



* Tocqueville, ib. pp. 158, 160. M. de Tocqueville makes at 
the end this admission: " Pour moi, je crois que dans tous les gou- 
vernemens, quels qu'ils soient, la bassesse s'attachera a la force, et 
la flatterie au pouvoir. Et je ne connais qu'un moyen d'empecher 
que les hommes ne se degradent : c'est de n'accorder a personne, 
avec la toute-puissance, le souverain pouvoir de les avilir." — p. 161. 
The question, therefore, returns to the former difficulty: whether it 
is possible to impose any legal check on a sovereign government. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 277 

sure of their own defects,* it is certain that this has 
not been either a universal or even a common weakness 
in national character. The people of Athens assembled 
to hear themselves unmercifully ridiculed, and even per- 
sonified on the stage, in the witty comedies of Aristophanes ; 
and Machiavel accounts for the erroneous belief as to the 
peculiar inconstancy and folly of the people, by saying 
that, under a popular government, every one speaks ill 
of the people with freedom and without fear; whereas 
no one speaks of an absolute Prince without a thousand 
fears and precautions. f 

In all countries, the prevailing tone of public opinion 
will exercise much influence on the expression of thought. 
Its influence will perhaps be greater in free countries, as 
in these the government has little power of protecting 
an unpopular minority. But the only effectual remedy 
for the evil, is the diffusion of a tolerant principle of 
judgment, and the disposition to respect the opinions of 
those who are qualified to form sound conclusions on 
each subject, and who give to the public the result of 
diligent, conscientious, and independent investigations. 
It is impossible that all men should be equally well- 



* " Chez les nations les plus fieres de l'ancien monde, on a 
publie des ouvrages destines a peindre fidelement les vices et les 
ridicules des contemporains. . . . Mais la puissance qui domine aux 
Etats-Unis n'entend point ainsi qu'on la joue. Le plus leger 
reproche la blesse, la moindre verite piquante l'effarouche ; et il 
faut qu'on loue depuis les formes de son langage jusqu'a ses plus 
solides vertus. Aucun ecrivain, quelle que soit sa renommee, ne 
peut echapper a cette obligation d'encenser ses concitoyens." — 
Ibid. p. 155. 

t L'opinione contro ai Popoli nasce perche de' popoli ciascun 
dice male senza paura e liberamente mentre che regnano; de' Prin- 
cipi si parla sempre con mille paure e mille rispetti. — Disc. I. 58. 



278 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

informed, and equally competent to judge for themselves ; 
but it is possible that they should learn to treat with 
lenity the opinions of a dissident minority. 

The virtuous man, firmly anchored to his own prin- 
ciples, not tossed about on the waves of popular favour 
or caprice, nor making himself the organ of the fury or 
folly of the people, but pursuing their interest against 
their wishes, is a subject of just admiration. On the 
other hand, it is to be remembered that good men have 
been persecuted by rulers, as well as impelled to error or 
crime by the populace; and that it is an equally edi- 
fying spectacle to see wisdom, or patriotism, or virtue, 
struggling against the oppression of the Few, as resisting 
the impetuous violence of the Many. 

Justum et tenacem propositi virum 
Non civium ardor prava jubentium, 

Non vultus instantis tyranni, 

Mente quatit solida. 

§ 6. It follows, from what has been said in this and 
the preceding chapter, that popular government, as now 
understood and carried into effect, for large territories, 
by means of the representative system, is to a great 
extent founded, legally and theoretically, upon the nume- 
rical principle; but that, morally and in practice, the 
working of this principle is modified, counteracted, and 
crossed in various directions, by the influence of the 
antagonist principle of special fitness.* In arranging the 



* " Nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human 
affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the 
many are governed by the few, and the implicit submission with 
which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of 
their rulers. When we inquire by what means this wonder is 
effected, we shall find that, as force is always on the side of the 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 279 

terms of this compromise, and in adapting them to a 
given community, lies the secret of a free constitution. 

A compromise of this kind (as we have already had 
occasion to remark in reference to the subject of De- 
cision by a majority), necessarily implies a junction and 
an amalgamation of opposite principles. It supposes 
that sufficient weight will be given to the numerical prin- 
ciple, for interesting the bulk of the community in the 
existing order of things, and attaching them to the 
government; while such an admixture of the principle 
of special fitness will be secured, as will prevent the 
government from falling into the hands of persons who, 
from their ignorance, inexperience, or want of judgment, 
are incapable of properly directing its course. 

The practical solution of this problem, so as to be 
attended with a reasonable amount of success, is perhaps 
the highest achievement of statesmanship, especially as 
it is always involved, to a greater or less extent, in a 
circulus vitiosus, from which no ingenuity can find an 
effectual escape. The difficulty to which we allude will 
appear from the following explanation. 

In proportion as any community is in a low state of 
civilization — as the people are turbulent, lazy, ignorant, 
improvident, and poor — as life and property are insecure, 



governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion." 
— Hume, Essays, Part I. 4: Of the first Principles of Government 
Upon consideration it will, I think, appear, that no means so 
effectual for giving weight to the opinion of a few competent per- 
sons as representative institutions have ever been devised. In the 
first place, each constituency select a person in whom they confide, 
and by whom they are willing to be represented; in the next place, 
the assembly formed of these representatives is in great measure 
guided by the opinions of the persons who lead the respective par- 
ties or sections of which it is composed. 



280 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

and as the different classes of society are alienated from 
each other — in the same proportion is the need of a 
good and enlightened government great, and the ad- 
vantages to be derived from its action important. 

Nevertheless, the chances of its being well governed 
are in the inverse ratio of the magnitude of the need, 
and of the advantage. When the people are in the state 
described, it is not likely that they will make a good 
choice of representatives or leaders. The government 
resulting from their selection is not likely to enact wise 
laws, or to administer the laws with equity, discretion, 
impartiality and integrity; nor, if they fail in these 
respects, is it probable that they will be impelled into a 
right course by the pressure of public opinion. The 
action of the people upon their representatives may be 
expected to realize the image of the blind leading the 
blind.* 

On the other hand, if a community has arrived at an 
advanced stage of civilization — and is orderly, frugal, 
industrious, well-instructed, and wealthy, it may indeed 
be seriously injured by a bad government, but can 
scarcely hope to receive much benefit from a good one. 
Nevertheless, its government is more likely to be good 
than that of the other community; inasmuch as the 



* Speaking of the general body of electors in any country, Mr. 
Bayley says: "In proportion to their ignorance, will they easily 
surrender themselves to the delusions of crafty impostors, and the 
designs of clevep but unprincipled men. In the same proportion, 
also, will they be liable to be the sport of sudden impulses and 
violent gusts of passion, beyond the control of reason and virtue. 
No political arrangements can transmute the effects of ignorance 
into those of knowledge, or bring it to pass that an unenlightened 
people can be as well governed under free institutions as an en- 
lightened one." — Rationale of Rep. Government, p. 216. 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 281 

people are likely to choose good representatives, and 
public opinion will exercise a beneficial control upon 
them and the executive government, when elected and 
acting. 

The practical result is, that a community is least 
likely to obtain a good representative government when 
it is most wanted, and most likely to obtain one when 
it is least wanted. 

Hence it might be thought, that a nation in a low 
state of civilization is most likely to be well-governed 
by an absolute monarch; and many persons, contem- 
plating the ineffectual struggles after an improved 
management of public affairs made by such a commu- 
nity, have sighed after an enlightened despotism. Setting 
aside the advantages to be derived from the gradual 
political training of a people by free popular institu- 
tions, it may be admitted that a really enlightened 
despotism would, in such a case, often be the surest and 
most direct road to good government. But the difficulty 
is, to insure an enlightened despotism; for experience 
certainly does not lead us to believe that wise and good 
despots are easily found. It is by the dextrous assump- 
tion of this very doubtful question that Darius, in the 
supposed debate of the seven Persian conspirators, re- 
ported in Herodotus — the earliest discussion upon the 
respective advantages of the three forms of government — 
proves the superiority of absolute monarchy. " Upon 
the hypothesis (he says) that each government is the 
best of its kind — that there is the best monarch, the 
best oligarchy, and the best people — I affirm that mo- 
narchy is the preferable form of government."* If this 
hypothesis be admitted to the advocate of despotism, his 



* Herod. III. 82. 



282 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

main difficulty is removed. For the chief objection to a 
pure monarchy is, that it leaves to chance the character 
of the sovereign; whereas, in an aristocracy and a de- 
mocracy, some securities exist for a due selection of the 
persons exercising the supreme power. To which it 
may be added, that in a country in a low state of civili- 
zation, an enlightened despot would find his measures 
counteracted by the resistance of the people, or marred 
in their operation by the want of fit instruments for 
their enforcement. 



Notes to Chapter VIII. 

Note A. (page 254.) 



See the speech of Megabyzus, in Herod. III. 81, recommending 

oligarchy: b/i'iXov yap axprjiov ovSev kariv a^vvsruTtpov ovde vfipiCTorspov. 

Kwg yap av yivuxricoi, og ovt' sdtdaxOt] ovde olds icaXbv ovdev ovd' 

oikyiiov, u>9eei ts sfX7re<TO}v ra Trprjyuara avev voov, \eijidpp(^ Trorajxip 'lkiXoq. 

Compare Demosth. de Fals. Leg. p. 383. 

With respect to popular government in the Italian republics, 
Muratori makes the following remark : " Hassi ora di osservare che 
quantunque non si possa negare, che molti comodi e beni talora 
provvennero dal reggimento popolare; tuttavia certo e altresi, che 
non lievi incomodi se ne provarono una volta; perch e non e atto 
abbastanza il popolo ignorante e rozzo, e nulla pratico del politico 
governo, e sovente suggetto a torbide passioni, di prendere saggie 
ed utili risoluzioni ne' grandi affari; e massimamente se interviene 
a' consigli la matta feccia del popolo, e dalla pluralita de' voti 
dipende la determinazion delle cose." He then cites the following 
passage from Ferreto's Cronica, respecting a war of the Paduans 
against Venice: " Ad hasc plebiscita vocati sunt plebis magistratus, 
et inanis populi multitudo, qui, velut aestuans dictabat impetus, fieri 
prorsus densis vocibus clamitabant. Nempe vesana est vulgi 
latrantis opinio, quum imperite judicium profert de rebus incognitis. 
Quid enim huic cum virtu te, cum prudentia? Quid temperatum 
aut forte est? Vendant opifices, emantque merces sordidas. Fabri 
incudes feriant, et ceteri illiberalium cultores artium sua lucra 
provideant; non se gravibus optimisque viris, quoties de virtute 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 283 

agitur, stolidi inserant; quod non intelligunt, discutere nolint; nee 
velut putant, id bonum esse fateantur." — (Muratori, Diss. 52; 
torn. III. p. 128.) This passage contains a distinct statement of 
the doctrine that the government ought to be vested in the intelli- 
gent and virtuous few, and that the ignorant and turbulent many- 
ought to be excluded. There is likewise mixed with it the ancient 
Greek prejudice against riyy ai fiavavaot. 

The same views occur in the treatise of Bodinus On Govern- 
ment : " Et quidem mirum debet videri, si plebs imperita, id est, 
multorum capitum immanis quaedam hydra, rectam ullam sententiam 
ferat. Certe quidem ab imperita multitudine consilium rerum 
gerendarum petere, aliud nihil est, quam a furioso sanitatem. . . . 
Quid autem absurdius, quam pro legibus habere levis et imperitae 
multitudinis temeritatem, quae ad mandandos honores caeco saepius 
et inconsiderato impetu quam certo et explorato judicio fertur? 
Quid magis furiosum, quam extremis reipublicae periculis ab insana 
plebe consilium petere? nihil enim injussi magistratus obire possunt; 
nee si possint, velint; et ut velint tamen [non] audent, perterriti 
furore plebis, quae adversos casus ac sua peccata regerit in ipsos 
magistratus."— Bodinus de Rep. VI. 4, pp. 1087, 1088. This 
treatise was published in 1576. See Bayle, Diet, in v. Note D. 



Note B. (page 257.) 

" In choosing persons for all employments, they have more re- 
gard to good morals than to great abilities; for, since government is 
necessary to mankind, they believe that the common size of under- 
standing is fitted to some station or other, and that Providence 
never intended to make the management of public affairs a mystery, 
to be comprehended only by a few persons of sublime genius, of 
which there seldom are three born in an age. But they suppose 
truth, justice, temperance, and the like, to be in every man's power, 
the practice of which virtues, assisted by experience and a good 
intention, would qualify any man for the service of his country, 
except where a course of study is required. But they thought the 
want of moral virtues was so far from being supplied by superior 
endowments of the mind, that employments could never be put 
into such dangerous hands as those of persons so qualified; and, at 
least, that the mistakes committed by ignorance, in a virtuous dis- 
position, would never be of such fatal consequence to the public 
weal as the practices of a man whose inclinations led him to be 



284 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. 

corrupt, and who had great abilities to manage, to multiply, and 
defend his corruptions." — Gulliver's Travels, Lilliput, p. 81. 

The above remarks of Swift represent what may be considered, 
at present, as the popular and prevailing view of the subject. It 
seems to be generally thought, that good intentions in a ruler are 
the first consideration, and that, provided he desires to benefit the 
community, his capacity for judging of the best means for ac- 
complishing his end is of secondary importance. Nevertheless, 
experience has shown that the delusions of short-sighted benevolence 
have been productive of very mischievous consequences to nations. 

Elsewhere, Swift expresses similar opinions as to the sufficiency 
of unaided common sense for conducting the affairs of civil govern- 
ment. 

" He confined the knowledge of governing within very narrow 
bounds — to common sense and reason, to j ustice and lenity, to the 
speedy determination of civil and criminal causes, with some other 
obvious topics, which are not worth considering. And he gave it 
for his opinion, that whoever could make two ears of corn, or two 
blades of grass, to grow upon a spot of ground, where only one 
grew before, would deserve better of mankind, and do more essen- 
tial service to his country, than the whole race of politicians put 
together." — iJ., Brobdignag, p. 228. 

According to this last doctrine, an improving farmer would 
confer a greater benefit on his country than the most enlightened 
and patriotic statesman. This is not Cicero's opinion: "Neque 
enim est ulla res in qua propius ad Deorum numen virtus accedat 
humana, quam civitates aut condere novas aut conservare jam 
conditas." — De Rep. I. 7. 

The following passage likewise refers to the prevalence of the 
opinion, that common sense is sufficient for the affairs of govern- 
ment: — 

" Un homme d'esprit n'est point jaloux d'un ouvrier qui a tra- 
vaille une bonne epee, ou d'un statuaire qui vient d'achever une 
belle figure. II sait qu'il y a dans ces arts des regies et une 
methode qu'on ne devine point; qu'il y a des outils a manier dont il 
ne connoit ni l'usage, ni le nom, ni la figure; et il lui suffit de 
penser qu'il n'a point fait l'apprentissage d'un certain metier, pour 
se consoler de n'y etre point maitre. II peut au contraire etre sus- 
ceptible d'envie et meme de jalousie contre un ministre et contre 
ceux qui gouvernent, comme si la raison et le bon sens, qui lui sont 
communs avec eux, etoient les seuls instruments qui servent a regir 



VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 285 

un £tat et a presider aux affaires publiques, et qu'ils dussent sup- 
plier aux regies, aux preceptes, a l'experience." — La Bruyere, 
Caracteres. c. 11. 



Note C. (page 258.) 

Aristotle, Pol. VI. 4, says that one of the best forms of govern- 
ment is when all the citizens have the right of judging, and calling 
the magistrates to account, and electing the magistrates; but there 
is a property qualification for the chief offices. The result of this 
is, that while the people exercise their due influence, the best men 
govern, but are subject to responsibility; and irresponsibility, he 
remarks, is too great a trial for the depravity of human nature : 
to yap eTravaKps/xaffOai, Kal firj nav IZsivai ttoiuv on civ do%?j, avfitpspov 
iariv' rj ydp i^ovGia tov TrpaTTtiv on av kOsXy rig ov Svvarat (pvXaTTtiv to kv 
iKaGTy tS>v av9pdJ7T(t)v tpavXov. More. avaytcaZov Gvuflaivetv 07np IgtIv w^sXi- 
pijjTaTov sv Tctig icoXiTtiaig, dpx^v tovq sinsiKug dva/xapTrjTovg ovrag, fxrjdev 
sXaTTovfikvov tov irXrjOovg. 

In another place, the same philosopher points out the fallacious- 
ness of an argument, founded on the supposed analogy between 
government and arts. It had been alleged, as an argument in 
favour of an arbitrary king, as opposed to a government according 
to laws, that a physician ought not to be bound by written rules, but 
should be left to his own discretion. To which Aristotle answers, 
that physicians gain their pay for curing a sick man, and have no 
motive of favour to deprave their judgment; but that persons in- 
vested with political power do many things from grounds of affec- 
tion or dislike. Even physicians, he says, when sick, call in other 
physicians, and trainers for the games employ other trainers, as 
distrusting their own judgment about themselves. — (Pol. III. 11.) 



Note D. (page 262.) 

The principle of numerical equality in government, as the cha- 
racteristic of democracy, is clearly opposed to the principle of special 
worth or fitness by Aristotle, in the following passage: — 

to diicaiov to SrjfioTiKOV to 'Lvov e%siv £gtI /car' dpiOfibv, dXXd firj /car' d%iav' 
tovtov d' ovtoq tov SiKCtiov, to irXrjOog dvayKaiov ilvai Kvpiov, Kal on av do%y 
toTq ttXhogi toii^ dvai Kal tsXoq, Kal tovt slvai to diKaiov <f>acl yap SeXv laov 
lytw Uaorov tS>v ttoXit&v. Pol. VI. 1 ; and lower down he says, that 
to diKaiov to dt]fiOKpaTiKov is to loov f% £lv a-rravTaq fear' dpi9fiov. 



286 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 



CHAPTER IX. 

ON THE PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE 
CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 

§ 1. New opinions, founded on a legitimate process 
of observation and inference, are generally worked out 
in solitude by persons of studious and reflective habits ; 
and they are, when once accredited and established 
among men of science, expounded, illustrated, and dif- 
fused, by popular writers. The two provinces of dis- 
covery and diffusion are usually divided; for the power 
of original thought, and the power of perspicuous ele- 
mentary exposition, are often not combined in the same 
mind. 

Eespecting opinions so formed and so propagated, no 
general proposition can be laid down. Their character 
as to soundness will depend on the peculiarities of the 
several persons with whom they originate ; and the re- 
ception which they meet with from the public will be 
determined by its capacity to form a judgment on the 
matter. For example : the existence of a man with such 
mighty powers of discovery and demonstration as New- 
ton, and the recognition of his doctrines among his con- 
temporaries, depend upon causes which do not admit of 
being generalized. The same remark applies to indivi- 
dual writers belonging to professions, or specially con- 
versant with any subject, who treat the question with 
the authority derived from their own appropriate know- 
ledge and fitness. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 287 

In this chapter, it is proposed to consider what are 
the chief permanent influences, in a modern civilized 
country, for the authentication of opinions; from what 
authoritative sources opinions are chiefly diffused; and 
what securities exist for rendering those guides of 
general opinion trustworthy. It may be observed, how- 
ever, that in treating this question, it is difficult always 
to distinguish the diffusion of opinions by authority, 
from their diffusion by argument; for that which is 
argument to one man, is often authority to another. A 
reasoned proof of a certain position is put forward in 
writing, or in oral discourse; one person may be con- 
vinced by the reasoning, while another, who has not 
followed, or perhaps even become aware of the argument, 
adopts the conclusion, because he has confidence in its 
promulgator. All opinions are diffused by a mixture 
of self-conviction and authority : B believes a general 
truth, because A has proved it ; and C believes it like- 
wise, because B is satisfied with the proof. Thus, in a 
battle, when one part of an army has yielded before an 
overwhelming attack, the other parts retreat — not be- 
cause they are attacked, but because the remainder has 
been repulsed. 

Independently of single writers (who cannot be 
brought under any general description,) the principal 
agents in the authorization and diffusion of opinions may 
be classed under the four following heads : — 

I. The supreme civil government of a country, and 
the persons exercising public functions under it. 

II. The heads of an established church, and of other 
churches or religious bodies. 

III. Subordinate associations for political, scientific, 
literary, and other miscellaneous purposes, including 
universities and places of learning. 



288 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

IV. The periodical press: daily, weekly, monthly, 
and quarterly. 

We will now attempt to ascertain how far each of the 
influences in question operates, and to what extent its 
operation is beneficial, or otherwise, for the purpose under 
consideration. 

§ 2. I. Before we can examine the influence of a 
government in authorizing and propagating opinions, we 
have first to consider the preliminary question — how far 
is it the duty of a government to diffuse and encourage 
truth, and to repress and discourage error? This ques- 
tion divides itself into two branches, — viz., the encou- 
ragement or discouragement of opinions on religion, and 
the encouragement or discouragement of opinions on 
secular subjects. 

In one sense, the province of a government is un- 
limited. There is no subject within the circle of human 
affairs and interests which it does not comprehend. The 
State is called omnipotent — that is to say, it can exercise 
for any purpose, and to any extent, the powers which are 
at its command. But although its province is theo- 
retically unlimited, and its powers theoretically un- 
bounded, there are in practice limits, not only to its 
powers, but to the purposes to which these powers can 
be applied with propriety and advantage. There is no 
subject with which it cannot legally interfere ; but there 
are many subjects with which it cannot fitly interfere. 
Now, when we speak of the duty of the State to inter- 
fere with any matter, there is no other criterion for 
trying this duty than the fitness of the interference. If 
the interference is likely to be attended with advantage 
to the community — if the end to which it is directed be 
good, and it be likely to promote that end, then the duty 
of the State is to interfere. But if, although the end 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 289 

is admitted to be good, the interference of the State is 
not likely to promote its accomplishment, and may even 
tend, on the whole, to counteract it, then it is not the 
duty of the State to interfere. For example, it may be 
conceded to be a desirable object that the maritime slave- 
trade should be suppressed all over the world. But 
whether it be the duty of any particular State to take 
active steps for the suppression of that trade, is a ques- 
tion which depends on the probable success which would 
attend the attempts made for this purpose, and their 
general result. 

The question as to the duty of the State, with respect 
to the encouragement of truth and the discouragement 
of error, must be decided on these grounds. Everybody 
admits that (provided his own standard of judgment be 
adopted) it is right and fitting to encourage truth and 
discourage error. About the desirableness of the end 
there is an universal agreement. That the promotion of 
this end lies, theoretically and legally, within the pro- 
vince of the State — that a government possesses powers 
which can be directed towards this object — is certain. It 
follows that, if the attempt is likely to be attended with 
success, and to be, on the whole, advantageous to the 
community, it ought to be made ;* but that, if the attempt 



* Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. and Pol. Law, part III. c. 2, 
lays it down, that as men's opinions influence their conduct, and 
thus strongly contribute to the good or evil of the State, it is the 
duty of the sovereign to neglect nothing that can contribute to the 
education of youth, to the advancement of the sciences, and to the 
progress of truth. Further, he assigns to the sovereign a right 
of judging of the doctrines publicly taught, and of proscribing all 
those which may be opposite to the public good and tranquillity. 
Hence he infers, that it belongs to the sovereign alone to establish 
academies and public schools of all kinds, and to authorize the 

U 



290 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

is likely to fail, and the cause of truth is not likely to 
be promoted by it, the State ought not to interfere. The 
question, therefore, which we have to consider is, 
whether the State is likely to succeed in promoting truth 
and repressing error. 

In order to arrive at a solution of this problem, we will 
confine ourselves, first, to the influence of the State with 
respect to religious truth — that portion of the subject 
upon which the greatest discrepancy of opinion prevails. 

§ 3. In considering this question, we may limit our- 
selves to Christianity — the religion of the civilized 
world ; and we may begin by observing, that the govern- 
ment of every civilized community may be expected to 
protect the ministers and congregations of all the reco- 
gnised Christian sects in the public exercise of their 
religion, and to confer on them all the rights necessary 
for this purpose. It will, likewise, impose penalties upon 
certain acts which are condemned by all the different 
forms of Christianity, such as blasphemy, and the viola- 
tion of the Lord's Day. An interference to this extent 
is implied in the general recognition of Christianity. 

In order, however, to ascertain how far the State is fit 
to perform the function of encouraging religious truth, 
and discouraging religious error, we must confine our 
view to the distinctive marks of the several Christian 
confessions ; and by religious truth and error, we must 
understand the truth of the peculiar tenets of one sect 
as distinguished from the errors of another sect. Now 



respective professors; also to take care that nothing be taught in 
them, under any pretext, contrary to the fundamental maxims of 
natural law, or to the principles of religion or good politics — in a 
word, nothing capable of producing impressions prejudicial to the 
happiness of the State. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 291 

the fitness of the State for the performance of this func- 
tion depends upon the efficacy of the means at its com- 
mand, applicable to the purpose. These means may be 
reduced to the five following heads : — 

1. Punishment for religious error. 

2. Keward for religious orthodoxy. 

3. Endowment of clergy and of public worship. 

4. Public instruction. 

5. Censorship of the press.* 

Upon the efficacy of these means, or some of them, 
for the establishment of the true form of Christianity in 
a country, as opposed to erroneous, heterodox, and he- 
retical forms, the question before us turns. 

§ 4. Until the age of the Reformation, the received 
doctrine in Christian Europe was, that the State was 
bound to treat religious error as a crime, to legislate pro 



* Mr. Gladstone gives the following enumeration of the modes 
in which it is possible for the State to lend aid to religion: — 

" 1. By the example of its profession and worship. 

" 2. By the adaptation of its laws to the rules of religion, wher- 
ever the same subject matter is within the view of both. 

" 3. By the constitutional recognition of a clerical estate as one of 
the great forces of society, and suitable provision for its action in 
that capacity. 

" 4. By supplying the temporal or pecuniary means for the pro- 
pagation of the national creed. 

"5. By repressive measures, such as the laws against blasphemy. 

" 6. By such general and indirect influences upon the quality of 
subjective religion, and upon the permanency or purity of sacred 
institutions, as result from a connexion between the Church and 
the State." — The State in its Relations with the Church, vol. I. 
ch. 4, § 65. 

The second, fifth, and sixth of these modes would be satisfied by 
a general recognition of Christianity, without giving a preference 
to any peculiar form of it. The first, third, and fourth, amount 
merely to the endowment of the clergy of a particular sect. 

u2 



292 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

salute animce, and to punish heresy as it would punish 
homicide or theft. Every Christian State acted upon the 
received interpretation of the famous text, compelle en- 
trare* and drove into the fold of the Church all sheep 
which had either strayed, or belonged to any other shep- 
herd. Conformity, exile, or death, were the three alter- 
natives which it presented to the heterodox believer, 
owning its allegiance, and resident within its territory. 

That the system of enforcing religious truth by 
punishment — the system which its enemies call religious 
persecution — has been, to a great extent, successful, cannot 
be disputed. It is impossible to doubt that, in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, the protestant or reformed 
faith was greatly checked by the temporal power of the 
catholic governments. It was checked in two ways : by 
preventing its entrance into a country, (as in Italy and 
Spain,) and by expelling it from countries in which it 
had taken root, (as in Southern Germany, France, and 
Flanders. )f The transportation of the Moriscoes from 
Spain, the expulsion of the Jews from several countries, 
and the destruction of the Christians in Japan,J afford 
other examples of the success of forcible measures for 
the extirpation of a creed which the government deemed 
erroneous. 

The protestants, being in general the weaker party in 
the age of the reformation, and having set the example of 

* St. Luke, XIV. 23. See Bayle's Dissertation, (Euvres, torn. II. 
p. 357. Compare Mr. Gladstone, ib. vol. II. ch. 8, §§ 91-3, where 
the progress of legislation in Europe with respect to religion is 
accurately deduced. On the duty of a prince to punish heretics, 
see Bayle, ib. p. 416; and on the degrees of severity with which 
religious error was repressed, ib. p. 414. 

t See Ranke's Popes. 

% See Bayle, Diet. art. Japon, note E. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 293 

dissenting from the established faith protected by the 
State, were, both by their logical position and their 
interest, led to question the received doctrine as to the 
employment of force for the propagation of religious 
truth. Nevertheless, the ancient rule was upheld for a 
long time by protestant, as well as catholic governments ; 
and enlightened writers of protestant confessions called 
it in question with hesitation and fear. Thus, Jeremy 
Taylor, in his Liberty of Prophesying, (1647,) discusses 
the question, " Whether it be lawful for a prince to give 
toleration to several religions?" (sect. 16;) and Grotius, 
in his treatise De Jure Belli et Pads, (1625,) examines 
the similar question, " Whether it be permitted to make 
treaties and alliances with those who are not of the true 
religion," (II. 15, §§ 8 — 22.) It is remarkable, too, that, 
notwithstanding the complaints justly made by the 
presbyterians and puritans of England and Scotland, 
with respect to their treatment by the Established Church, 
they nevertheless, when they had the power, showed a 
similar disposition to enforce their own faith by penal 
sanctions.* 

By degrees, a different standard of duty, with respect 
to the enforcement of religious truth by penal sanctions, 
was established, and more tolerant notions as to freedom 
of conscience and discussion, in questions of religion, 
became prevalent. It was seen that religious error could 



* Concerning the general reception of the maxim, that Christian 
princes are bound to enforce religion by the civil sword, see Palmer 
on the Church, part. V. c. 5, who still upholds the maxim. Con- 
cerning persecution by Protestant princes, see Bayle, CEuvres, 
torn. II. pp. 411, 509, 554. And as to the general maintenance of 
this principle by the reformers, though with progressive remon- 
strances against it, see Hallam, Hist, of Lit. of Europe, vol. II. 
c. 1, §§ 29—32; vol. III. c. 2, §§ 50-2. 



294 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

not be effectually suppressed by severity, inasmuch as 
that which one nation regarded as error, another regarded 
as truth, and no common effort of the European govern- 
ments would be made to put down or set up any one 
form of Christianity.* Moreover, the principle of 
leaving opinion free, where it does not tend to some act 
immediately and manifestly detrimental to society, has 
been gradually gaining strength since the sixteenth 
century, and has included religious opinions in its opera- 
tion. The attempt to propagate religious truth, and to 
crush religious error, by the criminal law and by penal 
inflictions, though it has, to a certain extent, met with 
a very decided success, is subject to strong counteract- 
ing forces. A man who attests the sincerity of his 
religious faith by the sacrifice of his life, or of his native 
country, his worldly possessions, and his means of gain- 
ing a subsistence, is respected for his fortitude, disinte- 
restedness, and honesty, even by those who do not share 
his opinions. He is not regarded as a common male- 
factor, whose overt acts have been dangerous and perni- 
cious to the security and peace of society, and have 
drawn down upon him the deserved punishment of the 
law. There is a sympathy with his sufferings, and a 
consciousness that the State, instead of gaining his con- 
viction by the legitimate weapons of persuasion and 
reason, has, being the stronger, used its strength for 
causing its own opinion to prevail. A man who, like 
Galileo, makes a feigned and insincere submission to the 
opinion of the supreme power, and reads his recanta- 
tion under duress, is scarcely considered a free agent, 



* This conviction, brought about by the long continued miseries 
and devastations of the thirty years' war, was finally embodied in 
the treaty of Westphalia. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 295 

and his conversion confers but little credit upon the 
coercing party.* Hence, the use of force to diffuse re- 
ligious opinions, by admitting the failure of reason in 
the individual case, has seemed to raise a presumption 
that reason was on the weaker side. True opinions in 
religion can, in the long run, only be propagated by 
reason, and that voluntary deference to authority which 
implies reason ; but false opinions in religion can be as 
well propagated by force as true ones. The sword, the 
stake, or the gibbet, are as good arguments in behalf of 
Mahometanism as of Christianity. In this way, the use 
of the civil power to repress religious error, has been ac- 
counted almost as an admission that the other side were 
in the right; martyrdom has been regarded as a sign 
of truth as well as of sincerity ; and the infant church 
has been said to have been watered by the blood of its 
martyrs. 

From the combination of these causes, the system of 
enforcing religious doctrines by the civil sword, has 
been condemned by the general opinion of the civilized 
countries of Europe, and penal sanctions are no longer 
extended to the profession of a creed not authorized by 
the State. Both the reason and feelings of mankind are 
outraged, by applying to the diffusion of truth means 
which are used reluctantly and sparingly even for the 
punishment of overt acts against society. 

Cum ventum ad verum est, sensus moresque repugnant, 
Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et sequi. 

The system of exterminating heresy by capital 
executions and wholesale deportation, may be considered 
as exploded in civilized Europe; but the discourage- 



* Upon the insincerity caused by religious persecution, see 
Bayle, ut sup. p. 399. 



296 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

raent of religious error by civil disabilities — by exclusion 
from certain political rights — still maintains its ground 
in some cases. Deprivation of civil rights is a species 
of penal infliction, and has been so considered in all 
systems of criminal law. The objection to its use for 
the purpose of repressing religious error, though less in 
degree, is therefore the same in principle. 

§ 5. Penal measures for enforcing religious truth are, 
from their nature, directed exclusively against those who 
are without the pale of the orthodox church; they are 
intended partly, by their direct operation, to reduce the 
obstinate heretic to a right course — and partly, by their 
example, to deter those who are "within the pale from 
straying out of it. Kemuneratory measures, on the 
other hand, tending in the same direction, leave the 
obstinate heretic in his error, but seek to allure the 
more flexible, or more interested, adherent of heterodoxy 
to the adoption of the true faith, by the attraction of 
temporal advantage. Such, for instance, would be 
pecuniary rewards to any member of an erroneous faith 
who adopted the orthodox faith ; or an offer of employ- 
ment in the public service on the same terms. Of this 
nature were some of the measures in the penal laws 
against the Irish catholics ; such as that which enabled 
a son who changed his creed to take possession of his 
father's property. Measures of this sort are, however, 
considered as a sort of seduction, or tampering with a 
man's conscience ; the witnesses to the truth so obtained 
are regarded as purchased by a species of subornation, 
and their testimony is not of much weight. As it has 
always been thought the part of a courageous and con- 
scientious man, not to surrender his religious opinions at 
the dictation of superior force, so it has always been 
considered disgraceful for a man to become an apostate 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 297 

from his religion for pecuniary gain. Martyrdom for 
opinion's sake has ever been accounted honourable ; and 
proselytism effected by bribery is rarely eulogized, even 
by those who are members of the church into which the 
convert has been received. Hence the sense of honour, 
operating in a proscribed sect, holds its members together, 
and restrains them from swallowing the tempting baits 
held out to their cupidity by the State. The attempt to 
draw away persons from the camp of error by direct re- 
ward, and to induce them by a bounty to enlist under the 
banners of truth, obtains, therefore, only a limited and 
partial success. So far, however, as pecuniary tempta- 
tions connected with the transmission of property, and 
rewards offered by a government in the way of official 
emolument and public honours, exercise any proselytizing 
influence, the proselytes are chiefly to be found among the 
wealthier classes. If James II. had succeeded in giving 
the Roman-catholics of England a monopoly of all public 
employments and distinctions, he would doubtless have 
gained over many converts in the upper ranks of society ; 
but the body of the people (as in Ireland, under a similar 
system) would have retained their religious convictions 
unchanged. 

§ 6. But, besides punishment and reward, the State 
can likewise employ Endowment as a means of encou- 
raging religious truth. The endowment of the clergy, 
the provision of funds for the building and maintenance 
of churches, or for the support of ecclesiastical seminaries, 
and other similar applications of the national property 
or income, may be considered as serving the double 
purpose of consolidating and confirming the religious 
community which is thus exclusively assisted by the 
State, and of attracting into it the members of the other 
unendowed churches. 



298 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

That an ecclesiastical endowment will diffuse religious 
truth, where apathy and indifference on religious matters 
exist, and where religion is untaught because there is 
no provision for teaching it, cannot be doubted. Where 
the ground is unoccupied, the endowed teacher will step 
into possession, and cultivate his allotted district. If he 
be industrious and skilful, his seed, being thrown into a 
field ready to receive it, will take root, and spring up 
and bear fruit. But it will be otherwise if the ground 
be already occupied by others, who contest the possession 
with him. In this case, his seed will be scattered to the 
winds, and there will be little or no harvest to gather 
into his garner. 

When an endowed clergyman supplies a void which 
otherwise would remain unfilled — when he affords reli- 
gious instruction to persons who would otherwise be 
uninstructed — when he preaches religious doctrine to 
persons who would otherwise hear no religious doctrine, 
— his influence in the propagation of the opinions of his 
confession cannot fail to be felt, provided that he ad- 
dresses persons of the requisite amount of intelligence 
and information. But if he comes into conflict with 
unendowed clergymen — if he addresses persons who 
already receive religious instruction from others, whose 
minds are preoccupied with the doctrines of a different 
sect, and whose conscience is bound to the practice of 
other religious rites and observances — his influence 
becomes less important, and may perhaps be nearly im- 
perceptible. If religion was a subject on which all men 
were agreed, or if there was any one living authority on 
religious questions to which they were willing to defer 
— if religious opinions were not a matter of conscientious 
conviction, and maintained from a sense of moral obli- 
gation — if, when religious instruction and the means of 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 299 

religious worship were provided gratuitously by the 
State, every person might be expected to use them, 
rather than incur the expense of providing them for 
himself — if people flocked to the lessons of the endowed 
clergyman, as they would flock to the distribution of 
relief by the State, or as the Romans went to the public 
games — if men looked upon religion as an article to be 
procured at the cheapest cost, and for which they would 
make no pecuniary sacrifice — then the influence of 
Endowment, in propagating the peculiar religious opi- 
nions of the endowed sect, would be decisive. But these 
necessary conditions for its success, as a means of gaining 
over converts from other confessions, are wanting ; and 
we accordingly find that it has failed, as an engine of 
proselytism. The most striking and decisive example 
is the case of the Irish Established Church — a complete 
system of exclusive endowment, founded on a territorial 
division of parishes, furnishing Protestant Episcopalian 
clergymen and churches, gratuitously, over the whole of 
Ireland, and intended to bring over the entire population 
to its creed. And yet, although it has existed since the 
Reformation, and has been assisted by active persecution 
and penal laws, it has never made any sensible impression 
upon the Presbyterian and Roman-catholic portions of 
the community, and it cannot, even at present, reckon 
among its adherents a ninth part of the population. 

Dr. Chalmers has pointed out, with great clearness, 
the error of supposing that, if religious instruction be 
left to the natural laws of demand and supply, it will be 
obtained like any other marketable commodity. He 
remarks that, in the case of food or clothing, or any 
other article of necessity or comfort, the want is felt the 
more keenly the longer it remains unsatisfied; but that 
if a person has received no religious instruction, and is 



300 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

not in the habit of attending a place of religious worship, 
he does not require the services of any minister of reli- 
gion, or seek to provide them for himself, if not provided 
for him by a public endowment. Hence, Dr. Chalmers 
speaks of the aggressive influence of an endowed clergy : 
he says that they must, by their teaching, create the 
very want which they satisfy; and he adverts to the 
efforts of missionaries, who are paid by the country 
which sends them out, not by the country which receives 
them.* 

The arguments of Dr. Chalmers on this subject are 
undoubtedly sound, so far as an opening to the labours 
of an endowed clergy is afforded by religious indifference, 
or the absence of other religious teachers. But if the 
endowed ministers are of a creed different from that of 
the people among whom they are planted, their aggres- 
sive efforts will probably not produce conversions to 
their own faith, but will merely irritate their hearers by 
the revival of slumbering controversies, and create 
divisions and discord, without increasing the numbers of 
their own flock. The same remark applies to Christian 
missionaries in a heathen country. Without an endow- 
ment, temporary or permanent, they cannot exist; but 
it is by no means certain that their efforts will be suc- 
cessful, or that their aggressions, even on the most mis- 
chievous and degrading forms of superstition, will be 
successful, f 

More may be said in favour of the influence of en- 
dowment in imparting solidity and coherence to a re- 
ligious body, in maintaining the consistency and purity 



* See his Lectures on National Churches, pp. 50-2, 72; On En- 
dowments, pp. 113, 118. 

+ According to Warburton, Alliance of Church and State, b. II., 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 301 

of its doctrine, and in preventing defections from its 
ranks. Even in this respect, however, its efficacy is 
probably less than is often supposed. There is, in 
general, a tendency to overrate the influence of wealth 
and power in giving currency to opinions.* Reasoning 
and new doctrines have a sort of electric force; they 
penetrate unseen from mind to mind, and give a shock 
to intelligences far removed from the origin of impulse. 
This subtle influence not only despises the seductions of 
wealth and station, but even defies the threats of power. 
It is therefore dangerous for any church to rely on the 
mere agency of endowment, in maintaining it against 
adverse forces. Unless the lives and doctrines of its 
clergy are such as would influence the minds of their 
hearers, supposing the church were unendowed, it runs 
the risk of seeing its sphere of action curtailed. Up to 
the Revolution of 1789, the French Catholic Church 



c. 3, the reasons of a public endowment for the ministers of a 
church are as follows: — 

" 1. To render the religious society, whose assistance the State 
so much wants, more firm and durable. 

" 2. To invite and "encourage the clergy's best service to the 
State, in rendering those committed to their care, virtuous. 

" 3. And principally, in order to destroy that mutual dependency 
between the clergy and people, which arises from the former's 
being maintained by the voluntary contributions of the latter." 

Warburton does not appear to consider the propagation of reli- 
gious truth, by conversion, as one of the ends of a church endow- 
ment. 

* Thus Pius VI., when he visited the emperor Joseph at Vienna, 
in remonstrating against his measures of ecclesiastical reform, is 
reported by Botta to have used (among others) the following 
argument: " Altra dover esser la condizione della chiesa ristretta, 
povera, e perseguitata, altra quella della chiesa estesa quanto il 
mondo, ricca, e trionfante." — Storia oV Italia dal 1789 al 1814, 
torn. I. p. 11. 



302 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

had every advantage which could be derived from the 
countenance, assistance, protection, and favour of the 
State. It was established by law; it was exclusively 
and richly endowed ; its clergy were numerous, held a 
high social position, and enjoyed important political 
privileges. Dissidents were discountenanced, oppressed, 
and scarcely tolerated. Everything that the State could 
do, or could give — exclusive favour, rank, wealth, consi- 
deration, political power, persecution of rivals and ene- 
mies — was done for and given to the French Church. 
Yet we know what was the result. It nursed up within 
its bosom a body of writers, who attacked not only Catho- 
licism, but Christianity, with every weapon of argument, 
irony, ridicule and invective, and whose attacks circulated 
throughout Europe, and gave the tone to all aristocratic 
society and literature. And when the Eevolution broke 
out, and the old French government was destroyed, the 
whole ecclesiastical system of France — establishment, 
endowment, and all their appendages — was swept away, 
as being a part of the political abuses against which the 
popular frenzy was directed ; and it was found that what- 
ever religious feeling survived, owed its continuance to 
causes wholly independent of the State endowment. 
Even in England, during the last century, much apathy 
and neglect of duty pervaded the Established Church, 
notwithstanding its endowed clergy ; and their exertions 
were much stimulated by the disinterested efforts of the 
unendowed preachers called into action by Wesley and 
Whitefield.* 

* " In general, every religious sect, when it has once enjoyed 
for a century or two the security of a legal establishment, has 
found itself incapable of making any vigorous defence against any 
new sect which chose to attack its doctrine or discipline. Upon 
such occasions, the advantage in point of learning and good writing 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 303 

In fine, where there is a large body of people hesitat- 
ing which creed to adopt, (as was the case in England 
during the reign of Elizabeth,) or where there is indif- 
ference or ignorance about religious matters, arising 
from the want of pastors, (as is the case in some of our 
large towns and manufacturing districts,) a State-endow- 
ment may be effectual in propagating religious doctrine. 
But where the boundaries of sects are well-defined, and 
their religious convictions deeply rooted ; where an active, 
zealous body of unendowed clergy exists ; where there is 
no religious indifference, but, on the contrary, a jealous 
maintenance of the distinctive doctrines of the particular 
creed, and a sensitive abhorrence of proselytism; where 
every member is regarded as the property of the congre- 
gation, whose defection to another sect is regretted as a 
common loss, and whose seduction is resented as a com- 
mon injury — there the endeavours of an endowed clergy 
to draw the entire people within their fold, however 
earnest and unremitting, will certainly fail of success. 

Upon an impartial consideration of the question, it 
will probably be seen that the beneficial influence of 
endowment, in religious matters, is felt less in the pro- 
motion of truth, than in improving the moral character 
of the minister as respects his flock, and in elevating 



may sometimes be on the side of the Established Church; but the 
arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining proselytes, are constantly 
on the side of its adversaries. In England, those arts have been 
long neglected by the well-endowed clergy of the Established Church, 
and are at present chiefly cultivated by the dissenters and by the 
methodists." — Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. I. ch. 1, art. 3. The 
example of the Church of Rome might alone have convinced Adam 
Smith, that his proposition as to established churches required much 
limitation. But these remarks indicate the advantages of zeal, 
which may belong to an unendowed clergy. 



304 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

and purifying the style of his teaching. A clergy de- 
pendent on the voluntary donations of their congrega- 
tions are less likely to exercise a wholesome and inde- 
pendent influence upon their hearers, to abstain from 
fanatical appeals to their fears and hopes, and to preserve 
a sober and even course, than a clergy whose means of 
subsistence are derived from a fixed endowment. This 
effect of Endowment, however, does not properly belong 
to its power of propagating opinion, and therefore need 
not be here examined. 

When a government tolerates no other creed than 
that which itself thinks good, and extirpates all other 
sects, diversity of religious opinion is prevented, and 
the opinion of the ruling power is the declared standard 
of religious truth. But when the government tolerates 
all religious opinions, and thus permits the existence of 
a plurality of sects, it must, if it desires to endow the 
clergy of one church exclusively, select the creed of the 
majority of the people.* If its choice was made solely 
on the ground of its obligation to promote religious 
truth, it could not consistently stop at an endowment 
of the orthodox creed, but must proscribe the heterodox 
sects. 

* Vatel, Law of Nations, § 130, lays it down generally, that the 
religion of the majority of the people ought to be established by 
law, and become the religion of the State. The case of Ireland 
may seem an exception to this rule, inasmuch as, in practice, Ire- 
land is treated as a separate country : but it is to be borne in 
mind that the arrangement was made by the Protestant government 
of England; and the defenders of the Established Church of Ireland 
generally refer to its union with that of England, and say that the 
population of both countries ought to be taken jointly, in which 
case the Protestants are a majority. If Ireland had been an inde- 
pendent State, the entire church-endowment would not have been 
given by its government to the Protestant clergy. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 305 

Now, on merely political grounds, there is much to be 
said in favour of endowing the clergy of the numerical 
majority of the people. If the endowment is to be ex- 
clusive, this is the most equitable and useful application 
which the State can make of the church property. But 
this system, though productive of considerable practical 
advantages, is nevertheless liable to serious objections. 
In the first place, the opinion of the majority of the po- 
pulation is not a correct, or, indeed, a recognised standard 
of belief, even in secular matters. In religious matters, 
it is still less applicable. The smaller sects, each of 
which constitutes an inconsiderable minority of the 
population, utterly repudiate any such measure of truth, 
and recognise only their own conscientious convictions, 
and the dicta of the teachers whose authority they re- 
verence. By adopting this criterion, the State admits 
its own unfitness to judge of religious truth; and yet it 
refers to no other judge of acknowledged competency. 
In the second place, exclusive endowment, though less 
oppressive and intolerant than a proscription of religious 
error, and less offensive and vexatious than a system of 
State proselytism, nevertheless implies political inequality 
on religious grounds, and therefore creates a certain 
amount of religious discontent and discord. The unen- 
dowed sects, though they cannot complain of the in- 
tolerance of the government, yet complain of its par- 
tiality ; and transfer to the political institutions of the 
State a portion of the dislike with which they regard a 
rival, but more favoured church. 

Owing to these difficulties, both in theory and prac- 
tice, two other plans have been resorted to by the 
governments of countries in which there is a plurality 
of Christian sects. One of them sacrifices the principle 
of church endowment — the other widens its operation. 

x 



306 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

The one is, for the State to abstain altogether from the 
recognition of any religious body, from the establishment 
of any political standard of religious truth, and from the 
endowment of any church; the other is, for all the 
Christian churches and sects to be concurrently endowed 
by the State. Both of these plans avoid the evils of 
religious inequality — the latter by admitting, the former 
by rejecting, all sects indiscriminately. Neither of 
them sets up the opinion of the majority of the people 
or any other political standard of religious truth. The 
former is adopted in France, Belgium, Prussia, and other 
continental States, and, to a certain extent, in the United 
Kingdom ; inasmuch as the Episcopal Protestant Church 
is established in England, while the Presbyterian Church 
is established in Scotland, and endowed in Ireland*— not 
to mention the colonies. The latter plan is adopted in 
the United States. The old system of exclusive tole- 
ration still subsists in the purely Catholic States of 
Southern Europe. 

§ 7. Besides endowing the clergy of a particular sect, 
and defraying the expenses of its public worship, the 
State may also seek to promote religious truth by an inter- 
ference with Public Instruction. It may establish schools 
having a certain religious character, and it may afford 
facilities for religious instruction of the same complexion. 
Its influence over public instruction may be exercised 
for the purpose of favouring the doctrines of a certain 
religious persuasion, so as to confirm some children in 
their actual faith, and to convert others to that faith. 



* Mr. Gladstone, The State in its Relations ivith the Church, 
ch. 3, § 47, sees no decisive objection to this system. He thinks 
that the connexion of the State need not, in all cases, be exclusively 
with one church. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 307 

Arguments similar to those which have been used 
above, in the case of ecclesiastical endowments, apply in 
the case of public instruction. Where children remain 
untaught in religion, from the want of teachers, and 
from mere neglect and indifference about religion, there 
the establishment of schools by the State, and the supply 
of religious instruction, will promote the spread of the 
peculiar religious opinions which may be inculcated in 
such schools : but where a spirit of sectarian repugnance 
exists, and the religious doctrines taught in the schools 
are considered by the people as unsound, parents will 
not send their children to receive the instruction, even 
gratuitously, or permit them to become attendants for 
the purpose of learning what they themselves believe to 
be error. Hence the establishment of government 
schools, for purposes of religious proselytism, may be 
expected to be attended with no better success than that 
which accompanied the Protestant Charter Schools of 
Ireland. 

The objections to an exclusive assistance of the schools 
of one religious denomination by the State, when the 
funds granted come, not from a permanent endowment, 
but from the annual taxation, have been so strongly felt, 
that in most modern countries, which give a public aid 
to instruction, the grant has been divested of an exclusive 
character, and has been made indiscriminately to schools 
of all religious sects. The principle of Concurrent En- 
dowment, which has been more reluctantly admitted with 
respect to the maintenance of public worship, has been 
more readily applied to the assistance of public instruc- 
tion. 

§ 8. Besides punishment and reward, endowment of 
the clergy and public instruction, the only means avail- 
able to the State for the promotion of religious truth, 

x 2 



308 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

and the repression of religious error, is the Regulation 
of the Press by a Censorship. A censorship of the press, 
rigorously and consistently exercised, may unquestionably 
do much for preventing the circulation of heterodox 
religious opinions in a country. It did much for this 
purpose in most parts of Europe, in the first centuries 
after the invention of printing,* and it still does much 
for the same purpose in Italy and Spain. A censor- 
ship of the press has, however, at all times been met by 
evasions and indirect violations, and thus has been found 
an imperfect means of preventing the circulation of 
religious ideas. Books prohibited in one country were 
printed in another ; they were introduced clandestinely, 
and were sought with the greater eagerness on account 
of the prohibition : the interest of the smuggler defeated 
the zeal of the censor.*j- The Reformers of the sixteenth 



* See Sarpi, 1. VI. c. 5. The entire passage, with the answer 
of Pallavicini, is given in Brischar, Controversen Sarpi's und 
PallavicinHs in der Geschichte des Trienter Concils, vol. II. 
pp. 347-58. See also Hoffmann, Geschichte der Biichercensur, 
(Berlin, 1819,) c. 2; Hallam, Literature of Europe, vol. II. c. 8. 
§§ 69-72; Disraeli, Curiosities of Literature, p. 250. ed. 10. 

t Madame de Stael makes the following remarks upon the effi- 
cacy of the censorship of the press in the last century : " On se 
plait a dire en France que c'est precisement par egard pour la reli- 
gion et pour les moeurs qu'on a de tout temps eu des censeurs, et 
neanmoins il suffit de comparer l'esprit de la litterature en Angle- 
terre, depuis que la liberte de la presse y est etablie, avec les divers 
ecrits qui ont paru sous le regne arbitraire de Charles IL, et sous 
celui du Regent et Louis XV. en France. La licence des ecrits 
a ete portee chez les Francais, dans le dernier siecle, a un degre 
qui fait horreur. II en est de meme en Italie, ou, de tout temps, 
on a soumis cependant la presse aux restrictions les plus genantes; 
L'ignorance dans la masse, et l'independance la plus desordonnee 
dans les esprits distingues, est toujours le resultat de la contrainte." 
« — Considerations sur la Revolution Francaise, part VI. c. 5. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 309 

and seventeenth, and the Freethinkers of the eighteenth 
century, were able to inundate Europe with their writings, 
in spite of the Catholic censors of the press. 

At present, a censorship of the press, either for reli- 
gious or other purposes, would not be submitted to by 
the countries which enjoy a popular government. In 
those States of Germany which have retained a censor- 
ship, it has been lately applied almost exclusively to the 
current political discussion, and has left a wide latitude 
to theological controversy. Practically, therefore, a 
censorship of the press can scarcely be enumerated 
among the engines which a government can now use for 
the repression of religious error. The same remark 
applies with still greater force to a Law of Libel, the 
practical effect of which, in regulating serious argumen- 
tative controversy on religious questions, may be consi- 
dered as nearly insensible. 

§ 9. The general result, therefore, at which we arrive 
is, that although the promotion of religious truth, and 
the repression of religious error, are universally admitted 
to be desirable objects, yet the State is not able, by the 
means at its disposal, to compass them effectually; and 
that not only will its attempts to attain them be wholly 
or in great part unsuccessful, but that they will be at- 
tended with serious incidental evils. For the fruitless 
efforts made by the State are not merely so much labour 
wasted and thrown away : the attempts to propagate 
its own religious creed disturb civil society — they aggra- 
vate and embitter the existing dissensions and animosities 
of the rival sects, and create new causes of discord, which 
would not otherwise have existed.* 



* Sully represented to the king — " Qu'il y avait assez long- 
temps que la difference des religions donnait en France les scenes 



310 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

§ 10. This result, however, which establishes the 
practical doctrine, that the State is to be neutral in 
questions involving religious truth and error, startles 
many persons, both practical statesmen and speculative 
reasoners. It seems to them to involve the conse- 
quence that, by being neutral, the State declares its 
indifference to religious truth, or even its hostility to 
religion. They think that the State, by its omission to 
take a part in the controversy, implies an opinion that 
the question at issue is unimportant. The abstinence of 
the State from identifying itself with one of the rival 
churches, appears to them in the light of a sinful neglect 
of religious duty — or even a profession of religious unbe- 
lief. The following seems to be the train of thought by 
which they are led to this conclusion : — 

" The State is the highest, most important, and most 
comprehensive of all societies. Its ends and its powers 
are unlimited. It embraces the whole circle of human 
interests. It commands the whole sum of human facul- 
ties and powers. The mind and the body, the hopes of 
a future, and the reality of the present life, are equally 
within the scope of its influence. All other societies are 
limited in their objects. A church is limited to religion, 
a municipality to the care of its local interests, a uni- 
versity to learning, a mercantile company to trading, 
a scientific society to science, and so on. All other so- 
cieties are limited likewise in their powers. They are all 
subordinate to the State ; they derive their legal rights 



les plus tragiques ; qu'elle etait une source de calamites et de 
desordres, par l'aversion qu'on inspirait au peuple contre ceux qui 
etaient d'une croyance differente de la sienne: ce qui se pratiquait 
egalement de la part des catholiques et des protestans." — Memoires, 
liv. V. torn. V, p. 165. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 311 

from its grant, and are restricted by its control to a 
defined province. But a State is unlimited, both in its 
objects and its powers. It may select any end; it may 
employ any means for compassing that end. It may 
assume any character; it may, if it thinks fit, make the 
cultivation of literature, art, or science, one of its objects, 
and direct all its political agents and powers towards the 
attainment of that object. 

" Now, the noblest and most exalted end of the State 
is, to make its citizens virtuous and happy, and to pro- 
mote, not only their temporal, but also their eternal hap- 
piness. This object is best accomplished by making 
them religious ; and, therefore, if a State observes neu- 
trality in religious affairs, and leaves them exclusively 
to the care of the church — if it does not establish a 
political standard of truth, and a political conscience, in" 
matters of religious faith, it abandons its highest duty, 
it desecrates its noblest functions, and it allows the 
largest powers, applicable to the most important object, to 
lie unused. The most valuable talent committed to its 
keeping is suffered, through its culpable neglect and in- 
difference, to remain in the napkin. The State is not 
merely an institution for the protection of life and pro- 
perty : it comprehends higher interests ; it seeks to make 
men good, as well as safe and rich ; it seeks, not merely 
to protect their bodies, but also to improve their minds 
and benefit their souls — it aims at spiritual, as well as 
secular and temporal ends. At all events, though its 
agencies be laic, it has a religious character, and reco- 
gnises religion as the basis of civil polity. It is a per- 
sona moralis, and, as such, it has a corporate conscience 
in affairs of religion." 

§ 11. Such appears to be a summary of the principal 
arguments used against the neutrality of the State in 



312 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

questions involving religious truth. Assuming it to be a 
correct representation of their general tenor, I would 
remark that, although the basis may be admitted to be 
sound, the superstructure is of very different materials. 
It is true that the State is not necessarily limited to the 
protection of life and property: its objects are un- 
limited, not less than the means at its disposal. There 
is nothing in the nature or essence of a State which 
would prevent it from making the promotion of religious 
truth one of its ends, and from seeking to attain that 
end by all the means in its power. Unquestionably, the 
State might propose to itself the same end, and assume 
the same duties as the church ; it might lay down articles 
of faith, regulate forms of worship, condemn propositions; 
in short, exercise all the spiritual functions which are 
exercised by the pope, if it thought fit so to do * In 
the middle ages, it was considered the duty of a Christian 
State to prevent Jerusalem from remaining in the pos- 
session of a Mahometan nation. It is competent to a 
State to adopt this, or any similar religious end, and to 
pursue it at any sacrifice of life, treasure, and temporal 
tranquillity or prosperity, provided such sacrifice were 
needed for the attainment of the religious end. 

But, (as we have shown in the preceding remarks,) 



* The treatise of Grotius, De Imperio Summarum Potestatum 
circa Sacra, has for its object to prove, that things sacred and 
spiritual are subject to the dominion of the sovereign of the State, 
and that the Church is not independent of the Civil power, see c. 1. 
and 8. It is directed against those writers of the Church of 
Rome who maintained the legal and temporal supremacy of the 
Church in things ecclesiastical and spiritual. As to the supremacy 
of the civil sovereign in things spiritual as well as temporal, see 
Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. and Pol. Law, part III. c. 3,- Vatel, 
Law of Nations, §§ 139, 140. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 313 

experience has proved that the State is not fit for the 
office of promoting religious truth, and repressing reli- 
gious error ; that these functions are not successfully dis- 
charged by the civil magistrate, and that they are better 
performed when left to the exclusive care of spiritual and 
ecclesiastical teachers.* There is nothing in the consti- 
tution or essence of a State which is inconsistent with its 
being a judge of religious truth, but it discharges this 
duty ill. It is capable of doing the work of the church ; 
but the work is better done by the church without its 
assistance. The State ought to abstain from the as- 
sumption of a sectarian character, and from undertaking 
to decide on disputed questions of religious truth, for the 
same reason that it ought to abstain from carrying on 
trade or manufactures. It is capable of trading, but it 
makes a bad trader ; it is capable of manufacturing, but 
it makes a bad manufacturer. So the State is capable 



* Warburton, in his Alliance of Church and State, b. II. c. 1, 
lays it down, that " the care of civil society extends only to the 
body and its concerns, and the care of religious society only to the 
soul." His whole theory is accurately summed up in Mr. Gladstone's 
treatise, On the Relations of Church and State, ch. I. §§ 16, 17. 
Mr. Gladstone remarks upon it : " It is a very low theory of 
government which teaches, that it has only the care of the body 
and bodily goods, and might almost seem to imply that all physi- 
cians are more peculiarly statesmen." Warburton, however, pro- 
bably never meant to teach that the mind, considered with reference 
to its temporal and secular relations, was not within the legitimate 
province of the State. 

Warburton's doctrine is borrowed from Locke, who, in his Letters 
on Toleration, lays it down, that a commonwealth is instituted for 
civil interests, and that its care does not extend to the salvation of 
souls. — Works, vol. VI. pp. 10 and 120. Compare pp. 211-18, 
where he answers the objection that the State comprehends spi- 
ritual ends. Locke here resorts to his favourite resource of a fiction, 
by which the ends of the State are limited. 



314 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

of acting the part of a theologian, but it makes a bad 
theologian. Hence, it is a manifest sophism to infer 
that, because a person does not wish to see the State 
undertake to promote religious truth, he is indifferent or 
hostile to religion. As well might it be inferred that, 
because he does not wish to see the State engage in trade, 
he is hostile to trade. If he thinks the promotion of 
religious truth a function unsuited to the State, and 
suited exclusively to the church — if he thinks that it 
ought to be performed by an ecclesiastical, and not by a 
political agency, he cannot, supposing him to be friendly 
both to Church and State, desire to see it assumed by 
the latter. 

There is a constant tendency, not only among the con- 
trivers of political Utopias and ideal commonwealths, but 
also among practical politicians, to over-estimate the 
capabilities of a government ; to assume that it can ex- 
ercise a greater influence over the community than it 
really possesses; and to forget that it can only act 
within a sphere determined by certain conditions, and is 
endowed with legal omnipotence in no other sense, than 
that its powers have no legal limit. If the practical 
province of a State, in matters involving truth, had been 
considered with greater attention — if facts, and not ideas, 
had been consulted, it would not have been invested with 
a character which is unsuited to it, and been loaded with 
so many moral obligations to which it is not properly 
subject. 

The error of those politicians who exaggerate and 
misapprehend the powers of a government over the 
people may be compared, as to its results, with the error 
of those speculators who, in the middle ages, exaggerated 
their command over external nature. While the alche- 
mists, the astrologers, and the praotisers of occult 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 315 

sciences, undertook to transmute metals, to cure all 
diseases, to reanimate the dead, and to predict the course 
of the weather and the fates of men and empires, they 
overlooked, while engaged in the pursuit of these unattain- 
able objects, the discovery of such processes of nature 
as lie within the reach of our faculties, and can be made 
available for our service. So political theorizers and 
statesmen, who, from an ignorance of the true limits to 
the practical powers of a government, extend its action 
beyond its proper province, not only waste its resources 
in vain efforts, but withdraw its effective powers from 
the subjects to which they are properly applicable, and 
thus diminish its efficiency in its own field. 

The aversion to the neutrality of the State in contro- 
verted questions of religion — the belief that it is bound to 
assume a religious character, and to promote religious 
truth, may perhaps be founded on the assumption, that 
the State ought to use its powers for furthering all the 
good ends to which its powers are applicable, whether its 
attempt is likely to be successful or not.* The promo- 



* Speaking of the speculators on a perfect or ideal pattern of 
civil government, Warburton says : " The end of government 
coming first under consideration, and the general practice of society 
seeming to declare this end to be only, (what, in truth, it is,) secu- 
rity to our temporal liberty and property; the simplicity of it dis- 
pleased, and the plan appeared defective. They imagined that, by 
enlarging the bottom, they should ennoble the structure, and there- 
fore formed a romantic project of making civil society serve for all 
the good purposes it was even accidentally capable of producing. 
And thus, instead of giving us a true picture of government, they 
jumbled together all sorts of societies into one, and confounded the 
religious, the literary, the mercantile, the convivial, with the civil." 
— Alliance of Church and State, b. I. ch. 3. 

The speculators to whom Warburton alludes were, however, 
right in supposing, that the State potentially includes all these 
objects. 



316 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

tion of religious truth is a good end ; the State is capable 
of applying its powers to the promotion of that end ; 
therefore, if it neglects so to apply them, it is guilty of a 
sinful omission, and of practical unbelief. Such is the 
simple argument on which many minds seem to rely ; 
but if they will extend the same mode of reasoning to 
other subjects, they will soon be startled by the conse- 
quences to which it will lead them, and will thus be 
brought to doubt of the soundness of their premises. If 
we only leave out of our calculation the probability of 
success, and require the State to undertake the promo- 
tion of all objects which are intrinsically good, whether 
they be attainable by it or not, we shall soon find it en- 
gaged in a multiplicity of impracticable pursuits, which 
might fill an academy of Laputa with envy. The State, 
like subordinate societies, and like individuals, is dis- 
pensed from the pursuit of unattainable goods. There 
is no moral obligation which binds a ruler to make an 
attempt, where success cannot reasonably be expected, 
A forlorn hope may be sometimes necessary in war; but 
it forms no part of the functions of a State, in the ordi- 
nary administration of its affairs. 

Writers who dwell on the religious functions of the 
State — who (like Dr. Arnold) almost identify the State 
and the Church, and merge the one in the other, are 
considered on that account as friends to religion ; while 
those who take a different view of the province of the 
State, are treated as hostile to religion and the Church. 
But all experience shows that, where this intimate union 
of the Church and State exists, instead of the Church 
spiritualizing the State, the State secularizes the Church. 
Where the political and ecclesiastical powers are exer- 
cised by the same hands, the former are sure to prevail 
over the latter. Practically, the religious theory of 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 317 

government will end in perfect Hobbism ; and therefore 
no enlightened friend to religion will seek to confound 
the province of the State with that of the Church,* or to 
confer upon the State spiritual, and upon the Church 
political, functions. 

§ 12. Having arrived at the conclusion, that it is not 
the province of the State to diffuse religious truth and to 
discourage religious error, we need not dwell at equal 
length upon its duty in diffusing truth and discouraging 
error as to matters other than religion. Even those who 
have attached the greatest importance to the enforcement of 
religious truth by the State, have not, in general, thought 
that it was the office of the State to diffuse truth on 
secular matters. It has rarely been maintained that, in 
questions of science, history, literature, art, &c, it is 
incumbent on the State to establish a standard of sound 
opinions, and to use its power for the purpose of main- 
taining and diffusing the truth. j* By founding univer- 



* " Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evi- 
dent enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal 
sovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, 
is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the people." — Smith, 
Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 3. 

t The Ptolemaic system of the world was taught till a few years 
ago in the university of Salamanca; but the prohibition of the New- 
tonian system was doubtless made on religious grounds — in the 
same manner that the Jesuit editors of Newton's Principia found 
it necessary to declare that, in illustrating the propositions relative 
to the heliocentric theory, they treated it as a mere hypothesis, and 
they professed, with a grave irony, their submission to the decrees 
of the church against the motion of the earth : " Cseterum latis a 
summis Pontificibus contra telluris motum decretis nos obsequi pro- 
fitemur." The works of Galileo and Copernicus were inserted in 
the index of prohibited books; and to this day the Ptolemaic system 
is the official doctrine of the Church of Rome. 



318 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

sities, and other places of education ; by endowing pro- 
fessorships and lecturerships ; by creating literary aca- 
demies ; by patronizing literature and science, and by 
assisting public instruction, it has, indeed, contributed 
powerfully to the diffusion of opinions on many im- 
portant subjects ; but it has left, in general, to the several 
professors and teachers the liberty of forming their 
own judgment as to the opinions which they would 
inculcate, and has not sought to induce them to make 
the matter of their teaching square with a prescribed 
standard. 

Without going the length of saying, that a government 
ought to be wholly indifferent to the character of the 
opinions diffused under its superintendence — without 
adopting the maxim, Sipopalus vult decipi, decipiatur — 
we may affirm that, after it has taken effectual means 
for encouraging the diffusion of knowledge, and for pro- 
moting the selection of fit teachers, it ought to exercise 
extreme reserve in regulating the opinions of the persons 
so employed. And we may here add that, if the State 
ought not to prescribe the opinions of endowed teachers 
of scientific, literary, and historical branches of know- 
ledge — in most of which there are recognised standards, 
and a generally admitted authority — still less ought it 
to take a decisive part in religious questions, as to which 
there is no common authority generally received and 
respected by all the Christian sects. 

It is by scientific and literary endowments, in con- 
nexion with universities, places of learning, academies, 
observatories, botanical gardens, museums, public 
libraries, and similar institutions, that the best pro- 
vision can be made for those men of science and letters, 
whose pursuits are not of such a nature as to afford them 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 319 

the means of a decent and permanent subsistence.* 
Poets, writers of fiction, and others, who can amuse and 
delight the public, may derive a profit from their literary 
works; those, again, who digest and arrange existing 
knowledge for the instruction of their readers, may ob- 
tain considerable pecuniary rewards for their labours, in 
the present state of civilization ; but those who originate 
new ideas, who explore the untrodden, and cultivate the 
waste tracts of science, cannot expect to reap any profit 
from their exertions. Unless they possess the means of 
independent support, the best maintenance for them is a 
literary endowment, of the sort just described ; professors, 
too, in a place of learning, who are remunerated for the 
lectures which they give, can study a subject in order to 
teach it, and devote their spare time to the composition 
of books.f Why teachers should not be rewarded for 
their services, I can see no valid reason; the objection of 
Socrates to the paid teaching of the Sophists of his time 
seems to have been partly founded in his opinion, that 



* Lord Bacon, Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 94, speaks " of the 
defect which is in public lectures ; namely, in the smallness and 
meanness of the salary or reward which, in most places, is assigned 
unto them ; whether they be lectures of arts or professions. For 
it is necessary to the progression of sciences that readers [i. e. lec- 
turers] be of the most able and sufficient men ; as those which are 
ordained for generating and propagating of sciences, and not for 
transitory use. This cannot be, except their condition and endow- 
ment be such as may content the ablest man to appropriate his 
whole labour, and continue his whole age, in that function and 
attendance ; and therefore must have a proportion answerable to 
that mediocrity or competency of advancement which may be 
expected from a profession, or the practice of a profession." 

t Mr. John Mill, in his Principles of Political Economy, vol. I. 
p. 468, throws out a doubt whether there is not " something radi- 



320 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

their lessons were valueless, and partly in the Greek 
prejudice against illiberal arts.* 

As has been just remarked, the State may, as wii. 
respect to religious instruction, interfere for the support 
and patronage of the secular instruction of the young, 
so as to give currency to certain opinions on subjects un- 
connected with religion. 

Aristotle,f apparently, approves of the Lacedaemonian 
system, according to which all free children, after a 
certain age, were taken out of the care of their parents, 
and placed under the discipline of the State. This 
system, however, had almost exclusively a military 
object. J Though carried, for a long time, into effect 
by the singularly rigid spirit of that little commonwealth, 
it was too extensive an interference with parental 
authority and natural affection for imitation, even by the 
most military republics of antiquity, such as the Romans ; 



cally amiss in the idea of authorship as a profession; and whether 
any social arrangement, under which the teachers of mankind con- 
sist of persons giving out doctrines for bread, is suited to be, or 
can possibly be, a permanent thing." Compare Comte, Cours de 
Phil. Pos. torn. VI. p. 466. 

* Adam Smith was led, by the abuses of universities in his time, 
and by their lazy and unimproving spirit, to underrate the advan- 
tages of literary endowments, in promoting the cultivation of those 
branches of knowledge which are not useful, (in the vulgar sense 
of the word,) — that is, which do not yield an immediate return to 
the learner, by fitting him for a gainful occupation, ( Wealth of 
Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 2). He admits, however, the advantage 
of an endowment for the instruction of the poor. 

See, with respect to this subject, the instructive work of Dr. 
Chalmers, On Endowments. The recent history of the German 
universities sufficiently proves, that literary endowments do not 
necessarily lead to the abuses adverted to by Adam Smith. 

t Eth. Me. X. 10; Pol VIII. 1. 

X Aristot. Pol. VII. 2. Compare c. 14. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 321 

and, in modern times, no such entire substitution of the 
political for domestic control over children is likely to be 
seriously entertained. 

The chief patronage which the State, in modern times, 
gives to instruction, is by appointing and endowing 
teachers, of different sorts and degrees, from universities 
and colleges, down to elementary schools for the poor.* 
This assistance is afforded on the assumption, that some 
public contribution is requisite for enabling the parents 
to instruct and train their children in their respective 
callings and walks of life; and that the State has an 
interest in the proper education, moral and intellectual, 
of its members. 

Aids afforded from the public purse, for the establish- 
ment and maintenance of astronomical observatories and 
botanical gardens ; for scientific voyages and travels ; for 
the formation of museums of natural history and anti- 
quities, of public libraries, and of collections of works of 
art; for the publication of expensive books; for the en- 
couragement of literature ; and for the support or remu- 
neration of persons connected with these several institu- 
tions or purposes, fall under the same general head. 
Public expenditure of this sort is intended to afford to 
the cultivators of sound knowledge and learning facilities 
which they could not derive, in an equal degree, either 
from their own means or from private patronage. f 



* The cases in which the State maintains as well as teaches the 
scholar, and therefore stands to him in loco parentis, are those in 
which a child is destitute, through the death or desertion of his 
parents. The assumption of the parental authority by the State, 
in these cases, is not sought, but forced upon it. 

t The establishment of the observatories of Paris and Green- 
wich, in 1667 and 1675, "may be considered (says Dr. Whewell) 
to be a kind of public recognition of the astronomy of observation, 

Y 



322 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

§ 13. In every case, however, in which the govern- 
ment interferes to assist and encourage science and 
learning, or to diffuse secular knowledge, it ought to 
avoid predetermining any set of opinions to be adopted 
by the teacher, or other object of its patronage. It ought 
to abstain from stereotyping any modes or formulas of 
thought; from imposing any test, or requiring an adhe- 
sion to any party or section, scientific, literary, or his- 
torical. The persons who may be thus assisted by the 
State, ought merely to receive facilities for prosecuting 
an independent and unprejudiced search after truth, but 
ought not to be expected to work up to a prescribed 
conclusion. 

The influence of a government, as an authority in 
matters of opinion and practice, is greatly enhanced by 
its confining itself to its legitimate province, and not 
attempting to pronounce on questions which it is not 
competent to decide. A court of justice, which was 
highly esteemed for its judgments on questions of law, 
would render itself ridiculous, and shake its authority, 
even within its own sphere, if it attempted to determine 
questions of science or literature. If a government 
should suborn, as it were, its endowed teachers, by in- 
ducing them to take its own opinion, and not truth, as 
their standard, it would impair their influence with the 
public, and at the same time diminish its own authority 
upon questions, as to which its judgment would otherwise 
be respected and valued. 



as an object on which it was the advantage and the duty of nations 
to bestow their wealth." — Phil, of Ind. Sci. vol. II. p. 432. See 
also his account of public observatories, of patronage of astronomy 
by governments, and of astronomical expeditions made at the 
public expense, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, b. VII. 
c. 6, §§ 2, 4, and 5. 



I 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 323 

§ 14. For a government, although it cannot regulate 
opinion as it can fix the rates of the public taxes, the forms 
of judicial procedure, or the scale of legal punishments, 
can yet exercise a considerable influence upon its move- 
ments and direction. Without undertaking to pronounce 
definitively a precise judgment upon disputed questions 
of speculation, or to enforce that judgment by its legal 
and coercive powers, a government possesses a moral 
authority, by which it can stamp a character of public 
approbation upon certain acts and certain opinions. It 
is placed on a high and conspicuous eminence ; its voice 
will be heard far and wide; many people will incline to 
imitate its tendencies; and its judgments, on subjects 
upon which it is competent to judge, will not fail to 
produce a powerful impression on the public. 

A government, considered as a source of authority, 
furnishes a model, or pattern, and does not act by com- 
pulsory and imperative laws. Its subjects fashion their 
actions, by a voluntary and self-imposed imitation, ac- 
cording to the type which it places before them — like 
the pupils copying a model in a school of design. They 
are not coerced into uniformity by the voice of com- 
mand, like soldiers at drill. 

In absolute monarchies, the personal influence of the 
monarch, or of his court, in establishing a standard of 
manners and morals, as well as of taste, and in deter- 
mining the aim and course of personal ambition in the 
numerous aspirers to honour and public employment, has 
often been most extensive. In constitutional monarchies, 
and other free governments, the ruling power is more 
divided, and its influence less concentrated; but, even 
here, its moral weight, in determining public opinion 
and conduct, is not inconsiderable. 

Bad examples set by rulers are almost invariably 

y2 



324 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

followed, to a greater or less extent, by their subjects. 
And, on the other hand, a good moral influence, in re- 
spect either of conduct or opinion, on the part of a govern- 
ment, can scarcely fail to produce a beneficial effect.* 

Indirectly, in the way of example and patronage, by 
the remuneration of merit and the distribution of 
honours, a government, and persons in eminent stations, 
can do much to countenance sound opinions, to establish 
a correct standard of conduct, and to encourage persons 
of genuine merit. But a government has little direct 
power of influencing opinion, except by preventing the 
free expression of thought, and by thus producing an 
intellectual stagnation, such as prevails in Spain, and, 
to a certain extent, even in Italy. No government of a 



* ttoKiq yap scttl iraaa ru>v rfyovjxkvhiv, 

vrparoQ ts crvfiirag' oi ffaKOGfXovvTiQ (3poTu>v 
8i8a<TKa\u)v Xoyoun yiyvovrai icaicoi. 

(Soph. Phil. 386-8.) 

Cicero particularly dwells on the moral effect produced by the 
example of the chief persons in the State : " Nee enim tantum mali 
est peccare principes (quamquam est magnum hoc per se ip&um 
malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum existunt. 
Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, quales- 
cumque summi civitatis viri fuerint, talem civitatem fuisse : qua3- 
eunque mutatio morum in principibus extiterit, eandem in populo 

secutam Pauci, atque admodum pauci, honore et gloria 

amplificati, vel corrumpere mores civitatis, vel corrigere possunt." 
— De Leg. III. 14. Claudian applies the same sentiment to the 
imperial period: — 

Componitur orbis 

Regis ad exemplum ; nee sic inflectere sensus 

Humanos edicta valent, ut vita regentis. 

Mobile mutatur semper cum principe vulgus. 

(De IV. Cons. Honor. 299-302.) 

Machiavel repeats these views, with examples derived from more 
recent times : " Non si dolghino i principi d'alcun peccato che 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 325 

civilized country, for example, could now, either by 
punishment or reward, by persecution or endowment, 
restore a general belief in the Ptolemaic system of the 
world, or in judicial astrology, within its dominions. 
Adam Smith remarks, that the most richly endowed 
universities have been the slowest in adopting improve- 
ments in the different branches of philosophy, and have 
been the most prone to retain exploded errors in their 
course of education.* Even if this statement were true, it 
would not prove that the endowment produced the effect 
of giving currency and authority to antiquated errors and 
obsolete systems. The probability is that the endow- 
ment, thus misapplied, would be merely wasted; and 
that the doctrines taught would gain little or no ac- 
ceptance among the public, if it was known that they 
were rejected by the competent scientific judges, and 
that they were still maintained by the university merely 
through the influence of its endowed chairs. 



facciano i popoli ch'egli abbiano in governo, perche tali peccati 
conviene che naschino o per sua negligenza, o per esser egli 
macchiato di simili errori. E chi discorrera i popoli che ne' nostri 
tempi sono stati tenuti pieni di ruberie e di simili peccati, vedra 
che sara al tutto nato da quelli che li governavano, che erano di 
simile natura. La Romagna innanzi che in quella fussero spenti 
da Papa Alessandro VI. quelli signori che la comandavano, era 
un esempio d'ogni scelleratissima vita, perche quivi si vedev a per 
ogni leggiera cagione seguire uccisioni e rapine grandissime. II che 
nasceva dalla tristizia di que' Principi, non dalla natura trista de 
li uomini, come loro dicevano." — Disc. III. 29, where the following 
verses of Lorenzo dei Medici are also quoted : — 

" E quel che fa il Signor fanno poi molti, 
Che nel Signor son tutti li occhi volti." 

* Wealth of Nations, b. Y. ch. 1, art. 2. On this subject, so 
far as regards the English universities, see the remarks of Dr. 
Whewell, Hist, of the Ind. Sciences y b. VII. c. 3, § 2. 



326 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

§ 15. A government may likewise countenance sound 
opinions by upholding institutions which imply those 
opinions, and are founded upon them. A criminal law 
in which the definitions of crimes, and the gradations of 
their punishments, are derived from correct principles 
respecting the grounds of moral imputation and the 
measure of moral guilt, tends powerfully to establish a 
good ethical standard in the minds of the community. 
The same may be said of the civil law : its definitions 
of contracts, rights of property, fraud, &c, tend to fix 
and enlighten men's ideas as to honesty and good faith 
in their mutual dealings. The theory of the criminal 
and civil law, and its application in practice, when 
governed by sound principles, thus contribute materially 
to the establishment of a good code of morals for the 
public. In like manner, the observance of good faith 
by the government, in its relations with foreign countries, 
tends to accredit sound maxims of international law, and 
to inculcate their observance upon other nations. Every 
good system of municipal laws, faithfully administered — 
every steady observance of sound rules of international 
law — tends to create a real, not an ideal, model of govern- 
ment, which serves for the imitation of other nations 
and future times.* 



* Adam Smith adverts to the good moral influence exercised 
upon the character of the Romans, by the excellent constitution of 
their judicatories : " The superiority of character in the Romans 
over that of the Greeks, so much remarked by Polybius, and 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better 
constitution of their courts of justice, than to any of the circum- 
stances to which those writers ascribe it." — Wealth of Nations, 
b. V. c. 1, art. 2. See Polyb. VI. 56. The influence of laws upon 
the morals and usages of a people is considered by Matter, in his 
treatise De VInfluence des Mceurs sur les Lois, et de VInfluence 
des Lois sur les Mceurs, (Paris, 1832.) Part III. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 327 

On the other hand, a government, by adopting 
erroneous opinions as the basis of its legislation, may 
not only give them the currency arising from its coun- 
tenance, but also that strength which arises from the 
existence of vested interests. This is particularly per- 
ceptible with regard to the economical principles, which 
are involved in legislation upon commerce, navigation, 
taxation, public charity, &c. 

§ 16. But although (as we remarked above) it has 
not been thought the duty of the State to take an active 
and impulsive part in propagating the truth upon secular 
subjects, it has not been held that the State could with 
propriety be equally passive with respect to the permission 
of error. The censorship of the press was, from the first 
invention of printing, exercised by all the European 
governments for preventing the circulation of dangerous 
and unsound opinions. As has been already stated, it 
was employed, in the first instance, and principally, for 
the repression of religious error; but it has also been 
used for the prohibition of writings upon philosophical, 
political, and historical subjects. It was thought, at one 
time, that the government rendered itself responsible for 
the errors which it permitted to be propagated through 
the press ; and that one of its duties was to protect the 
public against the diffusion of false opinions by means 
of books, as it was its duty to adopt measures for pre- 
venting the diffusion of pestilential diseases, or the pass- 
ing of false coins.* There is no doubt that this office 
was undertaken by the European governments with a 



* On the censorship of books, see Hoffmann's Treatise; and 
Beckmann, Hist, of Inv. vol. III. p. 93, art. Book Censors. In p. 98, 
a passage is quoted from a letter of Hermolaus Barbarus, written 
in 1480, in which he expresses an opinion favourable to the 



328 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

sincere desire of purging the productions of the press 
from all peccant matter, and of performing a preliminary 
work of selection, by authorizing useful and suppressing 
pernicious books. But, as in the case of religion, expe- 
rience has proved that the State cannot advantageously 
discharge the office of a censor of public discussion in 
matters of a secular character, and that society makes 
more progress towards the discovery and recognition of 
truth when it is unassisted by the well-meant, though 
ill-directed, efforts of a government censorship of the 
press. At present, it is only in the Italian States and 
Austria that philosophical and historical discussion is 
regulated by tbe censorship. In Prussia and the other 
German States, in which a censorship of the press has, 
until lately, subsisted, its practical exercise has been 
limited to the current political discussion of the day; 
and it has, in fact, been used by the government only as 
a means of suppressing unfavourable criticism upon their 
own acts and policy. It was to this purpose that the 
censorship of the press was turned by Napoleon, who, 
however, did not content himself with suppressing all 



adoption of Plato's recommendation in his Laws, that no person 
should publish anything without previous examination and per- 
mission of persons appointed by the government. The present 
multitude of inferior books, he says, causes good authors to be neg- 
lected: "Et quod calamitosissimum est, periti juxta imperitique de 
studiis impune ac promiscue judicant." The passage of Plato 
refers to poets exclusively, but supposes a regular censorship. — 
Leg.YlI. p. 801. 

In discussing the question of the prohibition of books at the 
Council of Trent, one of the members observed, that there had 
been already too many books printed since the invention of 
printing; and that it was better to prohibit a thousand books which 
did not deserve it, than to permit one which deserved to be pro- 
hibited. — Sarpi, 1. VI. c. 5, (t. II. p. 139, ed. Courayer). 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 329 

adverse criticism, but retained in the pay of the govern- 
ment all the writers whose articles were permitted to 
appear in the newspapers. By thus poisoning all the 
channels of information at their source, he rendered the 
periodical press the mere engine of his despotism; and 
all securities for truth of statement, and fairness or 
completeness of discussion, were thus, during his ascen- 
dancy, suspended in France.* 

If the State be fitted at all for establishing a 
standard of opinion, there is no function which it can so 
properly assume as that of authorizing printed works, or 
prohibiting their publication. f If it is ever to make 
itself the promoter of truth and the discourager of error, 
no less objectionable instrument than a censorship of the 
press can be devised. The practical abandonment of 



* For an account of the measures of Napoleon for regulating 
and managing the press, see Madame de Stael, Consid. sur la 
Revol. Francaise, Part IV. ch. 4 and 16. 

f " He [the king of Brobdignag] laughed at my odd kind of 
arithmetic, as he was pleased to call it, in reckoning the numbers 
of our people by a computation drawn from the several sects among 
us in religion and politics. He said he knew no reason why those 
who entertain opinions prejudicial to the public should be obliged 
to change, or should not be obliged to conceal them. And as it 
was tyranny in any government to require the first, so it was weak- 
ness not to enforce the second ; for a man may be allowed to keep 
poisons in his closet, but not to vend them about for cordials." — 
Swift. 

A similar image is employed in the Bull of Leo X. against the 
abuses of the press, issued in the year 1515: " Nos itaque (the 
Pope says), ne id, quod in Dei gloriam et fidei argumentum ac 
bonarum artium propagationem salubriter est inventum, in contra- 
rium convertatur, ac Christi fidelium saluti detrimentum pariat, 
super librorum impressione curam nostram habendam fore duxi- 
mus, ne de ccetero cum bonis seminibus spince coalescant, vet me- 
dicinis venena intermisceantur." — Hoffmann, ubi sup, p. 47. 



330 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

this system in all countries under a free government, 
and the general discredit into which it has fallen over 
the civilized world, afford a strong ground for thinking 
that the State is incapable of discharging the duty of a 
censor of opinion with success — that the accumulation 
of experience is adverse to the system, and that there 
is a radical defect in the theory which extends the 
dominion of the State over the regions of speculative 
truth. 

§ 17. Not only may the State, by its patronage, assist 
in promoting the diffusion of sound knowledge, both in 
the upper and lower strata of society ; but it may also 
authenticate certain persons, as possessing a compe- 
tent amount of skill for the practice of a profession or 
calling. 

Thus it may, by proper examinations, ascertain the 
qualifications of candidates to practise medicine or law; 
and upon those who come up to the prescribed mark of 
fitness, it may confer diplomas, or other authorities to 
practise. A similar process may be applied to school- 
masters and teachers of youth, to masters of merchant- 
vessels, and others who have difficult and important 
functions to perform. The granting of diplomas by 
universities, or other learned bodies, proceeds on the 
supposition, that the public require some assistance to 
their judgment in the choice of professional services, and 
that such an official scrutiny into the qualifications of 
practitioners is a useful security against the imposture 
or incompetency of mere pretenders to skill. For the 
practice of medicine in particular, a public authentication, 
by a board of competent and disinterested examiners, 
cannot fail to be an important safeguard against im- 
posture, inasmuch as the public are scarcely able to form 
an unassisted judgment as to the qualifications of medical 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 331 

men.* Such degrees or diplomas, however, do not of 
themselves import more than an authentication by duly 
appointed public officers; they are like a public seal or 
stamp affixed to goods for the purpose of attesting their 
genuineness, or like the mark impressed on the coin of 
the State, in order to serve as a public guarantee of its 
weight and fineness. Hence, they are not necessarily 
licences to practise, and do not imply any exclusive 
right. In this country, for example, any quack doctor 
may legally practise medicine: the diplomas of the 
public bodies which preside over the medical profession 
merely serve as guides to the public in the choice of their 
medical advisers. 

M. Dunoyer, in his work On the Liberty of Labour, 
maintains, not only that medical diplomas ought to con- 
fer no exclusive right of practising medicine, but that 
they serve merely as skreens for incapacity, and substi- 
tutes for real knowledge, and ought therefore to be 
discontinued altogether.^ But although the examinations 
and licences of artisans, and the exclusive rights of 
members of guilds, have been rightly abolished by 
modern nations, it does not follow that a public authen- 
tication of medical practitioners is either mischievous or 
superfluous. People in general can, by proper means, 
form a judgment as to the products of the useful arts 
without the assistance of the government :J the appoint- 
ment of public weighers and measurers, the stamping and 
marking of goods before sale, and other legislative inter- 



* See the remarks of Dr. Cullen upon the value of medical 
degrees, in answer to Adam Smith, cited in note XX. to Mr. 
M'Culloch's edition of the Wealth of Nations, p. 587. 

f De la Liberie du Travail, torn. III. p. 47-55. 

% See above, p. 127. 



332 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

ferences between the buyer and seller, intended to prevent 
fraud, and to insure the quality of goods, are indeed, 
(except in such cases as those of coin and plate,) pro- 
ductive of more harm than benefit. But where intel- 
lectual fitness is concerned, the public may have less 
facility for guarding against imposture ; and they may 
be aided in the selection of their medical advisers by the 
certificate of a board of competent examiners, who have 
ascertained the qualifications of the practitioner, and 
given them a solemn and authentic attestation. 

§ 18. II. With respect to the influence exercised by 
the heads of a church, or religious community, over 
opinion in religious and ecclesiastical matters, we refer 
generally to the remarks in Chapter IY. 

As has been there shown, no merely human authority 
is recognised by all the Christian churches. The au- 
thority of the heads and doctors of each church is con- 
fined to the members of their own communion, and does 
not pervade all Christendom. Each church or section 
of Christianity possesses its own authorities. Thus, the 
Church of Rome appeals to some of the Greek fathers, as 
Origen, Athanasius, and Chrysostom — and to the Latin 
fathers, as Lactantius, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine — 
to the leading schoolmen, as Thomas Aquinas and Peter 
Lombard, and to some later theologians, as Bellarmine. For 
the Lutheran Church, Luther ; for the Swiss or Reformed 
Church, Calvin and Zwingli are the main guides. The 
Church of England considers as its chief luminaries those 
divines who have excelled among its own clergy — as 
Hooker, Usher, Hall, Jeremy Taylor, Pearson, Bull, Bur- 
net, Butler, Waterland, &c. Among the Protestant Dis- 
senters of England, Baxter, Wesley, Whitefield, and other 
leaders of later date, are the chief guides of doctrine. 
Each of these teachers has, however, a jurisdiction which 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 333 

is limited to the members of his own confession, and 
which other churches either wholly repudiate, or reco- 
gnise only with large qualifications and restrictions. If 
they are quoted by writers of a different religious creed, 
it is principally in their character of recognised leaders 
and representatives of their own churches, and for pur- 
poses of controversy and refutation. Thus, a member of 
the Church of England, or any other Protestant church, 
would deny any decisive authority to a passage from 
Thomas Aquinas or Bellarmine ; and a polemical writer 
of the Church of Rome would probably think that he 
had made a large concession, in admitting that any 
Protestant divine was even a Christian. The Church 
of Rome, which formally prohibits the reading of all 
heretical books, places the writings of the Reformers in 
the Index Librorum Prohibitorum. Every Roman Catholic 
who reads a book included in this list, incurs the penalty 
of excommunication latce sententice* The Protestant 
churches, in like manner, discourage the reading of 
heterodox and erroneous writings ; but they have never 
gone the length of publishing an Index of condemned 
books.f 

§ 19. An important influence is exercised by the 
heads of a church, or by certain members of it invested 
with a delegated power, in ascertaining the fitness of 
candidates for the Christian ministry or priesthood, and 
in stamping them with the public character of the sacred 
profession. The character conferred by the process of 



* See Sarpi, VI. 5. Excommunication latce sententice is the 
same as what, in our law books, is called excommunication ipso 
facto; i. e. excommunication following immediately upon the offence, 
without the sentence of a court. 

t See Palmer, On the Church, Part IV, c. 1 7. 



334 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

ordination is, in some churches, indelible by law, and in 
nearly all by custom. It is accompanied, moreover, 
with a renunciation of many secular pursuits ; and, in 
the Church of Rome, the obligation of celibacy is likewise 
imposed upon ordained priests. The importance of the 
selection thus made mainly depends on the judicious 
exercise of the discretion confided to the ordaining 
parties, and on the qualifications which it guarantees. 
Whether the ordination is further sanctified by an un- 
interrupted succession from the Apostles, is a question 
upon which theologians and churches differ, and which 
does not belong to the present inquiry. In episcopal 
churches, the ordination is effected by the bishops — in 
presbyterian churches, by the presbyteries — and in other 
Protestant churches by boards, sometimes mixed of 
ministers and laymen. Thus, Cromwell established a 
board of commissioners called Triers, whose business it 
was to examine candidates for ecclesiastical benefices, 
and to admit them, if deemed worthy of approbation.* 

§ 20. III. We have next to consider the influence of 
Voluntary Associations for political, scientific, literary, 
and other purposes, in the diffusion and authentication 
of opinions. 

Both in England and the United States, it has been 
for some years (as has been before observed )f the prac- 
tice to form voluntary associations for certain political 
objects. Such associations have generally an internal 
organization — arrangements as to meetings, order of 
proceedings, committees, and the like, together with 
officers and funds of their own. Sometimes they are 
concerned in the party questions of the day, and seek to 



* See Neal's Hist, of the Puritans, vol. II. pp. 624-9. 
t Above, p. 265. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 335 

influence the government and legislature by appealing to 
and agitating public opinion against some existing law. 
At other times, their object is to procure the introduc- 
tion of some philanthropic measure — as for abolishing 
slavery or the slave-trade, for improving education or 
health, for diffusing knowledge, for promoting public 
order and morality. Voluntary associations of this sort 
bring together persons who are interested in the pur- 
suit of a common end; they tend to create and foster, 
by the mutual communication and emulation of their 
members, a body of enlightened opinion and accurate 
information on the given subject ; and thus, independently 
of the arguments which they may lay before the public, 
they promote the formation of a centre of authority on 
the matter, which is likely to exercise an influence in 
various directions. It is probable, indeed, that the active 
members of such an association may be prompted to the 
pursuit of their object by a zeal not sufficiently tempered 
with discretion, and that they may overrate the impor- 
tance and utility of the end at which they aim; still, 
with these deductions, the honest conviction of the 
leaders of such a body will scarcely fail to exercise an 
influence on some portion of the public. 

This effect is particularly perceptible in societies 
formed for scientific and literary purposes, whose pro- 
ceedings are of a more tranquil and less controversial 
character than those of political or semi- political asso- 
ciations. The earliest of the learned societies is the 
Museum founded at Alexandria, in the third century 
before Christ, by Ptolemy Philadelphus, which was as- 
sisted by a public endowment, and encouraged by the 
royal patronage. Societies for the cultivation of litera- 
ture, science, and the fine arts were, however, first esta- 
blished on an extensive scale in modern Italy. The 



336 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

Italian Academies, which began even in the fifteenth cen- 
tury, directed their attention to every department of the 
field of knowledge — from mathematics and physics to 
painting and music — and from them the learned societies 
afterwards established in the other European States, 
such as the Academie Franchise and the Academie 
Roy ale des Sciences, the Society of Antiquaries and the 
Royal Society, the Berlin Academy, &c, were imitated. 
Some of the most important of these societies obtain 
pecuniary assistance from the government; but their 
number has, during the last century, been greatly mul- 
tiplied by voluntary efforts, and their utility has been in- 
creased by the direction of their efforts to limited and 
definite subjects.* 

Bodies of this sort concentrate a large mass of skilled 
opinion upon the subject to which their combination refers, 
and their corporate judgment accordingly carries with it 
a deserved authority among the public. For example, 
the Reports of the French Academie des Sciences upon 
new works and discoveries belonging to the department of 
physics, have obtained great weight in the scientific world. 
Dictionaries of the Italian, Spanish, and French lan- 
guages have been published by academies — the Academia 
della Crusca, the Royal Academy of Madrid, and the 
Academie Franchise ; it being thought that the combined 
opinion of such a body would give authority to their ex- 
position of the usage and signification of words. For 
a similar reason, treatises or collections of papers pub- 



* Full details respecting literary and scientific societies may be 
found in the Penny Cyclopcedia, Arts. Academy and Societies, and 
in the Conversationslexikon, Arts. Akademie and Kunstschulen. 
Compare Hallam, Lit. of Europe, vol. I. p. 654; vol. II. p. 502; 
vol. IV. pp. 89, 560-3. Bethune's Life of Galileo, c. 9. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 337 

lished or circulated by learned societies, derive an addi- 
tional weight from the patronage under which they 
appear, and the authentication which they thus obtain. 
The scientific congresses, which, have grown up in 
Europe since the peace, differ from the former societies 
with like objects, principally in having a more cosmo- 
politan character, and being independent of national 
divisions ; by which means the consent of their members, 
when they agree, is calculated to inspire greater confi- 
dence, as being free from all suspicion of local prejudice 
or partiality.* 

Academies for the cultivation of the arts of design 
have, undoubtedly, contributed to promote that end, 
though they have been accused of a tendency to confine 
and pervert the natural taste and genius of the young 
artist. Academies of painting may, it is true, give 
authority and currency to a certain style and manner, 
which, by frequent repetition, and by the imitation of 
successive disciples, may degenerate into a sort of me- 
chanical and insipid ideal, wanting the freshness, variety, 
and truth of nature. Such an effect of academic 
teaching is not, however, necessary ; and it must be con- 
sidered an accidental abuse of the system, which might 
be prevented by a proper method of instruction — not a 
vice inherent in academies.f 

§ 21. The influence exercised upon opinion byuniver- 



* As to scientific societies, and their influence upon opinion, 
see the remarks of Dr. Whewell, Hist, of Ind. Sciences, b. VII. 
c. 6, § 3 ; and as to their beneficial effects, Laplace, cited by Weld, 
Hist, of Royal Society, vol. I. p. 27. With respect to the scien- 
tific congresses, compare the observations of M. Comte, Cours de 
Phil. Pos. torn. VI. p. 478. 

t See the remarks of Mr. Payne Knight, upon the cramping 
influence of academies of painting, and the mannerism which they 

Z 



338 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

sities and places of learning may be referred to the same 
head : these are bodies containing studious and learned 
men, competent to pronounce a judgment on the subjects 
which form a part of the academical course of reading 
and instruction; and, by their collection in one place, 
concentrating a mass of light on these subjects. Every 
such body ought to be a luminous point, diffusing its rays 
in all directions to the rest of the community. # The 
efficiency of universities and other learned bodies may 
be assisted and promoted by a public endowment, and 
by the countenance of the government, in the manner 
which has been already illustrated. 

§ 22. Political parties likewise are, properly speaking, 
voluntary associations for the promotion of certain 
opinions. This end they attain by their organization, 
numbers, and activity, and by the ability, zeal, and cha- 
racter of their leaders. On the means by which they 
exercise a moral authority, some remarks have been made 
in a former chapter, in reference to the working of a 



tend to generate. — Principles of Taste, Part II. c. 2, §§ 1 16-19. He 
admits, however, that if " academical science and precision can be 
united with feeling and sentiment, there is no doubt that the result 
would be a degree of perfection hitherto unknown to the art." 

* " It may perhaps be worth while to remark, that if we except 
the poets, a few orators, and a few historians, the far greater part 
of the other eminent men of letters, both of Greece and Rome, 
appear to have been either public or private teachers — generally 
either of philosophy or of rhetoric." — Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, 
art. 3, near the end. This remark of Adam Smith's is more appli- 
cable to the Greeks than to the Romans. Dr. Chalmers also 
observes, that much more than half the distinguished authors of 
Scotland have been professors, {On Endowments, p. 48.) Re- 
specting the English universities, and the readiness with which 
they have adopted new opinions in science, see Whewell, ut sup, 
b. VII. c. 3, § 2. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 339 

political body ; and we shall have occasion to revert to 
the subject, in treating of the abuses to which that in- 
fluence is liable.* 

§ 23. IV. We have, lastly, to consider the influence 
of the Periodical Press, through its various organs, so 
far as it affects the belief and convictions of the public 
by the weight of its authority. 

The extensive circulation of periodical publications is 
a phenomenon of comparatively recent date. The general 
diffusion of literary journals was prior, in point of time, 
to that of political newspapers ; but neither reached a 
considerable height until a long time after the invention 
of printing. A censorship of the press was, as we have 
seen, an institution universally established throughout 
Europe soon after the introduction of printing; and 
wherever a censorship of the press exists, political news- 
papers are restrained within narrow limits. A govern- 
ment, exercising a censorship over the press, may per- 
mit considerable freedom of discussion upon religion, 
philosophy, and the history of past ages ; but with regard 
to the events of the day, and its own acts, its en- 
forcement of silence is in general inexorable. In Eng- 
land, the censorship of the press was substantially main- 
tained until the reign of William III., and therefore it 
was not until after this period that political newspapers 
could assume any importance. A great variety of flying 
sheets of news were, indeed, issued during the Civil 
War;f but Milton in vain attempted to persuade the 
Long Parliament to abolish the licensing of books. 



* Above, ch. 8, § 3; below, ch. 10, § 7. 

t See Chalmers' Life of Ruddiman, pp. 102-24, and App. 6; 
Disraeli's Curiosities of Literature, p. 55 (ed. 10); Johnson's Life 
of Addison, vol. VII. p. 429. On the meaning of news, see above, 
p. 141. 

z 2 



340 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

Newspapers appear to have had the same origin in all 
the countries of Europe. They were at first mere 
manuscript collections of intelligence respecting the 
events of the day,* which were compiled for the use of 
readers; and either passed from hand to hand, or were 
exhibited in an office, where public notices and adver- 
tisements were sometimes also received and registered, f 
In England, these manuscript papers were called news- 
letters ; and, after the institution of posts, copies of them 
were often sent into the country, like other letters. By de- 
grees, these news-letters began tobe circulated in print — at 
first at irregular intervals, then weekly, and at last daily ; 
but, till after the middle of the last century, they were 
confined to the statement of a few articles of news, of 
general interest, and such as could be obtained without 
much expense, or the maintenance of an extensive corre- 
spondence or staff of reporters. J The names of newspapers 
(as News-letter, Diurnal, Journal, Giornale, Mercury, 
C our ant, Courier, Public Intelligencer, Intelligenz-blatt, 
Postreiter, Relation, Correspondent, Zeitung) allude to 
their character as vehicles of intelligence concerning the 
passing events of the day — such as might be sent pri- 
vately by correspondents through the post, or by a mes- 



* Called at Venice notizie scritte, where they were first circu- 
lated, about the year 1563. The German Relationen were first 
published in the same century, in the form of letters. The earliest 
known authentic newspaper printed in England is of the date 1619. 
See Knight's Political Dictionary, art. Newspapers. 

t See Beckmann, Hist, of Inventions, vol. II. p. 481, ed. 8vo, 
(art. Papers for conveying Intelligence.) Upon the combination 
of advertisements with newspapers, see the Idler, No. 40, (Jan. 20, 
1759.) 

% Upon the news-letters, see Macaulay's History of England, 
vol. I. pp. 388-91. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 341 

senger.* Some periodical essays of a political character, 
as the Examiner, Freeholder, Craftsman, &c, were, in- 
deed, published in England as early as the reign of Queen 
Anne, and even earlier ;f and a bill to restrain the 
licentiousness of the press was ordered to be brought 
into the House of Commons on the 2nd of June, 1712, 
having for its main object the prevention of anonymous 
publications, J which was doubtless directed against 
writings of this class. But the importance of the daily 
newspapers, as vehicles of political discussion and as 
organs of political party, in addition to their function 
of registers of news, dates in this country from about 
the close of the American war.§ On the Continent, 
none of the political journals contained more than a 
mere statement of news before the era of the French 
Revolution. The Allgemeine Zeitung, the first newspaper 
of Germany which added original discussion to reports 



* Newspapers were sometimes printed so as to resemble manu- 
scripts — Tatler, No. 178 (1710); or a blank page was left, on which 
a letter could be written. — Knight's Pol. Diet, uhi sup. 

t For this class of Essayists, see the account in Chalmers' Pre- 
face to the Guardian. — British Essayists, vol. XVI. pp. xxvi. — 
xlvi. 

% 6 Pari Hist. 1141. 

§ With respect to English newspapers, considered as mere vehi- 
cles of intelligence, see the remarks of Johnson in the Idler, No. 7, 
27 May, 1758. He there says — "All foreigners remark that the 
knowledge of the common people of England is greater than that 
of any other vulgar. This superiority we undoubtedly owe to the 
rivulets of intelligence which are continually trickling among us, 
which every one may catch, and of which every one partakes." As 
to the news- writers in Queen Anne's time, see Tatler, No. 18, 
(by Addison.) On the avidity for news, Spectator, No. 452, (1712.) 
Compare No. 457. See also Connoisseur, No. 45, (1754.) 



342 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

of events, was established in 1798. Even, however, in 
England, where the licensing of publications had been 
abolished for a century, the intellectual character of the 
newspaper press was at a low ebb at the outbreak of the 
revolutionary war; and it is principally since the Peace 
that the standard of its writers has been raised. From 
that time, it has been progressively rising, and, for 
several years past, all the current political questions 
have been discussed in the daily and weekly papers with 
great ability, research, and intelligence. During the 
same period, its character as a vehicle of information 
has also been much improved. Not only domestic news, 
but full and accurate reports of important public proceed- 
ings, and accounts of contemporary events in all the 
countries of the world, furnished by competent corre- 
spondents, together with criticisms of newly-published 
books, works of art, &c, are to be found in a well-con- 
ducted modern newspaper. 

§ 24. The extraordinary cheapness of the newspaper, 
in proportion to the cost of its contents,* the regularity 
as well as celerity of its publication, its circulation gra- 
tuitously, or at low rates of postage, through the Post- 
office, and the variety and interest of its information, and 
of its comments on passing events, cause it to be diffused 
widely, and to be read by a large part of the public; to 
whom it not only furnishes the materials out of which 
their opinions on the questions of the day are chiefly 
formed, but often suggests the opinions themselves. 



* The profit derived from the advertisements in a newspaper 
lowers its price to the public, and improves its quality. If there 
were no advertisements, the price of a newspaper of equal quality 
with the present must be greatly increased, and probably no such 
newspaper could be published. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 343 

A newspaper affords every day the intelligence which 
each person wants, without the interruption of a visitor 
or messenger — and suggests opinions on political and 
other subjects, without the formality or apparent pre- 
sumption of a personal adviser. It is a daily supply of 
information and discussion, of which everybody can take 
as much or as little as he pleases, and at the times most 
convenient to himself, without being guilty of any slight 
or breach of propriety. 

In every civilized country, therefore, in which the 
newspaper press is not strictly coerced by the govern- 
ment, it exercises a great influence upon the opinions of 
the community at large, in different directions and by 
different means ; partly by supplying facts as the ground- 
work of opinions, partly by argumentative discussion, 
and partly by its mere authority. 

§ 25. Now, in looking on the newspaper press as one 
of the principal guides of public opinion, and as an 
authoritative source of practical convictions to a large 
part of the community, the most prominent characteristic 
which strikes the observer is, that it is anonymous — that 
all the writers officially connected with a newspaper are 
unknown to the reader, and strictly maintain their in- 
cognito. This is certainly the general character of the 
newspaper press in all countries. The editorial articles are 
always anonymous in form, and generally anonymous in 
fact; though, in some cases, their authorship may be 
disclosed in private, or may be ascertained upon in- 
quiry. 

§ 26. The anonymous character of the newspaper press 
is so important and distinctive a feature, and is so closely 
connected with the nature of its influence as an authori- 
tative guide to opinion, that it is necessary to inquire 



344 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

what are the motives and causes, and what the operation 
of this system.* 

It may be said, in general, that the author of a writing 
is desirous that his authorship should be known. If the 
composition contains nothing of which he is ashamed, 
there is no reason why he should not avow his own pro- 
duction. He probably thinks that the publicity of the 
fact will contribute to his reputation. There must, 
therefore, be some cogent reason for the universal and 
studious concealment of authorship practised by news- 
paper writers. 

This reason is to be found in the facilities which it 
affords for the free expression of opinion on contempo- 
rary transactions. A newspaper writer undertakes the 
invidious office of a public censor. He cites before 
his tribunal kings, potentates, statesmen, churchmen, 
demagogues, officers of the government, members of 
political bodies, and men in every variety of relation in 
which they play any public part, however exalted or how- 
ever humble. The high are formidable by their influ- 
ence and station — the low, by their numbers and powers 
of union. Having no powerful party or connexions to 
support him in undertaking a conflict, in which the 
superiority of strength is so much against him, it is 
necessary that he should, by self-concealment, avoid the 
retaliation which he is sure to provoke. Being unequally 
matched against so great a preponderance of force, he is 
compelled to fight in ambush in order to gain the 
victory. He throws down his gauntlet in the lists, and 
challenges all the world to the combat; but before he 
enters the field, he is forced to lower his vizor. 



* Compare the remarks -upon anonymous testimony above, 
ch. III. § 2. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 345 

Writers in newspapers resemble the guests at a 
masquerade, who, by disguising their faces, are able to 
comment with freedom, and without fear of consequences, 
upon the errors or foibles of their neighbours. They 
are, as it were, disembodied voices, admonishing people 
of their faults or omissions — like u the airy tongues 
that syllable men's names," which, in times of alarm and 
superstition, have been heard to give warning of public 
danger. In this respect Junius, the magni nominis 
umbra, the mysterious monitor and castigator of men in 
high stations, who was never identified with any living 
person, is the prototype of the newspaper press. 

The anonymousness of newspaper writing rests on the 
same ground as the vote by ballot for electoral purposes — 
viz., the protection against intimidation orundue influence 
which, in either case, the secrecy affords. Both in writing 
upon public events, and in giving a vote at a public elec- 
tion, secrecy is "vindex tacitse libertatis." Unless the 
writer concealed his name, he would in many cases be ex- 
posed to personal quarrels and threats, and, in still more, 
to personal solicitations and remonstrances, if he wrote 
with freedom. If, on the other hand, he avowed his author- 
ship, he would find it necessary, or at least prudent, to 
suppress unpleasant truths, to spare certain individuals, 
to avoid giving offence to the powerful, and, in short, to 
make the same sacrifices to personal feeling and interest, 
as are made by those who discuss openly the conduct 
and character of their contemporaries. That this would 
be the case is proved by the practice, not only of editors 
and the regular paid contributors to newspapers, but 
also of most of their casual correspondents, who write 
under assumed names. If the descendants of every 
celebrated person of a former age thought it their duty 
to defend their ancestor's memory, and to fasten a quarrel 



346 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

upon a historian who censured him without reserve, it 
would be necessary for historians of the past to conceal 
their names, not less than the contemporary chroniclers 
who write in newspapers. Bayle, who wrote at a time 
when it was dangerous for a man to discuss philosophical 
and religious subjects with freedom, resorted to various 
devices of false dates and fictitious prefaces, in order to 
divert suspicion and to conceal his authorship. 

As an example of the dangerous hostility which a 
freespoken newspaper writer may excite, the case of 
Junius may be cited. Sir William Draper, when at- 
tacked with severity by Junius, called upon him to drop 
his anonymous character, and to decide the quarrel by 
arms. Junius declined this challenge, saying in reply, 
that " it was by no means necessary that he should be 
exposed to the resentment of the worst and the most 
powerful men in this country ;" and " that while Sir 
William Draper would fight, there were others who 
would assassinate." — {Letter 25.)* 

Hence, a person attacked by a newspaper is in the 
same position as a knight in a tale of chivalry, who finds 
himself, through the arts of an enchanter, assailed by the 
blows of an invisible hand, which he feels without being 
able to perceive their author. Under cover of their con- 
cealment, these writers can pass everywhere unimpeded ; 
they can act as the privileged spies of the public, without 
being subject to the danger of being hanged, if caught 
within the enemy's lines. They have the same defence 
of obscurity which the goddess is described as conferring 
on iEneas and his companions, in order to enable them 
to enter the walls of Carthage with safety, and to scru- 



* On Junius's concealment, see Johnson on the Falkland Islands, 
vol. VI. p. 204. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 347 

tinize its inhabitants without being stopped or challenged 
by the guards. 

At Venus obscuro gradientes aere ssepsit, 
Et multo nebulae circum dea fudit amictu; 
Cernere ne quis eos neu quis contingere possit, 
Molirive moram aut veniendi poscere causas. 

The newspaper press, so far as it is an organ of opi- 
nion, is a political and moral censorship, assumed volun- 
tarily, and exercised by concealed agents. Its operations 
may be considered as those of a modern Vehmic tribunal, 
adapted to a civilized state of society. It works by 
secret instruments, and its sentences are carried into 
effect with almost resistless force, but by unseen and 
unknown hands. In a certain sense, the public stands 
to the newspaper press in the same relation as that in 
which the government stood to the informers at Yenice : 
it opens a lion's mouth, into which all public accusations 
can be thrown, without the disclosure of the complainant's 
name. 

The concealment of authorship by newspaper writers 
exempts them from many of the feelings which disturb 
the judgment of rival politicians, contending in the open 
arena of public life. For example, being withdrawn 
from public notice, they are free from personal vanity or 
rivalry, and from all love of distinction ; they cannot be 
actuated by a desire of display, or of personal triumph — 
by the love of power for its sordid advantages — or by a 
spirit of interested faction. It is only so far as they are 
connected with, or set in motion by, the leaders or fol- 
lowers of political parties, that newspaper writers can be 
influenced by these motives. 

That there must be strong reasons of expediency 
in favour of a practice so generally adopted, so firmly 
maintained, and so peaceably acquiesced in, cannot be 



348 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

doubted. On the other hand, it is an unquestionable 
evil that the public mind should, with respect to the 
events and public characters of the day, be guided to a 
great extent by persons who, writing in studied conceal- 
ment, are exempt from the check of personal respon- 
sibility, and can gratify private resentment, private 
friendship, or any other private feeling, good or bad, at 
the expence of the public interest, or of the reputation 
and peace of individuals, without the prospect of moral 
accountability to any human tribunal — and, even in the 
event of the conviction of the publisher for libel, with no 
fear of individual exposure.* 

The concealment of authorship likewise encourages, 
or permits, the adoption of a censorious tone of assumed 
superiority, of disinterested regard for the public welfare, 
and of championship of the nation against the acts of 
the government, which would perhaps not be consistent 
with the writer's true position and character if he were 
known to his readers. In many cases, probably, the 
assumed is as unlike the real character of the writer, as 
the character of the tragedy-hero to that of the actor 
who represents him. 

It might be thought that, as the original articles in 
newspapers are all anonymous, they would pass merely 
for the intrinsic value of the facts and arguments which 
they contain, and that they would be devoid of any 
extrinsic and adventitious authority. Such, however, 
is not the fact ; newspapers are not like single anony- 



* Some strong remarks on the evils arising from the anonymous- 
ness of the newspaper press, may be seen in Lord Brougham's Pol. 
Phil. vol. II. p. 41; vol. III. pp. 122, 177. Compare also some 
observations on the same subject, in the collection of essays en- 
titled " Friends in Council" p. 163. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 349 

hious placards, issuing from an unascertained source. In 
some cases, indeed, the authority of a newspaper may 
even greatly exceed that of a statement or argument 
supported by the author's name. A newspaper, it is to 
be observed, by its continuous publication at the same 
office, and under the same title,* and by a unity of 
management under the same proprietary, acquires a 
species of individual character, similar to that of a cor- 
poration, or club, or regiment, or mercantile partnership, 
or other voluntary association, kept in existence by the 
perpetual succession and renewal of its members. It is, 
like them, a persona moralis ; and although its writers 
do not appear before the public in their personal identity, 
and in many cases, doubtless, are unknown to one 
another, yet they all depend on a common centre; they 
are selected and remunerated by a common employer; 
their several movements are regulated by a common 
mind, and according to a uniform plan. In this manner, 
a newspaper can acquire a corporate character for accu- 
racy and extent of intelligence, for correctness of state- 
ment, and even for soundness of judgment and strength 
of reasoning — which character is composite — the general 
result of its management; and it is formed from the 



* Any title or other mark by which a newspaper or other ven- 
dible article is distinguished, is recognised by our law as the subject 
of property, and a court of equity will restrain all unauthorized 
persons from pirating it. Johnson, in his Life of Addison, speak- 
ing of the newspapers published in England during the civil war, 
states, that " when any title grew popular, it was stolen by the 
antagonist, who, by this stratagem, conveyed his notions to those 
who would not have received him, had he not worn the appearance 
of a friend." — Works, vol. VII. p. 429. The same fraud continued 
to be practised in the next century : see Addison's Freeholder, 
No. 55. 



350 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY TPIE [CH. 

aggregate writings of its contributors, but is distinct 
from that of any one of them. 

Now, by taking advantage of this corporate character, 
but at the same time sheltering himself under the cover 
of anonymous authorship, the official newspaper writer 
secures the protection of secrecy, while he writes, never- 
theless, with a considerable weight of authority. He 
obtains all the adventitious strength which may be 
derived from the character, connexions, and influence of 
the newspaper, considered as a moral entity ; while he 
escapes from all personal responsibility, and is not 
known by, or accountable to, any one but his own 
employer. 

Another important incident of the corporate character 
of a newspaper, and of its continuous existence, is, that 
it may be the organ of a certain political party or 
interest, and may thus come to be regarded as the 
authentic representative of their views. In this way, 
again, it may acquire an authority extrinsic to the mere 
anonymous effect of the arguments or opinions which it 
circulates. 

From the relation in which newspapers stand to the 
public — being dependent on their sale for their very 
existence* — it is natural that they should seek to render 
their opinions acceptable to a large number of pur- 
chasers, and thus they often follow, as well as lead, 
public opinion. Even in these cases, however, they 
contribute to give it a more clearly marked form, and 
to turn it into a more definite course ; and their autho- 
rity with their readers is enhanced, rather than dimi- 



* It is true that the advertisements form a large part of the 
profits of a modern English newspaper, but the number of adver- 
tisements depends chiefly on the extent of the circulation. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 351 

nished, by a dextrous adaptation of their suggestions 
and censures to pre-existing opinions or sentiments. 

We see, therefore, that by its continuity of character, 
by becoming a party organ, and by sometimes following 
as well as leading public opinion, a newspaper obtains 
a considerable authority, independent of the force of its 
reasoning, and that this authority is directed by writers 
who, being anonymous, are exempt from all sense of 
personal responsibility. 

Such is the reverse of the picture which we have 
contemplated above. Such are the principal evils inci- 
dental to the anonymous authorship of newspapers. 

The system itself, however, rests, as we have seen, on 
a solid basis of expediency. The public has a para- 
mount interest in the free expression of opinion upon 
passing events, and in the free censure of the public acts 
of contemporaries ; and, without anonymous writing, this 
freedom cannot practically exist. Besides, any attempt 
to compel the true writers to disclose their names would 
be futile.* The law can only compel some responsible 
party to undertake the paternity of a newspaper article ; 
but it cannot make the paternity a question of fact. It 
can do nothing for creating a moral and personal respon- 
sibility in the real writers. It cannot get beyond the 
registered editor and the publisher. By these means, 
the author escapes, while the newsvender suffers — revers- 
ing the proverbial fate of the great and little : 

Low skulks the hind beneath the rage of power, 
And leaves the wealthy traitor in the Tower. 



* As was stated above, page 341, an attempt was made in Queen 
Anne's reign to compel anonymous writers to disclose their names; 
but the bill introduced into parliament for this purpose was 
dropped. 



352 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

The conclusion at which we arrive is, that however 
liable to abuse the anonymous authorship of newspapers 
may be, the practice is necessary, in order to secure the 
most important purpose of a newspaper, and therefore 
ought to be acquiesced in, even if it could be easily pre- 
vented by law, which is not the case. The proper 
object, therefore, to be aimed at is, to provide securities 
against the abuses of the system, and to obtain its 
advantages with as little admixture of evil as prac- 
ticable — to extract all the honey, and to neutralize 
some of the poison. 

One important protection against the abuses of this 
anonymous writing is derived from the vigilant watch 
which the several newspapers are led, by the spirit of 
competition, to keep up on one another. The rivalry 
of trade prevents them from combining for any common 
purpose ; and the censure which they cast on each other 
is at least as severe and unsparing as that which they 
direct against any member of the public. 

This mutual rivalry of newspapers affords to the 
public many securities against the abuses, to which the 
absence of personal responsibility in the writers would 
otherwise give rise. The private feelings and interests 
of one writer are not shared by others ; and as the news- 
papers do not make common cause, both sides of a ques- 
tion can obtain a hearing through their columns. What 
one newspaper attacks, another defends; what one 
asserts, another contradicts : there is argument against 
argument, declamation against declamation, ridicule 
against ridicule, invective against invective. All mis- 
statements of fact, all misrepresentations and exaggera- 
tions, may be exposed ; all sophisms may be refuted ; by 
this rude but effectual process of pleading, the question 
at issue is fully discussed, even if the truth is not at 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 353 

last worked out ; and the sentence of the judicium popu- 
lare is given after hearing the arguments of all parties. 
Hence, the competition existing between the various 
newspapers raises their character, by rendering them 
careful in their statements and reasonings. Being con- 
stantly watched by rivals, who are not likely to treat 
their failings with tenderness, they seek to make their 
performances come up to their professions, and to furnish 
the accurate information and enlightened opinions which 
they undertake to propagate. If, for example, any 
newspaper were to falsify a document which it reprinted, 
in order to support a particular view of a political ques- 
tion, it would infallibly be exposed by other newspapers ; 
and its circulation would probably be diminished, by the 
want of confidence in the accuracy and honesty of its 
information which such conduct would create among 
the public. The deliberate falsifications, as well as sup- 
pressions of truth, in which the Moniteur indulged under 
Napoleon's direction, could not have been attempted with 
a free press. The certainty of detection, as well as the 
disclosure of the truth from other sources, would have 
given to the public an effectual security against such a 
system of fraudulent misrepresentation, intended to mis- 
lead the people with respect to matters in which they 
were deeply interested. In this manner, the mutual 
censorship of the newspapers — a censorship not less rigid 
than that wdiich they exercise over the community at 
large — increases their fitness to serve as guides of 
opinion, and raises their authority with the public, both 
as reporters of facts, and as judges of public affairs. 

It may be added, that the same newspaper, by in- 
serting communications and documents on opposite sides 
of a question, and by reporting public discussions in 
which speakers of different opinions take a part, contri- 

A A 



354 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

butes to furnish materials for a fair judgment, and to 
neutralize the effect of a too exclusive advocacy. A 
newspaper thus often supplies both bane and antidote — 
" Una manus vobis vulnus opemque feret." 

It is only in countries governed by popular institutions, 
that the newspaper press is free; and in these countries, 
although the conduct of public men is constantly open to 
anonymous censure in the newspapers, they have an op- 
portunity, in parliamentary and other legally-constituted 
assemblies, of explaining and justifying their own acts 
and opinions ; and as these statements are made by per- 
sons in a conspicuous and recognised station, and subject 
to the completest personal responsibility, they outweigh, 
in authority, the remarks of antagonists who maintain 
their anonymous position, and do not come forward as 
accusers. When the accused appears in person, to 
defend himself against the charges of an unavowed ac- 
cuser, he enjoys, at least, the advantage of a position of 
superior credibility and authority. Although he cannot 
retaliate upon unknown assailants, he has at least the 
command of the most effectual means of self-defence. 
Ultimately, therefore, the balance between an unac- 
knowledged attack and an acknowledged defence may 
be fairly struck. 

Another preventive of the ill effects resulting from the 
anonymous authorship of newspapers is to be derived 
from remembering, that they are merely the organs of 
the proprietors, and are written by persons whom the 
latter employ — and that they are not invested with a 
representative character. Without this caution, the 
abstract " we " of a newspaper — in this context, an im- 
personal pronoun of unknown reference — is likely to 
impose upon an unreflecting reader ; and, at all events, 
the concealment of the writer's name may, upon the 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 355 

principle of ornne ignotum pro mirifico, create an im- 
pression of some mysterious agency — an effect of secrecy 
similar to that which induced Walter Scott to conceal 
the authorship of his novels. Above all, a newspaper 
ought never to be considered as the exponent of national 
opinion, nor, without decisive evidence, as the accredited 
organ of a government. Unless this caution be observed, 
the indiscretion of a single editor — writing without any 
due sense of personal responsibility — might, if his vo- 
lunteer assumption of the representative character were 
recognised abroad, give deadly offence to foreign nations, 
and render his own government accountable for his 
opinions. 

The general results of the above remarks on newspapers 
maybe summed up thus: — 1, That, in spite of their 
anonymous authorship, newspapers acquire an extensive 
influence over opinion, by the authority derived from 
their corporate character; 2, That the anonymous au- 
thorship places the public under the direction of guides 
who have no sense of personal responsibility; but, 3, 
That this evil must be endured for the sake of insuring 
a free censure of passing events; and that our main 
efforts should be aimed at the establishment of the best 
practicable securities against the incidental abuses of the 
concealment of authorship.* 

§ 27. With regard to Reviews and Magazines , the 
other important branch of the periodical press, the same 
observations as to their continuous character may be 
made as in the case of newspapers. They consist of a 
set of original critiques and essays, on literary, scientific, 
historical, political, and other subjects, which are written 



* The views of M. Comte, upon the influence of the newspaper 
press, may be seen in his Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. VI. p. 410. 

A A 2 



356 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

by contributors selected and employed by an editor, and 
are published at stated periods under his directions. The 
editor is in general unknown to the public; but the 
previous management of the Keview, and the character 
which it has thus acquired, afford a reasonable ground 
for expecting, that the selection of the papers for future 
numbers will be made on similar principles, and with 
equal discrimination. 

The early political journals, as we have already seen, 
contained mere announcements of news, without comment 
or discussion. The literary journals, on the other hand, 
from their first establishment, aimed at higher objects. 
Being less exposed to the jealousy and suspicion of the 
government, they were allowed to pursue a more unim- 
peded career. The literary reviews and miscellanies, 
which began to appear at the end of the seventeenth 
and commencement of the eighteenth century, gave not 
only accounts of books, but judgments upon them. They 
entered into free and intelligent criticism of the most 
important subjects of speculation, and they bound all the 
States of Europe into a republic of letters, by circulat- 
ing through it a knowledge of all important works, 
wherever published. By these means — in which they 
were materially assisted by the recent institution of 
government posts — they helped to counteract the narrow 
repulsive spirit of political, sectarian, and national 
divisions.* 



* The Journal des Savans was established in 1665; Bayle's 
Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, in 1684; Leclerc's Biblio- 
theque Universelle, in 1686; the Leipsic Acta Eruditorum, in 1682; 
the Gentleman's Magazine and the London Magazine were not 
established till 1731 and 1732; the Monthly Review, in 1749. Upon 
the early reviews, see Hallam, Lit. of Europe, vol. IV. e. 7, 
§§ 24-7; Disraeli, Curiosities of Lit. p. 4. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 357 

Periodical publications of this class are often devoted 
to a special department of literature or science, or to 
some professional subject, such as divinity, law, medi- 
cine, the military art, agriculture, mathematics, &c. 
In this case, the periodical work has an authority, de- 
rived not only from its previous management, but also 
from its limitation to a definite department, and its pos- 
session of a professional character. There are likewise 
newspapers devoted to a special subject, (as medicine 
or horticulture,) but they are less numerous. 

Articles in Keviews generally appear with the names 
of the authors, in France, Germany, and the other conti- 
nental countries. In England and the United States, 
reviews are almost always anonymous; but the secrecy 
of authorship is not so strictly maintained as in news- 
papers. In either case, an article appearing in a Re- 
view, possesses whatever authority it may derive from 
the previous character of the periodical work in which 
it is published.* 

A similar remark applies to the Transactions of 
learned societies. Such societies confer an authority 
upon the paper of a member or contributor, by selecting 
it for the honours of publication, and giving it to the 
world under their auspices. 

All publications which appear successively in a con- 



* Speaking of Young's optical discoveries, promulgated in the 
early part of this century, Dr. Whewell says — " There was in 
England no visible body of men fitted by their knowledge and 
character to pronounce judgment on such a question, or to give 
the proper impulse and bias to public opinion. The Royal Society, 
for instance, had not for a long time, by custom or institution, 
possessed or aimed at such functions. The writers of ' reviews' 
alone — self-constituted and secret tribunals — claimed this kind of 
authority." — Hist, of Ind. Set. vol. II. p. 431. 



358 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

nected Series involve the same principle: they imply 
a systematic and uniform management, and the delibe- 
rate selection of an editor or manager, whose endorsement 
gives a currency to each number. The celebrated col- 
lections of essays, which once had so large a circulation 
in this country — from the Tatler and Spectator to the 
Rambler, Idler, and Connoisseur — were founded on this 
principle.* There was unity of management, and the 
excellence of some numbers compensated for the in- 
feriority of others, while the spirit of all was similar. 
The well-known series of theological tracts published by 
Mr. Newman and his friends, at Oxford, likewise derived 
a portion of their importance from the circumstance, that 
they were all the authentic exponents of the opinions of 
a certain school, vouched for by their admission into the 
collection. It is from this principle that the collections 
of works published by societies (such as the Society for 
promoting Christian Knowledge, the Society for the 
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, and other similar asso- 
ciations,) derive their importance. f 

Encyclopaedias, arranged in an alphabetical order, are 
an important class of publications, which have sprung up 
since the beginning of the eighteenth century, and have 
been formed in general by the contributions of numerous 
writers, each writing upon the subject with which he is 
best acquainted. J The authority of any such compilation 



* Upon the origin of the class of periodical publications, known 
by the name of the Essayists, see the remarks of Johnson, in his 
Life of Addison, and Chalmers' Preface to his collection. The 
Tatler combined the Essayist and the News-letter. 

t See Conversationslexikon, art. Vereine zur verbreitung guter 
biicher. 

;j: For the history of encyclopaedias, see Macvey Napier's Intro- 
duction to the Ejicyclopcedia Britatmica, ed. 6. 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 359 

is derived from a cause similar to that which gives 
authority to a periodical work — viz., the continuity of 
management, and the general discretion and consistency 
shown in the choice of writers and materials. 

§ 28. It is scarcely needful to add, that those who 
assume to exercise the function of literary censors, 
through the periodical press, ought to exercise it with 
an honest and conscientious judgment, and that they 
ought not to abuse the privilege conferred by anonymous 
writing, for the purpose of unduly depressing or elevating 
a new work by unmerited praise or blame. Private 
friendship, private enmity, party feeling, literary jea- 
lousy, and the partialities of booksellers, however, fre- 
quently bias the judgment of critics. Even the sense of 
personal responsibility is no safeguard against the opera- 
tion of such disturbing motives; as we know from too 
many examples in literary history. The influence of 
such motives is more to be feared in anonymous writing, 
and ought to be carefully guarded against by a judicious 
and candid editor. Judges of literature and science, 
although they do not, like those who exercise a criminal 
and civil jurisdiction, decide on the lives and fortunes 
of men — nevertheless, by their arguments and authority, 
influence the reputation of authors, and the fate of 
books and opinions, and thus affect the serious interests 
of society. Their function ought, therefore, to be dis- 
charged with a due sense of its importance; their sen- 
tences ought to be given with independence, and without 
favour and affection, but, at the same time, in a spirit 
of fairness and candour, and without jealousy, malice, or 
love of detraction. 

The abuses of the system of literary puffing — a mis- 
chievous perversion of this power — having survived th§ 
well-known ridicule of Sheridan, have been argumenta- 



360 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

tively exposed by Mr. Macaulay, from whose able essay 
I borrow the following remarks (vol. I. p. 277) : 

" The opinion of the great body of the reading public 
is very materially influenced, even by the unsupported 
assertions of those who assume a right to criticise. Nor 
is the public altogether to blame on this account. Most, 
even of those who have really a great enjoyment in 
reading, are in the same state with respect to a book, in 
which a man, who has never given particular attention 
to the art of painting, is with respect to a picture. 
Every man who has the least sensibility or imagination 
derives a certain pleasure from pictures. Yet a man of 
the highest and finest intellect might, unless he had 
formed his taste by contemplating the best pictures, be 
easily persuaded by a knot of connoisseurs that the worst 
daub in Somerset House was a miracle of art. If he 
deserves to be laughed at, it is not for his ignorance 
of pictures, but for his ignorance of men. He knows 
that there is a delicacy of taste in painting which he 
does not possess; that he cannot distinguish hands, as 
practised judges distinguish them ; that he is not familiar 
with the finest models; that he has never looked at 
them with close attention; and that, when the general 
effect of a piece has pleased him or displeased him, he 
has never troubled himself to ascertain why: when, 
therefore, people whom he thinks more competent to 
judge than himself, and of whose sincerity he entertains 
no doubt, assure him that a particular work is exqui- 
sitely beautiful, he takes it for granted that they must 
be in the right. He returns to the examination, re- 
solved to find or imagine beauties; and if he can work 
himself up into something like admiration, he exults 
in his own proficiency. 

" Just such is the manner in which nine readers out 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 361 

of ten judge of a book. They are ashamed to dislike 
what men, who speak as having authority, declare to be 
good. At present, however contemptible a poem or a 
novel may be, there is not the least difficulty in pro- 
curing favourable notices of it from all sorts of publi- 
cations, daily, weekly, and monthly. In the meantime, 
little or nothing is said on the other side. The author 
and the publisher are interested in crying up the book. 
Nobody has any very strong interest in crying it down. 
Those who are best fitted to guide the public opinion 
think it beneath them to expose mere nonsense, and 
comfort themselves by reflecting that such popularity 
cannot last." 

§ 29. We have now traced the principal centres from 
which opinions are diffused in the present state of 
society, and have endeavoured to show how far the guides 
of opinion are invested with authority, and whence this 
authority arises. We have also attempted to indicate 
the means by which that authority may be rendered 
more trustworthy, and what are the limits within which 
it can be properly trusted. 

With respect to the influence of the government upon 
the opinions of the people, we have seen that one essen- 
tial postulate for its wholesome operation is, that it 
should not outstep its proper province. A government 
may, as in the Oriental countries, keep down its subjects 
by mere force ; it may, as has been done in some free 
States, conciliate support by corruption; but both these 
are short-lived expedients. The only stable foundation 
for a government is its moral authority. So long as it 
is looked up to with respect, confidence, and esteem, by 
the body of the people, it stands on a rock. Now, for a 
government to acquire a real moral authority,- it must 
fulfil two (among other) conditions. It must do well 



362 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

those things which it is fitted to do ; and it must abstain 
from attempting to do those things which it is not fitted 
to do. In general, a government violates both these 
rules. It attempts many things which it is ill-qualified, 
if not wholly unable, to perform ; and having wasted its 
force upon distant impossibilities, it omits to discharge 
those functions which lie close within its reach. If, 
however, it keeps steadily within its proper province, 
and within that province exercises its powers with ability, 
discretion, and public spirit, it can scarcely fail to ac- 
quire weight and authority with the people, and will 
thus be able really to guide their opinions, so far as it is 
competent to guide them. 

With respect to public instruction, (whether it be 
controlled by learned bodies, or churches, or voluntary 
associations,) the cardinal maxim is, that as all men 
cannot be judges of all things, the learner should be in- 
structed in the conclusions and results at which the most 
eminent authorities in each department of knowledge 
have arrived, and should, as far as possible, be furnished 
with an instrument for testing the soundness of the 
method which each original inquirer may employ. To 
the application of this maxim there appears to be no 
limit. It may be extended from instruction in logic, 
and the methods of scientific investigation, to the cautions 
against current delusions and other impostures which 
may be given to the children of a village school; from 
the rules for the selection of counsellors on state affairs 
and of professional advisers, to the marks by which even 
the working- classes might be taught to distinguish honest 
and well-intentioned guides, from persons who seek to 
make a profit by practising on their credulity. 

The newspapers, and other publications of the periodical 
press, though they may be conducted by persons writing 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 363 

under an imperfect sense of responsibility, have never- 
theless, both in this country and on the Continent, 
assumed a new character, and risen to a higher in- 
tellectual level, since the Peace of 1815. Independently 
of the opinions which they circulate, they furnish a 
large repertory of positive facts, authenticated by the 
endorsement of respectable publishing establishments; 
and they form a powerful counter-influence to the super- 
stitious fancies and flying rumours which prevail in. 
countries destitute of an accurate daily chronicle of con- 
temporary events. 

In attempting to find the means of giving currency to 
sound opinions, by the influence of a predominant autho- 
rity, it is to be borne in mind, that there are certain classes 
of opinions which it is more important to diffuse among 
the community than others. In many cases, the know- 
ledge of a subject may be confined to a few persons, and 
yet the public may derive as much benefit from it as if 
it were generally diffused. Provided that the know- 
ledge is on record, and that it is not concealed from the 
public, it is immaterial that many persons should make 
themselves masters of the subject. It is to be wished 
that the knowledge should be accessible to all the world ; 
but not that all the world should actually possess it. 
Thus, when we say that a court of justice is open to the 
public, we do not expect that all the public will demand 
admission. Most mechanical and other inventions con- 
nected with physical science, as well as remedies belong- 
ing to the practice of medicine, fall under this head. 
So long as the contrivance or work can be produced, 
and it is not one of the artes deperditce ; so long as the 
medical remedy or treatment is known ; it can be ob- 
tained by purchase, or by the employment of a profes- 
sional man, without any knowledge or understanding 



364 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. 

of its principles. Little advantage would arise if the 
whole community understood the art of manufacturing 
glass, or gunpowder, or of making watches. The diffu- 
sion of the practice of these arts would not tend to their 
perfection ; it would not cheapen their products, or ex- 
tend their use; on the contrary, the diffusion of such 
practical knowledge would counteract the. division of 
labour, by which production is facilitated and cheapened. 
So, when the knowledge of the Eoman formulas of actions, 
which had been kept secret by the patrician order, was 
divulged by the theft of the scribe Flavius, the public 
were benefited by the disclosure, though the number of 
persons who actually studied them was small. The 
knowledge of Sanscrit, likewise, was at one time pre- 
served as an inviolable secret by the Brahmins ; at last it 
was divulged ; and the world has since obtained all the 
advantage which can be derived from a knowledge of 
Sanscrit, although the number of persons who have mas- 
tered the language has been very limited. 

But if the subject be one on which each person is re- 
quired to act for himself, and he cannot procure what 
he wants by exchange from others, then it is important 
that correct opinions in relation to it should be diffused 
through the community, and that all people should be 
able to guide their judgment in the matter by a refer- 
ence to a trustworthy authority. This is the case with 
most of the opinions by which men steer their course, 
both in public and private life. In all cases where a 
man is called upon to act, or to decide, he ought to have 
such a store of those opinions which immediately preside 
over practice, as will enable him to direct his own course 
with safety; or, if he be not so provided, he ought to 
know how to chuse competent and honest guides. 

If, by a judicious combination of the means above in- 



IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 365 

dicated, this end could be approximately attained, the 
influence of impostors would be diminished; violence 
would be more rarely resorted to, especially by crowds 
and organized bodies ; the utility of a strict observance of 
law and order, for all classes, would be more generally 
recognised ; the evidence of positive facts and the 
light of experience would be more uniformly consulted; 
reason would be more in the ascendant, and would con- 
stantly exercise a greater influence over a larger por- 
tion of the population ; and discussion of all sorts would 
be at once more free, more tolerant, more intelligent, 
and more fruitful of results. As a consequence of these 
influences, public opinion would be more enlightened and 
wary, and less prone to run headlong after an ephemeral 
object of admiration or hatred. Its general character 
would be less puerile and more manly. 

To whatever extent the changes which have been just 
indicated may ever actually take place, it is certain that 
the movement of Western Europe, but especially of 
England, during the last thirty-five years, has been in a 
direction coincident with this progressive tendency. 
The movement may have been retarded, counteracted, 
and crossed by numerous influences, some intentional, 
some fortuitous ; but such has been the constant inclina- 
tion of its course, and such it may be expected to con- 
tinue, perhaps with an accelerated velocity. 



366 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 



CHAPTER X. 

ON THE ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 

§ 1. In previous parts of this Essay, an attempt has 
been made to trace out the proper province of authority 
in matters of opinion — to show what are the cases in 
which we ought to be guided by the opinion of others, 
as well as to give practical tests for selecting the persons 
who are most competent to act as guides, in questions 
both of speculation and practice, and for distinguishing 
them from impostors or pretenders to knowledge, who 
would only mislead their followers. If these indications 
are sufficient, they would operate as preservatives against 
abuses of the principle of authority ; if the right use and 
application of the principle is secured, its perversion is 
avoided. Nevertheless, the evils arising from a mis- 
direction of confiding followers, by persons exercising an 
influence over their opinion, are so great and numerous, 
that it may be useful to exemplify in detail some of the 
more prominent forms of the abuse in question. 

§ 2. It has been already shown, that great respect is 
due to the opinions of persons who have devoted their 
lives to the study of sciences, have employed upon it the 
powers of an acute and vigorous intellect, and have been 
actuated by an honest desire of discovering and teaching 
the truth. This respect, however, should be the willing 
obedience of a freeman — not the blind submission of a 
slave : the teacher to whose authority we bow ought to 
be regarded rather as an adviser and counsellor, than as 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 367 

a dictator and master. There may be an excessive 
reverence for scientific doctrines handed down from a 
former age, and received among existing philosophers, 
which may check the due freedom of investigation, per- 
petuate error, prevent originality of thought and the 
discovery of new truths, and maintain science in a sta- 
tionary and unimproving state. " Although (says Lord 
Bacon) the position be good, 'oportet discentem credere,' 
yet it must be coupled with this, ' oportet edoctum 
judicare' — for disciples do owe unto masters only a 
temporary belief, and a suspension of their own judgment, 
until they be fully instructed — and not an absolute re- 
signation, or perpetual captivity."* Whatever deference 
is justly due to great names and competent judges, they 
are not to be regarded as infallible — as the oracles of a 
scientific religion — or as courts of philosophy without 
appeal. Those who come after the great discoverers of 
truth, and teachers of mankind, may, though endowed 
with inferior intellectual gifts, retread the same ground 
— they may verify what is correct, and reject what is 
erroneous or doubtful. They may remove subordinate 
defects, and complete parts which have been left imper- 
fect, in systems which they could not have conceived. 



* Adv. of Learning, b. I. (vol. I. p. 45.) Compare Cicero, De 
Nat. Deor. I. 5 : " Quin etiam obest plerumque iis qui discere 
volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim 
suum judicium adhibere: id habent ratum quod ab eo quern probant, 
judicatum vident." See also Sir T. Browne's Vulgar Errors, b. I. 
c. 6 & 7. 

" Oportet in ea re maxime, in qua vitas ratio versatur, sibi quem- 
que confidere, suoque judicio ac propriis sensibus niti ad investi- 
gandam et perpendendam veritatem, quam credentem alienis 
erroribus decipi, tanquam ipsum rationis expertem." — Lactant. 
Div. Inst. II. p. 146; ed. Spark. 



368 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

Although they could not have designed the plan, or laid 
out the foundations, they may assist in bringing the 
edifice to perfection. 

The great and successful insurrection against the 
authority of a defective scientific system, was in the 
two centuries which succeeded the invention of printing 
— when the scholastic philosophy, founded chiefly upon 
the logical and metaphysical writings of Aristotle, and 
developed under the influence of the Church, was de- 
throned.* This revolution, although it had been prepared 
by a long series of minor insurgents, as well as by the 
positive researches of Galileo and Descartes, was mainly 
consummated by Bacon ; and he may be considered as 
the type of this great intellectual movement. According 
to the poetical tribute of Cowley, Bacon was the main 
author of this triumph of Eeason over Authority. 

Authority — which did a body boast, 

Though 'twas but air condensed, and stalk'd about, 
Like some old giant's more gigantic ghost, 

To terrify the learned rout — 
With the plain magic of true Reason's light, 
He chased out of our sight; 
Nor suffered living men to be misled 
By the vain shadows of the dead: 
To graves, from whence it rose, the conquered phantom fled.f 

§ 3. When, however, we speak of the triumph of 
Eeason over Authority, accomplished by the establish- 



* See Whewell's Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, b. XII. c. 7. 
Compare a passage from the preface to the first vol. of the Trans- 
actions of the Academy of Sciences, at Paris, quoted by Dr. Whe- 
well, ib., vol. II. p. 428; also Hallam, Lit. of Europe, vol. II. c. 3. 
t Cowley's Epistle to the Royal Society. Compare Dryden's 
verses, in his Epistle to Dr. Charleton — 

The longest tyranny that ever swayed, 
Was that wherein our ancestors betrayed 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 369 

ment of the Baconian inductive method in the place of 
the scholastic philosophy, and adopt the received lan- 
guage on this subject, we must be careful not to confound, 
under the name of submission to authority, two distinct 
intellectual defects. 

A blind spirit of routine in philosophy, and a passive 
assent to existing dogmas, without verification, or a really 
independent scrutiny, is not identical with belief on the 
principle of authority. By Authority, we have in this 
Essay understood, in conformity with general usage, the 
influence which determines the belief without a compre- 
hension of the proof.* But the scientific student, who 
servilely follows a beaten track, does not necessarily 
accept opinions upon the mere credit of his master, and 
without understanding the evidence on which they rest. 
He may, on the contrary, have gone through all the 
reasonings propounded by his guide — may have perused 
and reperused all his writings — have commented select 
portions of them — interpreted the obscure, and illustrated 
the concise passages — and reproduced his doctrines in 
compends and epitomes. He may be a slavish follower, 
but a slave both voluntarily and upon conviction. 



Their freeborn reason to the Stagirite, 
And made his torch their universal light. 

# * ¥r 

Among the assertors of free reason's claim 
Our nation's not the least in worth or fame. 
The world to Bacon does not only owe 
Its present knowledge, but its future too. 

Vol. XL p. 114; ed. Scott. 
* Thus, Cicero speaks of his belief being influenced, not merely 
by the arguments, but by the authority of great philosophers: 
" Nee solum ratio ac disputatio impulit, ut ita crederem ; sed 
nobilitas etiam summorum philosophorum et auctoritas." — De 
Senect. c. 21. 

B B 



370 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

Now the revolution in philosophy, which is represented 
by the name of Bacon, must be considered mainly as a 
change of scientific method, and the consequent substi- 
tution of a set of sound doctrines, of which the proof was 
understood, for a set of unsound doctrines, of which the 
proof was equally understood. The Arabian and scho- 
lastic philosophy, which had prevailed during the long 
stationary period after the extinction of Greek civiliza- 
tion, was doubtless founded upon the writings of Aris- 
totle; but the scientific writers of that period did not 
bow to the authority of Aristotle, without examining, 
understanding, and reproducing his reasons. They were, 
as Dr. Whewell has remarked,* distinguished by their 
commentatorial spirit — they translated the Aristotelian 
treatises, and illustrated them with elaborate expositions 
— they reduced the logical, physical, and metaphysical 
theories of their teacher into a connected system; but 
their assent was given to the argument, not to the con- 
clusion without the proof. They repeated the Aristotelian 
philosophy as a system of deductive science, not as a 
series of axioms. In truth, the schoolmen adopted the 
physical tenets of Aristotle, as a modern astronomer 
adopts the Principia of Newton ; they studied the system, 
understood the proofs, and assented to the conclusions. f 
Men such as Thomas Aquinas cannot be charged with 
a tame and sluggish acquiescence in conclusions, without 



* See his account of physical science during the stationary period 
of the middle ages, in his Hist, of the Ind. Sci. b. IV. 

t "Almost the whole career of the Greek schools of philosophy — 
of the schoolmen of Europe in the middle ages — of the Arabian and 
Indian philosophers, shows us that we may have extreme ingenuity 
and subtlety, invention and connexion, demonstration and method; 
and yet that out of these germs no physical science may be deve- 
loped." — Whewell, Hist, of Ind. Sci. vol. I. p. 8. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 371 

troubling themselves to examine their connexion with the 
premises. The error of the schoolmen, in fact, consisted 
in the adoption of a defective scientific method — in the 
uninquiring acceptance of first principles, false, indistinct, 
and unverified — and in reasoning deductively from pro- 
positions, whose truth had not been established by proper 
preliminary processes. They received the Aristotelic 
treatises as the sum of a perfect philosophical system, 
not as the provisional researches of a progressive science. 
This error is not identical with a servile deference to 
authority. The schoolman who drew all his lessons from 
Aristotle — the "Maestro di color che sanno," as he 
was called by Dante — might have believed nothing on 
the mere authority of the philosopher ; unless those first 
principles, which he doubtless considered as intuitive 
truths, may be considered as derived from this source. 
He mastered the philosophical system in vogue, and 
understood its logical connexion ; but it was built upon 
an unsound basis — and into the sufficiency of this basis, 
owing to the faultiness of his methods of investigation, 
he omitted to inquire. A modern student, who has 
access to the results of a better method, may exhibit 
equal want of originality of thought, and may merely 
repeat the deductions of his predecessors without veri- 
fication or improvement ; but if the conclusions are 
correct, he would not be censured for an undue submis- 
sion to authority. On the one hand, then, a man who 
never adopts a speculative opinion without understanding 
its grounds may, from sectarian prejudice or some other 
cause, be infected with the intellectual slavishness of the 
scholastic or Arabian period, and may receive syllogisms 
as if they were the responses of an oracle. But, on the 
other hand, a man who is strongly imbued with the 
progressive principle of science — who verifies all results 

BB 2 



372 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

by a rigid scrutiny within a certain circle of subjects, 
may, with respect to other subjects, cherish the principle 
of authority, convinced that he has not time for all 
things. 

§ 4. Bacon is very explicit and earnest in refuting 
the fallacy, which confounded a respect for opinions 
handed down from antiquity, with the respect due to the 
opinions of the aged* At a time when a superstitious 
veneration for traditionary doctrines in philosophy still 
prevailed, there was a confusion between the age of a 
man and the age of the world; and it was supposed 
that, as an old man is more experienced, and there- 
fore more able to judge, than a young man, so a remote 
generation, as being more ancient, is wiser than the 
existing one. Bacon exposed this somewhat obvious 
fallacy by the pithy sentence: " Antiquitas sasculi 
juventus mundi" — justly remarking, that each genera- 
tion is older than its predecessor, on the same principle 
that an aged man is older than a youth ; and that the 
latest generation ought to be the wisest, as being fur- 
nished with the most ample stock of experiments and 
observations. The mistake arose from not perceiving 
that, in order to compare the age of the world with that 



* See Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 46; Nov. Org. 1. I. aph. 83. 
The remark had been previously made by Giordano Bruno. See 
Whewell's Phil, of hid. Set vol. II. p. 361. Compare Hallam, 
Lit. of Europe, vol. IV. ch. 9, § 45. Pascal, Pensees, Part I. art. 1. 

Lactantius complains that the heathen religions were maintained 
simply on account of their antiquity: " Use sunt religiones, quas 
sibi a majoribus suis traditas, pertinacissime tueri ac defendere 
perseverant: nee considerant quales sint, sed ex hoc probatas atque 
veras esse confidunt, quod eas veteres tradiderunt: tantaque est 
auctoritas vetustatis, ut inquirere in earn scelus esse dicatur." — 
Div. Lnst. II. p. 144. Compare above, p. 114. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 373 

of a man, we ought in each case to reckon downwards ; 
according to which mode of calculation, the nineteenth 
century is older than the sixteenth, and the sixteenth 
than the eleventh.* Each successive generation enjoys 
the benefit of the experience and knowledge of its pre- 
decessors, together with its own; and if science be in a 
progressive state, the judgment of the most recent ge- 
neration ought to be the maturest and best. It is by 
efforts which, being successive, require time; by the 
gradual rejection of errors, and discovery of new truths ; 
by the combined attempts at forming and perfecting a 
technical vocabulary and a philosophical arrangement, 
that sciences are advanced. Hence Truth may, with 
Bacon, be called the daughter of Time rather than of 
Authority. f In an enlightened and progressive state of 
society, sound opinions gradually, in the long run, and 
in the majority of cases, prevail over error; for, if 
they were not thus predominant, society would cease to 
be progressive. Through the knowledge and skill of 
the steersman, they generally make at last a successful 
voyage down the great stream of time; while false 
theories, though they may at first be driven on by a 



* The nature of this mistake may be illustrated by comparing 
two chronological eras — in one of which the years are reckoned 
backwards, in the other, forwards: for example, the years before 
and after the birth of Christ. We must not suppose that, because 
the year 150 a.d. is later than the year 100 a.d., therefore the 
year 1 50 B.C. is later than the year 100 b.c. In like manner, we 
must not suppose that, because a man of sixty was born before a 
man of twenty, therefore the sixteenth century is older than the 
eighteenth. 

t Auctores vero quod attinet, summse pusillanimitatis est, auc- 
toribus infinita tribuere, auctori autem auctorum, atque adeo omnis 
auctoritatis, Tempori, jus suum denegare. Recte enim Veritas, 
Temporis filia dicitur, non Auctoritatis. — Nov. Org. lib. I. aph. 84. 



374 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

favourable gale, are allowed soon to drift upon the quick- 
sands and breakers, and to be lost in oblivion.* 

§ 5. Whatever errors may arise from a blind and 
fanatical submission of the judgment to the opinions of 
leaders of sects and parties — a subject to which we 
shall advert more at length presently — there is no 
danger, in the present age, of philosophic truth being 
obstructed, and error perpetuated, by a generally prevail- 
ing superstitious veneration for traditionary theories 
and the authority of great names. An habitual freedom 
of thought exists throughout the scientific world; a 
system of discussion concerning matters of science — not 
conducted in a controversial and acrimonious spirit, but 
directed mainly to the legitimate ends of science — has 
been established.f Every philosophic question is now, 
after a time, fairly tried upon its merits. It is prin- 
cipally in the domain of civil government and positive 



* Lord Bacon expresses a different view on this point, which is 
scarcely consistent with his own dictum, as to Truth being the 
daughter of Time. " Another error .... is a conceit that of former 
opinions or sects, after variety and examination, the best hath still 
prevailed, and suppressed the rest; ... as if the multitude, or the 
wisest for the multitude's sake, were not ready to give passage 
rather to that which is popular and superficial, than to that which 
is substantial and profound; for the truth is, that time seemeth t 
be of the nature of a river or stream, which carrieth down to us that 
which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which 
is weighty and solid." — Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 47. Compare 
Nov. Org. 1. I. aph. 77: " Sed temporibus insequentibus [after 
Cicero], ex inundatione barbarorum in imperium Romanum, post- 
quam doctrina humana velut naufragium perpessa esset, turn demum 
philosophise Aristotelis et Platonis, tanquam tabulce ex materi 
leviore et minus solida, per fluctus temporum servatae sunt." It 
seems to me that, if this view were correct, all improvement of 
mankind, in successive ages, would be impossible. 

t See Whewell's Philosophy of Ind. Sciences, b. XII. c. 4. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 375 

law that men's minds are now practically divided and 
embarrassed, as to the amount of respect due to antiquity 
and prescriptive authority. 

Now, with respect to political institutions and laws — 
if we look merely to their origin, the same remark holds 
good as with respect to philosophy. The generation 
which enacted a new law, or established a new institu- 
tion, had no better means of judgment on the sub- 
ject than ourselves; on the other hand, we have not 
only their knowledge, but the experience of subsequent 
years and of our own time, to guide us. To speak of 
the wisdom of our ancestors, as if they had some peculiar 
means of knowledge beyond ourselves, or were more 
likely to be right than the present generation, is a mani- 
fest fallacy. The generation who lived in the time of 
George I. were not wiser than those who lived in the 
time of George III. ; nor were those who lived in the 
time of George III. wiser than the present generation.* 
All laws were new when they were first made; and 
when they were made, they were made by persons who 
were not wiser than succeeding generations, and had, 
as to that untried law, no special experience to guide 
them. 

When we speak of an ancient institution, we may 
mean either one of two wholly distinct ideas. We may 
mean an institution no longer existing, which existed 
at a former period of history. In this sense, the Athe- 
nian ostracism, the Eoman tribunate or dictatorship, the 
mayor of the palace under the Merovingian kings, the 



* " Nee quia nos illi temporibus antecesserunt, sapientia quoque 
antecesserunt ; quae si omnibus aequaliter datur, occupari ab ante- 
cedentibus non potest," says Lactantius, referring to the preceding 
generations, Div. hist. II. p. 146. 



376 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

podesta of the Italian republics, the Vehmic tribunals 
of Germany, Alfred's law of mutual pledge, or the 
liberum veto of the Polish Diet, is an ancient institu- 
tion. According to this acceptation of the term, any 
institution which existed at an early date, however short 
its duration may have been, is an ancient institution. 
Or, we may mean an existing institution which dates 
back from a remote period, and has had a long con- 
tinuous existence. In this sense, trial by jury in Eng- 
land is an ancient institution. Now, with respect to 
an ancient institution of the first of these two classes, 
its antiquity, as such, raises no presumption in its 
favour. The mere fact of an institution having existed 
at an early period, does not prove that it is suited to 
our present wants and circumstances. On the contrary, 
the desuetude of an ancient law may have arisen from 
the very fact of its unsuitability to the actual state of 
things.* But the other class of ancient institutions 
stand on a different footing. Having being long in 
existence, either with few or no intervals or suspensions, 
they have been tried by a long experience, and have, by 
a gradual and intelligent, though almost insensible pro- 



* " D'oii vient que la loi ne plait pas egalement dans tous les 
temps, et qu'ainsi que la beaute, elle est sujette a vieillir? Quand 
le souverain l'etablit, son intention est certainement qu'elle subsiste 
jusqu'a ce qu'il lui plaise de la revoquer; cependant, combien de 
lois n'avons-nous pas qui n'ont jamais ete revoquees, et qui main- 
tenant n'ont ni force ni vigueur. L'age, au lieu de les /aire re- 
specter, semble au contraire les avoir rendues ridicules, au point 

qu'on n'ose pas meme les citer, et encore moins les produire 

Ainsi des qu'une loi contrarie les moeurs actuelles, elle eprouve un 
choc auquel elle ne peut resister. II semble que tous les esprits 
tombent d'accord pour ne la plus observer; le souverain lui-meme 
se voit force de l'abandonner." — Merlin, Repertoire de Jurispru- 
dence ; art. Autorite, § 1. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 377 

cess, been adapted to the interests, habits, and feelings 
of the community. Their good parts have been deve- 
loped ; their bad parts eliminated or counteracted ; usage 
and custom have reconciled people to their defects, and 
rendered theoretical absurdities, which shock the philoso- 
phical bystander and speculative reasoner, comparatively 
innocuous. By the mutual action of the people on the 
government, and the government on the people, they 
have been worked into a form which is more or less 
suited to the state of society, and with which the com- 
munity have become familiar. They have thus acquired 
a sort of prescriptive title to their possession, and they 
are often cherished by the people with a feeling of vene- 
ration and affection, of which the mere utility of the 
institution is the condition rather than the cause. 

In the domain of science, an opinion on a subject 
lying beyond the range of our experience, may be handed 
down, through a series of generations, with implicit faith, 
but without undergoing any process of examination or 
verification, and consequently without acquiring any 
confirmation of its truth. For example, the Greeks, in 
their iEsopian fables, represented the lion as the king of 
beasts, and gave him the royal attributes of clemency, 
mercy, and magnanimity. This belief having been pro- 
pagated through antiquity, was received and repeated 
in the middle ages, among nations which knew the lion 
only from books ; and it was not till late years that the 
observations of travellers and more accurate naturalists 
corrected the error, by showing that the lion is charac- 
terized by the ferocity, cowardice, and. treachery, which 
are qualities common to all the feline tribe. An opinion 
such as this derives no authority from its antiquity, and 
its passive reception by successive generations. But no 
law or political institution can remain in force for a long 



378 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

series of years, without being subjected to the test of a 
severe and searching experience. It can only be enforced 
by intelligent agents acting upon sentient beings ; and 
this process, when repeated on a large scale, for a long 
time, and in numerous cases, must produce a gradual adap- 
tation to the state and feelings of the people. Those parts 
of the law which are felt as oppressive, or vexatious, 
or inconvenient, will be resisted, openly or passively, or 
counteracted, or evaded; the voluntary contracts and 
agreements between private persons, and the settlements 
of property, will be arranged with a view of defeating 
these .provisions : while the officers of the government, 
from a desire either to do good, to avoid unpopularity, 
or to save trouble, will often allow such portions of the 
law to remain unenforced, or, if enforced for a time, to 
fall at last into disuse. In a case of this sort, the exe- 
cutive functionaries sometimes stand to the legislature 
in the same relation as the soldiers described by Tacitus 
stood to their generals, who preferred "jussa ducum in- 
terpretari quam exsequi."* On the other hand, full effect 
will be given to those enactments which are felt to be 
beneficial; and in the enforcement of these, the public 
functionary will be assisted by the spontaneous action of 
the community. Some discretion in the administration 
of laws must necessarily be intrusted to the executive 
authorities ; and if this be exercised with wisdom, or even 
with ordinary judgment, it cannot fail to give to the 
new law a form as suitable to the wants of the people, 
and to the state of society, as the general directions of 
the legislature will permit. f If the legislature be well- 



* Hist. II. 39. 

t " When any gross absurdity has for any reason found its way 
into the frame of a government, there seems to be called forth a 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 379 

intentioned and vigilant, it will second these attempts at 
voluntary adaptation; it will abrogate or amend those 
provisions which experience has shown to be bad ; it will 
extend and develop those which have proved beneficial, 
and suitable to the wants of the people. Where the 
legislature is indifferent or unobservant, courts of justice, 
by forced interpretations, by fictions of law, and other 
jurisprudential contrivances, frequently modify institu- 
tions rendered obsolete by changes of manners, or intro- 
duce new regulations required by new circumstances. 
In countries, too, which have free constitutions, legisla- 
tive measures are frequently, if not usually, the result of 
a compromise between opposite political parties — a mode 
of proceeding which, if not always defensible in strict 
argument, generally leads to an adjustment of conflicting 
claims, and the establishment of a medium state of 
things, favourable to tranquillity and stability. It is 
by a series of compromises of this sort that the balance 
of powers in a State is, in fact, maintained; though no 
such exact mechanical equilibrium of political forces can 
be provided by the forms of a constitution, as some 
speculators on politics have brought themselves to 
believe. 

The celebrated apophthegm of Bacon — " Naturae non 
imperatur nisi parendo"* — is to a certain extent true of 



protective or prophylactic power in the system, analogous to that 
by which the natural body throws off any noxious or any extraneous 
matter introduced into it; and if mischief cannot be prevented, there 
is exerted another power like the vis medicatrix of the natural 
frame — a power of making some secondary provision, which may 
counteract the mischievous effects of the malconformation, and 
enable the machine to go on working, which otherwise must be 
stopped or destroyed." — Lord Brougham, Pol. Phil. vol. II. p. 81. 
* Nov. Org. I. aph. 129. 



380 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

political government. A people can only be governed 
by adapting the laws to its circumstances, wants, feelings, 
and wishes ; and thus all ancient laws, having complied 
with this condition, may be presumed to be suited to the 
community. 

The experimental and tentative process of adaptation 
just described will be the more effectual and complete, 
in proportion as the government is mild and enlightened, 
and the people are independent and intelligent; but it 
must go on, to a certain extent, even under the most 
rapacious and mutable Oriental despotism, and in the 
most passive and improvident community. Every insti- 
tution, therefore, which has been long in existence 
acquires a certain presumption in its favour, by the pro- 
cess of adaptation to which it is necessarily subjected. 
No new and untried law can, by possibility, possess this 
recommendation; and, to this extent, there is a certain 
authority in favour of all laws which have been in ope- 
ration for a length of time, and have proved, on the 
whole, beneficial.* It is the observation of this process 
which has influenced the jurists of the historical school ; 
who contend that all laws ought to spring from a 
historical basis of gradual development, and not come 
full-grown from the head of a legislator — who hold that 



* " The world will not endure to hear that we are wiser than 
any have been which went before. In which consideration there 
is cause why we should be slow and unwilling to change, without 
very urgent necessity, the ancient ordinances, rites, and long-ap- 
proved customs, of our venerable predecessors. The love of things 
ancient doth argue stayedness, but levity and want of experience 
rnaketh apt unto innovations. That which wisdom did first begin, 
and hath been with good men long continued, challengeth allow- 
ance of them that succeed, although it plead for itself nothing. 
That which is new, if it promise not much, doth fear condemnation 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 381 

tliere ought always, in legislation, to be a continued 
chain of connexion between the past and the future, 
through the present. The same notion has been ex- 
pressed, though in more obscure and metaphorical 
language, by those who have compared the gradual pro- 
gress and development of political institutions with 
the growth of a tree. They have been struck by 
the process of adaptation which arises from the action 
of the people upon its laws and institutions, and they 
have therefore compared the gradual and coherent result 
of this action to the organism of vegetable growth. This 
quasi-organic creation they have contrasted with the for- 
mation of a government or an institution by a single act 
of legislation, which is produced uno flatu, as a metal 
statue is cast in a foundery. 

A similar contrast has been pointed out between the 
legends of mythology and a romance or tale of fiction. 
The former, it is said, are developed by the spontaneous 
and unconscious action of the popular mind, and are the 
natural and undesigned offspring of a certain religious 
belief : the latter are the conscious inventions of a 
single mind, formed upon a preconceived plan, for a 
definite purpose. But in the case, both of mythological 
legends, and of political institutions which have been 
formed by a gradual accretion, each step in the process 



before trial; till trial, no man doth acquit or trust it, what good 
soever it pretend and promise. So that in this kind there are few 
things known to be good, till such time as they grow to be ancient." 
—Hooker, Eccl. Pol V. 7, 3. 

It may be observed that, in this passage, Hooker has not kept 
quite clear of the confusion between old times and old men. " Our 
venerable predecessors" are, in fact, no more entitled to our vene- 
ration than our contemporaries, although they may have lived at 
an earlier period of the world's history. 



382 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

is the result of intelligence, and is prompted by a dis- 
tinctly-understood motive ; though the end may be 
limited and immediate, and the person concerned may 
not contemplate the entire structure to which his work 
is a contribution. 

It may be added, as a further element in the authority 
of ancient institutions, that if they are, on the whole, 
beneficial, and have been really adapted, by the hand of 
the legislator and administrator feeling its way as it 
advances, to the interests, circumstances, habits, and 
opinions of the generality, they have probably acquired 
a hold on the affections of the people; so that their 
maintenance is not a matter of mere calculation — of 
balance of individual gain and loss — but is exalted into 
a patriotic sentiment, which prompts the citizen to 
action in the moment of need without waiting to con- 
sider consequences. 

§ 6. In the management of public affairs, every legis- 
lative proposition for the removal of admitted or alleged 
evils is in general placed between two opposite and ex- 
treme parties; which (if it were allowed to coin new 
words, in order to avoid circumlocution) might be 
designated as the Panaceists and the Ruinists : the 
former underrate the authority of existing institutions, 
and overrate the probable effect of new legislative pro- 
jects — the latter fall into the opposite errors. The 
panaceist, disregarding the minute but numerous and 
powerful ties by which existing laws are attached to 
the habits and feelings of the people, proceeds to the 
enactment of extensive and systematic changes, founded 
probably on some one principle, which he introduces 
everywhere, and which he expects to prove a complete 
and immediate remedy for numerous political ills of the 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 383 

most discordant natures.* He does not see how much 
of the evil tendencies of existing institutions has been 
neutralized by the process above described; to what ex- 
tent they have been counteracted by the voluntary 
action of the community. He therefore exaggerates 
the amount of evil produced by the laws in force, and, 
by a cognate error, he exaggerates the advantages, which, 
in a sanguine delusion, he anticipates from his own 
legislative panacea. It is this error which has imposed 
upon so many well-meaning authors of paper-constitu- 
tions and organic laws, and has led to their disappoint- 
ment, and that of the credulous persons who confided in 
them. On the other hand, the politician of the opposite 
school entertains a blind veneration for ancient institu- 
tions, without perceiving that the changes of manners, 
opinions, social state, international relations, or mecha- 
nical inventions, necessitate corresponding changes in 
legislation. Hence, he sees nothing but ruin and de- 
struction in measures of reformation prepared in a safe 
and prudent spirit; and confidently predicts the most 
disastrous consequences from alterations suggested by 
the great innovator — Time. He forgets how great, ac- 



* The following remarks of Lord Bacon upon panaceas for the 
human body, are equally applicable to panaceas for the State: — 
" It is a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can 
be so sovereign and happy, as that the receipt or use of it can 
work any great effect upon the body of man. It were a strange 
speech, which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a 
vice to which he were by nature subject. It is order, pursuit, 
sequence, and interchange of application, which is mighty in nature; 
which, although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing, 
and more exact obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with 
the magnitude of effects."- — Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 168. 



384 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

cording to his own theory, is the power possessed by a 
community, of adapting institutions to its wants; he 
overlooks the fact, that the vis conservatrix reipublicce, 
which has been employed in the digestion and assimilation 
of existing laws, will also operate upon laws to be made 
hereafter ; and he argues on the assumption that every 
tendency in a new law will proceed, unchecked and un- 
resisted, to its full and natural development — as if men 
would always be willing instruments in the execution of 
laws which would really produce such effects as he antici- 
pates. An established law is judged by its actual opera- 
tion, and therefore according to its administration by in- 
telligent persons, exercising a reasonable discretion as to 
the enforcement of its provisions. But a proposed legisla- 
tive measure is in general judged by all the possible absurd 
consequences to which it might lead, if enforced by per- 
sons destitute of prudence and foresight, or even of 
common sense. Hence it generally happens, that not 
one tithe of the disastrous consequences anticipated of a 
law before it is passed really occur when it is carried 
into effect. It is by optimists and pessimists of these 
opposite sorts — by persons who think their own plans 
the best possible, and by persons who think the plans of 
others the worst possible — that the legitimate authority 
which belongs to existing institutions is misconceived ; 
unduly depreciated by one party, unduly magnified by 
the other. 

§ 7. It has been remarked above, that the principle of 
veneration for antiquity, as such, does not now in 
general mislead the philosophical world, though in 
politics much practical confusion of ideas exists on the 
subject. The factitious authority and importance which 
opinions derive from being the formulas and cries of 
parties, or the dicta of party-leaders, is a more besetting 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 385 

evil of modern times, and requires a separate considera- 
tion. 

When the party end is a good one, the facilities for 
attaining it which the party spirit and combination 
afford cannot fail to be beneficial. The increased ardour 
in the common pursuit, the co-operation, the division of 
labour, the mutual regulation, and submission to a 
common leader, when directed to a worthy purpose, 
must be instruments of good. So long as a party, 
formed for such an object, continues under the direction 
of virtuous and able leaders, the opinions which it ac- 
credits will be sound and useful in their tendency, and 
its authority will be employed in giving strength and 
circulation to these maxims. 

But in all parties, whether political or otherwise, 
there is a tendency to forget the end for which the com- 
bination exists, and to prefer to it the means; to think 
only of the confederation and the body, and not of the 
purpose for which the body exists.* Hence it sometimes 
happens, that the leaders who keep the proper end of 
the association steadily in view are after a time deposed, 
and that others, who look merely to the party as a 
party, who care little about the general objects at which 
it professes to aim, are substituted for them. These 
latter persons are followed and admired, as adopting a 
course which is to strengthen and consolidate the party 
union, and thus to make the party triumphant and 
powerful. Those, on the other hand, who urge that 
such a policy sacrifices the end to the means, and that 



* When a party abandons public and general ends, and devotes 
itself only to the personal interests of its members and leaders, it is 
called a faction, and its policy is said to be factious. See Boling- 
broke, Dissertation on Parties. — Works, vol. III. p. 14; ed. 8vo. 

C C 



386 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

the attainment of the purpose of the association is ren- 
dered secondary to the maintenance of the association 
itself, are disregarded and set aside. 

In political affairs, it is indeed often dangerous for a 
party-leader to give honest advice to his followers, and 
to turn the authority of his opinion in a good direction. 
For if, from the occurrence of untoward events, (which 
perhaps defied all calculation,) the result of his advice 
proves unfortunate, or is even misunderstood and mis- 
represented, they attribute all the blame to him, and 
visit the failure upon his head ; forgetting that they 
voluntarily adopted his recommendation, and were 
parties to his act.* This is a sort of revenge which 
the subordinates of a party inflict on their leader, for 
his eminence and their obscurity. They think that 
they are entitled to a compensation for their want of 
influence over the counsels of the party, in a comparative 
exemption from responsibility for its acts. As long as 
things prosper, and turn out according to their wishes, 
they not only make the leader's views their own, and 
identify themselves with his opinions, but they glory in 
being his adherents. As soon, however, as a change 
takes place, and fortune becomes adverse, they often 
separate themselves from him, disavow all connexion 
with his advice, and treat the former acts of the entire 
party as the acts of the individual leader. A party- 
leader cannot reckon on the friends of his prosperity 
being always the friends of his adversity. 

Diffugiunt cadis 
Cum foece siccatis amici, 
Ferre jugum pariter dolosi. 

It is partly from a consciousness of the difficulty of 



See above, ch. 7, § 14. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 387 

inspiring into a large and unorganized body a sense of 
common responsibility — and partly from the greater 
facility of leading people where they are desirous of going, 
than where they ought to go, that party chiefs often 
become the flatterers and courtiers of the multitude, 
humour their caprices, encourage rather than check their 
evil tendencies, abstain from giving them good but un- 
palatable advice, and thus, in fact, end in being their fol- 
lowers rather than their leaders. Bad counsels are often 
acceptable; the wise and safe course is not always the 
most specious and attractive; prudence can often be de- 
cried as timidity or indolence; and rashness may recom- 
mend itself under the guise of spirit and energy.* The 
moral authority of a party leader, arising from the con- 
fidence of his party, from his supposed desire to promote 
their interests, and from his peculiar knowledge of their 
proceedings, is great, whatever the extent or importance 
of the party may be : so long as he continues their leader, 
the prestige of his name must go for something; and 
hence the obligation upon him of using his influence for 
good purposes, of consulting the lasting interests, both of 
his party and the public, and of not allowing his judg- 
ment to be perverted by objects of mere personal or cor- 
porate ambition. This is the best return which he can 
make for the allegiance of his followers. 

Indeed, where the leader of a party, or founder of a 
sect, is influenced only by good motives, and his conduct 
is actuated by a conscientious sense of duty, he may 
sometimes become the object of an excessive veneration 
on the part of his followers; his very excellences tend 
to create an enthusiastic admiration of him, which 
carries his followers beyond the bounds of a reasonable 



* See Mach. Disc. I. 53, 57; II. 22. 



CC 2 



388 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

deference and respect. In religion, aJife of unspotted 
purity and ascetic devotion; in philosophy, a pene- 
trating, inventive, and comprehensive genius ; in politics, 
a disinterested, steady, and patriotic career, may exalt the 
authority of a leader above the credit due to fallibility. 
Unfortunately, however, the excessive veneration of a 
leader is not confined to good leaders. Fanaticism, 
mysticism, and other forms of error, conscious and un- 
conscious, often impose on the credulity of followers, and 
induce them to place in their guide an unlimited and 
unsuspecting confidence. Hence, if the chief of a party 
or sect has, by fair or unfair means, fascinated the minds 
of his adherents, they walk blindly in his footsteps, and 
refuse to listen to argument against his dicta — to ques- 
tion which is, in their eyes, almost an act of impiety. 
Thus the Pythagoreans decided all controversies by an 
appeal to the avrog £<£a, the ipse dixit, of their great 
master;* and Cato compared the Romans to a flock of 
sheep, on account of their headlong and gregarious ten- 
dency to follow a leader, contrasted with the difficulty of 
guiding them when scattered singly. f 

On the other side, the leader of a party or sect is 
sometimes unduly prejudiced in favour of his followers; 



* Nee vero probare soleo id quod de Pythagoreis accepimus: quos 
ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quaereretur, 
quare ita esset, respondere solitos, " Ipse dixit:" ipse autem erat 
Pythagoras. Tantum opinio prasjudicata poterat, ut etiam sine 
ratione valeret auctoritas. — Cic. de Nat. Deor. I. 5. 

The avrbg e.<pa is referred, not only by Cicero, but by Quintilian 
(Inst. Or at. XI. 1, 27) and others, to the followers of Pythagoras. 
There is, however, another explanation, which attributes the saying 
to Pythagoras himself; in which case the avrbg is supposed to be 
the god who inspired him. See Menage on Diog. Laert. VIII. 46. 

t Plutarch, Cat. Maj. c. 8. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 389 

his opinions are reflected in them, and they repeat, cir- 
culate, and extol his doctrines ; so that, by mutual praise 
and support, they inflame each other's self-esteem, and 
increase the tendency to sectarian exclusiveness.* Ten- 
dencies of this kind, if not repressed, may increase the 
authority of a leader amongst his own followers, but 
will inevitably diminish it with the rest of the world. 

It may be observed, that the opinions of a party are 
often propagated in a cluster. The authority which be- 
longs to the aggregate body of a party or sect, and to its 
leaders, prevents the requisite discrimination, and causes 
people to accept from them a ( set of opinions or doctrines, 
many or most of which may be true, but some can 
scarcely fail to be false. f Both in political and philo- 
sophical parties, there is often a disposition to imitate 
the practice of religious sects, and to establish a definite 
formula of faith, the acceptance of which constitutes 
orthodoxy— and its rejection, heterodoxy. If any neo- 
phyte attempts to exercise an independent judgment, or 
to make a selection among the articles of the prescribed 
creed, he is in danger of being visited with the moral 
pains of heresy. 

When the corporate spirit of a party has been worked 
up to a high pitch by the exhortation and zeal of its 
leaders, the concentration of its sympathetic feelings 
within is generally accompanied by an aggravation of its 
anti-social feelings without. Combination implies re- 
pulsion. J When the passions of political parties are 



* tovq fiev kratpovg fiyev leovg fxcucdpeaai QeoIglv, 
tovq c'aWovg riyelr ovr kv \6yw ovr kv apidfiS. 
verses concerning Pythagoras, cited in Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. IV. 
p. 547. 

f "Whately, Bampton Lectures, p. 54. 
t Whately, ib. p. 10. 



390 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

effectually roused, the principle or end of the union is 
nearly forgotten — the confederation itself is uppermost 
in the minds of its members. The two rival parties are 
like two hostile armies, each contending for victory, and 
regardless of the cause for which they are fighting. 
Hence the savage conflicts of political parties in the 
Greek republics of antiquity, and in the Italian republics 
of the middle age, which rendered it impossible for them 
to co-exist in the same commonwealth, and therefore the 
defeated party usually went into exile.* When the ani- 
mosity of faction reaches this height, the opinions of its 
leaders, and the cause which it represents, can derive no 
authority from its support in the minds of impartial 
persons. 

Now, with the subject of party generally, its character, 
causes, and effects, we are not at present concerned. We 
have to consider it mainly under a single aspect — viz., 
the moral weight and influence of the party leader, as 
arising from his position. This, however, though only 
a portion, is an important portion of the subject. No 
party can exist unless it be provided with leaders. 
Without a spokesman, a guide, and an organizer ; without 
a person to represent them — to collect, and express their 
opinions — to marshal their movements — to direct their 
proceedings — to form a common point of reference — to 
watch while others sleep — to reconcile differences— to 
arbitrate between rival pretensions — and to give unity, 
order, and concert to the actions of the many-headed 
body, — a multitude are powerless for anything but a 



* fi §vyy\. I fuorusciti. Owing to the fierce animosity and en- 
during hatred between political parties so situated, it has been 
maintained that three parties are more easily managed than two. — 
Bodinus De Rep. p. 568. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 391 

transient impulse.* Hence, when a person has occupied 
this position with success, the authority of his opinion 
is great ; from his experience and his peculiar means of 
information, he is believed to be better qualified to judge 
what is good for his party than any private member of 
it ; and a large confidence is thus reposed in his discre- 
tion and advice. For this reason he ought always to 
bear in mind the responsibility of his situation ; to re- 
member that all his advice comes recommended by a 
weight of authority far greater than the mere logical 
reasons which support it; and that he has a power of 
doing good or ill, proportioned to his influence over his 
followers, f 

§ 8. We have now called attention to some of the most 
prominent abuses of the principle of authority, and we 
might properly here conclude our inquiry- — if there were 
not another question, not, indeed, closely connected with 
the influence of this principle, but still having some 
affinity with it, upon which it seems desirable to offer a 
few remarks. 

In comparing the rapidity with which the knowledge 
of matters of fact, and a belief in opinions, are re- 
spectively propagated, a great difference is observable. 
Matters of fact, if interesting to the public, fly about 
with the speed of the wind. J Fame, according to 
Virgil's similitude, sits on an eminence, and speaks in a 



* Mach. Disc. I. 44, 57. 

f On party generally, see Thuc. III. 82-3; Bacon, Essay 51; 
Bolingbroke, vol. III. ; Lord Brougham's Political Philosophy, 
vol. II. c. 5. 

J The Italians have a proverb, (which, perhaps, recurs in other 
languages,) " Le male nuove presto vanno." Both good and bad 
news travel fast, but when good news arrives, nobody complains of 
its coming too soon. 



392 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

voice audible to whole cities. The modern inventions of 
newspapers, steam-presses, railways, and electric tele- 
graphs, diffuse intelligence as to events over a whole 
kingdom in a few hours. Discoveries in science, like- 
wise, so far as they are dependent on mere observation, 
such as discoveries in the heavens made by more power- 
ful telescopes, or in minute objects by more powerful 
microscopes, or new species in the animal or vegetable 
kingdom — are made known with great celerity. 

But opinions are ' propagated at a slower rate of 
velocity. At first their diffusion is the result of exami- 
nation and mature reflection by competent judges — a 
process which requires time. And when the general 
agreement of competent judges has accredited a new 
opinion, it is not diffused instantaneously by their 
authority. The public at large adhere tenaciously to 
their old opinions, and only surrender their convictions 
reluctantly and slowly. In either case, the area of 
opinion is only enlarged by a gradual extension.* 

Such is the manner in which sound opinions are dif- 
fused. Being addressed to the understanding and 
reason, and being founded on an induction of facts, often 
numerous, dissimilar, and complex, the examination and 
verification of the reasons by which they are supported, 
is necessarily a slow and tedious process. Whenever we 
see opinions diffused rapidly, by a sort of electric or 
mesmeric influence of a leader upon the minds of his 
followers, their soundness may be suspected. There is a 



* With respect to the reception of the Newtonian theory in 
England and on the Continent, see Whewell, Hist, of Ind. Sci. 
b. VII. c. 3, §§ 2, 3; of the Linna3an system, ib., b. XVI. c. 4, § 6; 
and of Harvey's discovery, ib., b. XVII. c. 2, § 3. On the slow 
diffusion of true opinions, see Helvetius, De V Homme, § 9, ch. 8. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PMNCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 393 

tendency in the mind to catch opinions when in a state 
predisposing to the reception of them, analogous to the 
tendency in the body to take diseases by infection. An 
influence is produced on the nervous system by impas- 
sioned and impressive addresses, and by sympathy with 
the enthusiasm of other listeners, which causes the whole 
audience to take fire, and to accept, on a sudden, im- 
pressions and opinions which each one, separately, would 
not have received from the self-same impulse.* This 
increased sensibility of a numerous audience arises from 
the stimulus which the feelings of each receive from 
witnessing the excitement of others, and from the con- 
sciousness, again, that his own feelings are reflected on 
their minds. If, for example, we could suppose an 
audience composed of persons isolated from all the rest, 
(by a contrivance such as the separate stalls in the 
chapel of some of the newly-constructed prisons,) 
ignorant of each other's feelings, and incapable of sym- 
pathy, no effect such as this could be produced, f On 
the other hand, strong examples of the contagious effect 
of nervous, impressions, communicated through the mind, 
have occurred among the illiterate audiences addressed 
by fanatical preachers, the effects of which have been 
similar to the imitative and sympathetic orgasms pro- 
duced by the Dancing Mania of the middle ages — by the 
influence of the tomb of the Abbe Paris upon the French 
convulsionnaires — and by the mesmerizers of our own 



* " The passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat 
of one brand, in an assembly are like many brands, that inflame 
one another, especially when they blow one another with orations, 
to the setting of the commonwealth on fire, under pretence of 
counselling it." — Hobbes, Leviathan, part II. c. 25. 

f See Whately's Rhetoric, part IV. ch. 3, § 8. Compare above, 
p. 170. 



394 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

time.* All opinions which are diffused rapidly, by im- 
pressions on the nervous susceptibilities of a numerous 
audience, are to be suspected ; all practical decisions pro- 
cured by such means are likely to prove unsound. The 
liability to such impressions increases, in proportion as 
the temperament approaches to the hysterical and femi- 
nine habit. But nobody, however robust his mind, >is 
proof against this influence ; and all men ought to dis- 
trust, not only the judgment. of others, but their own 
judgment also, when formed under such circumstances. f 
§ 9. The mental disposition just described is impor- 
tant with reference to the numbers of a deliberative 
body. A large body is much more liable than a small 
one to this nervous conflagration — to this contagious in- 
toxication of the emotions and judgment; for example, 
a numerous public meeting than a jury or a vestry. 
Where the address is to the reason and understanding, 
a body consisting of a moderate number is best fitted 
for deliberation — not a great multitude, such as used to 
crowd the ecclesia or comitia of the ancient republics, 
the numbers of which, as all adult male citizens were 
members of it, were practically unlimited. A defined 
limit to the numbers of a legislative assembly has been 
secured by the contrivance of a representative govern- 
ment, and is one of the best results of that excellent 
political system. On the other hand, where the appeal 



* Upon the Dancing Mania of the fourteenth and following cen- 
turies, and other impetuous nervous affections produced by sympa- 
thetic causes, see the interesting account in Hecker's Epidemics of 
the Middle Ages, translated by Dr. Babington, pp. 87 — 152, par- 
ticularly c. 4. Concerning mesmerism, see Burdin et Dubois, His- 
toire Academique du Magnetisme Animal, Paris, 1841. 

f See Hume's Essays, vol. HI. p. 572; Lord Brougham's Pol. 
Phil. vol. III. p. 99; Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. IV. pp. ^05, 6. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 395 

is, properly and avowedly, to the feelings, emotions, and 
taste of the audience, not to their practical reason and 
judgment — where their moral and aesthetic sentiments, 
not their deliberative faculties,, are called into action, 
the numbers of the assembly can scarcely be too great, 
provided that they comply with the mechanical condi- 
tions necessary for hearing and seeing. Such, for 
example, are all theatrical representations, which con- 
sist in dramatic performances, and are not (like combats 
of gladiators, bull fights, or dancing) addressed merely 
to the sight. 

The drama is an embellished portraiture of life, serious 
or comic, intended, not to create illusion^ as represented 
on the stage, but to produce a vivid effect upon the 
feelings of the audience, by the closeness of the resem- 
blance and the truth of the imitation. This impression 
is greatly strengthened by the simultaneous influence of 
the acting upon the audience, and the sympathetic play 
of their feelings. Laughter, as we know, is essentially 
a social emotion. No man can laugh in solitude. A 
comedy which would convulse a whole N theatre with 
laughter, would be read in the closet without a smile. 
The same is also the case, to a great extent, with the 
emotions of compassion and grief. Many more tears 
would be shed over the mimic sorrows of Juliet or Desde- 
mona in the theatre than in the study. # 

The art of the actor consists in working upon the 
emotions, either of pity, or admiration, or tenderness, or 
ridicule — in gently exciting the moral sensibilities of his 
audience, or in awakening mirth. These effects he pro- 
duces by recitation and gesticulation, and by personating 



* " Ut ridentibus adrident, ita flentibus adflent 
Humani vultus." Horace. 



396 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

an assumed character; and in this his whole art is 
summed up. He aims at no ulterior object. 

The deliberative orator speaks in his own person ; and 
although he may use as instruments what the actor 
regards as ends — although he may arouse the passions 
and move the mirth of his hearers, yet he addresses their 
understanding, and seeks to influence their practical 
judgment. The histrionic powers of the orator are 
worthless in themselves ; they are valuable only so far as 
they assist him in accomplishing his end — the conviction 
of his hearers.* In a theatre, the actors have alone a 
part to perform ; the audience are the passive recipients 
of the dialogue which passes on the stage. They sit by 
and listen, and, as it were, overhear it : though substan- 
tially intended for their amusement, it is not addressed 
to them in form.f Their enjoyment is derived from 



* There is a current mistake as to a saying of Demosthenes 
upon oratory, which is reported by Cicero in two different passages 
{De Orat. III. 56; Brut. 38). Being asked what is the first thing 
in oratory, and what the second, and what the third, he replied 
always actio. This is usually translated action, which, according to 
the common acceptation of the word in our language, would mean 
the motion of the body in speaking. It ought to be translated 
acting, or rather, as we should say, delivery. Plutarch, in his Lives 
of the Ten Orators, c. 8, and Valerius Maximus, VIII. 10, ext. 1, 
in relating the same anecdote, use the Greek word v-KOKpiaig ; 
while Quintilian, XI. 3, § 6, renders it by pronunciatio. Actio, or 
vwoKpiaig, was defined by the ancients to consist in all that belonged 
to voice and gesture. Thus Cicero, in his Orator, c. 17, says — 
" Est enim actio quasi corporis qusedam eloquentia, quum constet 
e voce atque motu." Compare Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Lat. in agere ; 
Lex. Techn. Gr. in vTroKpiaig; and Quintil. XI. 3, § 1. Undoubt- 
edly, the characteristic excellence of a speech, as distinguished from 
a written composition, consists in the delivery. 

t The parabasis of the ancient Greek comedy was a violation of 
the theatrical conventions, and of dramatic propriety. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 397 

hearing a good dramatic composition recited with 
suitable tones, gestures, and feeling, and with a faculty 
which identifies each actor with the character repre- 
sented by him. In producing this enjoyment, the whole 
business and purpose of a theatrical performance con- 
sists : the audience have nothing to do, or to decide ; 
they have merely to take delight in the imitation. But, 
in a deliberative assembly, the orator speaks as one of 
the body ; he tenders his counsel as on a matter in which 
all the members deliberating have a common interest; 
he does not stand on a stage, aloof from the others, to be 
gazed at and admired ; nor does he play a part distinct 
from the rest of the assembly. He attempts to lead 
them to his view of a practical question, in the decision 
of which they are all to concur. His words are directly 
and pointedly addressed to his audience, and intended 
to influence their convictions. However he may, by 
his rhetorical powers, gratify the taste of his hearers — 
however he may charm them by his brilliancy, or 
amuse them by his wit, still his work is not completed 
by the mere enjoyment communicated to them: they 
have a part to perform as well as himself; they are 
equally actors in the drama ; their collective act decides 
the question at issue; and they have a judgment to pass 
on the arguments and declamations addressed to them. 
His influence upon them, moreover, depends, to a great 
extent, upon their belief in his sincerity ; if they think, or 
suspect, that his earnestness and impetuosity are feigned, 
and that he is merely acting a part, he will never reach 
their convictions. 

It is manifest, therefore, that in theatrical repre- 
sentations the sympathetic play of the emotions is an 
advantage, inasmuch as it heightens the effect of the 
dramatic imitation upon each spectator; stimulates the 



398 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH, 

actor to a more lively and impassioned performance of 
his part ; and contributes essentially to the success of 
the entire work of art. But in deliberative assemblies, 
where the orator who delivers his opinion leads his 
hearers to a practical conclusion, there is no place for 
the exhibition of histrionic skill, or the mere indulgence 
of aesthetic feelings ; the play of sympathies excited in a 
large audience disturbs the judgment, and produces a 
mental anarchy. 

Where instruction is conveyed to an audience, who 
listen in respectful silence to the words of the teacher, 
it is immaterial how numerous they may be. In schools 
and churches, the pupils and congregation are, indeed, a 
necessary part of the assembly ; but as they exercise no 
power, and indulge in no expression of feeling, incon- 
venience cannot arise from numbers. With regard to 
schools, indeed, the emulation of the pupils may con- 
tribute essentially to enforce the lessons of the master'; 
and some assistance may be derived from mutual in- 
struction; so that numbers are an important element in 
scholastic instruction. 

§ 10. The inquiry undertaken in this essay has now 
been brought to a close. The different subjects proposed 
in the first chapter for investigation have been passed 
under review; and an attempt has been made to deter- 
mine the marks by which trustworthy guides in matters 
of opinion may be recognised — to ascertain the legitimate 
province of authority — and to discover the conditions 
most conducive to its beneficial influence. 

Before, however, we take a final leave of the subject, 
it may seem natural to ask whether, after having looked 
at the Principle of Authority under so many aspects, and 
after having traced it in so many of its applications, we 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 399 

have arrived at any simple and practical maxim as the 
fruit of our researches. 

The most important general formula which appears 
deducible from this inquiry is, that one of the main ele- 
ments of civilization is well-placed confidence. 

One leading condition for the improvement of man- 
kind, both in their public and private relations, is to 
find the means of promoting confidence in other persons, 
and of teaching how these persons can be properly 
selected. A disposition to confide, combined with a 
knowledge how to choose competent guides, and with a 
careful exercise of that choice, is both a mark of a 
civilized state of society, and a means of further social 
improvement. On the other hand, a general tendency 
to distrust and suspicion, combined with occasional 
blind deference to dishonest and unfit guides, is a mark 
of a backward state of society, and a hindrance to 
ulterior progress. 

The state of things last described may arise, either 
from a practical resistance to the Principle of Authority 
in every form ; or from a misplaced confidence, and the 
choice of an unsound authority. Both of these failings 
may be seen, on a large scale, in an Oriental country. 
A general prevalence of a habit of unfounded distrust 
can only be rectified, when men, instead of permitting 
" the proud feebleness of their understanding " (to use 
the words of a modern philosopher) to mislead them into 
judging upon matters on which they are not competent 
to form an independent judgment, evince a disposition 
to defer to the opinions of guides selected with care and 
discretion. Perhaps, however, the prevalence of distrust 
is more often owing to the want of fit guides than to a 
popular dislike of the Principle of Authority. It appears 
to be a frequent occurrence, in a backward state of 



400 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. 

society, that men are willing to waive their exercise of 
the right of private judgment, but place their faith in 
impostors and misleaders, who are candidates for their 
confidence, but are unworthy of it ; who seek to act as 
their trustees, but are unfit for the trust. 

That there is a strong inclination to the adoption of 
the opinion of competent judges, when competent judges 
can be clearly discerned to exist, is plain from the de- 
ference which is universally paid to the authority of the 
great luminaries of physical science. If there was a 
body of authority upon moral and political subjects, 
equally fulfilling the conditions which entitle it to 
public respect; if the choice of the people was not dis- 
tracted by the wide divergence of opinions upon funda- 
mental questions in this department of knowledge; it 
may be presumed that they would be equally inclined to 
place themselves under that guidance. 

The extension of well-placed confidence is not only 
wholesome in our domestic and private relations — in 
those points of conduct and management of our worldly 
affairs to which professional advice is applicable — in our 
pecuniary dealings, where we are unable, of ourselves, 
to ascertain the value and quality of commodities — and 
even in speculative opinions, as to which our time and 
opportunities for study do not permit the safe exercise 
of private judgment ; but it is also productive of eminent 
benefit in political affairs, in which a due selection of 
leaders, and a steady reliance upon their advice, is a far 
more effectual method of arriving at good government, 
than can ever be derived from those barren and wearisome 
changes in mere political forms, which practical states- 
men so often introduce blindly, at the suggestion of the 
fabricators of ideal commonwealths. 



X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 401 

Well-placed confidence, in questions of opinion and 
conduct, is what sound credit is in mercantile affairs. 
Credit does not create wealth ; neither does confidence 
create rectitude of judgment. The material commodity, 
and the mental capacity, must both pre-exist; but, in 
each case, the confidence turns it to the best account, 
and converts to a useful purpose that which might other- 
wise be locked up unproductively in the coffers or in the- 
breast of its possessor. 

In proportion as the circle of our confidence is en- 
larged, the probability that this confidence will meet with 
a fair return increases. He who confides justly in others, 
may expect that they will confide justly in him. At all 
events, it is only by evincing a disposition on one side 
to relax the precautions of mutual distrust, that the 
foundations of a general system of mutual reliance, as- 
cending from private to political, and from political to 
international relations, can ever be securely laid. 

In the present state of the civilized world, the progress 
of society will depend in part upon legislative improve- 
ments, and upon those measures which a government 
can command or influence ; but it will depend still more 
upon the substitution of competent for incompetent 
guides of public opinion; upon the continued extension 
of their influence ; and upon the consequent organization 
of a sound authority in all the departments of theory 
and practice. Every one may, within his own sphere, 
and by means of his own vocation, contribute his share 
to the accomplishment of this great end; and mankind 
may thus approach more and more to a state in which 
opinion will constantly predominate over violence, in 
which reason will hold the ascendancy over passion, and 
wisdom will be diffused from various sources through a 

D D 



402 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 

thousand channels. Under the operation of these in- 
fluences, it will be found that the increased mental 
activity which accompanies progressive civilization is not 
inconsistent with social tranquillity ; that the extension 
of knowledge among the people does not promote anar- 
chical doctrines; and that the principle of moral 
authority is too strong for the principle of political 
revolution. 






403 



APPENDIX. 






THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY, 
AND ON THE PROVINCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 

§ 1. In ch. VIII. of the preceding Essay, the Democratic form 
of government, and the power of the Majority of the People, as 
characteristic of that form, have been referred to, as something 
clearly understood, and having a recognised meaning. The subject 
is, however, still involved in some obscurity, notwithstanding the 
frequent use of the terms, and our apparent familiarity with the 
ideas which they represent; and I have, therefore, thought it 
advisable to append to the Essay, some remarks, in which an 
attempt will be made to ascertain, in what the received opposition 
between aristocracy and democracy, as generally understood, really 
consists. 

The difference between governments in which one person exer- 
cises the entire sovereign power, and governments in which this 
power is shared among several persons, is obvious and precise. It 
is analogous to the difference between the singular and plural 
numbers in grammar. The former are called Absolute or Pure 
Monarchies, or simply Despotisms: the latter are called Limited 
Monarchies and Republics, and are generally known by the common 
name of Free Governments. 

There is, however, greater difficulty in defining the distinction 
between the two varieties of the latter class of governments, which 
are respectively called Aristocracies and Democracies. 

The distinction between these two forms of government is com- 
monly made to depend on the sovereign power residing, or not 
residing, in a majority of the people. If, it is said, the sovereign 
power is vested in the people at large, or in a Majority of the 

DD 2 



404 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

people, the government is a democracy:* if only in a Minority of 
the people, the government is an aristocracy. 

Now, from what has been stated above, in chapter VIII. 
(p. 262) it is apparent that, in speaking of the Majority of the 
People, we mean not the majority of the entire population, but a 
majority of a certain portion of the community. It is necessary, in 
the first place, to strike off all the women and children, and in 
States where slavery exists, all the slaves ;t the residue, consisting 
of the free adult males, constitutes the people, for the purpose of 
determining the form of government. 

§ 2. Having, by these eliminations, obtained the body which 
practically constitutes the people, we have next to consider 
whether the distinction between aristocracy and democracy turns 
upon a precise demarcation of the majority and minority of this 
body. 

Now, (waiving, for the present, the question whether a right of 



* Aristotle, in more than one place, speaks of the sovereign power of the 
majority of the people being the mark of a democracy, Pol. iv. 4. v. 9. In de- 
fining the three forms of government, he says, " One, or the Few, or the 
Many, must be sovereign." lb. III. 7. Bodinus de Hep. II. 6, 7, defines aris- 
tocracy and democracy thus: — " Aristocratia reipublicse forma qusedam est, in 
qua minor pars civium in universos et singulos cives summse potestatis jus habet." 
(p. 339.) " Eespublica popularis est, in qua cives universi, aut maxima pars 
civium, cseteris omnibus non tantum singulatim sed etiam simul coacervatis et 
collectis, imperandi jus habent." (p. 359, and compare another version of the 
same definition, in p. 364.) He rightly remarks that there can be only three 
forms of government, determined by the number of the rulers (p. 366) ; and he 
objects to the system of Aristotle, which makes the distinction between oligarchy 
and democracy depend partly on the comparative wealth and poverty of the 
governing section of the citizens, (p. 356. 364.) '- Sive igitur optimi (he says) 
sive flagitiosissimi, sive ditissimi, sive nobilissimi, sive egentissimi, sive belli- 
cosissimi summum imperium teneant, modo civium pars minor extiterit, aristo- 
cratiam appellamus." (p. 341.) He lays it down that the decisive mark of an 
aristocratic government is, that the rulers should be less in number than half 
the entire community. — " Igitur in optimatum statu civium paucitatem spectare 
nihil est necesse, modo ii, qui in cseteros dominationem habent, dimidio pauciores 
sint universis." (p. 342.) 

+ Referring to slaves and freedmen, Aristotle says that all are not to be con* 
sidered as citizens, without whom a state could not exist: ov iravTaq Qereov 
7roXt'rac, w aviv ovk av tin ttoXiq, Pol. III. 5. Again, he remarks, that in 
order to determine the proper size of a state, as to population, we must look, not 
to the number of slaves and resident aliens, but to those who are, in fac% the 
component parts and members of the state: oaoi TroXewg slat p'epoc ical s% u>v 
avvLGTaTcii tcoXiq oiksiojv /xopiu>v. — ib. VII. 4. So he says that in calling a state 






APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 405 

voting for a representative in a supreme assembly can be fairly 
considered a portion of the sovereign power,) is it possible to found 
the distinction between aristocracy and democracy on any such 
minute difference? Mr. James Mill, in his Essay on Government, 
has apparently taken the words in this rigorous acceptation; for 
he has argued in favour of democracy, on the ground that each 
member of the majority of the people will have an interest in 
governing well, because he will have less than one person to 
oppress; whereas, each member of a minority of the people will 
have an interest in governing ill, because he will have more than 
one person to oppress.* But the ordinary usage of the words 
appears to me to be less precise, and it is doubtful whether, even 
in scientific reasoning, they can be advantageously used with greater 
strictness. 

The distinction between aristocracy and democracy, as commonly 
conceived and understood, is not a logical distinction of kind, 
founded on a precise line of separation, but merely a distinction of 
degree. Aristocracy and democracy cannot be considered as de- 
scribing governments in which a majority or minority of the 
people is sovereign, such majority or minority to be determined 
with numerical precision, like the numbers of voters in a parlia- 
mentary assembly, or at a popular election. Let us, for example, 
suppose that, in an independent State, there are 20,000 adult males, 
and that a law for the regulation of their political suffrage is in 
question. Everybody would feel that there was a wide and prac- 
tical difference between a suffrage co-extensive with this entire 
body, (i. e. universal suffrage,) or a suffrage dependent on a high 
property qualification, which would limit the voters to 1000 or 
1500. The former would be properly called a democratic, the 



happy, we must look not to a part, but to all the citizens: evdaifiova di ttoXiv 
ovk dg [xspog r* fiXtyavrag fot Xsyeiv avrrjg, dXX' tig rcavrag rovg TroXirag, Pol. 
VII. 9. He means, however, to exclude all who are not strictly free citizens ; 
i. e. — all aliens, freedmen, and slaves, the great numerical majority of the popu- 
lation. Compare Grot, J. B. et P. I. 3, § 8, n. 6. " Quid quod nulla respublica 
adeo reperta est popularis, in qua non aliqui aut valde inopes aut externi, turn 
vero et fceminse et adolescentes, a deliberationibus publicis arceantur." Where 
see Barbeyrac's note. " Servos antea ex albo civium eximi omnium pcene popu- 
lorum consensu diximus," says Bodinus de Rep. III. 8. p. 544 ; who however 
states it to be his own opinion, that slaves ought to be admitted to political 
rights. 

* Suppt. to Enc. Brit. vol. IV. p. 500-1. 



406 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

latter an aristocratic arrangement. But no one would consider it 
of any importance whether the suffrage extended to 10,001, or to 
9999 persons; and it would plainly be a distinction founded on a 
merely fanciful and unpractical line, if the difference between aris- 
tocracy and democracy was made to depend on such an impercep- 
tible shade. 

In cases where an assembly decides by a majority of votes, the 
difference between a majority and a minority founded even on a 
single vote, may, in a particular case, be all-important. But, 
where men are thrown into large masses, where public opinion acts 
irregularly, and by impulses, and where no legal effect is given to 
the numerical majority of the aggregate, but the constituent body is 
divided into distinct sections, all reference to the precise prepon- 
derance of numbers is nugatory. It would be as futile as an attempt 
to make the distinction between heat and cold depend on the ther- 
mometer being above or below some fixed degree in the scale. We 
know that the variations of the thermometer, for a few degrees 
above or below a medium point of temperature, are scarcely per- 
ceptible: but we can, nevertheless, distinguish between frost and 
summer's heat. 

Where a few persons, nobles, or rich men, monopolize the entire 
governing power, and give themselves important and exclusive 
privileges, there everybody recognises an aristocracy.* 

Where the great body of the people possess political rights and 
franchises, and a complete civil and political equality prevails, there 
everybody perceives democracy. 

But these two political states pass into one another by insensible 
degrees — like the conditions of rich and poor — and cannot be 



* In the definitions of aristocracy and democracy, both in ancient and modern 
writers, there is often no reference to a precise demarcation. The People, the 
Many, or the Poor, are spoken of as having the chief power in a democracy ; — 
the Nobles, the Rich, the Senate, or the Few, in an aristocracy. 

Pindar opposes the aotpoi to the \aj3pbg arpar6g, Pyth. II. 157. Tacitus says: 
" Cunctas nationes et urbespopulus aut primores aut singuli regunt." — Ann. IV. 33. 
Seneca names pop ulus, senatus, and singuli. — Epist. 14, § 6.. Quintilian names 
populus, panci, and unus. — Inst. Or. V. 10, § 63. Cicero names unus, delecti, and 
populus. — Be Rep. I, 26. Montesquieu says that when the people in a body has 
the sovereign power, it is a democracy ; when the sovereign power is in the 
hands of a part of the people, it is an aristocracy. — Esp. desLoix, I. 2. Puffen- 
dorf says, that in a democracy, the people is sovereign ; in an aristocracy, the 
principal persons of the state.— Law of N. and N. VII. 5, § 3. 



APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 407 

marked off by a precise boundary. Accordingly, it is often said, 
that a constitution is more or less aristocratic or democratic;* 
meaning that it approaches nearer to one or the other extremity of 
the scale, the opposite ends of which are thus characterized. 
Whereas, if the distinction were founded on a logical difference, a 
gradation such as this would not be possible. A number is either 
odd or even, and it cannot be more odd or more even. It is conceiv- 
able, likewise, that a government might be so tempered, that it has 
no decided inclination either to aristocracy or democracy; it might 
occupy that middle part of the scale to which neither designation 
could with confidence be applied, and which would correspond to 
the degrees of a thermometer which are styled temperate, to the 
period of life which is called middle age, and is neither old nor 
young, to the crepuscular state, which is neither night nor day, 
and the like.t 

Consistent with this view, is Aristotle's definition of a democracy, 
and its distinction from an oligarchy. He says, that the former is 
a government in which the poor, the latter, a government in which 
the rich are rulers. % That is to say, in order to characterize the 
form of government, he looks to the opposite extremities of the 



* Aristotle says that seditions take place concerning the different degrees of 
oligarchy and democracy — whether a government shall be more or less oli- 
garchical or democratical. 'in 7repi tov fiaXKov ical rjrrov olov ri okiyapx'iav 
ovaav eig to fiaWov 6\iy applied ai r/ eig to tJttov, rj drjfiOKpaTiav ovaav dg to 
fiaXXov SrifioKpctTeivQai fj eig to tjttov. — Pol. V. 1. Again, in V. 9, he speaks of 
the most democratic democracies, kv TcCig dt][xoKpaTiaig rdlg judXiora elvai 
doKovaatg dwoKpaTwcug. So, Montesquieu, on aristocracies: " Plus une aris- 
tocratie approchera de la democratic, plus elle sera parfaite -, et elle le deviendra 
moins a mesure qu'elle approchera de la monarchic." — Esp. des Loix, 1. II. ch. 3. 
Montesquieu here conceives aristocracy as oscillating between the extremes of 
monarchy and democracy — between the government of the one and that of themany 
— and as capable of resting at any point intermediate between these two limits. 

f Grotius refers to a middle state of this kind, as frequently creating uncer- 
tainty in the moral sciences : he compares it with the dawn, an intermediate state 
between night and day, and with water in a lukewarm state, between heat and 
cold. — De J. B. et P. II. 23, § 1. Puffendorf, in commenting on this passage, 
remarks that a medium state of this kind is called, in the schools, a participa- 
tive mean, as partaking of the two extremes in both directions. — Law of N. 
and N. I. 2, § 9. 

X Pol. III. 5, IV. 3. He reconciles this with the numerical definition by 
saying, that democracy \s when the free citizens and the poor, being the majority, 
are sovereign; oligarchy, when the rich and noble, being few in number, are 
sovereign. 



408 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

social scale, without adverting to the middle class of citizens; of 
whose importance he is, nevertheless, well aware.* He speaks, 
indeed, in many places, of the danger of making a government 
too democratic, or too oligarchical, by inclining too exclusively 
to the interest of the rich or the poor. He considers it fortunate 
for a commonwealth when the middle class of citizens is large and 
powerful, and he advises that this class should always, when it is 
possible, be invested with political power, so as to make a con- 
stitution mixed of oligarchy and democracy, f 

It may be added, that aristocracy and democracy are, properly 
speaking, forms of government ; and that, in distinguishing between 
them, the distribution of the sovereign powers, or of the political 
suffrage, must alone be considered. 

But, inasmuch as certain states of society are in general found to 
accompany these forms of government, a people is sometimes called 
aristocratic or democratic, although its form of government may 



* Pol IV. 11 and 12. 

f In Pol. IV. 11, Aristotle remarks, that "in all states the community con- 
sists of three parts — the very rich, the very poor, and those "between these two 
classes." In this and the following chapter, he enlarges, at length, on the 
advantages arising from investing with power the middle class of citizens. 
Again, in V. 8, he dwells on the importance of a moderate constitution, avoid- 
ing the extremes both of oligarchy and democracy, but founded on the interests 
of the middle class. Aristotle, however, remarks, that of the two extremes, 
the oligarchical is the most dangerous : the excesses of the rich destroy the 
State (he says) more often than the excesses of the people, (IV. 12.) Oligarchies 
are likewise more instable and short lived than democracies, (V. 1 and 12.) 
A moderate constitution, in which the rights of all the citizens are regarded, 
founded mainly on the support of the middle class, but inclining to democracy, 
is what Aristotle calls a 7roXir«/a, (V. 7.) 

Bodinus, de Repub. II. 6, (p. 345,) thinks: "Civitates optimatum imperio 
moderatas, stabiliores esse quam populares ;" and, indeed, he says: "aristo- 
cratic semper diuturniores fuerunt in quibus pauciores erant optimates." — 
VI. 4, p. 1102. 

Muratori likewise speaks of the mixture of aristocracy and democracy in the 
Italian republics: " Non una sorte di governo stabilimente si conservo una volta 
nelle citta libere d'ltalia, ma di tre differenti spezie di governo or l'una or l'altra 
si pratico. U Aristocratic o fu de' soli nobili, con esclusione della plebe, come 
tuttavia si osserva nelle repubbliche di Venezia, Genova, e Lucca. II democra- 
tico del solo popolo, esclusi i nobili, come sovente avvenne in Siena, e talvolta 
anche in Genova, Bologna, &c. II misto composto di nobili e popolari, con 
dividere fra loro gli ufizj ; il che si osservo non rade volte per quasi tutte le 
libere citta. L'ltalia e la Grecia anticamente diedero esempli di questi tre 
governi."— Muratori, Diss. 52, (torn. III. p. 119.) 



APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 409 

not be entitled to be so called. For example, M. de Tocqueville, 
in his work on the United States, often calls the English people, or 
state of society, aristocratic; and the French people, or state of 
society, democratic. There is more social equality, in point of 
actual wealth, among the upper and middle classes in France than 
in England;* but looking to political institutions — to the power of 
the crown, the extent of the suffrage, the liberties of the subject, 
the facility of political association, the freedom of the press, &c, 
England was, when M. de Tocqueville wrote, more democratic 
than France. So the state of society in France, before the revolu- 
tion of 1789, is usually called aristocratic, although the govern- 
ment was a pure monarchy. 

An aristocratic or democratic period is likewise spoken of, mean- 
ing a period characterized by the existence of those political insti- 
tutions, and that social state, which naturally result from these 
several forms of government, or by a tendency to their adoption. 

§ 3. If the preceding view of the difference between aristocracy 
and democracy is correct — if the distinction between them is of 
degree, and not of kind, it follows that much caution ought to be 
used in laying down general propositions respecting them. 

Unquestionably, there are certain tendencies which are common 
to all aristocracies and all democracies. Where the powers of 
government are confined to a, few, there is a tendency to political 
inequality — to a system of privilege for the persons possessing those 
powers, and probably to social inequalities of wealth, hereditary 
rank, &c. Where they are common to a large number — to an 
actual majority or a large minority of the people, there is a ten- 
dency to political equality, to the absence of privilege, and to social 
equality in respect of wealth and private position. 

From these distinctions certain consequences may be derived, 
which it may be possible to express in general terms. By care- 
fully analyzing the phenomena which accompany the aristocratic 



* " Quand un peuple a un etat social democratique, (says M. de Tocqueville,) 
c'est a dire qu'il n'existe plus dans son sein de castes ni de classes, et que tous 
les citoyens y sont a peu pres egaux en lumieres et en biens." — La Dem. en Am. 
torn. IV. p. 243. There is, however, no country in which the people are nearly 
equal in intelligence and knowledge. By a democratic state of society, is meant 
a state of society in which there are no privileged orders, and in which there is 
an approximation to an equal distribution of property : where the legal equality 
is complete, and the social inequality is not considerable. 



410 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

and democratic forms of government; by excluding those which 
are traceable to other causes, (such as religion, race, geographical 
position, state of the useful arts, &c.) by thus isolating the residuary 
phenomena, and referring them to their true cause; certain general 
theorems respecting the several tendencies of these two forms of 
government may be constructed.* 

After all, however, nothing more than general or prevailing 
tendencies can be predicated. t It can only be affirmed that, sup- 
posing men who have the power will use that power as men hitherto 
have for the most part used it, such and such consequences will 
follow. For it is conceivable, for instance, that in a narrow aristo- 
cracy, the ruling body might, under the guidance of some far-sighted 
and public-spirited leader, administer the government upon liberal 
and popular principles. % 

Of such a process of reasoning, confined within its proper limits, 
no better example can, perhaps, yet be named, than the analysis of 
the Greek oligarchies and democracies, in Aristotle's Politics. Even 
his inferences require, in many cases, to be limited by the peculiar 
data of his problem. 

Amongst the modern speculators on Politics, several have, how- 
ever, carried the attempt too far, and have selected, as distinctive 
marks, or invariable accompaniments, of aristocracy and democracy, 
or of free governments generally, circumstances which do not 



* " So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and 
so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that con- 
sequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, 
as any which the mathematical sciences afford us." — Hume, Essays, Part I. 
Essay 3 — That Politics may be reduced to a Science. See also, Mill, System of 
Logic, b. VI. c. 6. 

+ See above, p. 140. 

J " It has often happened (says Aristotle) that the constitution according to 
law is not popular; but, as to its spirit and conduct, is administered in a popular 
manner: and again, in other cases, the constitution has been according to 
law of a popular tendency; but in its spirit and conduct is rather oligarchical." 
—Polit. IV. 5. 

In like manner, Bodinus, De Rep. II. 2 (p. 295) : " Optimates pauci rem- 
publicam populari modo regere possunt, si cives omnes omnium magistratuum 
participes fecerint : aut aristocratice, si paucis quibusdam, [paucos quosdam ?] 
qui aut virtute, aut censu, aut nobilitate cseteris prsestent." He makes the same 
remark with respect to a king, viz. — that he may govern the State either on 
popular or on aristocratic principles. 



APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 411 

belong to the essence of these forms of government, and only are 
in certain cases accidentally found in connexion with them.* 

Thus, it cannot be laid down universally, with Montesquieu, that 
Virtue is the principle of democratic, and Moderation of aristocratic 
governments.t Neither can it be affirmed, with him, generally, 
that luxury is advantageous to monarchies, and detrimental to 
aristocracies and democracies; J or, that the Catholic religion best 
suits a monarchy, and the Protestant religion a republic.§ 

Some of the theorems respecting free or popular government, 
laid down by Hume, in his Essays, appear, in like manner, to be 
derived from an imperfect induction, and therefore not to admit 
the generality which he assigns to them. Thus, he lays it down, 
as a general truth in politics, " invariable by the humour or educa- 
tion both of subject or sovereign," that free governments, though 
commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom, 
are the most ruinous and oppressive to their provinces. " The pro- 
vinces of absolute monarchies (he adds) are always better treated 
than those of free States." || That many free States, as well 
aristocratic as democratic, have misgoverned their dependent pro- 
vinces, cannot be disputed; and it may, perhaps, be admitted, that 
the peculiar opinions and customs of a dependent community are 
more likely to be treated with respect where the paramount nation 
is governed by a monarch, than where it is under an aristocratic 
or democratic regimen; though the treatment of Flanders and the 
American provinces by Spain affords a remarkable proof of a similar 
tendency in a despotic government. But it cannot be conceded, 



* Hume remarks, that many of MachiavePs general inferences on political 
forms are founded on too narrow an induction for general application : " Ma- 
chiavel (he says) was certainly a great genius; but, having confined his study 
to the furious and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little dis- 
orderly principalities of Italy, his reasonings, especially upon monarchical 
government, have been found extremely defective; and there is scarcely any 
maxim in his Prince, which subsequent experience has not entirely refuted." — 
Part I. Essay 12— Of Civil Liberty. 

\ Esprit des Loix, liv. III. ch. 3, 4; V. 2—8. 

\ lb. 1. VII. c. 2, 3, and 4. He concludes the latter chapter thus : " Tout 
ceci mene a une reflexion ; les republiques finissent par le luxe, les monarchies 
par la pauvrete." Under republic, Montesquieu includes both aristocracy and 
democracy. 

§ lb. 1. 24, ch. 5. 

|| Essays, Part I. Essay 3 — That Politics may be reduced to a Science. 



412 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

that there is anything in the essence of a free government (i. e. a 
government which is not an absolute monarchy*), necessarily 
tending to produce oppression of dependencies. Hume, himself, 
on the other hand, refutes a position which he found laid down by 
many writers, that the arts and sciences never can flourish but under 
a free government.t He likewise questions the universality of 
another established opinion on the same subject, that trade can 
only flourish under free institutions; though he admits, that this 
latter opinion rests on a wider observation than the former one. J 
Elsewhere, however, he lays it down, that "it is impossible for the 
arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any people, unless that 
people enjoy the blessing of a free government:" and that, "though 
the only proper nursery of those noble plants [the arts and sciences] 
be a free state, yet may they be transplanted into any government; 
and that a republic is most favourable to the growth of the sciences, 
and a civilized monarchy to that of the polite arts."§ Positions 
such as these, respecting the attraction or repulsion, of either 
monarchy, on the one hand, or of aristocracy and democracy on 
the other, for the arts and sciences, and for commerce, seem to me 
scarcely to admit of satisfactory demonstration. 

No one, however, has carried this mode of reasoning so far as 
M. de Tocqueville, in his work on Democracy in America. In 
this able treatise he attempts to lay down a number of general pro- 
positions respecting democracy, and a democratic people or age; 
not confined to the more immediate and palpable effects of the form 
of government, but extending to very remote consequences, and 
comprehending subjects having no obvious connexion with political 
institutions. 

For example, he lays it down that a democratic age has a natural 
tendency to pantheism ; he believes that this philosophic or religious 
system has a peculiar attraction for a democratic people. || He thinks 



* " The government, which in common appellations [parlance?] receives the 
appellation of free, is that which admits of a partition of power among several 
members, whose united authority is no less, or is commonly greater, than that of 
any monarch ; but who, in the usual course of administration, must act by 
general and equal laws, that are previously known to all the members, and to 
all their subjects." — Hume, Part I. Essay 5 — Of the Origin of Government. 

f Part I. Essay 12.-0/ Civil Liberty. 

t Ibid. 

§ Part I. Essay 14, — Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences. 

]| La Democratic en Amerique, torn. III. p. 59. 



APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 413 

that democratic nations are passionately fond of abstract and generic 
terms* Again, with regard to the fine arts; he is of opinion that 
a love for numerous small works of painting or sculpture, executed 
by inferior artists, characterizes a democratic people.t He thinks 
likewise that in architecture the democratic taste inclines to build- 
ings devoid of solidity, and made only for outward show. As an 
example of the latter, he refers to a row of small palaces, of Grecian 
architecture, near the shore, at New York, which at a distance he 
supposed to be of white marble, but on a near approach he dis- 
covered to be of brick and plaster, with painted wooden columns. £ 
As to poetry, he fears that, finding no fit subject for it in the real 
life of his country, a democratic poet will depart widely from nature, 
will lose himself in the clouds, and pursue the wild, the monstrous, 
and the exaggerated. § He affirms that a democratic nation despise 
the coarse and noisy amusements which please the common people 
in an aristocracy, but that they cannot appreciate the intellectual 
and refined amusements of the aristocratic classes; that they require 
something productive and substantial even in their diversions.! 
He thinks farther, that a democratic age is peculiarly characterized 
by a fondness for easy successes and present enjoyments.^" He 
even believes that, in an aristocracy, every person has a single 
object which he pursues without cessation ; whereas in a democratic 
society each person follows several objects at the same time.** 

Now, on considering these and similar general propositions with 
which M. de Tocqueville's ingenious and suggestive work abounds, 
it is easy to see that he has not sufficiently borne in mind a caution 
which he has himself laid down, as a guide in inquiries, such as 
that which he has undertaken. He remarks elsewhere, that it is 
necessary not to confound that which is democratic with that which 
is only American. He warns his readers against seeing all 
democratic nations under the type of the American people. He 
says that he cannot consent to separate America from Europe, not- 
withstanding the ocean which divides them. For that he considers 
the people of the United States as only a portion of the English 
people, employed in clearing the forests of the New World; while 



* La Democratie en Amerique, torn. III. p. 135. 
f lb. p. 100. % lb. p. 101. 

§ lb. p. 155. || lb. torn. IV. p. 118. 

f Tom. III. p. 29. ** Tom. IV. p. 122. 



414 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

the rest of the nation, possessed of greater leisure, and less en- 
grossed with the care of procuring a livelihood, can occupy itself 
more with mental pursuits.* 

In these just remarks, M. de Tocqueville indicates the necessity 
of attending to other circumstances than political institutions in 
characterizing the acts and dispositions of a community, He shows 
that he bears in mind the important influence which national origin, 
race, religion, manners, climate, geographical position, as well as 
the state of the useful arts, cannot fail to exercise upon the opinions, 
feelings, acts, and character of a political society. He points to the 
many features of resemblance between the people of England and 
that of the United States, notwithstanding that the one (according 
to his view) is an aristocratic, the other a democratic community. 

It would, perhaps, be not difficult, if this were the proper place, 
to trace many of the phenomena, selected by M. de Tocqueville, to 
various unconnected sources, wholly independent of democratic or 
other political influences. For instance, the prevalence of pan- 
theistic opinions (so far as they are prevalent) is to be sought for 
in the diffusion of the modern German philosophy — the taste for 
cheap works of art in numerous mechanical inventions for facili- 
tating their production. In order to see at once that M. de Tocque- 
ville's theorems respecting aristocracy and democracy are, in fact, 
founded on an imperfect induction — that he has not disentangled 
all the antecedent facts concurring in the production of the observed 
phenomenon — and that he has generalized the single case of 
America, or, at most, of America and France, it is only necessary 
to test his propositions by the ancient republics. 

Now, nobody would think of saying that, in the Grecian demo- 
cracies, the people had any tendency to pantheism, or to the use of 
abstract terms; and certainly it could not be affirmed of Athens, in 
the age of Pericles, that its taste in poetry ran into the unnatural 
and grotesque, or that its taste in sculpture and architecture was 
turned to petty and perishable works. So the row of white plaster 
palaces at New York, which M. de Tocqueville considered a mark 
and consequence of democracy, has, I fear, many parallels, and pro- 
bably patterns, in aristocratic England. 

M. de Tocqueville doubtless saw that most of his general apoph- 
thegms concerning democracy, were not applicable to the republics 



Tom. III. pp. 68,70,71. 



APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 415 

which the ancients regarded as democratic, and which the moderns 
have generally recognised as such. Accordingly, he considers the 
governments, both of Athens and Rome, at their most popular 
periods, as being, in fact, aristocratic on account of the exclusion 
of the slaves from political rights.* 

It is no doubt right, in reasoning upon the ancient democracies, 
and in instituting a comparison between them and modern demo- 
cracies, to bear constantly in mind the important fact, that the 
former contained a numerous class of slaves, and that the free 
citizens were only a small minority of the entire population. But 
it would, in my opinion, be a disturbance of the established land- 
marks of history, and an unauthorized departure from the received 
language of all writers, ancient and modern, to treat the Athenian 
and Roman governments, in their developed forms, as aristocracies. 
Nor, indeed, would even this phraseology render M. de Tocque- 
ville's generalizations correct ; for assuming these governments to 
be aristocratic, it will be found that his general affirmations respect- 
ing aristocracies are often as inapplicable to those ancient republics 
as other of his general affirmations respecting democracies. 

The utmost caution is requisite in laying down general propo- 
sitions respecting the tendencies of aristocratic and democratic 
governments, or the characteristics of aristocratic and democratic 
communities. Even the induction of Aristotle, which was neces- 
sarily confined to the Greek and other republics on the shores of 
the Western Mediterranean, is, in many cases, inapplicable to 
modern Christian communities, having no class of slaves, and ac- 
quainted with the use of gunpowder, printing, the compass, and the 
steam-engine. M. de Tocqueville remarks, that " two neighbour- 
ing nations cannot have the same democratic social state without 
adopting similar opinions and manners."t Admitting the truth of 
this remark, (which, however, I must be permitted to think very 
questionable,) it does not follow that this similarity will exist in 
cases where communities are separated, not only by wide intervals 
of space, but also by wide intervals of time, and whose religion, 
race, language, and civilization, are widely different. 

§ 4. It is by a neglect to observe the cautions above indicated — 



* Tom. III. p. 122. In like manner, he says, that the Americans who 
inhabit the States where slavery does not exist, alone present the complete 
image of a democratic society, torn. IV. p. 147. 

+ Tom. IV. p. 243. 



416 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

by hasty attempts to generalize without a sufficient basis of facts, 
and to found universal theorems upon a complex but undissected 
phenomenon — by the consequent establishment of imaginary laws 
of connexion between facts related to each other only by juxta- 
position in place or time — and by subjecting intricate problems of 
plurality of causes to the direct inductive method, without verifi- 
cation or correction, that the Science of Politics has been rendered 
uncertain and uninstructive, and that practical politicians and 
statesmen have been deterred from regarding it as resting on a 
sure foundation, or as tending to useful applications.* If political 
science be properly understood — if it be confined within the limits 
of its legitimate province — and if its vocabulary be well fixed by 
sound definitions and a consistent usage, there is no reason why it 
should not possess the same degree of certainty which belongs to 
other sciences founded on observation. 

§ 5. Political science may be conveniently distributed into the 
following three great departments : — 

1. The nature of a sovereign government, and its relations 

with the individual persons immediately subject to it. 

2. The relation of a sovereign government to a political com- 

munity dependent upon it. 

3. The mutual relations of the sovereign governments of 

independent communities. 

Each of these departments admits of being considered in a double 
point of view. Each may be either treated merely as something 
existing, as something which is, without reference to its tendencies, 
or to any standard of rectitude ; or, again, it may be assumed that 
the existing state of each is known, and it may be treated with 
reference to its probable future tendencies and effects, as well as 
with reference to its most improved and erfect state, or what it 
ought to be. The former may be called Positive or Descriptive, 
the latter, Ideal, or Speculative Politics. 

The science of Positive or Descriptive Politics would, with regard 
to the first of the three departments above mentioned, comprehend 
an exposition of the structure of a sovereign government, and its 
powers — the nature of laws and of their execution — the nature of 
legal rights and obligations, and their classes, and other cognate 



* As to the defectiveness of the ordinary methods of proof in the moral 
sciences, see the exposition of Mr. Mill, System of Logic, b. III. c. 10, §8; 
b. V.c.5.§4; b. VI. c. 7. 



APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 417 

subjects. This exposition would be generally applicable to all 
governments, laws, rights, obligations, &c, without reference to 
their comparative goodness or badness, or to their conformity with 
some ideal standard; it would treat political society merely as a 
subject of observation, and political institutions as something to be 
noted and described.* Portions of Aristotle's Politics, of Cicero's 
Republic, of Hobbes' Leviathan, of the works of Grotius and 
Puffendorf on the Law of Nations, and of their followers, fall 
under this head. Most of the writers on general jurisprudence 
likewise contain an exposition of the nature and action of a sovereign 
government. On the other hand, the Republic and Laws of Plato, 
a large part of Aristotle's Politics, the works of Bodinus, Machiavel, 
Montesquieu, Sir T. More, and others, are occupied almost ex- 
clusively with considering the tendencies and effects of certain 
political forms and institutions, or the best form of government. 

The second department above mentioned, viz. — that which con- 
cerns the relation between a paramount or imperial community, and 
its dependency, has been considered more or less at length by 
many writers, but has been generally treated in connexion with the 
question of colonies, both as respects the actual form of the relation, 
and the rules of expediency by which it ought to be governed. 

The third department, viz. — that of the Law of Nations, or 
International Law, may be regarded under the same double aspect. 
It may be either considered as an actually existing system of moral 
rules, to which the governments of civilized nations usually conform 
in their mutual relations, and to which they habitually appeal as 
something recognised in common. Or it may be considered as an 
ideal or theoretical type, to which the practice of independent 
nations ought to conform. Such, for example, would be a system 
of conventional rules for the prevention of war between civilized 
nations, and for the settlement of international differences without 
an appeal to arms. The former of these has been called the Positive 
Law of Nations ; the latter might be called Speculative Inter- 
national Law. In the earlier writers, as Grotius and his imitators, 
the Law of Nations as it is, and the Law of Nations as it ought to be, 
are frequently confounded; and, indeed, scarcely any attempt is made 



* " General jurisprudence, or the philosophy of positive law, is concerned 
with law as it necessarily is, rather than with law as it ought to be : with law as 
it must be, be it good or bad, rather than with law as it must be, if it be good." 
— Austin, Outline of Lectures on General Jurisprudence, p. 3. 

E E 



418 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

to separate them. By the more recent writers on this important 
branch of political science — as Martens and Wheaton — this dis- 
tinction has been generally observed.* 

The Positive or Descriptive Branch of Political Science, (whether 
it treats of the relations of a sovereign government to its immediate 
subjects, or of its relations to its dependencies, or of international 
law,) is concerned merely with the past and present. It considers 
exclusively what a sovereign government is, and must be ; what is 
necessarily its mode of action; what are its relations, in every con- 
ceivable state of things, with those who are subject to its power. 
In like manner, it describes the rules which have been actually ob- 
served and recognised by sovereign governments in their relations 
with each other. It is partly founded on facts observable, and 
within the reach of our senses, and partly on facts recorded in 
history. 

This portion of political science admits of as much certainty as 
the physical sciences; and it might, by due attention, and the 
absence of political prejudice, be brought immediately to scientific 
perfection. Within its proper province, there is no fact or phe- 
nomenon requiring notice which eludes observation; nor is there 
any combination of facts for which an adequate general expression 
cannot be found. 

Let us, for example, take such propositions as the following : — 

A sovereign government is free from all legal restraint. 

A positive law is a general command, proceeding directly or in- 
directly from a sovereign government. 

A legal right is conferred, a legal obligation is created, by a 
sovereign government. 

A dependency is a political community under a subordinate 
government. 

International law is not enforced by any tribunal common to two 
or more independent nations. 

Such propositions as these are as certain, and rest on as good 
evidence, as general propositions in mechanics, optics, or chemistry. 
If they are not true, the fault must be imputed, not to the subject- 



* The distinction between the Positive and the Natural Law of Nations is 
clearly laid down hy Vatel, (Law of Nations, §§ 24-7,) and he says: "We 
shall be careful to distinguish them, without, however, treating of them sepa- 
rately." Martens points out the same distinction, and dwells on its importance. 
— Law of Nations, Introd. §§ 3, 4. 



APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 419 

matter, but to imperfect or inaccurate induction, or defective lan- 
guage. The facts upon which these propositions are founded lie 
as open to observation, and are determined with the same amount 
of certainty as those which support propositions in physical science. 
It is true that political science cannot be made the subject of 
experiment ; we cannot arrange the phenomena at will so as to test 
a certain principle ; but the relations of government and society, in 
a state of equilibrium, are all within the range of our senses, and 
can be determined with scientific certainty. 

Politics, considered as a descriptive and positive science, deals 
merely with the relations of men to one another. All these are 
manifested in outward acts, and are, therefore, exempt from the 
obscurity which envelops the internal processes of thought, the 
subject of metaphysics — and the operation of our vital organs, 
the subject of physiology.* 

The prevalent belief in the inferior certainty of political, as com- 
pared with physical science, arises in part from a confusion between 
the certainty and the precision of sciences. It has been truly remarked 
by M. Comte, that a proposition may be certain without being pre- 
cise, and precise without being certain. f There is such a thing 
as precise falsehood; and in cases where we can only approximate 
to the truth, a statement which is true may be couched in vague 
and general terms. Thus, in politics, many of the definitions — 
such as those of aristocracy and democracy, illustrated in this Ap- 
pendix — are founded on distinctions of degree, and are, therefore, 
necessarily unprecise. Many, if not most, political forms are sepa- 
rated from one another rather by gradation than by a logical limit. 
Yet the distinctions which they indicate, though wanting in the 
sharpness and rigour of geometrical determinations, are just as real 
and certain as lines, angles, surfaces, and solids. 

The speculative or ideal branch of political science, on the other 
hand, (with whatever department of politics it may be occupied,) 
considers the tendencies, actual or possible, of governments, political 
institutions, and laws; it also considers what are the best and most 
perfect political forms and institutions, or what a government and 
its acts ought to be. It is concerned primarily and directly with 
the future, and only incidentally and by reference with the past. 



* Compare Mill's System of Logic, vol. I. p. 537. 
f Cours de Phil Positive, torn. I. p. 103. 



420 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

It professes to furnish the statesman with a manual of legislation; 
to teach how States ought to be constituted, organized, and governed ; 
what rules ought to be observed in the intercourse of independent 
nations; and, generally, to lay down the maxims which should guide 
mankind in all the relations and forms which political government 
can assume. 

Positive and speculative politics stand to one another in the same 
relation as that in which the descriptive and preceptive departments 
of ethics stand to each other; in which an account of the passions 
and moral sentiments stands to a set of moral rules for the guidance 
of life, and the formation of a virtuous character; or in which 
anatomy and pathology stand to therapeutics. 

The speculative branch of politics, from its nature, does not 
admit the same amount of certainty as the positive branch. While 
the latter treads on the sure and firm ground of the past, the 
former partakes of the uncertainty and obscurity which generally 
cover the future. It professes to describe the tendencies of political 
institutions, collecting them from the past by a process of observa- 
tion and inference. But when the theory so established is applied 
to any practical case, it becomes necessary to consider whether the 
tendency will operate unchecked, or whether its operation will be 
counteracted, either wholly or partially, by opposing and disturbing 
forces. In politics, as in other sciences, the probable consequences 
of any efficient cause can only be expressed in general terms, by 
supposing that cause to act freely, and without impediment or re- 
sistance. But, in applying such a general theorem to practice, 
allowance must be made for the action of the opposing or retarding 
influences; and it is in the detection of these influences, in their 
due appreciation, and in the calculation of their number, duration, 
direction, and intensity, that the practical skill of the politician, to 
a great extent, resides. The same is the case with the science of 
mechanics, in which the tendencies of bodies in movement, or of 
mechanical powers, are calculated without reference to friction; and 
with the science of medicine, which teaches the probable effect of 
a drug or other remedy when the human body is in an ordinary 
state, but leaves to the skill of the physician to judge how far 
these effects will be heightened or diminished by an abnormal state 
of the system. 

Thus, for example, it may be affirmed that the natural tendency 
of aristocracy is to produce political inequality, and of democracy 
to produce political equality; that certain forms of criminal law 



APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 421 

and systems of punishment tend to repress crime, and that others 
fail in this respect; that high duties counteract, and low duties 
facilitate, the importation of goods. But it cannot be predicted 
with confidence, in any individual case, that each of these tendencies 
will produce its natural effect. Thus, an aristocratic government 
may abolish slavery, while a democratic government may maintain 
it. A high duty may be so far neutralized by smuggling, as to be 
inoperative; while the natural tendency of low duties to encourage 
importation may be frustrated by a deficient supply, by high 
freights, or by maritime insecurity. In like manner, the natural 
tendency of mankind, in a state of imperfect civilization, is to 
increase their numbers at a more rapid rate than their means of 
subsistence. But this tendency may, in any given country, and 
at a given time, be effectually counteracted by prudence, industry, 
the love of accumulation, and judicious political and domestic 
arrangements. The general tendency of monastic institutions is 
to produce laziness and ignorance in their members; nevertheless, 
some monastic bodies have been distinguished for their learning, 
and, during the dark ages, such learning as existed was principally 
to be found in convents. 

In practical politics, moreover, there is the additional difficulty, 
that not only is the future hard to determine, even where time is 
afforded for the inquiry, on account of the multitude, intricacy, and 
diversity of the influences to be considered, but it often happens 
that a decision must be made on the spur of the moment, and 
with imperfect information.* This difficulty, however, besets 
every department of active life, and is not peculiar either to politics 
or ethics. A traveller in an unknown country must act on such 
information or indications as he can obtain in order to reach his 
destination, or perhaps to save his life. A commander of a vessel, 
threatened with shipwreck, must judge, as he best can, how to ex- 
tricate it from its peril. The general of an army must regulate 
his manoeuvres according to the best information he can obtain re- 
specting the state of the roads and bridges, the feelings of the 
people, the supply of food, and the enemy's movements. 

Moreover, in practical politics, as in the conduct of private 
affairs, there is much intentional deceit. False reports are circu- 



* See, on this subject, the remarks of Puffendorf, Law of N. and N. 1. I. 
ch. 2, § 4. 



422 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. 

lated, and false information sent, in order to mislead the govern- 
ment; false testimony is given, in order to pervert the course of 
justice; documents are forged, and other contrivances are resorted 
to, for the purpose either of concealing the truth, or accrediting 
falsehood. From this source of error, the physical sciences are 
nearly free — the chemist, the astronomer, or the optician, has to 
deal with natural phenomena, in which there is no motive or 
opportunity for deception; and, even in medical science, the risk 
of intentional fraud is not in general considerable. 

§ 6. Inasmuch as the positive and speculative branches of 
politics aim at different objects, and rest on evidence of unequal 
certainty, it is advisable to treat them separately, and to keep 
their provinces distinct in discussion as much as possible.* Posi- 
tive politics may be taught as a system, in connexion with juris- 
prudence and law. It may be reduced to a small number of 
elementary principles, liable to little doubt or controversy; it 
admits of as much certainty and simplicity as other sciences, which 
enter into the course of a liberal education; and it ought not, if pro- 
perly handled, to involve any questions calculated to arouse party 
feelings, or to alarm established authorities in Church or State. To 
which it may be added, that a judicious selection from the best 
existing works on political philosophy, the law of nature and 
nations, and general jurisprudence, will furnish most of the materials 
which are needed for such a scientific exposition. Speculative 



* " Speculative systems have, in all ages of the world, heen adopted for 
reasons too frivolous to have determined the judgment of any man of common 
sense, in a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has 
scarce ever had any influence upon the opinions of mankind, except in matters 
of philosophy and speculation; and in these it has frequently had the greatest." 
— Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 2. 

Undoubtedly, men have been, and continue to be, deceived by gross sophistry 
in speculative matters. But I cannot perceive that entire exemption from the 
dominion of sophistry in questions of practice which Adam Smith believes to 
exist. That there have been popular delusions, of the most dangerous kind, in 
practical matters where fear operates, is notorious. Religious impostures, divina- 
tion, astrology, witchcraft, have also exercised, and in many countries continue to 
exercise, an almost unbounded sway. Nor has pecuniary interest, (as Adam 
Smith seems to think,) been any preservative against error. Commercial 
bubbles of all sorts — from the South Sea scheme downwards — make a long 
chapter; and surely the various economical delusions, which Adam Smith 
himself exposed, and which are still to a great extent current, have a close 
connexion with practice. 



ArPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 423 

politics, on the other hand, is a subject which requires a gentle and 
cautious treatment. Its province is vast, and almost unbounded; 
its problems are nearly indeterminate; it has been cultivated with- 
out a due regard to the laws of scientific analysis, and has been 
overlaid with fanciful and unsound theories, by writers whose very 
genius has only served to give currency to their errors, without 
guiding or illuminating their way; it is likewise, in each country, 
connected with some of the most stimulating questions by which 
political, religious, and historical parties are divided from and em- 
bittered against each other. 

If, by a science of government, is meant a science which teaches 
what is the one best form of government, at all times, in all coun 
tries, and under all circumstances, I agree with Mr. Mill,* that no 
such science can exist. In like manner, the science of mechanics 
cannot show what is the best machine for accomplishing a given 
purpose, in every combination of circumstances; the science of navi- 
gation cannot teach how a ship is to be navigated, in every com- 
bination of circumstances; the science of strategy cannot teach how 
an army is to be moved, or a fortress attacked, in every combination 
of circumstances. The science of government, as it has been treated 
by the speculators on ideal states, stands in nearly the same relation 
to positive politics, as that in which the sacred theories of the earth 
propounded by Burnet and others, and the systems of the Plutonian s 
and Neptunians, stand to the modern descriptive geology; or as that 
in which the speculations on the philosopher's stone and the elixir 
vitae stand to modern chemistry and medicine. But if, by the 
science of government, is understood the science of legislation, such 
a science can and does exist; although its objects are different from 
those of positive politics, and its certainty inferior, while its impor- 
tance is greater. 

In whatever manner we look at these two departments of political 
science — whether we compare their objects, the evidence on which 
they rest, or the subjects with which they are connected — it is mani- 
fest that the cultivation of positive politics has everything to lose, and 
nothing to gain, by an association with its more ambitious and pre- 
tending neighbour. 

These remarks, however, are not intended to discourage the in- 
vestigation of that important class of subjects which fall under the 



See his System of Logic, vol. II. p. 578 Compare p. 598. 



424 ON THE DISTINCTION, ETC. [APPEN. 

domain of speculative politics, or the science of legislation. Their 
purpose is merely to recommend the separation of departments of 
knowledge, which are in their nature different. The field of poli- 
tical science will be better cultivated, if its several portions are 
clearly marked off, and placed under appropriate labourers. 

The speculative branch of politics, consisting of inquiries into 
the tendencies of political forms, the probable effects of certain laws 
and institutions, and the best means of promoting the welfare of a 
civil society, must be combined, to a great extent, with historical 
and statistical researches; and, perhaps, some of its most useful 
and soundest theories are to be found in connexion with avowed 
collections or narratives of facts. With the prevailing tendency of 
the civilized world to look in all things scientific for a positive 
basis of fact, historical writers, in all the various forms which the 
registration of human transactions can assume, and not speculators 
on the most perfect form of government, are the principal teachers 
of political wisdom.* 

It ought not, however, to be overlooked, that a distinct, precise, 
and complete conception of positive politics, and of the ideas in- 
volved in it, is a necessary preliminary to a successful excursion 
into the region of speculative politics. In order that a person 
should describe the character, trace the effects, and predict the pro- 
bable future operation, of political forms and institutions, he must 
previously understand what they are, how they arise, and in what 
they consist. He must have a familiar knowledge of the tools with 
which he is to work; he must know the value of the coins with 
which his traffic is to be carried on. If, therefore, the separation 
of these two departments should tend to give greater clearness and 
certainty to those fundamental ideas on which all political science 
is built, it would, in its consequences, prove an effectual assistance 
to Political Speculation. 



* See above, p. 154. 



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